Pat Buchanan: Obama's War

[Winehole23]

http://www.creators.com/opinion/pat-buchanan.html
Obama's War



Just two months after the twin towers fell, the armies of the Northern Alliance marched into Kabul. The Taliban fled.


The triumph was total in the "splendid little war" that had cost one U.S. casualty. Or so it seemed. Yet, last month, the war against the Taliban entered its eighth year, the second longest war in our history, and America and NATO have never been nearer to strategic defeat.


So critical is the situation that Defense Secretary Robert Gates, in Kandahar last week, promised rapid deployment, before any Taliban spring offensive, of two and perhaps three combat brigades of the 20,000 troops requested by Gen. David McKiernan. The first 4,000, from the 10th Mountain, are expected in January.


With 34,000 U.S. soldiers already in country, half under NATO command, the 20,000 will increase U.S. forces there to 54,000, a 60 percent ratcheting up. Shades of LBJ, 1964-65. Afghanistan is going to be Obama's War. And upon its outcome will hang the fate of his presidency. Has he thought this through?


How do we win this war, if by winning we mean establishing a pro-Western democratic government in control of the country that has the support of the people and loyalty of an Afghan army strong enough to defend the nation from a resurgent Taliban?


We are further from that goal going into 2009 than we were five years ago.
What are the long-term prospects for any such success?


Each year, the supply of opium out of Afghanistan, from which most of the world's heroin comes, sets a new record. Payoffs by narcotics traffickers are corrupting the government. The fanatically devout Taliban had eradicated the drug trade, but is now abetting the drug lords in return for money for weapons to kill the Americans.


Militarily, the Taliban forces are stronger than they have been since 2001, moving out of the south and east and infesting half the country. They have sanctuaries in Pakistan and virtually ring Kabul.


U.S. air strikes have killed so many Afghan civilians that President Karzai, who controls little more than Kabul, has begun to condemn the U.S. attacks. Predator attacks on Taliban and al-Qaida in Pakistan have inflamed the population there.


And can pinprick air strikes win a war of this magnitude?


The supply line for our troops in Afghanistan, which runs from Karachi up to Peshawar through the Khyber Pass to Kabul, is now a perilous passage.

Four times this month, U.S. transport depots in Pakistan have been attacked, with hundred of vehicles destroyed.

Before arriving in Kandahar, Gates spoke grimly of a "sustained commitment for some protracted period of time. How many years that is, and how many troops that is ... nobody knows."


Gen. McKiernan says it will be at least three or four years before the Afghan army and police can handle the Taliban.


But why does it take a dozen years to get an Afghan army up to where it can defend the people and regime against a Taliban return? Why do our Afghans seem less disposed to fight and die for democracy than the Taliban are to fight and die for theocracy? Does their God, Allah, command a deeper love and loyalty than our god, democracy?


McKiernan says the situation may get worse before it gets better. Gates compares Afghanistan to the Cold War. "(W)e are in many respects in an ideological conflict with violent extremists. ... The last ideological conflict we were in lasted about 45 years."


That would truly be, in Donald Rumsfeld's phrase, "a long, hard slog."
America, without debate, is about to invest blood and treasure, indefinitely, in a war to which no end seems remotely in sight, if the commanding general is talking about four years at least and the now-and-future war minister is talking about four decades.


What is there to win in Afghanistan to justify doubling down our investment? If our vital interest is to deny a sanctuary there to al-Qaida, do we have to build a new Afghanistan to accomplish that? Did not al-Qaida depart years ago for a new sanctuary in Pakistan?


What hope is there of creating in this tribal land a democracy committed to freedom, equality and human rights that Afghans have never known? What is the expectation that 54,000 or 75,000 U.S. troops can crush an insurgency that enjoys a privileged sanctuary to which it can return, to rest, recuperate and recruit for next year's offensive?


Of all the lands of the earth, Afghanistan has been among the least hospitable to foreigners who come to rule, or to teach them how they should rule themselves.


Would Dwight D. Eisenhower — who settled for the status quo ante in Korea, an armistice at the line of scrimmage — commit his country to such an open-ended war? Would Richard Nixon? Would Ronald Reagan?
Hard to believe. George W. Bush would. But did not America vote against Bush? Why is America getting seamless continuity when it voted for significant change?

[clambake]

why don't we pay them not to kill us and call it a surge?

[DarrinS]

why don't we pay them not to kill us and call it a surge?

:rolleyes

[Winehole23]

why don't we pay them not to kill us and call it a surge?Instead of making fun, why not try taking it seriously for a second. It's a war. Our blood and treasure and national prestige are on the line.

Do we have a strategy? Are the objectives, supposing they are clear at all, achievable? Can we commit the resources necessary to do the job?

Just like Bush with the Iraq war, Obama seems to be waging war on the fly. Reconstruction has already failed, we don't have enough troops to beat the Taliban, the Afghans hate us, and the national interest in fighting this war now is totally murky.

WTF do we, the USA, stand to gain in Afghanistan besides another egregiously expensive fiasco, more dead troops and another hit to our national honor?

I would suggest -- like the NATO commanders and our own generals and secdef -- that there is no military solution in Afghanistan. Our supply lines are threatened, our allies are dropping like flies, Kabul is encircled, and our enemies can convalesce and regroup more or less undisturbed in Pakistan. At best, a surge there portends only a slightly better bargaining position to make a deal with the Taliban. The alternative is a more or less endless occupation.

[clambake]

Instead of making fun, why not try taking it seriously for a second. It's a war. Our blood and treasure and national prestige are on the line.
i'm not laughing. wait until we stop paying them not to kill us in iraq. hell, maliki just arrested 23 people in his own cabinet for conspiring to rebuild the Baath party. if it won't work in iraq, it certainly won't work in afghanistan.


Do we have a strategy? Are the objectives, supposing they are clear at all, achievable? Can we commit the resources necessary to do the job?
strategy? objectives? when you grow tired of using 600K dollar smart bombs to blow up mud huts, you find a way to acquire more lucrative targets. (iraq)


Just like Bush with the Iraq war, Obama seems to be waging war on the fly.
you are giving obama too much credit for starting this shit. why are you doing that?

Reconstruction has already failed, we don't have enough troops to beat the Taliban, the Afghans hate us, and the national interest in fighting this war now is totally murky.
what do you want the guy that's not even president yet to do?

WTF do we, the USA, stand to gain in Afghanistan besides another egregiously expensive fiasco, more dead troops and another hit to our national honor?
all that's left of our national honor is the fact the world gives us kudos for electing a smart guy. can't you at least wait until jan. 21 to grade him?

I would suggest -- like the NATO commanders and our own generals and secdef -- that there is no military solution in Afghanistan.
we've known this for years. the guy that ignored it is leaving office.

Our supply lines are threatened, our allies are dropping like flies, Kabul is encircled, and our enemies can convalesce and regroup more or less undisturbed in Pakistan.
are you feigning suprise or are you serious?

At best, a surge there portends only a slightly better bargaining position to make a deal with the Taliban. The alternative is a more or less endless occupation.
a troop or money surge is useless. it's a shithole country. money doesn't mean jack to them. do you really think kabul has a chance?

[Winehole23]

you are giving obama too much credit for starting this shit. why are you doing that?You mistake me. Obama's declared intention is to continue and expand this war. Without some clear strategic objective, I think this is a bad idea.


all that's left of our national honor is the fact the world gives us kudos for electing a smart guy. can't you at least wait until jan. 21 to grade him?I assume he'll stand firm on what he's already said. Maybe I assume too much.


are you feigning suprise or are you serious?Just describing. You disagree?


a troop or money surge is useless. it's a shithole country. money doesn't mean jack to them. do you really think kabul has a chance?In the short term, Awakening Council type payoffs could work, but this only kicks the can down the road.

Does Kabul have a chance? Possibly, if it can reach accomodation with the Taliban. Otherwise, Karzai is toast. Afghans hate his government even worse than they hate us.

[clambake]

karzai is toast when we leave.

taliban don't play any lasting "accommodations.

[Winehole23]

karzai is toast when we leave.Why assume that we're leaving anytime soon? Sec'y Gates compared Afghanistan to Korea. Nearly 60 years later, we're still there.

[clambake]

should i assume we'll construct another "38th parallel"?

if you're going to compare it to korea, it's a fair question.

[ChumpDumper]

Instead of making fun, why not try taking it seriously for a second. It's a war. Our blood and treasure and national prestige are on the line.We spent all of that stuff in Iraq.

[Winehole23]

We spent all of that stuff in Iraq.We're still spending it.

[ChumpDumper]

We're still spending it.In Iraq.

[Winehole23]

In Iraq.And Afghanistan.

[ChumpDumper]

And Afghanistan.1/4 the amount spent in Iraq.

[Winehole23]

1/4 the amount spent in Iraq.That's not chump change.

[ChumpDumper]

Compared to Iraq it is.

It's too bad we wasted all that money, life and international cooperation on Iraq -- but it's done.

[Blake]

why are we in Afghansitan again?

[ChumpDumper]

That's where the Islamic fundamentalists are. The only problem is they are in Pakistan too.

[Rohirrim]

Afghan. is nothing like Iraq. The same tactics will not work.

[clambake]

That's where the Islamic fundamentalists are. The only problem is they are in Pakistan too.

and for the cheap heroin.

[Winehole23]

That's where the Islamic fundamentalists are. The only problem is they are in Pakistan too.The money comes from Saudi Arabia, and so did the 9/11 hijackers. Why aren't we there? (Yeah, I know, oil.)

We'll never kill all of the fundamentalists, and we can't kill fundamentalism. Boots on the ground would seem to be the least effective, and costliest solution. We're playing whack a mole. They're always gonna pop up somewhere else.

[ChumpDumper]

The money comes from Saudi Arabia, and so did the 9/11 hijackers. Why aren't we there? (Yeah, I know, oil.)They trained and plotted in Afghanistan. The fundamentalists would love to overthrow the House of Saud as well.


We'll never kill all of the fundamentalists, and we can't kill fundamentalism. Boots on the ground would seem to be the least effective, and costliest solution. We're playing whack a mole. They're always gonna pop up somewhere else.Someplace that's not Afghanistan would be a good start.

[Winehole23]

Someplace that's not Afghanistan would be a good start.Mission accomplished. Al Qaeda's in Pakistan now. Should we start a war with them?

[ChumpDumper]

Mission accomplished. Al Qaeda's in Pakistan now. Should we start a war with them?With them against fundamentalists?

Yes, that's what should have happened in 2003. Good thinking.

[Winehole23]

With them against fundamentalists?

Yes, that's what should have happened in 2003.I don't disagree, but Pakistan's been our "key ally" all along. They don't have the nerve to take out Al Qaeda, or they would already have done it.

Eradicating fundamentalism in South Asia isn't realistic, no more than it would be here.

[ChumpDumper]

I don't disagree, but Pakistan's been our "key ally" all along. They don't have the nerve to take out Al Qaeda, or they would already have done it.

Eradicating fundamentalism in South Asia isn't realistic, no more than it would be here.Eradicating the US isn't realistic for them, but they are still going to try.

[Winehole23]

Eradicating the US isn't realistic for them, but they are still going to try.Therefore, what?

[RandomGuy]

Obama seems to be waging war on the fly.

It's December 20th, 2008.

How many US troops does Obama command?

[clambake]

It's December 20th, 2008.

How many US troops does Obama command?

about 12, but they're in this forum.

[RandomGuy]

Do we have a strategy? Are the objectives, supposing they are clear at all, achievable? Can we commit the resources necessary to do the job?

Yes, we have a strategy. Nation building 101, or simply read the counterinsurgency doctrine.

Given that we will draw down in Iraq, we will commit the resources necessary to do the job.



Reconstruction has already failed, we don't have enough troops to beat the Taliban, the Afghans hate us, and the national interest in fighting this war now is totally murky. WTF do we, the USA, stand to gain in Afghanistan besides another egregiously expensive fiasco, more dead troops and another hit to our national honor?

1) Reconstruction has not quite failed, it simply hasn't been given the resources necessary to succeed. As I noted that will change.

2) Our national interest was the same as it was in 2002. Prevent Al Qaeda from having room to freely operate training camps from which to launch attacks. This is what we stand to gain.


I would suggest -- like the NATO commanders and our own generals and secdef -- that there is no military solution in Afghanistan. Our supply lines are threatened, our allies are dropping like flies, Kabul is encircled, and our enemies can convalesce and regroup more or less undisturbed in Pakistan. At best, a surge there portends only a slightly better bargaining position to make a deal with the Taliban. The alternative is a more or less endless occupation.

Afghanistan is a bit different from Iraq, and Obama will be able to ask NATO for more support and reasonably be expected to get it. The Europeans will not like it much, but they will go along.

The generals are exactly right that there is no purely military solution to Afghanistan. There never was.

Counter-insurgency and nation-building of the type that is in our interest in Afghanistan are not going to be accomplished purely with bullets.

It will be accomplished by building up the social and physical infrastructure required to give the Afghan people a real choice between the thugs running the Taliban and an actual democratically elected government.

The problems with this are manifold, but not unsolvable.

[Winehole23]

Yes, we have a strategy. Nation building 101...Because we're so good at it, we need a do-over.


...or simply read the counterinsurgency doctrine.Strategy isn't like a socket set. What works in one place may not in another. Afghanistan isn't Iraq.


Given that we will draw down in Iraq, we will commit the resources necessary to do the job.Are you so sure we'll draw down? Gen Odierno has already indicated we intend to overstay (http://www.bostonherald.com/news/international/general/view/2008_12_14_U_S__troops_to_stay_in_Iraq_after_deadl ine/srvc=news&position=also) the summer deadline for withdrawal from Iraqi cities.

And consider:


ISAF Commander McNeill has said himself that according to the current counterterrorism doctrine, it would take 400,000 troops to pacify Afghanistan in the long term. But the reality is that he has only 47,000 soldiers under his command, together with another 18,000 troops fighting at their sides as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, and possibly another 75,000 reasonably well-trained soldiers in the Afghan army by the end of the year. All told, there is still a shortfall of 260,000 men.http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,556304-3,00.html

Given that we couldn't find that many troops for Iraq, but had to hire out 100,000 or so mercenaries, where do you think the additional bodies will come from? We only have 149,000 or so troops in Iraq, well short of the number needed, and some of these will remain in Iraq as a rump of support.


Reconstruction has not quite failed, it simply hasn't been given the resources necessary to succeed. As I noted that will change.This strikes me as optimistic. But you could be right.


Our national interest was the same as it was in 2002. Prevent Al Qaeda from having room to freely operate training camps from which to launch attacks. This is what we stand to gain.Al Qaeda is stronger now than it was in 2003, and has more elbow room. Progress toward the putative national security objective so far does not inspire confidence. Maybe Obama can turn it around, but without Pakistan's cooperation, there's not much he can do.


Afghanistan is a bit different from Iraq, and Obama will be able to ask NATO for more support and reasonably be expected to get it. The Europeans will not like it much, but they will go along.Very optimistic. Do you have any support for this hunch? I do not gather that enthusiasm for the escalation of war is rising in Europe, and their troops seem to be moving in the wrong direction right now.


It will be accomplished by building up the social and physical infrastructure required to give the Afghan people a real choice between the thugs running the Taliban and an actual democratically elected government.With whose money? We're gonna rebuild the USA and Afghanistan at the same time, while 10-15% of Americans are unemployed, and we're spending trillions to keep insolvent finance and US manufacturing on life support?

And we're gonna redesign Afghan society at the same time? This is super ambitious. Do you really think the Afghans will let us? And will the American people go for it?

[ChumpDumper]

Therefore, what?Therefore, kill them.

[Winehole23]

Therefore, kill them.Makes sense enough. That it requires the occupation of foreign lands doesn't necessarily follow.

[spurster]

Basically, we (and I) don't have the stomach to truly beat down on them because of the number of civilian causalities that would result. Even if we did, the Russian example does not provide much confidence in a military strategy. There does not seem to be a true Afghan democracy/republican movement either. At least not enough of one to develop a big enough, competent enough army and police.

Shit, if the Afghan people want to be governed by the Taliban (or as it seems, don't have the will to oppose it), let them. Perhaps our strategy should be one of containment rather than some form of surrender. Anytime we see anything resembling a military complex, we bomb it.

[Winehole23]

Basically, we (and I) don't have the stomach to truly beat down on them because of the number of civilian causalities that would result. The lack of sufficient troops practically guarantees this result. The more we bomb them, the more they'll hate us.


Shit, if the Afghan people want to be governed by the Taliban (or as it seems, don't have the will to oppose it), let them. It's not unthinkable they prefer the Taliban to us and the weak, corrupt Karzai regime. Self-determination sometimes means other countries end up with leaders we don't like.


Perhaps our strategy should be one of containment rather than some form of surrender.Containment would be a better strategy than endless occupation IMO.

N.B.: Capitulation isn't the only alternative to the present state of affairs. An armistice or peace treaty isn't the same as surrender by a long shot. Eventually, some kind of political deal has to be made. Excluding the Taliban from the parley would only ensure its irrelevance.

[ChumpDumper]

Makes sense enough. That it requires the occupation of foreign lands doesn't necessarily follow.Easier to kill them that way.

[Winehole23]

Easier to kill them that way.You'd think so. Are we closer to success than 2003, or further away?

[ChumpDumper]

Again, there was that small distraction in Iraq.

[Winehole23]

Again, there was that small distraction in Iraq.Yeah, look how well that one went for us. And the Iraqis, too. I hope Afghanistan doesn't turn out to be a rerun.

[ChumpDumper]

I said it was a distraction.

[Winehole23]

I said it was a distraction.I heard you. I'll stand by my comment.

[ChumpDumper]

I stand by mine.

[Winehole23]

I wouldn't have it any other way.

[byrontx]

Where nationalism is strong, US military intervention is not necessary.
Where nationalism is weak, US military intervention will not be effective.

Pretending Afghanistan is country is causing us problems. It is just a grouping of feudal societies that occupy the area we call Afghanistan. Put a strong guy in charge and have him on the payroll but more importantly, arm and pay off the warlords. Make it so that it is not in their best interest to have the Taliban in their neighborhoods. It is time to let someone else whack the moles and whacking people is the national pastime over there.

[Nbadan]

Old man Buchanan is projecting what Afghanistan would have been like had we followed George Bush's Iraqi plan in Afghanistan...

[Winehole23]

Old man Buchanan is projecting what Afghanistan would have been like had we followed George Bush's Iraqi plan in Afghanistan...What you're saying isn't quite coherent, Dan. Can you point to something in the posted article that backs this up?

You do get that Buchanan is against the war, don't you? Buchanan never thought the game was worth the candle. On this issue, he's never been on GWB's side. Buchanan (like Ron Paul) harks back to the erstwhile Taft Republicans, who stressed anti-imperialism among other things. There is such a thing as an antiwar conservative.

[Nbadan]

I never said Buchanan was a Neo-con.....but that he is attempting to project that Obama would follow George Bush diplomacy in Afghanistan....

[Winehole23]

I never said Buchanan was a Neo-con.....but that he is attempting to project that Obama would follow George Bush diplomacy in Afghanistan....Recommitting to the war effort in Afghanistan was one of Obama's own selling points, and a new surge of troops there appears to be a foregone conclusion.

Nothing is ever certain beforehand, but Obama is making the wrong sort of noises, for those who were hoping for an end to the war. Signs point to continuity.

[ChumpDumper]

Recommitting to the war effort in Afghanistan was one of Obama's own selling points, and a new surge of troops there appears to be a foregone conclusion.

Nothing is ever certain beforehand, but Obama is making the wrong sort of noises, for those who were hoping for an end to the war. Signs point to continuity.There was never a strong movement against the military action in Afghanistan.

[Duff McCartney]

I think there's alot of things that people just don't get about fighting extremists like that. I can only quote Ho Chi Minh who said it best...

"You can kill ten of our men for every one we kill of yours. But even at those odds, you will lose and we will win."

All the extremist need to do..and are doing is make the war too costly for America. And that's a strategy that we have no defense against. There's no such thing as a winnable war anymore. Everything that we do will cost us dearly.

[LnGrrrR]

Just get some CIA in there, kill bin Laden, then get out.

[doobs]

Just get some CIA in there, kill bin Laden, then get out.

Wow, that's brilliant. Don't be surprised if later today a military helicopter whisks you away to Washington so you can brief the NSC and the President. Brilliant plan.

[Winehole23]

Wow, that's brilliant. Don't be surprised if later today a military helicopter whisks you away to Washington so you can brief the NSC and the President. Brilliant plan.It's arguably better than keeping tens of thousands of troops there indefinitely to support a government Afghans hate.

You're quick to swing the axe, doobs, but I notice you didn't stretch your neck out to give your own opinion. Cat got your tongue? Or are you content to be a self-appointed fly-swatter?

[doobs]

It's arguably better than keeping tens of thousands of troops there indefinitely to support a government Afghans hate.

You're quick to swing the axe, doobs, but I notice you didn't stretch your neck out to give your own opinion. Cat got your tongue? Or are you content to be a self-appointed fly-swatter?

OK, well, I'm sorry for being harsh . . . but don't you think we've already sent the CIA and special forces into Afghanistan and Pakistan to hunt bin Laden? So he didn't really "stretch his neck out" either. [EDIT: I now realize that you didn't say this; you were just jumping to someone else's defense.]

If you want my opinion, then here it is: capturing or killing Osama bin Laden is not all that important to our national security or to the stability of Afghanistan. It is far more important that we have friendly governments in Afghanistan and Pakistan and India, because our ability to act in South Asia is of vital importance to our national security.

So I think we are generally doing the right thing by maintaining a military presence in Afghanistan and cultivating strong cooperative relationships with important actors, like Karzai. How to actually achieve that objective is another matter. We may need to increase our troop presence to fight a resurgent Taliban. We may need to employ different counterinsurgency tactics, as conditions warrant. But what we don't need to do is withdraw our forces and let Karzai fend for himself. Capturing bin Laden will be an empty victory if Afghanistan succumbs to civil war and the Taliban reasserts itself.

My hope is that Obama understands the importance of productive American engagement in South Asia. The region is armed to its teeth as it is; the removal of American security guarantees could be catastrophic. We need to: play the role of responsible peace broker; provide a credible deterrent to military aggression; encourage further economic and political relations among South Asian countries; be able to respond quickly and decisively to terrorist attack or to increased nuclear tensions between India and Pakistan . . . all of this necessitates (1) a significant American military presence in the region, (2) the development of a large and capable American intelligence network in the region, and (3) an American commitment to strategic partners in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. If Obama understands the importance of all three--and if he doesn't sacrifice any of them to focus solely on catching bin Laden--then I have high hopes for his administration's South Asia policy.

[Winehole23]

If you want my opinion, then here it is: capturing or killing Osama bin Laden is not all that important to our national security or to the stability of Afghanistan. It is far more important that we have friendly governments in Afghanistan and Pakistan and India, because our ability to act in South Asia is of vital importance to our national security.Interesting. To focus on OBL now would be taking our eye off the ball. The objective you're stressing is regional stability. IMO the weakness of this argument is the assumption that our presence does not create instability, but it is an interesting argument.


So I think we are generally doing the right thing by maintaining a military presence in Afghanistan and cultivating strong cooperative relationships with important actors, like Karzai. How to actually achieve that objective is another matter. We may need to increase our troop presence to fight a resurgent Taliban. We may need to employ different counterinsurgency tactics, as conditions warrant. But what we don't need to do is withdraw our forces and let Karzai fend for himself. Capturing bin Laden will be an empty victory if Afghanistan succumbs to civil war and the Taliban reasserts itself.This may happen even with us there. Karzai himself cedes to the possibility of making a deal with the Taliban and bringing them into the government and our own Generals have said this may be unavoidable. Why do you think they say so? Is it possible the military objective you describe is not acheivable at the current level of force? The Taliban has de facto control of much of the country already, and are encircling Kabul.


My hope is that Obama understands the importance of productive American engagement in South Asia. The region is armed to its teeth as it is; the removal of American security guarantees could be catastrophic. We need to: play the role of responsible peace broker; provide a credible deterrent to military aggression; encourage further economic and political relations among South Asian countries; be able to respond quickly and decisively to terrorist attack or to increased nuclear tensions between India and Pakistan . . . all of this necessitates (1) a significant American military presence in the region, (2) the development of a large and capable American intelligence network in the region, and (3) an American commitment to strategic partners in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. If Obama understands the importance of all three--and if he doesn't sacrifice any of them to focus solely on catching bin Laden--then I have high hopes for his administration's South Asia policy.Your stance on removal is henny-pennyish[strike that, Chicken Little-ish] and if we whack the hornet's nest in Pakistan once too many times, it is imaginable that our continued presence could conceivably cause the regional conflagration you fear.

You say South Asia is vital to our national interests but you do not identify the interests at stake. Would you mind clarifying just what justifies a generation long comittment of American blood and treasure in the region? What are we fighting for? Regional stability in an neighborhood that has always been dangerous and unstable?

The rest of your security laundry list assumes our physical presence is necessary to manage security and that it is our job to do so. It's possible you're right, but as stated it's more petitio principii. Do you really think, now that we are staring a deflationary spiral in the face, and crushing debt as far as the eye can see, that we can still afford to be the world's policeman? Or that the world still wants us to fulfill this role, after eight years of screwing it up? At any rate, the necessity of long term occupation has been merely asserted here, rather than supported.

As to your third requisite, the clash of interests of the India and Pakistan should give us pause about appearing too close to either one. If one of them thinks we are too cozy with the historic enemy we could endanger our troops, and our strategic aims. It's sometimes easier to be an honest broker from afar, than too close in. Our regional participation may vitiate our perceived impartiality.

Containment and black ops would appear to ways to manage the problem that do not require a generational investment in Afghanistan, the "graveyard of Empires." Total withdrawal and defeat are not the only alternatives to the present regional policy. Pretending they are is not only intellectually dishonest, but unwise. Any viable measures consistent with our aims should not be precluded from consideration beforehand.

[RandomGuy]

You'd think so. Are we closer to success than 2003, or further away?

Closer.

Insurgencies generally take about a decade or so.

We have made some small progress in terms of building up the government in Kabul, but have not committed the resources necessary to really do the job effectively, as I stated previously.

[RandomGuy]

Dammit. My lunch hour is over. :/

Ah well. Laters.

[Winehole23]

Dammit. My lunch hour is over. :/

Ah well. Laters.Whenever you have time, I'd be interested in your take on doobs' take. He says OBL is no longer significant for the national interest, but thinks our presence in Afghanistan is geostrategically justified.

[doobs]

Interesting. To focus on OBL now would be taking our eye off the ball. The objective you're stressing is regional stability. IMO the weakness of this argument is the assumption that our presence does not create instability, but it is an interesting argument.

This may happen even with us there. Karzai himself cedes to the possibility of making a deal with the Taliban and bringing them into the government and our own Generals have said this may be unavoidable. Why do you think they say so? Is it possible the military objective you describe is not acheivable at the current level of force? The Taliban has de facto control of much of the country already, and are encircling Kabul.

Your stance on removal is henny-pennyish, and if we whack the hornet's nest in Pakistan once too many times, it is imaginable that our continued presence could conceivably cause the regional conflagration you fear.

You say South Asia is vital to our national interests but you do not identify the interests at stake. Would you mind clarifying just what justifies a generation long comittment of American blood and treasure in the region? What are we fighting for? Regional stability in an neighborhood that has always been dangerous and unstable?

The rest of your security laundry list assumes our physical presence is necessary to manage security and that it is our job to do so. It's possible you're right, but as stated it's more petitio principii. Do you really think, now that we are staring a deflationary spiral in the face, and crushing debt as far as the eye can see, that we can still afford to be the world's policeman? Or that the world still wants us to fulfill this role, after eight years of screwing it up? At any rate, the necessity of long term occupation has been merely asserted here, rather than supported.

As to your third requisite, the clash of interests of the India and Pakistan should give us pause about appearing too close to either one. If one of them thinks we are too cozy with the historic enemy we could endanger our troops, and our strategic aims. It's sometimes easier to be an honest broker from afar, than too close in. Our regional participation may vitiate our perceived impartiality.

Containment and black ops would appear to ways to manage the problem that do not require a generational investment in Afghanistan, the "graveyard of Empires." Total withdrawal and defeat are not the only alternatives to the present regional policy. Pretending they are is not only intellectually dishonest, but unwise. Any viable measures consistent with our aims should not be precluded from consideration beforehand.

You may think my argument makes assumptions, but so does the opposing argument. To think that we can withdraw militarily from Afghanistan, and that no regional instability would ensue, assumes that we're causing regional instability, and that the countries are inclined towards peacefulness. That's a huge assumption, unsupported by the region's history. You would almost have to believe that Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan are all willing to play nice and be peaceful, responsible countries on their own. I prefer to rely on the lessons of history--lessons of military security in general, and of our experiences in South Asia in particular.

[By the way, our interests in the region are pretty much self-evident. India is a large country with a growing economy, and a trading partner. It also has nuclear weapons. Pakistan is a large Muslim country with nuclear weapons and problems with Muslim extremism. Afghanistan is a poor, historically unstable country that was home to bin Laden and his terrorist network. Need I say more?]

Like nature, international politics abhors a vacuum. For instance, Saddam's invasion of Kuwait was made possible, in large part, by the United States and the Soviet Union substantially withdrawing from the Middle East in the late 1980s. Or take present-day Iraq. When the insurgency was stronger and American forces were failing to restore security, there was a security vacuum created by the violence . . . which was promptly filled by Iran.

Why do you think North Korea has not mounted a large-scale invasion of South Korea? Don't you think maybe it has something to do with thousands of American troops stationed in South Korea? Why do you think the Soviet Union never mounted a large-scale, land invasion of Europe? Europe was very weak after World War II, and ripe for the taking. But, by joining NATO and basing thousands of American troops in Europe, we made a strong commitment to European independence and security. Surely you would agree that an American military presence helped to keep Europe free and make its economic and political integration possible?

Anyway, you said so yourself that the Taliban is re-energized and is taking control of large parts of Afghanistan. So do you really think that withdrawing American troops from the region will enable Karzai to fight off the Taliban? Or do you think that our withdrawal will leave Karzai powerless and unable to stop the Taliban's advance on Kabul? Actually, I have a better question: do you think it's even in our interest to fight the Taliban, or do you think it's OK for the Taliban to take over again? Do you really think the combination of killing bin Laden and leaving Afghanistan to the Taliban will solve anything?

With respect to our military presence, this is what I think we're achieving: (1) increasing the stability of Karzai's government (we could do a lot better in this regard); (2) fighting and killing some of the main supporters of Muslim terrorism in South Asia, the Taliban; (3) being in close proximity to Pakistan and Iran, thereby signaling our willingness and ability to intervene in their affairs; (4) disrupting al Qaeda by keeping its senior leadership on the run and, for the most part, out of contact with their foot soldiers; and (5) making a partner out of Afghanistan, thereby enhancing our ability to broker a sustainable peace in the region.

You can disagree all you want, and say my argument makes assumptions. Well, get used to it. That's what foreign policy requires. You have to make educated assumptions about how a policy will serve your interests based on historical examples and an understanding of human nature.

[Winehole23]

You may think my argument makes assumptions, but so does the opposing argument. To think that we can withdraw militarily from Afghanistan, and that no regional instability would ensue, assumes that we're causing regional instability, and that the countries are inclined towards peacefulness. That's a huge assumption, unsupported by the region's history. It depends on the conditions of the withdrawal. I see no reason to assume that withdrawal would be inconsistent with armistice, treaty or a strategy of containment plus black ops.


By the way, our interests in the region are pretty much self-evident. India is a large country with a growing economy, and a trading partner. It also has nuclear weapons. Pakistan is a large Muslim country with nuclear weapons and problems with Muslim extremism. Afghanistan is a poor, historically unstable country that was home to bin Laden and his terrorist network. Need I say more?I think so. I did not claim the region was bereft of US interests, but I doubt any of the interests you have named are vital US interests, such as require us to go to war or invade foreign lands.


Like nature, international politics abhors a vacuum.
Neither me nor LnGrrrR were recommending one.


Why do you think North Korea has not mounted a large-scale invasion of South Korea? Don't you think maybe it has something to do with thousands of American troops stationed in South Korea? Why do you think the Soviet Union never mounted a large-scale, land invasion of Europe? Europe was very weak after World War II, and ripe for the taking. But, by joining NATO and basing thousands of American troops in Europe, we made a strong commitment to European independence and security. Surely you would agree that an American military presence helped to keep Europe free and make its economic and political integration possible?I do agree. But Europe and Korea wanted us there. Our occupation of Afghanistan is less, uh, consensual, and the foreign threat to the country isn't comparable. Nor is Afghanistan as important to us as Korea or Western Europe were at the end of WWII IMO. But I do think that reasonable people can disagree about this.


Actually, I have a better question: do you think it's even in our interest to fight the Taliban, or do you think it's OK for the Taliban to take over again? Do you really think the combination of killing bin Laden and leaving Afghanistan to the Taliban will solve anything?An interesting question. Much turns on the semantics of the word "Taliban". There are a lot of Afghans who do not want to go back to the status quo ante, but hate Karzai and foreign occupation, and have become fighters. Pretending they all carry water for OBL and Mullah Omar is simplistic. It is possible large numbers of so-called Taliban can be peeled away from Al Qaeda and Mullah Omar (http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5he_-0XfioqYH-80MbRoI_wq91a3g), if they are given a political stake in their own country.

In addition, any armistice involving the Taliban might include provisions for Allied enforcement, or be subject to US containment. There is no reason to assume US withdrawal leaves Afghanistan subject to chaos. Is this the case in Iraq?

At some point, Iraq and Aghanistan will have to take responsibility for their own messes. The sooner the better, IMO.


With respect to our military presence, this is what I think we're achieving: (1) increasing the stability of Karzai's government (we could do a lot better in this regard); (2) fighting and killing some of the main supporters of Muslim terrorism in South Asia, the Taliban; (3) being in close proximity to Pakistan and Iran, thereby signaling our willingness and ability to intervene in their affairs; (4) disrupting al Qaeda by keeping its senior leadership on the run and, for the most part, out of contact with their foot soldiers; and (5) making a partner out of Afghanistan, thereby enhancing our ability to broker a sustainable peace in the region.You think Wilsonian intervention is justified and conduces to the political ends; I think the political ends do not rise to the level of being vital to the country, and that the military lever will tend to produce more resistance than agreement over time in Afghanistan. History shows the latter to be the case, too.


You can disagree all you want, and say my argument makes assumptions. Well, get used to it. That's what foreign policy requires. You have to make educated assumptions about how a policy will serve your interests based on historical examples and an understanding of human nature.True enough. We stand and fall on opinion here. I appreciate the seriousness of your reply to me, even if we disagree about the details, doobs.

It is neither persuasive nor plain IMHO that: the stability of Afghanistan is a vital US interest; that US boots on the ground in Afghanistan is the only viable means to secure this interest; that using any other means would bring about chaos.

This war is optional, not necessary. I'm pretty sure I've seen this movie before. I don't like the way it turns out for us.

It's time to stop acting tough, and start getting smart on terror. Our current GWOT is counterproductive and costly in the extreme. It raises terrorists to a level of historical significance they do not deserve, gives them hands on training they would not otherwise have, and makes us, in the words of Michael Scheuer, "Al Qaeda's indispensible ally."

[Winehole23]

Putting the focus on something broadly agreed to in the thread so far: that we lack enough troops in theatre to get the job done.

According to the ISAF chief, current counterinsurgency doctrine requires 400,000 troops in Afganistan. We're 260,000 troops short. There are ~150,000 troops in Iraq. According to an NYT article (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/22/washington/22combat.html?ref=todayspaper) today, SecDef Gates estimates the rump of US support in Iraq will be in the range of "several tens of thousands." At best, around 100,000 additional US troops will be available for duty in Afghanistan.

It would appear the resources necessary to wage the counterinsurgency aren't there, absent conscription or increased NATO participation. I can see how a surge might produce temporary advantages that would allow us, as in Iraq, to draw down significantly and hand over responsibility to local authorities. But without the necessary troops, prospects don't look good for the long term.

[Winehole23]

Closer.

Insurgencies generally take about a decade or so.

We have made some small progress in terms of building up the government in Kabul, but have not committed the resources necessary to really do the job effectively, as I stated previously.Your conclusion that we're closer is a contradiction, unless you think counterinsurgency is an egg timer. If we haven't committed necessary resources to do it right, does the clock still run? And when it goes ding, will we have won?

One other thing. Weren't we closer to taking out Al Qaeda for good in 2003 than we are now? I appreciate how sanguine you are about our eventual success, RG, but your optimistic brio appears to have colored your judgment about facts. Al Qaeda is rejuvenated according to our own intel. Before we invaded Iraq, they were weak and on the run.

[LnGrrrR]

Wow, that's brilliant. Don't be surprised if later today a military helicopter whisks you away to Washington so you can brief the NSC and the President. Brilliant plan.

Ta-da! *takes a bow*

Obviously there's much more than that, but in essence, that should be the plan. Behead (figuratively!) the leader of al Qaeda to send a message, and then let the CIA/FBI do what it does. I don't think we need long-term military occupation of Afghanistan anymore than we did Iraq.

Then again, I'm an isolationist. :)

[LnGrrrR]

Also, to comment on the above discussion:

I tend to side with Winehole, in the idea that military intervention is a very blunt tool to use in international relations. I echo the words of Washington when he said we should try to maintain neutrality with foreign countries. Additionally, our presence there does not guarantee that instability will not occur anyways.

Tell me, if another country deemed American 'unstable' and supported whichever government that they thought was best with military, how would your local populace think of them? Most people are never truly comfortable with foreign military around, I find.

Maintain neutrality and let each side work it out. If the region goes to crap... well I'm sorry, that sucks. If India/Pakistan/Afghanistan want help, let them ask the international community. We shouldn't always be the first to respond, just because we can.

[Winehole23]

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=a_G.w1Vgsork&refer=us

Obama’s Afghan Troop-Surge Plan May Prove Too Much, Too Late



By Ken Fireman


Dec. 24 (Bloomberg) -- Sending more U.S. forces to Afghanistan is an idea whose time has come. The question is whether the time when it could work has already gone.



President-elect Barack Obama (http://search.bloomberg.com/search?q=Barack+Obama&site=wnews&client=wnews&proxystylesheet=wnews&output=xml_no_dtd&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&filter=p&getfields=wnnis&sort=date:D:S:d1), departing President George W. Bush (http://search.bloomberg.com/search?q=George+W.%0ABush&site=wnews&client=wnews&proxystylesheet=wnews&output=xml_no_dtd&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&filter=p&getfields=wnnis&sort=date:D:S:d1) and holdover Defense Secretary Robert Gates (http://search.bloomberg.com/search?q=Robert+Gates&site=wnews&client=wnews&proxystylesheet=wnews&output=xml_no_dtd&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&filter=p&getfields=wnnis&sort=date:D:S:d1) have backed a plan to send 20,000 or more troops next year. Those forces must confront an increasingly entrenched Taliban enemy and a population grown hostile to foreign troops after seven years of U.S.-led warfare.
“We may have missed the golden moment there,” said Lawrence Korb, a former Pentagon official who has long advocated an increased U.S. focus on Afghanistan.The tension between the short-run need for more muscle to thwart the Taliban and the long-term trap of becoming the latest in a long line of foreign intruders bogged down in Afghanistan forms the core of the dilemma confronting Obama.



The new U.S. troops will likely be used to strike hard at Taliban insurgents and attempt to halt their momentum, said retired Army General Jack Keane (http://search.bloomberg.com/search?q=Jack+Keane&site=wnews&client=wnews&proxystylesheet=wnews&output=xml_no_dtd&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&filter=p&getfields=wnnis&sort=date:D:S:d1), who helped plan a similar U.S. buildup in Iraq two years ago.



In a parallel effort, the Afghan National Army will be rapidly expanded and trained to secure the areas cleared of insurgents, Keane said. U.S. and Afghan forces will also seek to recruit local tribes to the anti-Taliban campaign, said Seth Jones, an analyst for the policy-research organization RAND Corp. and a Defense Department consultant.


Quick Results



Jones said the buildup must show results quickly, given declining Afghan support for foreign troops on their soil. “The clock is ticking right now,” he said.



And some experts say sending more U.S. forces could prove counterproductive, making it harder for President Hamid Karzai (http://search.bloomberg.com/search?q=Hamid+Karzai&site=wnews&client=wnews&proxystylesheet=wnews&output=xml_no_dtd&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&filter=p&getfields=wnnis&sort=date:D:S:d1)’s wobbly government to defeat a resurgent Taliban by increasing the perception that the government is dependent on outsiders for survival (http://www.unama-afg.org/).



“In the end, insurgencies are not won or lost by foreign troops,” said Christine Fair, an analyst in the Arlington, Virginia, office of RAND (http://www.rand.org/) who worked in Afghanistan for the United Nations.



The Afghanistan surge eventually may almost double the U.S. military personnel in the country. The reinforcements Bush sent to Iraq last year amounted to about a 20 percent boost in a force more than four times bigger.



Karzai, Casualties



Karzai has urged the U.S. to consult with Afghan officials on how the additional troops are used and to limit civilian casualties during operations. He made those points in a Dec. 22 meeting in Kabul with Admiral Michael Mullen (http://search.bloomberg.com/search?q=Michael+Mullen&site=wnews&client=wnews&proxystylesheet=wnews&output=xml_no_dtd&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&filter=p&getfields=wnnis&sort=date:D:S:d1), the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Associated Press reported.



Military officials and observers don’t dispute the limits of the planned U.S. buildup. Keane said it “is enough to make a difference, but it’s not big enough to win. We will begin to change momentum, but we won’t win unless we grow the Afghan army.”And Gates has raised a caution flag, even as he has approved adding one combat and one aviation brigade and “conceptually” endorsed a request from commanders to send three more combat brigades next year.



During a trip to the region earlier this month, Gates said no decision has been made about the duration of the buildup. He said it would be unwise to exceed the planned U.S. reinforcements.



Gates’s Concern



“I would be very concerned about a substantially bigger U.S. presence than that,” he said on Dec. 14. “The Soviets were there with 120,000 troops and lost because they didn’t have the support of the Afghan people. At a certain point, we get such a big footprint, we begin to look like an occupier.”



During the presidential campaign, Obama repeatedly called for sending more troops to cope with insurgent attacks that have risen to their highest level since the Taliban -- an Islamist militia known for its harsh treatment of women -- was ousted from power by the U.S.-led invasion in 2001. The country’s farm economy also has shifted toward soaring production of opium.



There are currently about 31,000 U.S. troops and another 31,000 from other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Afghanistan, according to Pentagon and NATO data.



Vikram Singh, a former Defense Department official, said he found during a recent trip to Afghanistan a “profound sense of disappointment” among U.S. and NATO forces about the resurgence of the Taliban and the limited opportunities for countering it at current troop levels.



Rural Rule



In many rural areas of the country, the Taliban has begun acting as a de facto government thanks to “a combination of support, intimidation, fear and the belief that the government cannot win,” he said.



The planned U.S. buildup will add between 20,000 and 30,000 troops during the next year, according to Mullen.



The new forces will be divided between three southern provinces that form the heart of the current Taliban insurgency and two others near the capital of Kabul where attacks have increased in recent months.



Even with the planned buildup, U.S. and NATO forces won’t be large enough by themselves to fulfill the primary goal of any effective counter-insurgency campaign, which is protecting the population, military experts say.



Bigger Country



In Iraq, they note, the U.S. had more than 150,000 troops at the height of last year’s surge. And Afghanistan has 16 percent more people than Iraq, 48 percent more territory and a far more challenging military environment because of its varied terrain and lack of roads.



“We don’t have enough troops to create security on the ground in Afghanistan, and the Afghan army is not big enough,” said retired Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, one of the principal authors of the service’s counter-insurgency manual.



The Afghan government has endorsed a plan to double the size of its army to 134,000 over five years. Even that will be too small to meet its needs, said Keane and other experts; he said a force of at least 250,000 should be the goal.



The good news, Keane said, is that recent experience in Iraq demonstrates that an indigenous army can be rapidly upgraded in both size and quality when sufficient resources are provided.



Another lesson from Iraq that may be transferable to Afghanistan, Jones said, is the utility of drawing in local tribal institutions to oppose the insurgents. That is true even through Afghanistan’s tribal structure is more complex and ethnically varied, he said.
And doing this successfully offers a way to avoid the stigma of being perceived as a foreign intruder, he said.



“If American forces operate unilaterally, they will be viewed increasingly as foreign occupiers,” Jones said. “If they’re able to leverage local institutions, local concerns will be lessened.”

[Winehole23]

There was never a strong movement against the military action in Afghanistan.Popularity isn't prudence. The same myopia, unreflectiveness and Panglossian flair that got us into Iraq sustains our present course in Afghanistan IMO.

Most of the country is already lost to the Taliban. We don't have the troops to turn this around. The sooner we face this the better.

[LaMarcus Bryant]

The sad thing is, if we nuked every square foot in that god forsaken country until it was just one big mountain of glass, there would be no more opium. So I'm at a total loss when trying to think of a solution :sad

[RandomGuy]

Whenever you have time, I'd be interested in your take on doobs' take. He says OBL is no longer significant for the national interest, but thinks our presence in Afghanistan is geostrategically justified.

I would agree on both points.

OBL has been removed as anything other than a figurehead.

Better for us not to actually kill him, but let him die of something unglorious like kidney failure.

[RandomGuy]

Your conclusion that we're closer is a contradiction, unless you think counterinsurgency is an egg timer. If we haven't committed necessary resources to do it right, does the clock still run? And when it goes ding, will we have won?

One other thing. Weren't we closer to taking out Al Qaeda for good in 2003 than we are now? I appreciate how sanguine you are about our eventual success, RG, but your optimistic brio appears to have colored your judgment about facts. Al Qaeda is rejuvenated according to our own intel. Before we invaded Iraq, they were weak and on the run.

Hmm. Perhaps some clarification is in order.

The fucktarded way Iraq was run for the first 3 or 4 years has put Al Qaeda in a stronger position today than they were in 2003.

BUT

We collectively, and that includes the military have learned a lot, and that counts for a great deal in terms of making our efforts more effective.

I think we have a long row to hoe in Afghanistan, and it will be a VERY difficult task to put together the country that the Russians fucked up.

[RandomGuy]

[quoting from an article--RG]

The Afghan government has endorsed a plan to double the size of its army to 134,000 over five years. Even that will be too small to meet its needs, said Keane and other experts; he said a force of at least 250,000 should be the goal.



The good news, Keane said, is that recent experience in Iraq demonstrates that an indigenous army can be rapidly upgraded in both size and quality when sufficient resources are provided.



Another lesson from Iraq that may be transferable to Afghanistan, Jones said, is the utility of drawing in local tribal institutions to oppose the insurgents. That is true even through Afghanistan’s tribal structure is more complex and ethnically varied, he said.
And doing this successfully offers a way to avoid the stigma of being perceived as a foreign intruder, he said.



“If American forces operate unilaterally, they will be viewed increasingly as foreign occupiers,” Jones said. “If they’re able to leverage local institutions, local concerns will be lessened.”

Therein lies the solution. We MUST build up the central government's ability to control areas of the country.

We MUST build up physical and social infrastructure that makes a difference.

This isn't rocket science, but does require a lot of "soft" skills and power in addition to raw firepower.

Trigger pullers are necessary, but not sufficient. The most important component of the military build up will be the trainers that can create new, capable Afghan military and police units. This must be coordinated with improved access to water, trade, education, and a semi-functioning legal system.

[boutons_]

CIA is giving the Afghan warlords, who run their own govts independent of Karzai and practice polygamy, Viagra. A couple of warlords apparently have now become US allies (as if these guys couldn't afford Viagra).

In Iraq, the military bought the Sunnis with arms and $300/month, peace-for-money.

In Afganistan, it's hard-dicks-for-peace. :lol

Gotta love the CIA, always good for a barrel of laughs.

[Winehole23]

I think we have a long row to hoe in Afghanistan, and it will be a VERY difficult task to put together the country that the Russians fucked up.Indeed, it will. It will be a very expensive and very lengthy, if not also a very risky mission to keep enough of the country to preserve Karzai in power, while training all his troops and rebuilding Afghanistan's infrastructure, public health, education and legal system.

I wonder if Americans don't deserve better infrastructure, public health and education first. I also wonder whether holding Afghanistan and building it to our liking over the next few decades is:

a. doable;
b. affordable;
c. wise or prudent;
d. conducive to our strategic ends;
e. the only strategy so conducive.

The pattern of serious-minded people begging all the important questions before the war is what got us into the Iraq jackpot. I hope we don't repeat it. Afghanistan could end up being a lot more expensive and bloody than Iraq.

Like the Russians, the English twice, the Mughal Empire, Tamerlaine, Genghis Khan, the Ghaznavids, the Turks and Alexander the Great before us, we could end up losing there.

[LaMarcus Bryant]

On second thought, we should put poppy seeds into the seed vaults scattered throughout the world..THEN turn that entire mountaineous backland shithole into a big sheet of glass. The only fragment of history we have on our side in terms of a war in afghanistan is that we have the ability to do this.

[RandomGuy]

Indeed, it will. It will be a very expensive and very lengthy, if not also a very risky mission to keep enough of the country to preserve Karzai in power, while training all his troops and rebuilding Afghanistan's infrastructure, public health, education and legal system.

I wonder if Americans don't deserve better infrastructure, public health and education first. I also wonder whether holding Afghanistan and building it to our liking over the next few decades is:

a. doable;
b. affordable;
c. wise or prudent;
d. conducive to our strategic ends;
e. the only strategy so conducive.

The pattern of serious-minded people begging all the important questions before the war is what got us into the Iraq jackpot. I hope we don't repeat it. Afghanistan could end up being a lot more expensive and bloody than Iraq.

Like the Russians, the English twice, the Mughal Empire, Tamerlaine, Genghis Khan, the Ghaznavids, the Turks and Alexander the Great before us, we could end up losing there.

We have little choice but to commit ourselves to it. To do otherwise would be to cede a large chunk of territory and resources to people who are dedicated to killing us. It would also abandon some very good people to the Taliban, with whom the Taliban would likely deal very harshly.

It is very doable, given the proper level of resources, which have been, and currently are, woefully inadequate. We will be pulling out of Iraq barely in time and committing to Afghanistan. It is a race at the moment.
If we pull it off, it will provide some pretty conclusive proof to a lot of muslims that we aren't the evil imperialists that Al Qaeda says we are.
It is affordable, and has the benefit of being something that our allies can actually support and share some of the burden.

You can't really draw too much on history for this one. The Russians had an active superpower funneling tens of billions of dollars into the insurgency, and we don't. We do have to contend with the money from the poppy production, but that is something we have some experience with in Columbia and other places.

I really don't see another viable option to keeping our commitment to Afghanistan, both in terms of moral imperitive, or general geopolitical strategy.

[Winehole23]

We have little choice but to commit ourselves to it. To do otherwise would be to cede a large chunk of territory and resources to people who are dedicated to killing us. It would also abandon some very good people to the Taliban, with whom the Taliban would likely deal very harshly. By "people who are dedicated to killing us'' I presume you mean Al Qaeda. But it is far from clear that the Taliban take their marching orders from OBL. And the Taliban themselves are not a monolith, but draw on diverse sources of support. If they're really such bad guys, why do Karzai and Khalilzad both stress the importance of negotiating with them?

And given that Al Qaeda is already secure in Pakistan, more secure in fact, than they ever were in Afghanistan, what supports RG's assumption that they will reoccupy Afghanistan, and even further that the Taliban would allow them to sit at the levers of power?

For the sake of argument, let's grant everthing RG would have us assume. The Taliban take over, terrorize the country, and invite OBL to give orders.

Does OBL in charge of Afghanistan pose some threat to the United States, that makes an indefinite occupation and war of the country imperative? Afghanistan is weak, has few friends, and no means of projecting its power, except as a narco-state. Do we really have to accept endless war and the tab for rebuilding Afghanistan as the price for...

...wait for it

...the threat posed to the USA by Afghanistan? :rollin


It is very doable, given the proper level of resources, which have been, and currently are, woefully inadequate. We will be pulling out of Iraq barely in time and committing to Afghanistan. It is a race at the moment.At least you seem to have open eyes about this: that losing in Afghanistan is not just some dark cloud on the horizon, but a real possibility. Because the focus was elsewhere, and because adequate resources have yet to be dedicated to the mission.



If we pull it off, it will provide some pretty conclusive proof to a lot of muslims that we aren't the evil imperialists that Al Qaeda says we are.If by some miracle we turn Afghanistan into a tolerant, pro-Western democracy, Afghanistan will be regarded as a US colony, its leaders as our puppets, and their imperialism thesis will be considered proven -- not refuted -- by our success.


It is affordable, and has the benefit of being something that our allies can actually support and share some of the burden.http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/003200812271240.htm

http://www.hindu.com/2008/12/23/stories/2008122356051200.htm

http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3714038,00.html -- 1,000 extra troops, 14 months. The Germans, who've failed miserably in training the Afghan Army, don't seem to see the urgency.

Public support for the mission is declining in Canada, Great Britain, Italy and the Netherlands. Pleas that countries besides the US and GB contribute more to the effort seem to have fallen on sympathetic ears, but so far our allies' checkbooks have not been so tractable.

You keep saying our allies are on board for a massive projection of soft power and money into Afghanistan. Could you please link evidence for this support, RG? My own brief searches of the news do not support this view.


You can't really draw too much on history for this one.Famous last words.



I really don't see another viable option to keeping our commitment to Afghanistan, both in terms of moral imperative...Moral imperative? There is some moral consideration that trumps national interest and strategic advantage? I hope it does not oblige us to invade and occupy even more countries than we already have. Already our forces are stretched to the limit. Eventually, so-called moral imperatives will have to yield to prudence and do-ability.



...or general geopolitical strategy.How about containment plus black ops, as suggested upstream?

If you cannot think of alternatives to the current strategy, what that suggests to me is that you have not even considered them yet, RG.

[RandomGuy]

Good points. I will get to them some time tomorrow. Need to finish a project for my bookkeeping client tonight.

[Nbadan]

We have little choice but to commit ourselves to it. To do otherwise would be to cede a large chunk of territory and resources to people who are dedicated to killing us. It would also abandon some very good people to the Taliban, with whom the Taliban would likely deal very harshly.

Not to mention we'd be back in Afghanistan within a decade cleaning up a even more dangerous threat...Afghanistan can be controlled with much fewer troops than the 140K+ we still have in Iraq, and using Afghan locals and guiding councils those extra 30-80K US troops wouldn't be in combat for very long, at least, the troops would get regular combat duty...We're not talking about a invasion of Pakistan here...we are talking about patrolling and securing the tribal-lands between Pakistan and Afghanistan which would definitely be in the U.S. long-term strategic interests for the region....

[Nbadan]

You can't really draw too much on history for this one. The Russians had an active superpower funneling tens of billions of dollars into the insurgency, and we don't. We do have to contend with the money from the poppy production, but that is something we have some experience with in Columbia and other places.

Hey RG, there are billions being pumped into Afghanistan from herion sales in Europe, were do you suppose that money is today?

[Nbadan]

Does OBL in charge of Afghanistan pose some threat to the United States, that makes an indefinite occupation and war of the country imperative? Afghanistan is weak, has few friends, and no means of projecting its power, except as a narco-state. Do we really have to accept endless war and the tab for rebuilding Afghanistan as the price for...

There's only one real way to cure what ailes Middle East countries...Democracy and Capitalism ...if there was Democracy in the Middle East there would be less war, less wars and better stability would equal greater economic investments......we gotta start somewhere...I would have preferred these seeds were planted in Israel-Syria (i.e. Jeruselum) but this being the Middle East, we go for what we can get...

[Winehole23]

Not to mention we'd be back in Afghanistan within a decade cleaning up a even more dangerous threat...Afghanistan can be controlled with much fewer troops than the 140K+ we still have in IraqIf true, we don't really need the 30,000 or so troops on the way to Afghanistan next year, even though present counterinsurgency doctrine says we need 400,000 troops to keep the peace.

I wonder who's got the numbers right, nbadan or the DoD and ISAF commanders?


...We're not talking about a invasion of Pakistan here...we are talking about patrolling and securing the tribal-lands between Pakistan and Afghanistan which would definitely be in the U.S. long-term strategic interests for the region....Afghanistan seems to be for it, but the FATA lies within Pakistan's border, so it is a little misleading to say it is between the two countries. As a matter of law and diplomacy, we need Pakistan's permission to operate within their border.

While the result of sweeping the FATA clean of insurgents would obviously be in the long term interest of the USA, the risk we run short term is destabilizing Pakistan. Given the weakness of the civil authority in Pakistan and escalating tensions with India, American action inside Pakistan would seem neither feasible for them, not wise for us right now. To pretend we can simply impose our will regionally with US guns, unacceptably simplifies the problem and the dangers.


There's only one real way to cure what ailes Middle East countries...Democracy and Capitalism ...if there was Democracy in the Middle East there would be less war, less wars and better stability would equal greater economic investments......we gotta start somewhere...I would have preferred these seeds were planted in Israel-Syria (i.e. Jeruselum) but this being the Middle East, we go for what we can get...
The thesis that democracy and capitalism lead to peace and stability is ideological cant, and the noblisse oblige which requires us to force our way of life on others by making war on them puts the lie to our solemn regard for peace and democratic will. I'm a little surprised to to see nbadan to get behind this, but it's a fairly prevalent attitude.

Scratch a neocon, and you'll find a cold war liberal. nbadan would appear to be a version of the latter.

[boutons_]

Afghanistan is failed state, a state in name only.

It has no democratic institutions, no democratic history. If ever, democracy is decades away.

Typically of such nominal states, the Karzai govt is totally corrupt, and has no influence outside of Kabul. The people have and are turning away from Kabul because the Taleban and local/tribal warlords offer them a better deal.

Another of dubya's murderous geo-political disasters, Afghanistan was invaded to punish/remove the Taliban and AQ, but there was no follow-up plan. dubya kicked ass, then what?

The Taleban and Pakis are getting stronger and more pervasive, not weaker, not beaten, so the inarguable conclusion is that US/NATO's 7 years there is a failure.

Like the English and Russians before them, the US has failed in Afghanistan, which was always the probable outcome, predicted by history.

Obama, continuing the American imperial militarisitic hubris, is being trapped into continuing the failure indefinitely, with no exit plan.

Get The Fuck Out and fuck the neo-c*nts and conservatives who will bitch and argue to continue their MIC-enriching disaster forever.

[Winehole23]

Obama, continuing the American imperial militarisitic hubris, is being trapped into continuing the failure indefinitely, with no exit plan.Seems to be the case.


Get The Fuck Out and fuck the neo-cons[sic] and conservatives who will bitch and argue to continue their MIC-enriching disaster forever.I endorse this sentiment, but fear the MICC (military-industrial-congressional complex) will end up fucking us.

War is a powerful stimulus to business and manufacturing, but imperial overreach has been the undoing of every hegemon in history. I hope we learn the lesson before it learns us.

[Winehole23]

http://www.thehindu.com/2008/12/25/stories/2008122555130800.htm

M.K. Bhadrakumar

The time has come to carefully assess the U.S. motivations in widening the gyre of the Afghan war, which commenced seven years ago.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States armed forces, Admiral Mike Mullen, has lent his voice to the incipient idea of a “regional” approach to the Afghanistan problem. He said the over-arching strategy for success in Afghanistan must be regional in focus and include not just Afghanistan but also Pakistan and India. The three South Asian countries, he stressed, must figure a way to reduce tensions among them, which involves addressing long-standing problems that increase instability in the region.”


Adm. Mullen then referred to Kashmir as one such problem to underline that if India-Pakistan tensions decreased, it “allowed the Pakistani leadership to focus on the west [border with Afghanistan].” He regretted that the terror attack in Mumbai raised India-Pakistan tensions, and “in the near term, that might force the Pakistani leadership to lose interest in the west,” apart from the likelihood of a nuclear flashpoint.


Interestingly, he gave credit to the Pakistani top brass for its recent cooperation in the tribal areas which, he said, has had a “positive impact” on the anti-Taliban operations.
The Pentagon’s number one soldier has legitimised an idea that was straining to be born — U.S. mediatory mission in South Asia. Adm. Mullen announced that the U.S. was doubling its force level in Afghanistan from the present strength of 32,000 troops. The Afghan war is about to intensify. All this comes in the wake of the recent hint by Senator John Kerry that the appointment of a U.S. special envoy for South Asia by the Obama administration is on the cards.


The time has indeed come to carefully assess the U.S. motivations in widening the gyre of the Afghan war, which commenced seven years ago as a vengeful hunt for Osama bin Laden and metamorphosed into a “war on terror.” What is in it for India? It is very obvious that the U.S. thought process on a “regional approach” to the Afghan problem and the appointment of a South Asia envoy go hand in hand. The U.S. design confronts India with a three-fold challenge: it insists that India is a protagonist in the U.S.-led war; India-Pakistan relationship is a crucial factor of regional security and stability which directly affects the U.S. interests and, therefore, necessitates an institutionalised American mediatory role; and, it asserts a U.S. obligation to be involved in “nation-building” in South Asia on a long-term footing.


Vulnerable to U.S. pressure Islamabad will be chuckling with pleasure. The parameters of its foreign policy, which Indian diplomacy rubbished for decades, are finally gaining habitation and name. The heart of the matter is that India has made itself vulnerable to U.S. pressure. Of all Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries that are exposed to the danger of militancy, India is the only “non-combatant” threatened with a spill-over. The Central Asian countries bordering Amu Darya, though much weaker than India, have marvellously insulated themselves from the pernicious fallout from the Hindu Kush. So has China’s Xinjiang. So indeed has Iran despite robust efforts by the U.S.-British intelligence to inject the virus of terrorism into its eastern provinces. Certainly, Moscow managed to insulate Chechnya too.


Alas, India stands out as the solitary exception. If diplomacy is the first line of national defence, there have been shortfalls. The slide began, in retrospect, when the Indian foreign policy seriously erred in 2001 while assessing the implications of the U.S.’ march into Afghanistan. Except India, the regional powers that took part in the Bonn conference in December 2001 seem to have had a Plan B. Our diplomats blithely travelled in the U.S. bandwagon as one-dimensional men fixated over Pakistan, comfortable in their assumption that the underpinning of a strong “partnership” with the U.S. elevated India from the morass of its regional milieu, opening up in front of it a brave new world as the pre-eminent power in the Indian Ocean region. They remained sure that Pakistan would be a passing aberration in the U.S. regional policy, whereas India would be a life-long blissful partner. And all that was needed was for us to keep an obscure back channel to Pakistan from time to time.


The cold blast of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai scatters these facile assumptions. After all, the accumulated debris of India-Pakistan tensions did not go away and the past four years have been a chronicle of wasted time, as the relationship is in ground zero. The Mumbai attacks underscore that the Afghan war has crossed the Khyber and is stealthily reaching the fertile Indo-Gangetic plains. Our opinion still underestimates the gravity of the unfolding crisis by visualising it as merely an India-Pakistan dogfight, which it certainly is but is far from everything. Adm. Mullen has done a signal service by starkly placing the crisis in its setting.


Fortunately, we stopped in the nick of time from plunging into the Afghan cauldron via a military intervention from which there would have been no turning back. This fortuitous happenstance leaves us some options to incrementally step back from becoming part of the lethal brew that the witches are concocting in the Hindu Kush.



Way ahead What is to be done? First, we need to realise that the Afghan war is a classic Clausewitzean affair politics by other means. The U.S. has ensured a permanent presence in the strategic highlands of the Pamir mountains. Even the current highly simulated disruption of transit routes for NATO supplies via the Pakistani territory is providing a pretext for the establishment of fresh U.S. military presence in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and in the Caucasus for the first time ever. While the U.S.’ close partnership with the Pakistani military continues intact, the search for new supply routes becomes the perfect backdrop for ruthlessly expanding American influence in the Russian and Chinese (and Iranian) backyards in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
This signifies a great leap forward for NATO, which is poised to wade ashore from the Black Sea into the Caucasus and Central Asia. Also, the U.S. is effectively undercutting the raison d’etre of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. In short, the “war on terror” is providing a convenient rubric under which the U.S. is incrementally securing for itself a permanent abode in the highlands of the Pamirs, the Central Asian steppes and the Caucasus that form the strategic hub overlooking Russia, China, India and Iran.


We must, therefore, be vigilant about the veiled U.S. threat of reopening the “Kashmir file,” which Admiral Mullen held out. It aims at keeping India off balance. Plainly put, the U.S. faces a real geopolitical challenge in the region only in the eventuality of a coalition of like-minded regional powers like Russia, China, Iran and India taking shape and these powers seriously beginning to exchange notes on what the Afghan war has so far been about and where it is heading and what the U.S. strategy aims at. So far, the U.S. has succeeded in stalling such a process by “sorting out” these regional powers individually. Indeed, Washington has been a net beneficiary of the contradictions in the mutual relations between these regional powers.



If Barack Obama genuinely wants to end the bloodshed and the suffering in Afghanistan, tackle terrorism effectively and enduringly, as well as stabilise Afghanistan and secure South Asia as a stable region, all he needs to do is to turn away from the great game, and instead seek an inclusive inter-Afghan settlement facilitated by a genuine regional peace process. The existential choice is whether he will break with the past U.S. policies out of principle. Surely, as Adm. Mullen’s statements underscore, Mr. Obama will run into the vested interests of the U.S. security establishment, the military-industrial complex, Big Oil and the influential corpus of cold warriors who are bent on pressing ahead. India must, therefore, take note that the war in the Hindu Kush enters a decisive phase for the New American Century project.


Independent policy The need arises for India to revive close consultations with Russia and Iran with which we have profound shared concerns over the Afghan problem and regional security. We must steer an independent policy towards Iran as a factor of regional stability. It is not in the interests of Russia, Iran and India to abandon Afghanistan to the U.S.-U.K.-Pakistan-Saudi condominium. They must use their influence on Afghan groups to chisel a regional peace initiative. In a helpful departure, China also took a differentiated approach to the recent U.N. Security Council move regarding Pakistani militant outfits, which we must take note of and build on. Finally, of course, while there is a time for everything, India must eventually resume the arduous search to make Pakistan a stakeholder in good neighbourly relations. The U.S. factor complicates this search, which is best undertaken bilaterally.


The wheel has come full circle. Those who sold us the dream of a U.S.-India strategic partnership are nowhere to be seen.
(The writer is a former ambassador and Indian Foreign Service officer.)

[boutons_]

Intimidation from the Taliban. "resist us and die"

==================

http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/misc/nytlogo153x23.gif (http://www.nytimes.com/)

December 29, 2008

Taliban Attacks Pakistani Village That Resisted
By RICHARD A. OPPEL JR. (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/o/richard_a_jr_oppel/index.html?inline=nyt-per) and PIR ZUBAIR SHAH

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/pakistan/index.html?inline=nyt-geo) — Four months ago, the people of the Pakistani mountain village of Shalbandi gained national repute after a village posse hunted down and killed six Taliban (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/t/taliban/index.html?inline=nyt-org) fighters who had tied up and killed eight local policemen. The posse displayed the Taliban corpses like trophies for other residents to see, and the village was celebrated as a courageous sign that the Taliban could be repelled.

On Sunday morning, the Taliban struck back.

A suicide car bomber exploded at a school in Shalbandi that was serving as a polling place, as voters lined up to elect a representative to the National Assembly. More than 30 people were killed and more than two dozen wounded, according to local political and security officials. Children and several policemen were among the dead.

The attacks was the latest demonstration of the Taliban’s bloody encroachment eastward and deeper into Pakistan from the lawless tribal areas on the western border. Shalbandi is less than 100 miles northwest of Islamabad, the capital, and lies just south of the lush Swat Valley, a onetime ski resort known as the “Switzerland of Pakistan” that has been largely taken over by the Taliban despite large-scale army operations.

In the frenzied aftermath of the car bombing, survivors and witnesses offered conflicting accounts of the attack, said Mian Iftikhar Hussain, information minister for the North-West Frontier Province, where Shalbandi is located.

In one version, he said, the bomber sped his car toward the school but plowed into adjacent shops. The explosion was so large that it destroyed part of the school and killed many people waiting to vote. In the other version, he said, the killer parked near the school and told people he was having car trouble. As people gathered, he detonated the bomb inside.

“He pretended his car was not working, then he asked for help, people came and tried to push it, and then it blew up,” Mr. Hussain said. It was not clear which account was more accurate.

A Taliban spokesman claimed responsibility for the attack as retribution for the deaths of six fighters, according to a Pakistani news channel.

The Pakistani military claimed over the weekend that it had killed 34 militants in Swat, just north of Buner, the district that includes Shalbandi. But the choice of Shalbandi for the attack left little doubt which six deaths the Taliban had sought to avenge.

“They singled out this village because it had clearly resisted and had expelled the Taliban by force,” said Afrasiab Khattak, head of the Awami National Party in the province, which now leads the provincial government after defeating incumbent religious parties with ties to militants in February elections. Shalbandi had received constant threats after the posse hunted down the Taliban fighters. “Disrupting elections is a general strategy for these elements,” Mr. Khattak said. The bombing on Sunday was not the first act of retaliation. The son of a village elder who had been a leader of the August posse was recently kidnapped by militants in Swat, Mr. Hussain, the provincial information minister, said. The village elder responded by kidnapping the son of a well-known Taliban spokesman in Swat.

“These people cannot frighten us,” said Mr. Hussain, who added that voting for the legislative seat continued Sunday at other polling places. “We are ready for a dialogue, but if they continue with the violence we will take strong action against them even at the cost of our lives.”

=======

Taliban killed only 30? They better up their game. US bombers have taken out several wedding, etc parties with more kills than 30.

[Winehole23]

The US ambassador to Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai and American generals all stress the necessity of negotiating with the Taliban.

If there is no military solution, and a political settlement is unavoidable, that necessarily means doing a deal with bad guys. This is the normal way wars conclude. It may be satisfying to cry out from the recesses of your hypermasculine armchair for the extermination of all enemies, but in the real world they sometimes get a place at the parley.

[Nbadan]

Taliban add another region to their control


Taliban rebels are beheading and burning their way through Pakistan's Swat Valley, and residents say the insurgents now control most of the mountainous region far from the lawless tribal areas where jihadists thrive.

"You can't imagine how bad it is," said Muzaffar ul-Mulk, a lawmaker whose home in Swat was attacked by bombers in mid-December, weeks after he left. "It's worse day by day."

The Taliban activity in northwest Pakistan also comes as the country shifts forces east to the Indian border because of tensions over last month's attacks in Mumbai, potentially giving insurgents more space to maneuver along the Afghanistan frontier.

Rebels began preying on Swat two years ago, and it is now too dangerous for foreign and Pakistani journalists to visit. Interviews with residents, lawmakers and officials who have fled the region paint a dire picture.

Seattle Times (http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2008571595_pak30.html)

[RandomGuy]

By "people who are dedicated to killing us'' I presume you mean Al Qaeda. But it is far from clear that the Taliban take their marching orders from OBL. And the Taliban themselves are not a monolith, but draw on diverse sources of support. If they're really such bad guys, why do Karzai and Khalilzad both stress the importance of negotiating with them?

I am not entirely sure what exactly they are thinking.

Were I to guess, I would say it is part of an attempt to win over Taliban supporters, and somehow bring the Taliban into the normal political process so that their only recourse is not violence.

The Taliban do not take marching orders from OBL or al Qaeda, but do have something of a symbiotic relationship in terms of money/training.

Whether negotiating with them is a good strategy is also far from clear to me. Were I to guess, I would say it is, on the balance, a good idea to at least attempt it. Anything that ratchets the level of violence down, gives the Kabul government time, and that is what they need most.

[Winehole23]

This article (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4587&page=0) from Foreign Policy discusses the counterinsurgency field manual for Afghanistan and has a short interview with David Petraeus.

[RandomGuy]

This article (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4587&page=0) from Foreign Policy discusses the counterinsurgency field manual for Afghanistan and has a short interview with David Petraeus.

If you actually get a chance to read the whole manual, I would highly recommend it. The FM incorporates all the lessons learned in Vietnam and re-learned the hard way in Iraq, and is, I think, spot on.

It is one the web somewheres as a pdf, and is unclassified, so feel free to hoark it and paruse.

[RandomGuy]

This article (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4587&page=0) from Foreign Policy discusses the counterinsurgency field manual for Afghanistan and has a short interview with David Petraeus.

I would also recommend that anyone interested in geo-politics and military affairs take in "The Pentagon's New Map" by PM Barnett. (http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/pnm/)


Gen. David Petraeus: In looking at which lessons learned in Iraq might be applicable in Afghanistan, it is important to remember a key principle of counterinsurgency operations: Every case is unique. That is certainly true of Afghanistan (just as it was true, of course, in Iraq). While general concepts that proved important in Iraq may be applicable in Afghanistan—concepts such as the importance of securing and serving the population and the necessity of living among the people to secure them—the application of those ‘big ideas’ has to be adapted to Afghanistan. The ‘operationalization’ will inevitably be different, as Afghanistan has a very different history and very different ‘muscle memory’ in terms of central governance (or lack thereof). It also lacks the natural resources that Iraq has and is more rural. It has very different (and quite extreme) terrain and weather. And it has a smaller amount of educated human capital, due to higher rates of illiteracy, as well as substantial unemployment, an economy whose biggest cash export is illegal, and significant challenges of corruption. Finally, it lacks sufficient levels of basic services like electricity, drinking water, and education—though there has been progress in a number of these areas and many others since 2001.

One cannot adequately address the challenges in Afghanistan without adding Pakistan into the equation. In fact, those seeking to help Afghanistan and Pakistan need to widen the aperture even farther, to encompass at least the Central Asian states, India, Iran, and even China and Russia.

FP: Defense Secretary Robert Gates has said that U.S. efforts in Afghanistan were really on the verge of failure. What’s your incoming assessment?

DP: I told [then] Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in September 2005 that Afghanistan would be the longest campaign in the so-called ‘long war.’ That judgment was based on an assessment I conducted in Afghanistan on my way home from my second tour in Iraq. And having been back to Afghanistan twice in recent months, I still see it that way. Progress there will require a sustained, substantial commitment. That commitment needs to be extended to Pakistan as well, though Pakistan does have large, well-developed security institutions and its leaders are determined to employ their own forces in dealing with the significant extremist challenges that threaten their country.

FP: I was rereading an account of an Afghan veteran from Soviet operations there. After every retaliatory strike, he said, ‘Perhaps one mujahideen was killed. The rest were innocent. The survivors hated us and lived with only one idea—revenge.’ Clearly [U.S.] engagement in Afghanistan didn’t start out in the same way as the Soviets’ did, but one of the questions is whether all these occupations wind up similarly after seven years.

DP: A number of people have pointed out the substantial differences between the character of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and that of the coalition forces in Afghanistan, especially in the circumstances that led to the respective involvement, as well as in the relative conduct, of the forces there. Foremost among the differences have been the coalition’s objectives: not just the desire to help the Afghans establish security and preclude establishment of extremist safe havens, but also to support economic development, democratic institutions, the rule of law, infrastructure, and education. To be sure, the coalition faces some of the same challenges that any of the previous forces in Afghanistan have faced: the same extreme terrain and weather, tribal elements that pride themselves on fighting, lack of infrastructure, and so on. In such a situation, it is hugely important to be seen as serving the population, in addition to securing it. And that is why we’re conducting counterinsurgency operations, as opposed to merely counterterrorism operations.

FP: Tell me where you see lessons from Iraq that might not apply in Afghanistan, and things that you will export.

DP: We cannot just take the tactics, techniques, and procedures that worked in Iraq and employ them in Afghanistan. How, for example, do you communicate with the Afghan people? The answer: very differently than the way you communicate with the Iraqi people, given the much lower number of televisions and a rate of illiteracy in the Afghan provinces that runs as high as 70 to 80 percent. Outside Kabul and other big Afghan cities, Afghans don’t watch much television; they don’t have televisions. In Iraq, one flies over fairly remote areas and still sees satellite dishes on many roofs. In Afghanistan, you not only won’t see satellite dishes; you also won’t see electrical lines, and you may not even find a radio. Moreover, you can’t achieve the same effect with leaflets or local newspapers because many Afghans can’t read them. So, how do you communicate with them? The answer is, through tribal elders, via hand-crank radios receiving transmissions from local radio stations, through shura councils, and so on.

FP: What people most want to know, of course, is: Where does this end? The counterinsurgency principles, your own statements in the past, have focused on the idea that such wars end with political solutions—you don’t kill your way out of it.

DP: One of the concepts we embraced in Iraq was recognition that you can’t kill or capture your way out of a complex, industrial-strength insurgency. The challenge in Afghanistan, as it was in Iraq, is to figure out how to reduce substantially the numbers of those who have to be killed or captured. This includes creating the conditions in which one can have successful reconciliation with some of the elements fighting us. Progress in reconciliation is most likely when you are in a position of strength and when there are persuasive reasons for groups to shift from being part of the problem to becoming part of the solution. In Iraq, that was aided by gradual recognition that al Qaeda brought nothing but indiscriminate violence, oppressive practices, and an extremist ideology to which the people really didn’t subscribe. Beyond that, incentives were created to persuade the insurgents that it made more sense to support the new Iraq.

The challenge in Afghanistan, of course, is figuring out how to create the conditions that enable reconciliation, recognizing that these likely will differ somewhat from those created in Iraq.

FP: Do you think that does involve speaking with warlords, people like [Gulbuddin] Hekmatyar, who up to now have been absolute non-starters?

DP: Any such outreach has to be an Afghan initiative, not the coalition’s. In Iraq, frankly, it was necessary for the coalition to take the lead in some areas where there was no Iraqi government or security presence.

FP: Do you think there is something qualitatively or quantitatively new and different about the insurgencies that U.S. forces have encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan?

DP: We looked at this issue closely when we were drafting the counterinsurgency manual. And we concluded that some aspects of contemporary extremist tactics are, indeed, new. If you look, as we did, at what [French military officer] David Galula faced in Algeria, you find, obviously, that he and his colleagues did not have to deal with a transnational extremist network enabled by access to the Internet. Today, extremist media cells recruit, exhort, train, share expertise, and generate resources in cyberspace. The incidence of very lethal suicide bombers and massive car bombs is vastly higher today. It seems as if suicide car bombs have become the precision-guided munition of modern insurgents and extremists. And while there has been a religious component in many insurgencies, the extremist nature of the particular enemy we face seems unprecedented in recent memory.

FP: The counterinsurgency manual, an object of huge praise, is seen as a key moment in the rethink that put the war in Iraq on a different course. But it has not been uncontroversial. There are people on the left who see it as a form of neocolonialism; conservatives are skeptical of anything they see as nation-building, while others believe that by organizing to fight this kind of war, the United States risks not being prepared for a more conventional conflict in the future. How much of an intellectual debate have these principles stirred up? What do you say to these critics?

DP: It’s important to recognize the most important overarching doctrinal concept that our Army, in particular, has adopted—the concept of ‘full spectrum operations.’ This concept holds that all military operations are some mix of offensive, defensive, and stability and support operations. In other words, you’ve always got to be thinking not just about the conventional forms of combat—offensive and defensive operations—but also about the stability and support component. Otherwise, successes in conventional combat may be undermined by unpreparedness for the operations often required in their wake.

The debate about this has been a healthy one, but we have to be wary of arguments that imply we have to choose—or should choose—between either stability-operations-focused or conventional-combat-focused training and forces. It is not only possible to be prepared for some mix; it is necessary.

A wonderful essay that I read as a graduate student captures the essence of my view on this. The essay discussed the different schools of international relations theory, and it concluded that ‘the truth is not to be found in any one of these schools of thought, but rather in the debate among them.’ That is probably the case in this particular discussion. We would do well to avoid notions that we can pick and choose the kinds of wars in which we want to be involved and prepare only for them.

FP: You said [that] even in 2005 when you were in Afghanistan, you reported to Secretary Rumsfeld that this could be the longest part of the long war.

DP: I didn’t say it could be. I said it would be. My assessment was that Afghanistan was going to be the longest campaign of the long war. And I think that assessment has been confirmed by events in Afghanistan in recent months.

FP: Just how long did you have in mind?

DP: Those are predictions one doesn’t hazard.

One the most cogent points he brings up is that the charactor of the US operations in Afghanistan is entirely different from everything that has gone before.

This completely points out the logical fallacy of assuming that because history points out that others have failed does not mean that we will.

Simply because X has never been done before does not mean that the task is impossible. If it were, heavier than air flight and a lot of other things we take for granted wouldn't exist. :lol

One does have to be aware of history and can learn a lot from it, though, and we will and are doing that here.

[RandomGuy]

This article (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4587&page=0) from Foreign Policy discusses the counterinsurgency field manual for Afghanistan and has a short interview with David Petraeus.


Lastly, the nine paradoxes of counter insurgency was something I brought up a while back in 2006 when Iraq was completely in the shitter.

http://www.spurstalk.com/forums/showthread.php?t=51788

I had been saying since about 2005 that we needed to follow our own doctrine, and sur-fucking-prise, we did and finally see something approaching success.

[Winehole23]

Russia stops US on road to Afghanistan (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KA27Df01.html)
By M K Bhadrakumar

Precise, quick, deadly - the skills of a soldier are modest. But then, US Central Command chief General David Petraeus is more than a soldier. The world is getting used to him as somewhere more than halfway down the road to becoming a statesman. Sure, there may be warfare's seduction over him still, but he is expected to be aware of the political realities of the two wars he conducts, in Iraq and Afghanistan.

That is why he tripped last Tuesday when he said while on a visit to Pakistan that the American military had secured agreements to move supplies to Afghanistan from the north, easing the heavy reliance on the transit route through Pakistan. "There have been agreements reached, and there are transit lines now and transit


http://asianmedia.com/GAAN/www/delivery/lg.php?bannerid=123&campaignid=96&zoneid=36&channel_ids=,&loc=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.atimes.com%2Fatimes%2FSouth_A sia%2FKA27Df01.html&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwhatreallyhappened.com%2F&cb=a7bb15a414
http://asianmedia.com/GAAN/www/delivery/avw.php?zoneid=36&cb=INSERT_RANDOM_NUMBER_HERE&n=a53e495a (http://asianmedia.com/GAAN/www/delivery/ck.php?n=a53e495a&cb=INSERT_RANDOM_NUMBER_HERE)

agreements for commercial goods and services in particular that include several countries in the Central Asian states and Russia," Petraeus said.

He was needlessly precise - like a soldier. Maybe he needed to impress on the tough Pakistani generals that they wouldn't hold the US forces in Afghanistan by their jugular veins for long. Or, he felt simply exasperated about the doublespeak of Janus-faced southwest Asian generals.

The shocking intelligence assessment shared by Moscow reveals that almost half of the US supplies passing through Pakistan is pilfered by motley groups of Taliban militants, petty traders and plain thieves. The US Army is getting burgled in broad daylight and can't do much about it. Almost 80% of all supplies for Afghanistan pass through Pakistan. The Peshawar bazaar is doing a roaring business hawking stolen US military (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KA27Df01.html#) ware, as in the 1980s during the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union. This volume of business will register a quantum jump following the doubling of the US troop level in Afghanistan to 60,000. Wars are essentially tragedies, but can be comical, too.

Moscow disclaims transit route
At any rate, within a day of Petraeus' remark, Moscow corrected him. Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Maslov told Itar-Tass, “No official documents were submitted to Russia's (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KA27Df01.html#) permanent mission in NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] certifying that Russia had authorized the United States and NATO to transport military supplies across the country."

A day later, Russia's ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, added from Brussels, "We know nothing of Russia's alleged agreement of military transit of Americans or NATO at large. There had been suggestions of the sort, but they were not formalized." And, with a touch of irony, Rogozin insisted Russia wanted the military alliance to succeed in Afghanistan.

"I can responsibly say that in the event of NATO's defeat in Afghanistan, fundamentalists who are inspired by this victory will set their eyes on the north. First they will hit Tajikistan, then they will try to break into Uzbekistan ... If things turn out badly, in about 10 years, our boys will have to fight well-armed and well-organized Islamists somewhere in Kazakhstan," the popular Moscow-politician turned diplomat added.

Russian experts have let it be known that Moscow views with disquiet the US's recent overtures to Central Asian countries regarding bilateral transit treaties with them which exclude Russia. Agreements have been reached with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Moscow feels the US is pressing ahead with a new Caspian transit route which involves the dispatch of shipments via Georgia to Azerbaijan and thereon to the Kazakh harbor of Aktau and across the Uzbek territory to Amu Darya and northern Afghanistan.

Russian experts estimate that the proposed Caspian transit route could eventually become an energy transportation route in reverse direction, which would mean a strategic setback for Russia in the decade-long struggle for the region's hydrocarbon reserves.

Russia presses for role in Kabul
Indeed, Uzbekistan is the key Central Asian country in the great game over the northern transit route to Afghanistan. Thus, during Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's visit to Tashkent last week, Afghanistan figured as a key topic. Medvedev characterized Russian-Uzbek relations as a "strategic partnership and alliance" and said that on matters relating to Afghanistan, Moscow's cooperation with Tashkent assumed an "exceptional importance".
He said he and Uzbek President Islam Karimov agreed that there could be no "unilateral solution" to the Afghan problem and "nothing can be resolved without taking into account the collective opinion of states which have an interest in the resolution of the situation".

Most significantly, Medvedev underlined Russia had no objections about US President Barack Obama's idea of linking the Afghanistan and Pakistan problems, but for an entirely different reason, as "it is not possible to examine the establishment and development of a modern political system in Afghanistan in isolation from the context of normalizing relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan in their border regions, setting up the appropriate international mechanisms and so on".

Moscow rarely touches on the sensitive Durand Line question, that is, the controversial line that separates Afghanistan and Pakistan. Medvedev underscored that Russia remained an interested party, as there was a "need to ensure that these issues are resolved on a collective basis".

Second, Medvedev made it clear Moscow would resist US attempts to expand its military and political presence in the Central Asian and Caspian regions. He asserted, "This is a key region, a region in which diverse processes are taking place and in which Russia has crucially important work to do to coordinate our positions with our colleagues and help to find common solutions to the most complex problems."

Plainly put, Moscow will not allow a replay of the US's tactic after September 11, 2002, when it sought a military presence in Central Asia as a temporary measure and then coolly proceeded to put it on a long-term footing.

Karzai reaches out to Moscow
Interestingly, Medvedev's remarks coincide with reports that Washington is cutting Afghan President Hamid Karzai adrift and is planning to install a new "dream team" in Kabul.

Medvedev had written to Karzai offering military aid. Karzai apparently accepted the Russian offer, ignoring the US objection that in terms of secret US-Afghan agreements, Kabul needed Washington's prior consent for such dealings with third countries.

A statement from the Kremlin last Monday said Russia was "ready to provide broad assistance for an independent and democratic country [Afghanistan] that lives in a peaceful atmosphere with its neighbors. Cooperation in the defense sector ... will be effective for establishing peace in the region". It makes sense for Kabul to make military procurements from Russia since the Afghan armed forces use Soviet weaponry. But Washington doesn't want a Russian "presence" in Kabul.

Quite obviously, Moscow and Kabul have challenged the US's secret veto power over Afghanistan's external relations. Last Friday, Russian and Afghan diplomats met in Moscow and "pledged to continue developing Russian-Afghan cooperation in politics, trade and economics as well as in the humanitarian sphere". Significantly, they also "noted the importance of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO]" that is dominated by Russia and China.

SCO seeks Afghan role
Washington cannot openly censure Karzai from edging close to Russia (and China) since Afghanistan is notionally a sovereign country. Meanwhile, Moscow is intervening in Kabul's assertion of independence. Moscow has stepped up its efforts to hold an international conference on Afghanistan under the aegis of the SCO. The US doesn't want Karzai to legitimize a SCO role in the Afghan problem. Now a flashpoint arises.

A meeting of deputy foreign ministers from the SCO member countries (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) met in Moscow on January 14. The Russian Foreign Ministry subsequently announced that a conference would take place in late March. The Russian initiative received a big boost with Iran (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KA27Df01.html#) and India's decision to participate in the conference.

New Delhi (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KA27Df01.html#) has welcomed an enhanced role for itself as a SCO observer and seeks "greater participation" in the organization's activities. In particular, New Delhi has "expressed interest in participating in the activities" of the SCO contact group on Afghanistan.

The big question is whether Karzai will seize these regional trends and respond to the SCO overture, which will enable Kabul to get out of Washington's stranglehold? To be sure, Washington is racing against time in bringing about a "regime (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KA27Df01.html#) change" in Kabul.

The point is, more and more countries in the region are finding it difficult to accept the US monopoly on conflict-resolution in Afghanistan. Washington will be hard-pressed to dissociate from the forthcoming SCO conference in March and, ideally, would have wished that Karzai also stayed away, despite it being a full-fledged regional initiative that includes all of Afghanistan's neighbors.

The SCO is sure to list Afghanistan as a major agenda item at its annual summit meeting scheduled to be held in August in Yekaterinburg, Russia. It seems Washington cannot stop the SCO in its tracks at this stage, except by genuinely broad-basing the search for an Afghan settlement and allowing regional powers with legitimate interests to fully participate.

The current US thinking, on the other hand, is to strike "grand bargains" with regional powers bilaterally and to keep them apart from collectively coordinating with each other on the basis of shared concerns. But the regional powers see through the US game plan for what it is - a smart move of divide-and-rule.

Moscow spurns selective engagement
No doubt, these diplomatic maneuverings also reveal the trust deficit in Russian-American relations. Moscow voices optimism that Obama will constructively address the problems that have accumulated in the US-Russia relationship. But Russia figured neither in Obama's inaugural address nor in the foreign policy document spelling out his agenda.

Last Tuesday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov summed up Moscow's minimal expectations: "I hope the controversial problems in our relations, such as missile defense, the expediency of NATO expansion ... will be resolved on the basis of pragmatism, without the ideological assessment the outgoing administration had ... We have noticed that ... Obama was willing to take a break on the issue of missile defense ... and to evaluate its effectiveness and cost efficiency."

But Russia is not among the new US administration's priorities. Besides, as the influential newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta noted last week, "A considerable number of [US] congressmen from both parties believe Russia needs a good talking-to." The current Russian priority will be to organize an early meeting between Lavrov and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and until such a meeting takes place, matters are on hold - including the vexed issue of the transit route for Afghanistan.

Thus, while talking to the media in Tashkent, Medvedev agreed in principle to grant permission to the US to use a transit route to Afghanistan via Russian territory, but at once qualified it saying, "This cooperation should be full-fledged and on an equal basis." He reminded Obama that the "surge" strategy in Afghanistan might not work. "We hope the new administration will be more successful than its predecessor on the issues surrounding Afghanistan," Medvedev said.

Evidently, Petraeus overlooked that the US's needless obduracy to keep the Hindu Kush as its exclusive geopolitical turf right in the middle of Asia has become a contentious issue. No matter the fine rhetoric, the Obama administration will find it difficult to sustain the myth that the Afghan war is all about fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban to the finish.

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KA27Df01.html#), Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KA27Df01.html#).

[Winehole23]

Barack Obama abandons Afghan President Hamid Karzai

The Barack Obama administration has abandoned Afghan President Hamid Karzai and now believes he is a major obstacle to defeating the Taliban-led insurgency.



By Dean Nelson, Alex Spillius and Ben Farmer in Kabul
Last Updated: 9:34PM GMT 29 Jan 2009

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/telegraph/multimedia/archive/01114/karzai_1114998c.jpg Afghan President Hamid Karzai has fallen out of favour with the Obama administration Photo: GETTY




Officials in the US State Department, Department of Defence and National Security Council are now openly questioning Mr Karzai's ability to rein in corruption, improve law and order and confront the warlords who control the country's deadly opium trade.



Sources close to the U.S administration last night denied they will pressurise President Karzai to stand down but said they will offer tacit support to candidates standing against him.



Their opposition to a second term for Mr Karzai emerged after Afghanistan's Election Commission announced a delay in the presidential election from April 22, four weeks before his term expires, to August 22.



Citing the worsening security situation, technical problems and a shortfall of $223 million dollars, Commissioner Azizullah Ludin said new security forces had been promised, but without them an election could not be held.
The delay has presented an opportunity for Mr Karzai's growing band of detractors in Washington and Europe who believe the situation in Afghanistan cannot improve while he is at the helm in Kabul.



Their views are understood to reflect those of new Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who described Afghanistan as a 'narcostate' at her Senate appointment hearing earlier this month, and Richard Holbrooke who was last week appointed as President Obama's 'super envoy' to Pakistan and Afghanistan.



Holbrooke, a former US ambassador to the UN has made a number of highly critical speeches on Karzai's governments and wrote a withering article in September last year in which he said Afghanistan's "central government has shown that it is simply not up to the job."



Diplomats said Mr Holbrooke's appointment marked the beginning of the end for Mr Karzai, and his likely replacement by Dr Abdullah Abdullah, Afghanistan's former foreign secretary, or one of his allies.
Dr Abdullah was one of four Afghan politicians who attended President Obama's inauguration ceremony in Washington last week, and is known to be close to Mr Holbrooke.



The Afghan president has become increasingly anti-Western in his comments as his re-election campaign looms ever closer, and has launched a number of attacks on Western-interference in Afghanistan's affairs.
In particular, he has condemned Nato's high number of civilian casualties and the attempt to appoint Lord Ashdown as the UN's 'super-envoy' to galvanise reconstruction work. But it has failed to convince Afghans while further alienating the Western allies who have shored up his regime.
One senior diplomat who recently met the American officials responsible for its Afghan policy said: "They have realised that it is untenable, that the implications of five more years will be catastrophic. Policy is being made as we speak. All [those] I spoke with in [Washington] D.C openly said that it is time to go – established people in the State [Department], National Security Council, Department of Defence," said



"People were saying that things will get a lot more serious – they have been messing about to date – once the date of the election has been set, which it now obviously has been." Another senior Western official said Afghanistan was now America's top priority. "You do not leave top priority in the hands of a third rate mafia-linked team. The Americans are only just going to work now. The job is too important for a duffer.



"The Western backers are not about to reimpose Karzai. They recognise the need for leadership which is competent and popular. Karzai is neither." He said Mr Karzai remaining in office once his term expires on May 22 would leave American troops fighting overseas to prop up what will then be an unconstitutional government. The Afghan president will come under pressure to stand down in favour of a caretaker in the run-up to the August election, he added.



Speculation over a successor has centred on four Afghan politicians, including Dr Abdullah Abdullah, who attended President Obama's inauguration. The Afghan delegation also included Gula Agha Sherzai, Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai and Dr. Ali Ahmad Jalali, who is regarded as a front-runner. Another candidate mentioned is Haji Nasrullah Baryalai Arsalai, the brother of Kabul governor Haji Din Mohammed.



Washington-based Afghanistan analyst Dr Mohammad Daud Altaf said disillusionment with President Karzai had emerged during the U.S presidential campaign. Now the Obama administration faced a tough choice over Karzai's role as head of an interim government in the run-up to the elections. "It should be Afghans who make some way of finding an interim government, rather than a continuation of the status quo which would be illegitimate," he said.

[Winehole23]

Obama May Postpone Afghan Surge;
Severe Problems in Supply Routes Afflict Aghanistan War Effort (http://www.juancole.com/)


While the attention of the US public and the news media here has been consumed (understandably enough) by the congressional debate over the economic stimulus plan, America's war in Afghanistan has nearly collapsed because of logistical problems.

First, the Taliban destroyed a crucial bridge west of Peshawar over which NATO trucks traveled to the Khyber Pass (http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-fg-pakistan5-2009feb05,0,544041.story) and into Afghanistan. 75% of US and NATO supplies for the war effort in Afghanistan are offloaded at the Pakistani port of Karachi and sent by truck through the Khyber Pass into Afghanistan. Then the Taliban burned 10 trucks carrying such materiel, to demonstrate their control over the supply route of their enemy. The Taliban can accomplish these breathtaking operations against NATO in Pakistan in large part because Pakistani police and military forces are unwilling to risk much to help distant foreign America beat up their cousins. That reluctance is unlikely to change with any rapidity.

Well, you might say, there are other ways to get supplies to Afghanistan. But remember it is a landlocked country. Its neighbors with borders on the state are Pakistan, China, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan; Kyrgyzstan is close enough to offer an air route. Pakistan is the most convenient route, and it may be at an end. China's short border is up in the Himalayas and not useful for transport. Tajikistan is more remote than Afghanistan. The US does not have the kind of good relations with Iran that would allow use of that route for military purposes. A Turkmenistan route would depend on an Iran route, so that is out, too.

http://www.imb.org/newsletter/thetask/images/Central-Asia-map_sm.jpg

So what is left? Uzbekistan and (by air) Kyrgyzstan, that's what.

More bad news. Kyrgyzstan has made a final decision to deny the US further use (http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0206/p03s07-usmi.html) of the Manas military base, from which the US brought 500 tons of materiel into Afghanistan every month. It is charged that Russia used its new oil and gas wealth to bribe Kyrgyzstan to exclude the US, returning the area to its former status as a Russian sphere of influence. (Presumably this would also be payback for US and NATO expansion on Russia's European and Caucasian borders).

Then there was one. The US has opened negotiations with Uzbekistan, which had given Washington use of a base 2002-2005 but ended that deal after it massacred protesters at Andizhon in 2005. Some Uzbeks charged that the US had promoted an "Orange Revolution" style uprising similar to the one in the Ukraine against Uzbek stongman Islam Karimov. But even if the US could get a stable relationship with Karimov, the Uzbeks are not offering to be the transit route for military materiel, only for nonlethal food, medicine and other items.

In the light of these logistical problems (which are absolutely central to the prospects for success of the Afghanistan War), and given that no clear, attainable, finite mission in Afghanistan has ever been enunciated by US civil or military leaders, it is no wonder that President Barack Obama is reported to be putting the "Afghan surge" or the sending of 30,000 new troops to Afghanistan on hold (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article5683681.ece) until a clearer mission can be formulated. TheTimes of London writes:


' The president was concerned by a lack of strategy at his first meeting with Gates and the US joint chiefs of staff last month in “the tank”, the secure conference room in the Pentagon. He asked: “What’s the endgame?” and did not receive a convincing answer. '

and adds, 'Leading Democrats fear Afghanistan could become Obama’s “Vietnam quagmire”.'