FBI: Retweeting a Terrorist's Tweet Could Land You In Trouble

[ElNono]

Twitter has become a valuable tool for U.S. law enforcement agencies in their fight against terrorism. It's been used as evidence in trials, it's provided useful intelligence, and it has helped them figure out who is involved with these groups. But ACLU lawyer Lee Rowland is trying to make sure they don't take it too far (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/twitter-terrorism-fbi_55b7e25de4b0224d8834466e). In April, a 30-year-old man was charged with providing "material support" to the Islamic State. The FBI's probably cause? He retweeted some of the group's tweets. FBI director James Comey says a person's intent is the heart of the issue: "Knowing it was wrong, you provided material support for a terrorist organization or some other offense. That is the bulwark against prosecuting someone for having an idea or having an interest. You have to manifest a criminal intent to further the aims prohibited by the statute." Rowland points out the obvious First Amendment concerns. He adds, "... there's also the question of intent there: repeating speech is not automatically an endorsement. ... So a RT alone is certainly not an endorsement and in many situations may be a criticism of the original speaker, and that's particularly true with terrorism, because I believe many people may believe terrorism is self-evidently immoral."

[Splits]

When is this finally going to be brought back to the Supreme Court? Advocating political violence is a protected first amendment right:


395 U.S. 444Brandenburg v. Ohio (No. 492) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/395/444)

Argued: February 27, 1969

Decided: June 9, 1969

Reversed.


Syllabus (https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/395/444#writing-USSC_CR_0395_0444_ZS)
Opinion, (https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/395/444#writing-USSC_CR_0395_0444_ZO)
Concurrence, Black (https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/395/444#writing-USSC_CR_0395_0444_ZC)
Concurrence, Douglas (https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/395/444#writing-USSC_CR_0395_0444_ZC1)


Syllabus
Appellant, a Ku Klux Klan leader, was convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute for
advocat . . . the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform and for voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.

Neither the indictment nor the trial judge's instructions refined the statute's definition of the crime in terms of mere advocacy not distinguished from incitement to imminent lawless action.
[I]
Held: Since the statute, by its words and as applied, purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate the described type of action, it falls within the condemnation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Freedoms of speech and press do not permit a State to forbid advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/274/357/), overruled.

Reversed.

[DarrinS]

Be careful, Splits

[Splits]

Careful of what? Advocating for a constitutional right? You think I'm a KKK sympathizer?