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View Full Version : Privatization: Guess Who Wins, and Who Loses



boutons_deux
01-31-2014, 12:09 PM
Given the immensely favorable deals that governments — federal, state and local — give to their private “partners,” how can crony corruption and kickbacks not be a part of it.

For example, consider just this via Rich Perlstein, on the sale of revenues from Chicago parking meters to a consortium led by Morgan Stanley and including the Sovereign Wealth Fund of Abu Dhabi.

Perlstein writes (http://www.thenation.com/blog/176043/privatizations-cutting-edge) (my bolding and some reparagraphing):

On Privatization’s Cutting Edge

… Everyone, I suppose, dislikes parking meters. Chicagoans hate them even more. That’s because Mayor Richard M. Daley in 2008 struck a deal with the investment consortium Chicago Parking Meters LLC, or CPM, that included Morgan Stanley, Allianz Capital Partners and, yes, the Sovereign Wealth Fund of Abu Dhabi, to privatize our meters.

The price of parking—and the intensity of enforcement—skyrocketed (http://www.inthepublicinterest.org/article/real-chicago-way-thomas-frank). The terms were negotiated in secret. City Council members got two days to study the billion-dollar, seventy-five-year contract before signing off on it. An early estimate from the Chicago inspector general was that the city had sold off its property for about half of what it was worth. Then an alderman said it was worth about four times what the city had been paid. Finally, in 2010, Forbes reported (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-09/morgan-stanley-group-s-11-billion-from-chicago-meters-makes-taxpayers-cry.html) that in fact the city had been underpaid by a factor of ten.


Who would negotiate such terms, if they had anything like the city’s interest at heart? But wait, there’s more:

The deal, you see, is structured like this. Not only does CPM get the money its meters hoover up from the fine upstanding citizens of Chicago. It gets money even if the meters are not used. Each meter has been assigned a “fair market valuation.”If the City takes what is called a “reserve power adverse action”—that can mean anything from removing a meter because it impedes traffic flow, shutting down a street for a block party or discouraging traffic from coming into the city during rush hour—“CPM has the right to trigger an immediate payment for the entire loss of the meter’s fair market value over the entire life of the seventy-five-year agreement.”

Shut down one meter that the market-valuation says makes twenty-two bucks a day, in other words, and the City of Chicago has to fork over a check for $351,000—six days a week (why six days? more on that later), fifty-two weeks in a year, times seventy-five—within thirty days. Very easily, Geoghegan points out, a single shut-down of parking in a chunk of the city—say, for something like a NATO summit Chicago hosted last year—“could be more than the original purchase price of the deal.”


Do read the rest (http://www.thenation.com/blog/176043/privatizations-cutting-edge). A great many privatization schemes like this have the same profit-guaranteeing clauses in them.

I recently did a radio interview with Angie Coiro and Blaine Rummel of In The Public Interest discussing just this subject. Blaine pointed out that prison privatization contracts typically had a “guaranteed occupancy” clause (think about that; think about the incentives that sets up), as well as a taxpayer-funded reimbursement if those occupancy quotas aren’t met.

Who would negotiate such a contract, except someone in bed with cronies, or benefiting from kickback.

http://americablog.com/2013/09/privatization-driven-corruption-chicago-parking-meter-debacle.html

boutons_deux
01-31-2014, 12:14 PM
The Stealth Privatization of Pennsylvania's Bridges


At midnight of January 20, 2014, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette announced that the administration of Gov. Tom Corbett finally decided to take action on the state's crumbling bridges. The action it is taking is to sign a 40-year contract to privatize Pennsylvania bridges.

The word privatization does not appear in any of the announcements. Instead, PennDOT refers to the project as a public-private partnership. However, whether called a PPP, P3, public-private partnership, contracting out or privatization, the result is the same. Infrastructure privatization - that is privatization of roads, bridges, parking garages, parking meters, airports and the like - involves signing a contract, generally for a term of 30 to 99 years.

In the case of Pennsylvania's bridges, the private contractor takes on responsibility for designing, constructing, financing and operating bridges for up to 40 years. [PennDOT (ftp://ftp.dot.state.pa.us/public/Bureaus/Press/P3/PA%20Rapid%20Bridge%20Replacement%20Forum%20Nov%20 6.pdf), McCalls (http://articles.mcall.com/2014-01-23/news/mc-penndot-rapid-bridge-repair-20140123_1_deficient-bridges-state-bridges-penndot)] Experience with infrastructure privatization shows what we can expect as the bridge privatization proceeds.

Pennsylvania will hire a privatization industry insider as a consultant to advise the state. International firms such as Mayer Brown, Morgan Stanley and Macquarie frequently are hired to act as the consultant and, in other cases, will sit on the other side of the table as the private contractor. Consultants often are paid a "success fee" if a privatization agreement is reached. The success fee will motivate the adviser to recommend privatizing.

The public tends to grumble about paying tolls, but that misses bigger issues, such as the contract's adverse-action rights. Adverse-action rights give the contractor the right to be paid compensation whenever an action lowers the amount of money the private contractor expects to receive.

(note: some good info here in the article about Chicago's privatization disasaster)


1. What is the real cost of privatization? Will the deal really cost less than the traditional way of building and repairing bridges - that is, hiring private firms as consultants, engineers and construction crews to do the repair work while the people of Pennsylvania retain control and ownership of the bridges?

2. Once the government and private contractor sign their 40-year deal, the people of Pennsylvania will have to live under a 40-year monopoly contract that will cost the state money any time it needs to make a change. What will the privatization contract say about adverse action and other contractor rights?

3. Forty years is two generations, and there likely will be many unanticipated situations the contract does not cover. For example, how will developments in transportation technology affect the bridges? Will Pennsylvanians have to pay adverse-action compensation because the contract terms don't cover new technology or other changes? If PennDOT starts making changes outside the contract, how will it affect the parties' costs and responsibilities? Any adjustments once the contract is signed will become particularly expensive, because locking the state into such a long contract takes away the state's bargaining power.

4. Right-to-know rights currently give the public the right to ask for public records. How will the public's right to know be affected once bridge-related activities become confidential, private business practices?

http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/21513-the-stealth-privatization-of-pennsylvanias-bridges