duncan228
02-03-2009, 06:19 PM
Top N.B.A. Free Agents Have Little Incentive to Say Goodbye (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/04/sports/basketball/04lebron.html?_r=1&ref=sports)
By Howard Beck
They are coming for LeBron James. Like possessed, bug-eyed shoppers on Black Friday, N.B.A. executives are gathering for a mad dash at James, who in 17 months could become the most coveted free agent in modern history: the biggest toy under the tallest tree.
They will come in waves, armed with earnest smiles, clever videos, dreamy promises and, most important, with cap space, that precious N.B.A. commodity. The Knicks have cleared their 2010 payroll to chase James, the Cleveland Cavaliers’ superstar, and his fellow free agents in waiting, Dwyane Wade of the Miami Heat and Chris Bosh of the Toronto Raptors.
At least a dozen other franchises will be in the hunt, all with the same three-step plan: dump contracts, clear salary-cap room, write a big check to the nearest superstar.
The strategy is simple, sensible, flawlessly logical. And it is probably doomed to fail because of one immutable, rarely acknowledged truth: superstar free agency barely exists in the N.B.A.
It has been almost 13 years since Shaquille O’Neal jilted the Orlando Magic and altered the N.B.A. landscape by signing with the Los Angeles Lakers. It was a modern anomaly, not a precedent. Few certified superstars have made free-agent moves since then.
It is not an accident.
“It’s built right into the system,” said Lon Babby, an agent whose client list includes Tim Duncan, Grant Hill and Ray Allen. “They don’t want guys to leave.”
By “they,” Babby means N.B.A. officials, whose quest for parity and cost control has created a market that rewards superstars for staying put and punishes them for leaving.
Under the N.B.A.’s collective bargaining agreement, a player who stays with his team can sign a six-year contract with 10.5 percent raises. If he leaves, he is limited to five years and 8 percent raises. In real terms, a player like James would have to forgo about $31 million in guaranteed money to sign a so-called max contract with any team other than the Cavaliers, who will be in New York on Wednesday night to face the Knicks.
In theory, a player can recoup the money in his next contract or through endorsement deals. Yet the fact remains that players seldom leave guaranteed money on the table, and superstars almost never leave home.
In the last 13 years only three certifiable franchise players changed teams as free agents while in their prime: Hill, Tracy McGrady and Steve Nash. Hill and McGrady joined Orlando in 2000. Nash joined Phoenix in 2004.
Now consider the list of in-their-prime franchise players who stayed put in the same time span: Kobe Bryant, Tim Duncan, Dirk Nowitzki, Allen Iverson, Kevin Garnett, Chris Webber, Jason Kidd, Paul Pierce, Reggie Miller, Gary Payton, Ray Allen, Amare Stoudemire, John Stockton, Karl Malone and David Robinson. (Malone and Payton signed with the Lakers in 2003, but they were nearing retirement.)
James, Wade and Bosh — the stars of the 2003 draft — could be added to that list. Like most elite players, they signed lucrative extensions to their rookie deals as soon as they were eligible, in 2006.
All of them followed entrenched wisdom: that long-term financial security trumps career flexibility. Combine financial self-interest with the N.B.A.’s complex salary-cap rules, and a result is a market in which superstars have little incentive to move.
“This succession of agreements has resulted in a hard salary cap,” said Arn Tellem, one of the N.B.A.’s most influential agents, “and has really, I think, eliminated for the most part free agency for the high-end players.”
The most critical element at work is the cap on individual salaries. Those limits did not exist in 1996, when the Lakers outbid the Magic and signed O’Neal to a $121 million contract. Today, no team can be outbid for its own free agent unless it wants to be.
The best example is Nash, who in 2004 left Dallas to sign a five-year, $60 million deal with Phoenix. The Mavericks could have matched or exceeded the offer, but they were worried about Nash’s age (he was 30), health and breakneck style.
If the system is a burden to elite players, it is a boon for the league, which prizes franchise stability, and for fans, who almost never have to say goodbye to their heroes.
Malone and Stockton played together for nearly two decades with the Utah Jazz, in one of the N.B.A.’s smallest markets. Miller spent his entire 18-year career with the Indiana Pacers. Duncan will almost certainly finish his career in San Antonio. All are future Hall of Famers. If they played baseball, they would probably have become Yankees, Mets or Dodgers.
“It’s pretty consistent with what we had hoped the rules would produce,” said Joel Litvin, the N.B.A.’s president for league and basketball operations. “That’s the best model.”
When the system fails, the N.B.A. fixes it. Earlier this decade the Warriors lost Gilbert Arenas to Washington and the Cavaliers lost Carlos Boozer to Utah because of a cap loophole involving second-round picks. The N.B.A. closed the loophole in 2005.
Litvin said the N.B.A. aims to balance franchise stability with player freedom. Yet a combination of money and simple human inertia tends to keep players in place.
“It’s hard to leave,” Babby said. “Often the home team has the advantage because the player is comfortable. He’s successful there, his marketing is there, his family is there, his house is there.”
Sometimes the best-laid plans for franchise revival are destroyed by human frailty.
Ten years ago Orlando purged its payroll for the last great free-agent class. The Magic snared Hill and McGrady and at one point seemed close to getting Duncan too. Hill’s career was derailed by injuries, but as free-agent signings go, the Magic pulled off one of the great modern coups.
Then consider the plight of the Chicago Bulls, a big-market team with a rich history. After Michael Jordan’s retirement in 1998, Chicago conserved cap space for years in hopes of landing a new star. None came.
In the N.B.A., the best way to obtain superstars is to trade for them. The Celtics drafted Pierce in 1998 but did not become champions until they obtained Garnett and Allen in a pair of 2007 trades. Kidd has been traded three times. Iverson and O’Neal have been traded twice each.
Of course, it only takes one adventurous superstar in 2010 to render the historical trends irrelevant. But Donnie Walsh, the Knicks’ president, is mindful of the odds and the history.
“Their own teams still have the advantages,” he said. “It’s not an easy deal two years from now to just say, ‘Oh, yeah, let’s go get one of these guys.’ ”
There are shiny consolation prizes for the teams that miss on James. Stoudemire, Nowitzki, Joe Johnson and Michael Redd could be free agents in 2010 as well.
“By the way,” Walsh added coyly, “there’s a next year too after this famous year you’re talking about.”
In the game of cap-space roulette, the champion is the one who spends the most money on the best players. But there is more than one way to win the game.
By Howard Beck
They are coming for LeBron James. Like possessed, bug-eyed shoppers on Black Friday, N.B.A. executives are gathering for a mad dash at James, who in 17 months could become the most coveted free agent in modern history: the biggest toy under the tallest tree.
They will come in waves, armed with earnest smiles, clever videos, dreamy promises and, most important, with cap space, that precious N.B.A. commodity. The Knicks have cleared their 2010 payroll to chase James, the Cleveland Cavaliers’ superstar, and his fellow free agents in waiting, Dwyane Wade of the Miami Heat and Chris Bosh of the Toronto Raptors.
At least a dozen other franchises will be in the hunt, all with the same three-step plan: dump contracts, clear salary-cap room, write a big check to the nearest superstar.
The strategy is simple, sensible, flawlessly logical. And it is probably doomed to fail because of one immutable, rarely acknowledged truth: superstar free agency barely exists in the N.B.A.
It has been almost 13 years since Shaquille O’Neal jilted the Orlando Magic and altered the N.B.A. landscape by signing with the Los Angeles Lakers. It was a modern anomaly, not a precedent. Few certified superstars have made free-agent moves since then.
It is not an accident.
“It’s built right into the system,” said Lon Babby, an agent whose client list includes Tim Duncan, Grant Hill and Ray Allen. “They don’t want guys to leave.”
By “they,” Babby means N.B.A. officials, whose quest for parity and cost control has created a market that rewards superstars for staying put and punishes them for leaving.
Under the N.B.A.’s collective bargaining agreement, a player who stays with his team can sign a six-year contract with 10.5 percent raises. If he leaves, he is limited to five years and 8 percent raises. In real terms, a player like James would have to forgo about $31 million in guaranteed money to sign a so-called max contract with any team other than the Cavaliers, who will be in New York on Wednesday night to face the Knicks.
In theory, a player can recoup the money in his next contract or through endorsement deals. Yet the fact remains that players seldom leave guaranteed money on the table, and superstars almost never leave home.
In the last 13 years only three certifiable franchise players changed teams as free agents while in their prime: Hill, Tracy McGrady and Steve Nash. Hill and McGrady joined Orlando in 2000. Nash joined Phoenix in 2004.
Now consider the list of in-their-prime franchise players who stayed put in the same time span: Kobe Bryant, Tim Duncan, Dirk Nowitzki, Allen Iverson, Kevin Garnett, Chris Webber, Jason Kidd, Paul Pierce, Reggie Miller, Gary Payton, Ray Allen, Amare Stoudemire, John Stockton, Karl Malone and David Robinson. (Malone and Payton signed with the Lakers in 2003, but they were nearing retirement.)
James, Wade and Bosh — the stars of the 2003 draft — could be added to that list. Like most elite players, they signed lucrative extensions to their rookie deals as soon as they were eligible, in 2006.
All of them followed entrenched wisdom: that long-term financial security trumps career flexibility. Combine financial self-interest with the N.B.A.’s complex salary-cap rules, and a result is a market in which superstars have little incentive to move.
“This succession of agreements has resulted in a hard salary cap,” said Arn Tellem, one of the N.B.A.’s most influential agents, “and has really, I think, eliminated for the most part free agency for the high-end players.”
The most critical element at work is the cap on individual salaries. Those limits did not exist in 1996, when the Lakers outbid the Magic and signed O’Neal to a $121 million contract. Today, no team can be outbid for its own free agent unless it wants to be.
The best example is Nash, who in 2004 left Dallas to sign a five-year, $60 million deal with Phoenix. The Mavericks could have matched or exceeded the offer, but they were worried about Nash’s age (he was 30), health and breakneck style.
If the system is a burden to elite players, it is a boon for the league, which prizes franchise stability, and for fans, who almost never have to say goodbye to their heroes.
Malone and Stockton played together for nearly two decades with the Utah Jazz, in one of the N.B.A.’s smallest markets. Miller spent his entire 18-year career with the Indiana Pacers. Duncan will almost certainly finish his career in San Antonio. All are future Hall of Famers. If they played baseball, they would probably have become Yankees, Mets or Dodgers.
“It’s pretty consistent with what we had hoped the rules would produce,” said Joel Litvin, the N.B.A.’s president for league and basketball operations. “That’s the best model.”
When the system fails, the N.B.A. fixes it. Earlier this decade the Warriors lost Gilbert Arenas to Washington and the Cavaliers lost Carlos Boozer to Utah because of a cap loophole involving second-round picks. The N.B.A. closed the loophole in 2005.
Litvin said the N.B.A. aims to balance franchise stability with player freedom. Yet a combination of money and simple human inertia tends to keep players in place.
“It’s hard to leave,” Babby said. “Often the home team has the advantage because the player is comfortable. He’s successful there, his marketing is there, his family is there, his house is there.”
Sometimes the best-laid plans for franchise revival are destroyed by human frailty.
Ten years ago Orlando purged its payroll for the last great free-agent class. The Magic snared Hill and McGrady and at one point seemed close to getting Duncan too. Hill’s career was derailed by injuries, but as free-agent signings go, the Magic pulled off one of the great modern coups.
Then consider the plight of the Chicago Bulls, a big-market team with a rich history. After Michael Jordan’s retirement in 1998, Chicago conserved cap space for years in hopes of landing a new star. None came.
In the N.B.A., the best way to obtain superstars is to trade for them. The Celtics drafted Pierce in 1998 but did not become champions until they obtained Garnett and Allen in a pair of 2007 trades. Kidd has been traded three times. Iverson and O’Neal have been traded twice each.
Of course, it only takes one adventurous superstar in 2010 to render the historical trends irrelevant. But Donnie Walsh, the Knicks’ president, is mindful of the odds and the history.
“Their own teams still have the advantages,” he said. “It’s not an easy deal two years from now to just say, ‘Oh, yeah, let’s go get one of these guys.’ ”
There are shiny consolation prizes for the teams that miss on James. Stoudemire, Nowitzki, Joe Johnson and Michael Redd could be free agents in 2010 as well.
“By the way,” Walsh added coyly, “there’s a next year too after this famous year you’re talking about.”
In the game of cap-space roulette, the champion is the one who spends the most money on the best players. But there is more than one way to win the game.