BillMc
10-22-2016, 04:11 AM
http://bballbreakdown.com/?s=top+50
Kawhi: 5
When he entered the league in 2011, Kawhi Leonard was a relative unknown. At the time, he was expected to grow into and remain strictly within the three-and-D pigeonhole. Considering his career .250 three-point shooting percentage in two years at San Diego State University, the first part of that three-and-D formula was a hopeful projection.
That was the ceiling. If the Spurs were lucky and the kid worked hard, he’d be a more athletic Bruce Bowen. Earn his keep on the defensive end and for God’s sake, stay in the corners on offense. Maybe catch a lob every now and then.
Those humble draft night expectations are worth repeating as Leonard has surpassed them so entirely they are now all but forgotten. In the space of just five years he has made himself into one of the most complete players in the NBA.
A year ago, Will Gottlieb wrote these words in an article accompanying Marc Gasol’s selection as the 10th ranked player in the league for this site: “Being the dominant scorer often comes at a cost—most players have to choose where they want to place their effort—because being the defensive ace and offensive first-option is close to impossible.”
Coming off his second consecutive season both leading the Spurs in scoring and earning Defensive Player of the Year honors, Leonard has made a habit of doing the (close to) impossible.
In 2016 Leonard raised his scoring average from 16.5 to 21.2 points per game (15th in the NBA) and was somehow even more efficient, posting a .506 field goal percentage as compared with .479 the previous year. More impressive was how he did it.
Relegated to the corners no more, Leonard unveiled a surprisingly accurate three-point shot that found its way home more than 44 percent of the time. It was the third-best three-point percentage of the year behind J.J. Redick and Stephen Curry, and a personal improvement of nearly 10 percent from the previous season. A leap of that magnitude is almost unheard of.
He didn’t do it by relying on the short corner either. Only 68 of Leonard’s 291 three-point attempts came from the left or right corner. He actually made more above the break threes—96—than he even attempted from the corners.
Leonard’s comfort at almost any spot on the floor also showed itself in the continued development of his in-between and post-up skill sets. Hours of developmental work with Chad Forcier, now lead assistant with the Orlando Magic, came to fruition in a variety of moves not often put to good use in today’s NBA.
The array has been wildly successful for Leonard. He shot better than 50 percent on fadeaways (56.9 percent), hook shots (64.3 percent), pull up jumpers (53.1 percent), step backs (72 percent), and turnaround jump shots (51.7 percent). He even made 60 percent of the 25 turnaround fadeaways he attempted, which just sounds extremely difficult and seemed worth mentioning.
Overall, he was one of the top performers in the league in all his major categories: spot ups, post ups, isolation, and even pick-and-rolls (as Coach Nick covers in his video).
All of this he did while routinely drawing the league’s toughest defensive assignments and holding his opponents to 5.6 percent below their average field goal percentage.
With Leonard as the linchpin, the Spurs won a historic 67 games in the regular season, the best record ever for the franchise and tied for fifth all-time with the ’86 Celtics, ’92 Bulls, ’00 Lakers, ’07 Mavericks and ’15 Warriors.
The DPOY was awarded First Team All-Defensive and All-NBA honors, voted an All-Star starter and finished as runner-up in MVP voting. He was fourth in win shares and box plus/minus, sixth in player efficiency rating, eighth in true shooting percentage, seventh in offensive rating, third in defensive rating and had the seventh highest value over replacement player in the NBA. His performance left no doubt as to his standing as one of the top players in the game. At least it should have.
There still exists the odd YouTube commenter or barbershop analyst who questions Leonard. It’s gotten to the point where the arguments against him are almost so ridiculous they can be used in his favor. For example, Kawhi Leonard must be pretty good when what passes for criticism against him is that he never scored more than 32 points in a game, or he only averaged 21 points.
But the favorite argument against him isn’t an argument at all. It’s just one word. A shining ideal. An elusive philosophy. The system. “System” is thought of by those who hold tightly to it to discredit players as a trump card in any discussion of ranking. In actuality it usually functions more like a scarlet letter, a flashing neon sign announcing, “I don’t really watch this guy play!”
What “system” really is, is a technical word for that common sense thing the Spurs do where they endeavor to move themselves and the ball in order to move the defense and create quality scoring opportunities for each other, rather than standing around and watching one guy try to score at a great degree of difficulty.
Sure, that’s an oversimplification of the intricacies of strategy involved and the skill required to achieve it, but so is any suggestion that Leonard’s accomplishments should count for less because he’s the beneficiary of good coaching.
The Spurs’ system absolutely puts players in the best position to succeed but it is not without its dirty secrets. Another function of the system—wherein bench players factor heavily and minutes are kept low across the board—is that it is just as adept at limiting the numbers of its stars as it is raising the value of its role players. At this point it takes some willful ignorance to mistake Leonard for the latter.
Still, there are legitimate points to be made about the system’s effect. Critics argue the Spurs’ ball movement shields Leonard from the burden of offensive responsibility players like James Harden or Paul George endure. By the same token, they further argue that he is not forced to take as many inefficient shots, and is more frequently assisted on his field goals than other star players.
There is a degree of truth to each of these arguments. Their weight is a matter of opinion but they are fair, so long as they are not extrapolated as proof that Leonard is incapable of creating his own offense and entirely reliant on the system to do so for him. Neither the tape nor the statistics support that belief anymore.
For one, only 26.8 percent of Leonard’s attempted shots were of the catch and shoot variety last year. That is simply not the bread and butter of his game. Looking at where his field goal attempts come from, Leonard’s penchant for the mid-range is evident. The majority of his 1,090 FGAs in 2016 came from that portion of the floor.
http://bballbreakdown.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/chart-e1476114900778.jpeg (http://bballbreakdown.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/chart-e1476114900778.jpeg)
He was assisted on only 41 percent of his makes from that range. The total percentage of Leonard’s field goals he was assisted on is about 55 to 45 percent unassisted. The number assisted is a luxury not all stars enjoy, but not a large enough differential to suggest dependency.
Piggybacking on that statistic, though dribbling or holding onto the ball longer than a few moments is generally tantamount to a mortal sin in Spurs’ culture, nba.com’s player tracking (http://bballbreakdown.com/2016/10/10/2016-bballbreakdown-top-50-kawhi-leonard-no-5/stats.nba.com/player#!/202695/tracking/shots/) gives us a look at how Leonard fared in those limited occurrences.
For comparison sake, here is a table and chart comparing the frequency of field goals attempted after 6+ seconds of having the ball, or 7+ dribbles taken, and the subsequent field goal percentages on such attempts for Leonard, Paul George, and Kevin Durant:
Kawhi Leonard
Paul George
Kevin Durant
7+ Dribble FGA FRQ%
8.3
12.2
12.5
7+ Dribble FG%
53.3
35
46.8
6+ Sec FGA FRQ%
11.9
17
17.8
6+ Sec FG%
47.7
35.8
43.9
http://bballbreakdown.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Kawhi.jpg (http://bballbreakdown.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Kawhi.jpg)
The differential in frequency is minimal—only four percent on attempts after seven or more dribbles, between five and six percent on attempts coming after touches of six seconds or longer. Leonard is exceptionally efficient in both cases, more evidence supporting his emergence as a first option. Throw him the ball and he is a real threat to go get a bucket in isolation, pick-and-roll, and especially the post.
Leonard’s offensive responsibility has also grown more than many realize. Last season there were only five players (http://bkref.com/tiny/vLQ4U)with a usage rate of at least 25 (meaning they used an estimated quarter of their team’s plays while they were on the floor) and effective field goal percentage (which accounts for the fact that three-point field goals are worth one more point than twos) of 55 or better: Stephen Curry, Kevin Durant, Klay Thompson, LeBron James, and Leonard.
It’s no coincidence three of those players join Leonard in the top five. The Spurs depend on his offensive output. Take into account that Leonard is the youngest of the group and has improved every year.
Finally, let’s compare the quality of Leonard’s shot opportunities to those of an undisputed top player in the game. Below are statistics for Leonard and reigning two-time MVP Stephen Curry:
http://bballbreakdown.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/c1.png (http://bballbreakdown.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/c1.png)http://bballbreakdown.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/c2.png (http://bballbreakdown.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/c2.png)
While Curry obviously fired up more shots per game than Leonard (about five), the frequency with which they took open versus closely guarded shots is nearly identical. The shooting percentages aren’t far off either (except for the part where Curry hits five threes a game and his effective field goal percentages are proportionately, insanely high).
Now clearly Leonard and Curry are vastly different players, but both lead talented rosters with vaunted offensive schemes. Why should one be penalized for that fact, especially when he has shown that he is capable of scoring open and tough opportunities, assisted and unassisted alike, when necessary?
Certainly, some consideration can be allowed for those players who are tasked with generating almost the entirety of their team’s offense. But I’m not sure it makes sense to penalize players whose teams don’t force them to play with one hand tied behind their back. Using Leonard’s situation to discredit him smacks of proof that we undervalue defense and place too much importance on tough shots.
The hypothetical trades will continue. What if Kawhi Leonard swapped places with Paul George, or Jimmy Butler? Would they also trade places on player rankings like this one? But dealing in hypotheticals is only an intellectual exercise, a ski trip down the slippery slope of imagined scenarios. Kawhi Leonard’s performance is the reality that justifies his place on this list.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8z_hYdas7KU
Kawhi: 5
When he entered the league in 2011, Kawhi Leonard was a relative unknown. At the time, he was expected to grow into and remain strictly within the three-and-D pigeonhole. Considering his career .250 three-point shooting percentage in two years at San Diego State University, the first part of that three-and-D formula was a hopeful projection.
That was the ceiling. If the Spurs were lucky and the kid worked hard, he’d be a more athletic Bruce Bowen. Earn his keep on the defensive end and for God’s sake, stay in the corners on offense. Maybe catch a lob every now and then.
Those humble draft night expectations are worth repeating as Leonard has surpassed them so entirely they are now all but forgotten. In the space of just five years he has made himself into one of the most complete players in the NBA.
A year ago, Will Gottlieb wrote these words in an article accompanying Marc Gasol’s selection as the 10th ranked player in the league for this site: “Being the dominant scorer often comes at a cost—most players have to choose where they want to place their effort—because being the defensive ace and offensive first-option is close to impossible.”
Coming off his second consecutive season both leading the Spurs in scoring and earning Defensive Player of the Year honors, Leonard has made a habit of doing the (close to) impossible.
In 2016 Leonard raised his scoring average from 16.5 to 21.2 points per game (15th in the NBA) and was somehow even more efficient, posting a .506 field goal percentage as compared with .479 the previous year. More impressive was how he did it.
Relegated to the corners no more, Leonard unveiled a surprisingly accurate three-point shot that found its way home more than 44 percent of the time. It was the third-best three-point percentage of the year behind J.J. Redick and Stephen Curry, and a personal improvement of nearly 10 percent from the previous season. A leap of that magnitude is almost unheard of.
He didn’t do it by relying on the short corner either. Only 68 of Leonard’s 291 three-point attempts came from the left or right corner. He actually made more above the break threes—96—than he even attempted from the corners.
Leonard’s comfort at almost any spot on the floor also showed itself in the continued development of his in-between and post-up skill sets. Hours of developmental work with Chad Forcier, now lead assistant with the Orlando Magic, came to fruition in a variety of moves not often put to good use in today’s NBA.
The array has been wildly successful for Leonard. He shot better than 50 percent on fadeaways (56.9 percent), hook shots (64.3 percent), pull up jumpers (53.1 percent), step backs (72 percent), and turnaround jump shots (51.7 percent). He even made 60 percent of the 25 turnaround fadeaways he attempted, which just sounds extremely difficult and seemed worth mentioning.
Overall, he was one of the top performers in the league in all his major categories: spot ups, post ups, isolation, and even pick-and-rolls (as Coach Nick covers in his video).
All of this he did while routinely drawing the league’s toughest defensive assignments and holding his opponents to 5.6 percent below their average field goal percentage.
With Leonard as the linchpin, the Spurs won a historic 67 games in the regular season, the best record ever for the franchise and tied for fifth all-time with the ’86 Celtics, ’92 Bulls, ’00 Lakers, ’07 Mavericks and ’15 Warriors.
The DPOY was awarded First Team All-Defensive and All-NBA honors, voted an All-Star starter and finished as runner-up in MVP voting. He was fourth in win shares and box plus/minus, sixth in player efficiency rating, eighth in true shooting percentage, seventh in offensive rating, third in defensive rating and had the seventh highest value over replacement player in the NBA. His performance left no doubt as to his standing as one of the top players in the game. At least it should have.
There still exists the odd YouTube commenter or barbershop analyst who questions Leonard. It’s gotten to the point where the arguments against him are almost so ridiculous they can be used in his favor. For example, Kawhi Leonard must be pretty good when what passes for criticism against him is that he never scored more than 32 points in a game, or he only averaged 21 points.
But the favorite argument against him isn’t an argument at all. It’s just one word. A shining ideal. An elusive philosophy. The system. “System” is thought of by those who hold tightly to it to discredit players as a trump card in any discussion of ranking. In actuality it usually functions more like a scarlet letter, a flashing neon sign announcing, “I don’t really watch this guy play!”
What “system” really is, is a technical word for that common sense thing the Spurs do where they endeavor to move themselves and the ball in order to move the defense and create quality scoring opportunities for each other, rather than standing around and watching one guy try to score at a great degree of difficulty.
Sure, that’s an oversimplification of the intricacies of strategy involved and the skill required to achieve it, but so is any suggestion that Leonard’s accomplishments should count for less because he’s the beneficiary of good coaching.
The Spurs’ system absolutely puts players in the best position to succeed but it is not without its dirty secrets. Another function of the system—wherein bench players factor heavily and minutes are kept low across the board—is that it is just as adept at limiting the numbers of its stars as it is raising the value of its role players. At this point it takes some willful ignorance to mistake Leonard for the latter.
Still, there are legitimate points to be made about the system’s effect. Critics argue the Spurs’ ball movement shields Leonard from the burden of offensive responsibility players like James Harden or Paul George endure. By the same token, they further argue that he is not forced to take as many inefficient shots, and is more frequently assisted on his field goals than other star players.
There is a degree of truth to each of these arguments. Their weight is a matter of opinion but they are fair, so long as they are not extrapolated as proof that Leonard is incapable of creating his own offense and entirely reliant on the system to do so for him. Neither the tape nor the statistics support that belief anymore.
For one, only 26.8 percent of Leonard’s attempted shots were of the catch and shoot variety last year. That is simply not the bread and butter of his game. Looking at where his field goal attempts come from, Leonard’s penchant for the mid-range is evident. The majority of his 1,090 FGAs in 2016 came from that portion of the floor.
http://bballbreakdown.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/chart-e1476114900778.jpeg (http://bballbreakdown.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/chart-e1476114900778.jpeg)
He was assisted on only 41 percent of his makes from that range. The total percentage of Leonard’s field goals he was assisted on is about 55 to 45 percent unassisted. The number assisted is a luxury not all stars enjoy, but not a large enough differential to suggest dependency.
Piggybacking on that statistic, though dribbling or holding onto the ball longer than a few moments is generally tantamount to a mortal sin in Spurs’ culture, nba.com’s player tracking (http://bballbreakdown.com/2016/10/10/2016-bballbreakdown-top-50-kawhi-leonard-no-5/stats.nba.com/player#!/202695/tracking/shots/) gives us a look at how Leonard fared in those limited occurrences.
For comparison sake, here is a table and chart comparing the frequency of field goals attempted after 6+ seconds of having the ball, or 7+ dribbles taken, and the subsequent field goal percentages on such attempts for Leonard, Paul George, and Kevin Durant:
Kawhi Leonard
Paul George
Kevin Durant
7+ Dribble FGA FRQ%
8.3
12.2
12.5
7+ Dribble FG%
53.3
35
46.8
6+ Sec FGA FRQ%
11.9
17
17.8
6+ Sec FG%
47.7
35.8
43.9
http://bballbreakdown.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Kawhi.jpg (http://bballbreakdown.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Kawhi.jpg)
The differential in frequency is minimal—only four percent on attempts after seven or more dribbles, between five and six percent on attempts coming after touches of six seconds or longer. Leonard is exceptionally efficient in both cases, more evidence supporting his emergence as a first option. Throw him the ball and he is a real threat to go get a bucket in isolation, pick-and-roll, and especially the post.
Leonard’s offensive responsibility has also grown more than many realize. Last season there were only five players (http://bkref.com/tiny/vLQ4U)with a usage rate of at least 25 (meaning they used an estimated quarter of their team’s plays while they were on the floor) and effective field goal percentage (which accounts for the fact that three-point field goals are worth one more point than twos) of 55 or better: Stephen Curry, Kevin Durant, Klay Thompson, LeBron James, and Leonard.
It’s no coincidence three of those players join Leonard in the top five. The Spurs depend on his offensive output. Take into account that Leonard is the youngest of the group and has improved every year.
Finally, let’s compare the quality of Leonard’s shot opportunities to those of an undisputed top player in the game. Below are statistics for Leonard and reigning two-time MVP Stephen Curry:
http://bballbreakdown.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/c1.png (http://bballbreakdown.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/c1.png)http://bballbreakdown.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/c2.png (http://bballbreakdown.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/c2.png)
While Curry obviously fired up more shots per game than Leonard (about five), the frequency with which they took open versus closely guarded shots is nearly identical. The shooting percentages aren’t far off either (except for the part where Curry hits five threes a game and his effective field goal percentages are proportionately, insanely high).
Now clearly Leonard and Curry are vastly different players, but both lead talented rosters with vaunted offensive schemes. Why should one be penalized for that fact, especially when he has shown that he is capable of scoring open and tough opportunities, assisted and unassisted alike, when necessary?
Certainly, some consideration can be allowed for those players who are tasked with generating almost the entirety of their team’s offense. But I’m not sure it makes sense to penalize players whose teams don’t force them to play with one hand tied behind their back. Using Leonard’s situation to discredit him smacks of proof that we undervalue defense and place too much importance on tough shots.
The hypothetical trades will continue. What if Kawhi Leonard swapped places with Paul George, or Jimmy Butler? Would they also trade places on player rankings like this one? But dealing in hypotheticals is only an intellectual exercise, a ski trip down the slippery slope of imagined scenarios. Kawhi Leonard’s performance is the reality that justifies his place on this list.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8z_hYdas7KU