Winehole23
07-14-2014, 09:21 AM
According to data from the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Barclays' dark pool, often shortened to LX, was nearly the largest in trading volume, second only to Credit Suisse's dark pool, Crossfinder. So, it was something of a serious matter when, two weeks ago, New York state's Attorney General Eric Schneiderman filed what the New York Times called "a scathing lawsuit" (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/29/opinion/sunday/lawsuit-against-barclays-shows-need-for-more-scrutiny.html?_r=0) against Barclays over "demonstrated persistent fraud" (http://go.bloomberg.com/assets/content/uploads/sites/2/Schneiderman-Barclays-complaint.pdf) and repeated violations of the Martin Act.
"The particularly egregious behavior was that they marketed this as a protected dark pool," Todd Cipperman of Cipperman Compliance Services told Crain's Pensions & Investments (http://www.pionline.com/article/20140707/PRINT/307079982/barclays-suit-another-black-eye-for-dark-pools) (an excellent gift (https://sec.crain.com/PI/QuickOrder.aspx?PromotionCode=W4PIWBN) for grandma or grandpa).
Integral to this deception, according to the suit, was a complete misrepresentation of Barclays' "Liquidity Profiling" service which promised to police "each interaction in the dark pool" to "protect [clients] from predatory trading" but in practice, well, didn't do shit. The suit alleges that Barclays "granted liberal 'overrides' to high-frequency trading firms and to Barclays' own internal trading desks (which themselves employ 'aggressive' trading strategies), in order to make them appear less 'toxic' than they really are."
Citing internal emails between senior executives of Barclays' Equities Electronic Trading division, Schneiderman's office states that the firm intentionally "de-emphasized" high-frequency traders in a promotional chart of the pool's liquidity landscape. They also altogether removed data about Tradebot Systems, an ominously generic firm that "had historically been, and was at that time, the largest participant in Barclays' dark pool, with an established history of trading activity that was known to Barclays as 'toxic.'"
As described by one former senior-level Director within the division:
Barclays was doing deals left and right with high frequency firms to invite them into the pool to be trading partners for the buy side. So the pool is mainly made up of high frequency firms. [...]
[T]he way the deal would work is [Barclays] would invite the high frequency firms in. They would trade with the buy side. The buy side would pay the commissions. The high frequency firms would pay basically nothing. They would make their money off of manipulating the price. Barclays would make their money off the buy side. And the buy side would totally be taken advantage of because they got stuck with the bad trade [...] this happened over and over again.http://blackbag.gawker.com/barclays-dark-pool-trading-scandal-sounds-bad-becaus-1602189211/+tcberman
"The particularly egregious behavior was that they marketed this as a protected dark pool," Todd Cipperman of Cipperman Compliance Services told Crain's Pensions & Investments (http://www.pionline.com/article/20140707/PRINT/307079982/barclays-suit-another-black-eye-for-dark-pools) (an excellent gift (https://sec.crain.com/PI/QuickOrder.aspx?PromotionCode=W4PIWBN) for grandma or grandpa).
Integral to this deception, according to the suit, was a complete misrepresentation of Barclays' "Liquidity Profiling" service which promised to police "each interaction in the dark pool" to "protect [clients] from predatory trading" but in practice, well, didn't do shit. The suit alleges that Barclays "granted liberal 'overrides' to high-frequency trading firms and to Barclays' own internal trading desks (which themselves employ 'aggressive' trading strategies), in order to make them appear less 'toxic' than they really are."
Citing internal emails between senior executives of Barclays' Equities Electronic Trading division, Schneiderman's office states that the firm intentionally "de-emphasized" high-frequency traders in a promotional chart of the pool's liquidity landscape. They also altogether removed data about Tradebot Systems, an ominously generic firm that "had historically been, and was at that time, the largest participant in Barclays' dark pool, with an established history of trading activity that was known to Barclays as 'toxic.'"
As described by one former senior-level Director within the division:
Barclays was doing deals left and right with high frequency firms to invite them into the pool to be trading partners for the buy side. So the pool is mainly made up of high frequency firms. [...]
[T]he way the deal would work is [Barclays] would invite the high frequency firms in. They would trade with the buy side. The buy side would pay the commissions. The high frequency firms would pay basically nothing. They would make their money off of manipulating the price. Barclays would make their money off the buy side. And the buy side would totally be taken advantage of because they got stuck with the bad trade [...] this happened over and over again.http://blackbag.gawker.com/barclays-dark-pool-trading-scandal-sounds-bad-becaus-1602189211/+tcberman