RG foreign policy prediction/analysis: Iran

[RandomGuy]

Recent disparate news items have indicated to me that the Obama administration is laying the groundwork for lowering the boom on Iran in coming weeks.

Much has been made of the Obama administrations horse-trading and log-rolling to get votes for the health care reform bill. This indicates a certain flexibility when it comes to achieving policy ends.

Given this, and the following:
Permanent UN security council members Russia and China, have up until now been hesitant to impose sanctions.

US/Russian relations have taken a slight thaw with the recent treaty. (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/08/barack-obama-nuclear-treaty-russia) This adds some political capital for the US to spend with Russia.

Recent treasury delay in issuing report regarding chinese currency manipulation. (http://news.firedoglake.com/2010/04/03/treasury-delays-report-on-chinese-currency-manipulation/) This creates a substantial "bargaining chip", and has caused some unusual behind-the-scenes negotiations with China over trade issues.

Obama's stated intention to have sanctions "within weeks" (http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/03/30/obama-ask-visiting-sarkozy-afghan-help/) showing that he is acting on moving in this direct now.

The recent non-proliferation conference (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/12/ukraine-nuclear-deal-reac_n_534672.html) provided a vehicle to discuss non-proliferation and where Iran's nukes were a substantial "subtext".

Obama's pressing of leaders at that conference gave him the opportunity to personnally press the issue, and raise awareness of the issue in public consciousness on a global scale.

In the coming weeks, we will see some rather substantial proposals for sanctions on Iran by the administration, that will very likely pass the UN security council.

The groundwork has been prepared, and it seems obvious the ball in in motion.

Yes, it is pretty obvious that this was in the works, but the administration seems to have taken some fairly substantial steps to ensure that the sanctions will go off as Mr. Obama wants.

[Winehole23]

I doubt Russia and China are on board for the sort of "crippling" sanctions (e.g., an embargo of petroleum distillates) promised by Sec'y Clinton. I don't see them going along with us unless the sanctions are fairly carefully targeted. Russia and China have too much invested in Iran to support anything that could hurt ordinary Iranians or alienate its political class.

[coyotes_geek]

Sanctions or no sanctions, Iran's going to end up with a nuke.

[Winehole23]

Sanctions or no sanctions, Iran's going to end up with a nuke.This is what gets me: can you think of a more powerful incentive for Iran to develop nukes than not so thinly veiled threats to nuke them preemptively?

[coyotes_geek]

This is what gets me: can you think of a more powerful incentive for Iran to develop nukes than not so thinly veiled threats to nuke them preemptively?

I hadn't thought about it in that exact way, but yeah, I see your point. I was thinking more that this is just about the ruling class deciding that the personal benefits associated with forcing your way into the exclusive nuclear club outweigh any consequences that sanctions would bring.

Also, I think there's a good case to be made that the people the Iranian government would most like to intimidate by having a nuke is the Iranian people.

[RandomGuy]

I doubt Russia and China are on board for the sort of "crippling" sanctions (e.g., an embargo of petroleum distillates) promised by Sec'y Clinton. I don't see them going along with us unless the sanctions are fairly carefully targeted. Russia and China have too much invested in Iran to support anything that could hurt ordinary Iranians or alienate its political class.

I don't see it being really crippling either, but I do see it as being rather painful/substantial.

The Chinese, in particular, are a bit wary of loose nukes in that part of the world, having problems with their own islamist movements.

China and US interests in keeping oil flowing from the middle east are starting to align our interests.

[RandomGuy]

Sanctions or no sanctions, Iran's going to end up with a nuke.

I give this as the most probable outcome.

Iran WILL more likely than not, get nukes.

The question then becomes:

"what are the implications of that, really?"

I am a bit indifferent to it. I don't see it as really affecting much, despite the doom and gloom predictions from certain sectors.

Eventually the Iranian theorcracy/thugocracy will evolve into something a bit more reasonable/democratic.

[doobs]

This is what gets me: can you think of a more powerful incentive for Iran to develop nukes than not so thinly veiled threats to nuke them preemptively?

Preemptively?

[RandomGuy]

This is what gets me: can you think of a more powerful incentive for Iran to develop nukes than not so thinly veiled threats to nuke them preemptively?

No, I cannot. Countries secure in their military security do not seem to me to be all that motivated to develop the weapons to balance out perceived conventional weaknesses.

[Duff McCartney]

I agree that Iran will more than likely get a nuke. I also agree that the doom and gloom rhetoric that comes out of every politicians mouth is mere hot air. It won't change anything in that part of the world, if anything it will probably be more peaceful. I think for all their theocratic bullshit, Tehran is a modern city, more modern and liberal that people would think. It may not be Paris or London, but if you scratch the surface I think it would be Philadelphia.

Everyone knows that the United States and Russia have more than enough nukes to blow the world up a hundred times over. So what's the point of trying to threaten anyone with a nuke? The entire world saw how the people of the United States reacted to 9/11, nobody, and I mean nobody in the United States wanted anything less than to destroy Afghanistan and the Taliban. Can you imagine what would happen if a city got nuked? We'd nuke whatever country these terrorists were hiding in back to pre-cambrian life, and nobody, except myself, would want otherwise.

It's become clear to me that nukes are just saber rattling that does absolutely nothing. Once you nuke any country, there is no going back. We've come to a point in our nuclear capabilities that it's impossible for anyone to attack with a nuclear weapon.

[Winehole23]

Preemptively?Should I have said preventively instead?

[doobs]

Should I have said preventively instead?

I dunno.

I don't disagree that preemptive nuclear strike has never been disavowed by the United States. But if you want to talk about perverse incentives, I would think a policy of preventive nuclear strike would be more of a problem.

With classic preemption you're exercising first-strike in self-defense. Imminence is key. Nuclear preemption would involve a country's use of nuclear weapons to (presumably) defend itself against the use of nuclear weapons. I don't see how this would affect the incentives of a non-nuclear state, since it would still apply to them in a preemption scenario.

With nuclear prevention you're exercising first-strike much more offensively. You're doing so to prevent another country from doing something in the future, whether it's developing WMDs or whatever. I'm not sure that this has ever been the US policy . . . but if it has been, then I can see how it would encourage other countries to covertly develop nuclear weapons, since nuclear prevention is much more effective against a country that cannot retaliate in kind.

In other words, I can see at least three distinct subsets of nuclear strike policy: retaliation (which can always be justified, though the proportionality of the retaliation is debatable); preemption (which is more difficult to justify, but can be done so upon a showing of imminence and necessity); and prevention (which is incredibly difficult to justify.)

[coyotes_geek]

I give this as the most probable outcome.

Iran WILL more likely than not, get nukes.

The question then becomes:

"what are the implications of that, really?"

I am a bit indifferent to it. I don't see it as really affecting much, despite the doom and gloom predictions from certain sectors.

Eventually the Iranian theorcracy/thugocracy will evolve into something a bit more reasonable/democratic.

I'm not indifferent to it, in fact I really don't like it one bit. But I've accepted that the only way to prevent it is direct military action and that the "benefit" of that decision does not justify the "cost".

[Winehole23]

I dunno.

I don't disagree that preemptive nuclear strike has never been disavowed by the United States. But if you want to talk about perverse incentives, I would think a policy of preventive nuclear strike would be more of a problem.I agree strongly with this.


With classic preemption you're exercising first-strike in self-defense. Imminence is key. Nuclear preemption would involve a country's use of nuclear weapons to (presumably) defend itself against the use of nuclear weapons. I don't see how this would affect the incentives of a non-nuclear state, since it would still apply to them in a preemption scenario.Hysterical suspicion of the Iranian threat has already carried us half way there. Nukes+mad mullahs= Shoah 2.0.


With nuclear prevention you're exercising first-strike much more offensively. You're doing so to prevent another country from doing something in the future, whether it's developing WMDs or whatever. I'm not sure that this has ever been the US policy . . . It would appear to be now, from my vantage. I think it's harebrained.


but if it has been, then I can see how it would encourage other countries to covertly develop nuclear weapons, since nuclear prevention is much more effective against a country that cannot retaliate in kind.Maybe I should have said preventive, but it might behoove us here to distinguish preventive war itself from the mere threat of it. But it would seem where nukes are concerned the threat is taken about as seriously as actually waging war. With good reason, it seems to me.


In other words, I can see at least three distinct subsets of nuclear strike policy: retaliation (which can always be justified, though the proportionality of the retaliation is debatable); preemption (which is more difficult to justify, but can be done so upon a showing of imminence and necessity); and prevention (which is incredibly difficult to justify.)Nice nutshell, doobs. :tu

[Winehole23]

In short, the imminence and necessity needful for preemption would seem to be lacking here, to say nothing whatever wrt prevention.

[Winehole23]

Leaving the nuclear option on the table is conspicuous. The implied threat doesn't work if Iran doesn't take it seriously.

[Winehole23]

I give this as the most probable outcome.

Iran WILL more likely than not, get nukes.We can't prevent it forever.

We can hope the passage of time will change the reigning thugocracy in Iran before it happens, but the change may not be as much in our favor as we might be inclined to think: liberal ideology is not a natural or necessary outgrowth of the democratic franchise or a more republican form of government.


The question then becomes:

"what are the implications of that, really?"

I am a bit indifferent to it. I don't see it as really affecting much, despite the doom and gloom predictions from certain sectors.Iran is a major regional factor, but compared to us, they're not much of a threat, and anyway they'd be much less of one if we GTFO of Iraq and Afghanistan.


Eventually the Iranian theorcracy/thugocracy will evolve into something a bit more reasonable/democratic.I'm not sure what underwrites your optimism here, but I sure envy it. I hope you're right.

[doobs]

In short, the imminence and necessity needful for preemption would seem to be lacking here, to say nothing whatever wrt prevention.

Agreed. An attack on Iran--whether nuclear or conventional--could not be justified on grounds of preemption.

Since prevention is dangerously close conceptually to outright aggression, you would need to have some compelling interest at stake to justify it; Iran being close to illicit development of nuclear weapons would qualify, IMO. But that still would not justify a preventive nuclear attack since a more limited conventional attack would almost certainly suffice.

This is why a UN use-of-force resolution is particularly helpful in cases of preventive attack. It makes the task of answering these thorny questions less difficult, since the international community has basically agreed to say it's OK.


Leaving the nuclear option on the table is conspicuous. The implied threat doesn't work if Iran doesn't take it seriously.

I guess this is what I'm wondering about. What nuclear options have we left on the table vis-a-vis Iran? (I'm sure there's some calculated ambiguity to scare off potential adversaries.)

I have no doubt that Iran is well-aware of America's willingness to use nuclear weapons to retaliate and perhaps to preempt an imminent attack; but a preventive nuclear attack? Perhaps we've subtly warned Iran of this. IMO, that would be bad policy.

[Winehole23]

I seem to recall official and publicly disclosed speculation within the last five years or so about the effectiveness of bunker-busting weapons we actually have against specific Iranian targets. Wasn't there?

[Winehole23]

Obama has previously declined to take any options off the table, and in his recent pronouncement on US nuclear policy, he was careful to exclude NK and Iran.

[doobs]

Well, there's a difference between what we say and what our allies and adversaries actually believe. What we say tends to affect their viewpoints, but not all threats or promises are equally credible.

From Iran's perspective, I bet they're most concerned about a last-ditch conventional attack by the United States or Israel. If the United States is interested in preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power, it is in the United States' interests to pursue the least disruptive means of achieving that objective. So even if the United States pointedly refuses to take the nuclear option off the table for purposes of prevention, Iran has probably concluded (reasonably) that a nuclear attack would be highly unlikely.

Bunker busters or tactical nuclear weapons are distinguishable here from nuclear attack (at least in the way I'm using the terms). I'm sure Iran views these weapons to be very much on the table.

[Winehole23]

Agreed. An attack on Iran--whether nuclear or conventional--could not be justified on grounds of preemption.

Since prevention is dangerously close conceptually to outright aggression, you would need to have some compelling interest at stake to justify it; Iran being close to illicit development of nuclear weapons would qualify, IMO. But that still would not justify a preventive nuclear attack since a more limited conventional attack would almost certainly suffice.What inspires your confidence in this? (I'm certainly no judge of it myself, so fire away. :lol)


This is why a UN use-of-force resolution is particularly helpful in cases of preventive attack. It makes the task of answering these thorny questions less difficult, since the international community has basically agreed to say it's OK.If your aim is war, yes. It smoothed the way in Serbia in 1999, but I think that was a bad deal too. The coercive partition of Serbia set a bad example Russia followed in North Ossetia and Abkhazia, and it resulted in a de facto narco-state, Kosovo.


I have no doubt that Iran is well-aware of America's willingness to use nuclear weapons to retaliate and perhaps to preempt an imminent attack; but a preventive nuclear attack? Perhaps we've subtly warned Iran of this. IMO, that would be bad policy.Yeah, I agree.

[Winehole23]

@doobs: On the one hand, you say preventive war is harder to justify. But wrt to Iran, you seem to see the burden for prevention as already having been met, while agreeing that the justification for preemption fails.

Correct?

[doobs]

@doobs: On the one hand, you say preventive war is harder to justify. But wrt to Iran, you seem to see the burden for prevention as already having been met, while agreeing that the justification for preemption fails.

Correct?

I consider them to be completely separate beasts. But generally, yes, preventive war is a harder sell.

Let me see if I can articulate this. Preemption only applies when there is an imminent threat. When the conditions for preemption exist, the case for preemption is fairly easily made.

But where there is *no* imminent threat--so there can be no justification on preemption grounds--there might still be some interest at stake that justifies military intervention. A more difficult case to make than in a scenario where preemption is available.

[EVAY]

This is an honest question... not bright but nonetheless honest, perhaps...if Iran has nuke capacity, the issue is one of delivery capability, right? And the delivery capability in question has to be toward Israel, right? Now, if Iran were to hit Israel with nuclear bombs, wouldn't the fall-out necessarily fall all over Muslim territories, given the prevailing winds? What would be the point of that, in realistic terms?

Whereas, If Israel were to hit Iran, wouldn't the prevailing winds carry the radiation only to other muslim or arab lands ( or perhaps even to China?)?

I mean, really, what are the likelihoods here?

[Nbadan]

This is an honest question... not bright but nonetheless honest, perhaps...if Iran has nuke capacity, the issue is one of delivery capability, right? And the delivery capability in question has to be toward Israel, right? Now, if Iran were to hit Israel with nuclear bombs, wouldn't the fall-out necessarily fall all over Muslim territories, given the prevailing winds? What would be the point of that, in realistic terms?

The more pertinent question should be, even if they had the capability, why would Iran nuke Israel? Pakistan has nukes, Israel is still there...Turkey has nukes, Israel is still there...

[Nbadan]

...but I think the Obama administration is looking to do something, sanctions maybe, but in all honesty, China, which gets most of its oil and other petroleum distillates from Iran to prime its expanding economy, wouldn't just sit there and do nothing if the Israelis or U.S. bombed the Iranian oil infrastructure...

[EVAY]

The more pertinent question should be, even if they had the capability, why would Iran nuke Israel? Pakistan has nukes, Israel is still there...Turkey has nukes, Israel is still there...

I have assumed (perhaps erroneously), that iran wanted to make a statement about the biggest baddest anti-Israeli power, so that they would want to wipe out all israelis with a bomb. Problem being one of logistics, i.e., you take out the Israelis, you take out your own folks as well. It seems to be a bit of a short range plan, if you know what I mean.

Pakistan keeps its nukes for India threat, nothing more. They may talk the talk, but they won't walk the walk regarding Israel. They have more immediate concerns in India and Casmir.

[Nbadan]

I have assumed (perhaps erroneously), that iran wanted to make a statement about the biggest baddest anti-Israeli power, so that they would want to wipe out all israelis with a bomb. Problem being one of logistics, i.e., you take out the Israelis, you take out your own folks as well. It seems to be a bit of a short range plan, if you know what I mean.

Israel has well over 300 nukes and thanks to the U.S., the most modern air, sea and land power in the region...Iran supports Palestinian sovereignty, just as we support Iraq and Afghanistan sovereignty, but Iran would be obliterated if it even thought of attacking Israel.

[EVAY]

Israel has well over 300 nukes and thanks to the U.S., the most modern air, sea and land power in the region...Iran supports Palestinian sovereignty, just as we support Iraq and Afghanistan sovereignty, but Iran would be obliterated if it even thought of attacking Israel.

Agreed...so, why would they ever actually even think of it?

[Nbadan]

Agreed...so, why would they ever actually even think of it?

Why does any country want a nuke? So they aren't the next Iraq....

[Winehole23]

Israel has well over 300 nukes and thanks to the U.S., the most modern air, sea and land power in the region...Iran supports Palestinian sovereignty, just as we support Iraq and Afghanistan sovereignty, but Iran would be obliterated if it even thought of attacking Israel.Sidebar: please correct me if I've misremembered, but isn't it ultimately France that Israel has to thank for it nuclear fuel-cycle proficiency?

[Winehole23]

This is an honest question... not bright but nonetheless honest, perhaps...if Iran has nuke capacity, the issue is one of delivery capability, right? I thought the question of delivery was more or less unquestioned, but that the hangup was enrichment capability. They can probably hit the edges of Europe right now, if newspaper reports of Iranian missile tests have any veracity.

I've heard that they don't have enough centrifuges, the ones they have don't work as well as they'd like, and they might not have enough "off-schedule" materials to start with. (By heart, right? I didn't bookmark any of that.)


And the delivery capability in question has to be toward Israel, right? Why, please?


Now, if Iran were to hit Israel with nuclear bombs, wouldn't the fall-out necessarily fall all over Muslim territories, given the prevailing winds? What would be the point of that, in realistic terms?This is where I begin to wonder if there's a realistic distinction to be made between using *tactical nukes* -- which have never been used outside of test conditions that I know of -- versus using *conventional* nukes.

[Winehole23]

Is the distinction between tactical and conventional nukes to some extent self-drawn and self-serving?

[Winehole23]

Does international law make such a distinction?

[Winehole23]

Does Iran?

[Winehole23]

http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/nuclear_weapons/technical_issues/nuclear-bunker-buster-rnep-animation.html

[TeyshaBlue]

Have we even developed a RNEP?

[Winehole23]

Honestly, I don't know. I do know the missile supposed for the above simulation ("60 times more powerful than Hiroshima") was never funded.

[Winehole23]

I was sort of intrigued by the doob's suggestion that a strike with "tactical" nukes is somehow not a "conventional" nuclear attack.