Winehole23
04-29-2010, 12:53 PM
Appeals court says money-laundering law applies in case involving DeLay associates (http://www.statesman.com/blogs/content/shared-gen/blogs/austin/courts/entries/2010/04/28/appeals_court_says_moneylaunde.html)
By Chuck Lindell (http://www.statesman.com/blogs/content/shared-gen/blogs/austin/courts/entries/2010/04/28/appeals_court_says_moneylaunde.html#postcomment) | Wednesday, April 28, 2010, 11:15 AM
The Austin appeals court erred in deciding that the state’s money-laundering statute - used to prosecute associates of former U.S. House Majority Leader Tom DeLay - did not apply to transfers made via checks, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ruled today.
The court’s 9-0 decision also upheld the state’s election laws prohibiting corporations from making political contributions to candidates. DeLay’s associates - John Colyandro and Jim Ellis - had challenged the law as an unconstitutional infringement on First Amendment rights.
In 2002, the Public Integrity Section of the Travis County District charged Colyandro - working on behalf of Texans for a Republican Majority PAC - with accepting political contributions from corporations.
Colyandro and Ellis also were charged with money laundering by transferring $190,000 in corporate contributions to the Republican National Committee by a check, with a similar amount later returned to the state organization.
The men asked the trial court to dismiss the charges, arguing the money-laundering statute was unconstitutionally vague if it were interpreted to apply to transactions involving something other than cash, including checks.
When the trial court declined, they appealed to the 3rd Court of Appeals in Austin.
In 2008, the appeals court ruled that the money-laundering law did not apply to Colyandro and Ellis because it did not specifically refer to checks.
The law reads: “A person commits an offense if the person knowingly … conducts, supervises, or facilitates a transaction involving the proceeds of criminal activity.” The law defines proceeds as coin or paper money, U.S. Treasury notes and silver certificates and official foreign bank notes.
However, in its ruling today, the state’s highest criminal court chastised the lower court for applying an improper legal standard to its analysis of the money laundering statute.
Writing for the Court of Criminal Appeals, Presiding Judge Sharon Keller said Colyandro and Ellis improperly challenged the constitutionality of the money-laundering statute in a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The appeals court had no authority to determine that the law only applies to cash payments, Keller wrote.
Keller also noted, however, that the statute could also be read to apply to checks, Keller wrote, noting that “foreign bank notes” operate on the same principle as checks.
By Chuck Lindell (http://www.statesman.com/blogs/content/shared-gen/blogs/austin/courts/entries/2010/04/28/appeals_court_says_moneylaunde.html#postcomment) | Wednesday, April 28, 2010, 11:15 AM
The Austin appeals court erred in deciding that the state’s money-laundering statute - used to prosecute associates of former U.S. House Majority Leader Tom DeLay - did not apply to transfers made via checks, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ruled today.
The court’s 9-0 decision also upheld the state’s election laws prohibiting corporations from making political contributions to candidates. DeLay’s associates - John Colyandro and Jim Ellis - had challenged the law as an unconstitutional infringement on First Amendment rights.
In 2002, the Public Integrity Section of the Travis County District charged Colyandro - working on behalf of Texans for a Republican Majority PAC - with accepting political contributions from corporations.
Colyandro and Ellis also were charged with money laundering by transferring $190,000 in corporate contributions to the Republican National Committee by a check, with a similar amount later returned to the state organization.
The men asked the trial court to dismiss the charges, arguing the money-laundering statute was unconstitutionally vague if it were interpreted to apply to transactions involving something other than cash, including checks.
When the trial court declined, they appealed to the 3rd Court of Appeals in Austin.
In 2008, the appeals court ruled that the money-laundering law did not apply to Colyandro and Ellis because it did not specifically refer to checks.
The law reads: “A person commits an offense if the person knowingly … conducts, supervises, or facilitates a transaction involving the proceeds of criminal activity.” The law defines proceeds as coin or paper money, U.S. Treasury notes and silver certificates and official foreign bank notes.
However, in its ruling today, the state’s highest criminal court chastised the lower court for applying an improper legal standard to its analysis of the money laundering statute.
Writing for the Court of Criminal Appeals, Presiding Judge Sharon Keller said Colyandro and Ellis improperly challenged the constitutionality of the money-laundering statute in a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The appeals court had no authority to determine that the law only applies to cash payments, Keller wrote.
Keller also noted, however, that the statute could also be read to apply to checks, Keller wrote, noting that “foreign bank notes” operate on the same principle as checks.