Nbadan
01-11-2006, 04:09 AM
by Victoria Sampson, Center for Defense Information
On Dec. 17, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) put its 10th interceptor rocket in the ground at Ft. Greely, Alaska. This is part of the overarching ballistic missile defense system that the Pentagon and the Bush administration has been promising us would protect the United States against a rogue ICBM attack. Unfortunately for U.S. national security, and for those who care about where our tax dollars go, it does nothing of the sort.
. . .
The interceptors fielded in Alaska and California are part of a weapons system that suffered two flight test failures within three months. In December 2004 and February 2005, the interceptor rockets not only failed to intercept their test targets -- they could not even leave the launch pad. The United States has been launching rockets for decades now; while missile defense requires an accuracy that has been likened to "hitting a bullet with a bullet," rocket launches should be well within our capabilities.
Following these recent setbacks, MDA officials took a hard look at their testing program and scaled things down. On Dec. 13, 2005, a test of the interceptor rocket was held, and finally it managed to get off the ground. No target was used; nor will a live target be incorporated in the tests for some time.
Yet somehow, the Pentagon argues with a straight face that this system can provide a "limited" defense for the United States against missile attack. It is theoretically possible that it may do so in the future, but missile defense, as it stands today, tomorrow, and really, for the next few years, does nothing more than divert funding and resources from programs that actually do work.
Still, it continues to grow. Unsatisfied to focus on simply getting the technologies that we have now to actually work, the Pentagon has set its sights on expanding the program abroad. In the coming year, it is set to make a decision as to which lucky European country gets to host a third interceptor site. The United States will soon be exporting its special brand of "defense" to our purported allies, which is to say, a system that costs billions of dollars and yet doesn't work. Lucky them -- and lucky us.
The Center For Defense Information (http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=3244&StartRow=1&ListRows=10&appendURL=&Orderby=D.DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=6&from_page=index.cfm)
China, Korea and Russia have moved away from stationary, large MIRV-based ballistic missiles (those that actually come close to the edge of the atmosphere). This system can only deal with that 1st generation technology. If it ever worked. It has to launch high and fast, AFTER nonexistant satellites detect the boost phase, note the arc and anticipate the target. The warhead then has to be tracked by nonexistant mid range radar, and finally ID's tracked, targetted and shot from Alaska. In other words, we have to pray that China and Russia AND Korea direct their missiles close to the arctic, just so our defense system can find them in range and in time. Any further south, and we are SOL.
What those three countries have done is to allow us to waste many billions on a maginot line that works even worse than the original.
Today's threat comes from
1) supersonic cruise missiles which we have no way of detecting, much less defending. Moreover this piece of junk we are still building in Alaska can only shoot up and very high. It cannot detect or aim down to a low flying cruise missile, especially one travelling at Mach 2.
2) Ship launched, low trajectory missiles from one use only fishing boats or towed platforms. China, Russia and the EU are all gaining experience in sea launching. NASA is not, nor is the DOD. Instead, we have a couple of private US companies that are far ahead of our military planners.
3) Containerized weapons, with hidden bombs, to be detonated by remote control, or timers. (we only check 1/10 of 1/10 of 1/10th of 1/10th of all millions of containers arriving each week, and a small fraction of those by eye.
4) Sub launched missiles, with an extra quiet diesel based sub, holding no more than one to two missiles per sub.
As stated before, NONE of these viable techniques can be stopped by today's ABM systems being built in Alaska. It is akin to using a worker trained in gas lamp lighter technology to program the operating system for a nuclear powerplant.
On Dec. 17, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) put its 10th interceptor rocket in the ground at Ft. Greely, Alaska. This is part of the overarching ballistic missile defense system that the Pentagon and the Bush administration has been promising us would protect the United States against a rogue ICBM attack. Unfortunately for U.S. national security, and for those who care about where our tax dollars go, it does nothing of the sort.
. . .
The interceptors fielded in Alaska and California are part of a weapons system that suffered two flight test failures within three months. In December 2004 and February 2005, the interceptor rockets not only failed to intercept their test targets -- they could not even leave the launch pad. The United States has been launching rockets for decades now; while missile defense requires an accuracy that has been likened to "hitting a bullet with a bullet," rocket launches should be well within our capabilities.
Following these recent setbacks, MDA officials took a hard look at their testing program and scaled things down. On Dec. 13, 2005, a test of the interceptor rocket was held, and finally it managed to get off the ground. No target was used; nor will a live target be incorporated in the tests for some time.
Yet somehow, the Pentagon argues with a straight face that this system can provide a "limited" defense for the United States against missile attack. It is theoretically possible that it may do so in the future, but missile defense, as it stands today, tomorrow, and really, for the next few years, does nothing more than divert funding and resources from programs that actually do work.
Still, it continues to grow. Unsatisfied to focus on simply getting the technologies that we have now to actually work, the Pentagon has set its sights on expanding the program abroad. In the coming year, it is set to make a decision as to which lucky European country gets to host a third interceptor site. The United States will soon be exporting its special brand of "defense" to our purported allies, which is to say, a system that costs billions of dollars and yet doesn't work. Lucky them -- and lucky us.
The Center For Defense Information (http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=3244&StartRow=1&ListRows=10&appendURL=&Orderby=D.DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=6&from_page=index.cfm)
China, Korea and Russia have moved away from stationary, large MIRV-based ballistic missiles (those that actually come close to the edge of the atmosphere). This system can only deal with that 1st generation technology. If it ever worked. It has to launch high and fast, AFTER nonexistant satellites detect the boost phase, note the arc and anticipate the target. The warhead then has to be tracked by nonexistant mid range radar, and finally ID's tracked, targetted and shot from Alaska. In other words, we have to pray that China and Russia AND Korea direct their missiles close to the arctic, just so our defense system can find them in range and in time. Any further south, and we are SOL.
What those three countries have done is to allow us to waste many billions on a maginot line that works even worse than the original.
Today's threat comes from
1) supersonic cruise missiles which we have no way of detecting, much less defending. Moreover this piece of junk we are still building in Alaska can only shoot up and very high. It cannot detect or aim down to a low flying cruise missile, especially one travelling at Mach 2.
2) Ship launched, low trajectory missiles from one use only fishing boats or towed platforms. China, Russia and the EU are all gaining experience in sea launching. NASA is not, nor is the DOD. Instead, we have a couple of private US companies that are far ahead of our military planners.
3) Containerized weapons, with hidden bombs, to be detonated by remote control, or timers. (we only check 1/10 of 1/10 of 1/10th of 1/10th of all millions of containers arriving each week, and a small fraction of those by eye.
4) Sub launched missiles, with an extra quiet diesel based sub, holding no more than one to two missiles per sub.
As stated before, NONE of these viable techniques can be stopped by today's ABM systems being built in Alaska. It is akin to using a worker trained in gas lamp lighter technology to program the operating system for a nuclear powerplant.