supaphly119
10-15-2006, 11:09 PM
Not sure if any of you guys have the espn insider columns so i figured i'd post up the article hollinger wrote about the upcoming season. i searched to make sure it wasn't posted, but if its a repost, i'm sorry.
Last season San Antonio never gave you the impression that it was destined to repeat as NBA champion. Franchise icon Tim Duncan struggled with plantar fasciitis for much of the season and posted career lows in points, rebounds, blocks and shooting percentage, while star wingman Manu Ginobili missed 17 games with a variety of ailments and couldn't reproduce the magic of his stellar 2004-05 campaign. Ultimately the Spurs fell short when Dallas knocked them out in a tightly contested seven-game series in the Western Conference semifinals.
It's a testament to the depth and competitiveness of the Spurs that they were in position to repeat as champs despite injuries to their two best players. Tony Parker took a huge step forward and made his first All-Star team, and San Antonio got solid contributions from 10 different players. As a result, the Spurs set a franchise record for wins, put up the best record in the West at 63-19, and were once again No. 1 in defensive efficiency.
It was the fifth time in six years under coach Gregg Popovich that San Antonio had the league's best defense. Thanks to the length of Duncan and Rasho Nesterovic inside and the quickness and grit of Bruce Bowen and the underrated Parker on the perimeter, San Antonio was difficult to beat from any part of the floor.
San Antonio's broad-based defensive excellence was easily seen if you break down defense into its component parts. In seven of the eight important metrics -- field-goal percentage, 3-point percentage, free-throw rate, 3-point rate, assist rate, rebounding, and shot-blocking -- the Spurs were well above average. Their only middling effort came in forcing turnovers, where their opponents coughed it up slightly less than the league average.
The Spurs were particularly tough to make a 3-pointer or get an assist against, which is an indication of what great individual defenders they had on the floor. Most assisted baskets and 3-pointers come because a player is beaten and needs help, or because an overmatched defender requires a double-team from a teammate. With the players San Antonio had, that rarely happened. As a result, opponents only took 13.8 percent of their shots beyond the 3-point line, which easily led the league (see chart). Plus, the Spurs permitted assists on just 48 percent of opponent baskets -- only Phoenix did better.
Ironically, defense was San Antonio's undoing in the playoffs. Dallas went to a small lineup that forced the Spurs to mothball Nesterovic, Nazr Mohammed and Robert Horry for most of the series and play Michael Finley as an undersized power forward. As a result, the Mavs scored as easily as any Spur opponent in the past half-decade.
The Spurs weren't shabby on offense either, ranking ninth overall in offensive efficiency. Although the Spurs' three best players aren't 3-point shooters, they created enough opportunities for everyone else that San Antonio ranked second in the NBA at 38.5 percent from long range. The team ranked third overall in field-goal percentage -- boosted greatly by Parker shooting a scorching 54.8 percent from the point.
The one area where San Antonio really struggled was behind Parker. Normally backup point guards don't have much impact on a club's results, but this was a rare exception where a decision on a secondary player might have cost a team a championship. Nick Van Exel was so terrible that he almost certainly was the difference between winning and losing the conference semifinals against Dallas, and an organization as smart as the Spurs really should have known better than to rely on him.
First, a little background is in order. Because of rookie Beno Udrih's troubles in the 2004-05 Finals against Detroit, the Spurs decided to get a veteran backup point guard that offseason. This was the first mistake -- Udrih had a solid rookie campaign otherwise, and two bad games against Detroit shouldn't have swung their opinion of him so sharply.
It got worse when the Spurs took a shine to Van Exel, citing his clutch shot-making against them in the 2003 Western Conference Finals as one reason. The Spurs might have been romanticizing the past a bit -- yes, Nick hit some big shots in that series, but all told he shot 37.1 percent, and had 17 turnovers in six games. More importantly, it happened three years earlier -- eons in the scope of a basketball player's career -- and the 34-year-old Van Exel had diminished a good deal since as a result of his aching knees.
In fact, on any rational basis this decision was completely indefensible. Van Exel had little defensive value, shot erratically, and based on his numbers a year earlier in Portland he was barely marginal as an NBA player. Udrih, meanwhile, had played fairly well in 2004-05 and figured to do better with a year under his belt. Predictably, Udrih did exactly that in the minutes he played, posting a solid 15.21 player efficiency rating, while Van Exel limped to 39.7 percent shooting mark and a miserable 10.96 PER.
Van Exel played poorly enough during the season that it was a bit shocking to see San Antonio keep him in the rotation during the playoffs. Predictably, he was just as bad. Not only were the stats hideous (21.9 percent, 2.2 ppg), but he was even worse on defense than offense. The lowlight came in the fourth quarter of Game 4 against Dallas. On consecutive plays, Van Exel went under a pick against the screen-and-roll, but was still so slow getting to the other side that his man beat him to the basket for a layup and got a foul from Van Exel as the bonus.
I'm not sure there's any way else to put this -- in opting for a faded Van Exel instead of the younger, more talented Udrih, the Spurs essentially sacrificed a championship at the altar of veteran leadership.
OFFSEASON MOVES
With a rare summer in which no foreign players figured in their offseason haul, the Spurs were left to the traditional route of trades and free agency, and they were fairly busy:
• Traded Nesterovic and cash to Toronto for Matt Bonner, Eric Williams and a 2009 second-round pick. Mostly a salary dump by San Antonio, the cash was sent along to ease the Raptors' pain in absorbing Rasho's deal. Bonner's skills overlap a bit with Horry's, but he makes a good hedge against age and is an even better 3-point shooter. Don't be shocked if he's effective as the backup center, playing alongside Duncan for 10 minutes a night off the bench. The challenge will be figuring out how to hide him on defense. As for Williams, he won't play much but his expiring contract might be a factor at the trade deadline.
• Signed Jackie Butler, lost Mohammed. The Spurs might love Isiah Thomas even more than the Bulls do. First he took on Malik Rose's contract and gave them Mohammed -- they don't win the title in 2005 without that deal. Now they lose Mohammed as a free agent, but swipe Butler from New York for peanuts. This was hands down the best free-agent signing of 2006 -- Butler is a potential stud and yet the free-spending Knicks let him walk rather than match a three-year, $7 million offer sheet. Look at the deals mediocre centers are getting around the league and then check that price tag again. The dude is 21 and really can score -- he'll be better than either Mohammed or Rasho and cost about a quarter as much.
• Signed Francisco Elson, lost Sean Marks. Marks had no value other than as a clubhouse guy, but Elson was another cheap free-agent center who can play a little. I emphasize "a little" -- he's a third center type who helps defensively as long as he doesn't have to put a body on anyone. But you have to be impressed with a team that replaced two centers making a combined $12 million a year with two that make half as much, and not appear any worse for it.
• Signed Jacque Vaughn, lost Van Exel. They only had the veteran's minimum left after they got the two centers, so this was the best they could do in the backcourt. It was a direct reaction to the Dallas series, as a defensive guard like Vaughn would have been mighty helpful against Jason Terry and Devin Harris. Vaughn is completely worthless offensively, though, so he's a No. 3 point guard.
BIGGEST STRENGTH
The organization. Welcome to Mayberry. San Antonio is a fairy-tale place where everybody in the locker room gets along, the players are genuinely likable, and nobody feels the slightest sense of entitlement because he's in the NBA. That might be a bit of an exaggeration, but not by much. There's no question this club has the best chemistry in the league.
That chemistry didn't happen by accident -- it's the result of a methodical, yet at times brilliant, approach to building a roster. The Spurs remain the gold standard for a professional basketball organization, not only winning with class but managing the cap with clinical precision. As a result they routinely beat the snot out of their rivals without spending a penny of luxury tax. (That might change this season, but of course, the Spurs have logic on their side -- tax payments are likely to be unusually low this year.)
What's particularly impressive is San Antonio's focus on finding and developing young players, giving the team a long-term competitive advantage by continually replenishing the roster. The Butler heist is one example, but an even better one is San Antonio's trend of drafting European players in the second round of the draft and letting them develop overseas on somebody else's dime.
Ginobili was the first example of this, but the Spurs still have a veritable AAA team playing in Europe right now -- Argentine forward Luis Scola and Lithuanian center Robertas Javtokas are NBA-quality players, while French center Ian Mahinmi and Georgian forward Viktor Sanikidze aren't there yet but are young enough to improve significantly from here forward.
BIGGEST WEAKNESS
Free throws. OK, this one isn't exactly a state secret. Everyone knows that Duncan struggles from the line (68.5 percent career), and Bowen is even worse (56.8 percent). Overall, San Antonio's 70.2 percent mark from the line ranked 28th among the league's 30 teams, and one of the clubs that was worse (Miami) ranked so low almost entirely due to one player. On the Spurs it was a real team effort -- Finley was the only Spur to clear 80 percent, and you have to think there's something in the water down there when even Brent Barry is shooting 66.1 percent.
But San Antonio's problem isn't just making shots from the line, it's getting there in the first place. The Spurs ranked second in field-goal percentage and third in 3-point percentage a year ago, but only seventh in True Shooting Percentage. That's because their ratio of free-throw attempts to field-goal attempts was .298, which ranked 27th in the NBA. Even shooting as badly as San Antonio did, foul shots are a far better proposition than shooting from the field, so not getting to the line more is a major failing. Parker is a major culprit here, earning shockingly few free-throw attempts for a guard who drives to the basket so often.
2006-07 OUTLOOK
San Antonio set a franchise record for wins a year ago, but the amazing part is that there are several reasons to think the Spurs will be even better this year. Their two best players, Duncan and Ginobili, weren't close to being at full strength last year, so one would think San Antonio would be much better if those two return to their normal output. And as harsh as this might sound, Van Exel's retirement alone should make them better, because whoever replaces him virtually is guaranteed to be better.
San Antonio should also be better at center, where Butler and Bonner can replace the indifferent production Mohammed and Nesterovic gave a year ago -- though replacing Nesterovic's defense is a tougher assignment. Age on the wings is a concern -- Finley and Barry have seen better days; Bowen is 35, and Ginobili is only 29 but has taken a beating the past two years -- but that's about the best I can do in making a case for why San Antonio might be worse. The Spurs again should be among the top two or three teams defensively, while they have three stud offensive players and several shooters around them to keep defenses honest. Throw in a great coach and the league's best organization, and all told they're a good bet to win their fourth championship in nine years.
John Hollinger writes for ESPN Insider. To e-mail him, click here.
Last season San Antonio never gave you the impression that it was destined to repeat as NBA champion. Franchise icon Tim Duncan struggled with plantar fasciitis for much of the season and posted career lows in points, rebounds, blocks and shooting percentage, while star wingman Manu Ginobili missed 17 games with a variety of ailments and couldn't reproduce the magic of his stellar 2004-05 campaign. Ultimately the Spurs fell short when Dallas knocked them out in a tightly contested seven-game series in the Western Conference semifinals.
It's a testament to the depth and competitiveness of the Spurs that they were in position to repeat as champs despite injuries to their two best players. Tony Parker took a huge step forward and made his first All-Star team, and San Antonio got solid contributions from 10 different players. As a result, the Spurs set a franchise record for wins, put up the best record in the West at 63-19, and were once again No. 1 in defensive efficiency.
It was the fifth time in six years under coach Gregg Popovich that San Antonio had the league's best defense. Thanks to the length of Duncan and Rasho Nesterovic inside and the quickness and grit of Bruce Bowen and the underrated Parker on the perimeter, San Antonio was difficult to beat from any part of the floor.
San Antonio's broad-based defensive excellence was easily seen if you break down defense into its component parts. In seven of the eight important metrics -- field-goal percentage, 3-point percentage, free-throw rate, 3-point rate, assist rate, rebounding, and shot-blocking -- the Spurs were well above average. Their only middling effort came in forcing turnovers, where their opponents coughed it up slightly less than the league average.
The Spurs were particularly tough to make a 3-pointer or get an assist against, which is an indication of what great individual defenders they had on the floor. Most assisted baskets and 3-pointers come because a player is beaten and needs help, or because an overmatched defender requires a double-team from a teammate. With the players San Antonio had, that rarely happened. As a result, opponents only took 13.8 percent of their shots beyond the 3-point line, which easily led the league (see chart). Plus, the Spurs permitted assists on just 48 percent of opponent baskets -- only Phoenix did better.
Ironically, defense was San Antonio's undoing in the playoffs. Dallas went to a small lineup that forced the Spurs to mothball Nesterovic, Nazr Mohammed and Robert Horry for most of the series and play Michael Finley as an undersized power forward. As a result, the Mavs scored as easily as any Spur opponent in the past half-decade.
The Spurs weren't shabby on offense either, ranking ninth overall in offensive efficiency. Although the Spurs' three best players aren't 3-point shooters, they created enough opportunities for everyone else that San Antonio ranked second in the NBA at 38.5 percent from long range. The team ranked third overall in field-goal percentage -- boosted greatly by Parker shooting a scorching 54.8 percent from the point.
The one area where San Antonio really struggled was behind Parker. Normally backup point guards don't have much impact on a club's results, but this was a rare exception where a decision on a secondary player might have cost a team a championship. Nick Van Exel was so terrible that he almost certainly was the difference between winning and losing the conference semifinals against Dallas, and an organization as smart as the Spurs really should have known better than to rely on him.
First, a little background is in order. Because of rookie Beno Udrih's troubles in the 2004-05 Finals against Detroit, the Spurs decided to get a veteran backup point guard that offseason. This was the first mistake -- Udrih had a solid rookie campaign otherwise, and two bad games against Detroit shouldn't have swung their opinion of him so sharply.
It got worse when the Spurs took a shine to Van Exel, citing his clutch shot-making against them in the 2003 Western Conference Finals as one reason. The Spurs might have been romanticizing the past a bit -- yes, Nick hit some big shots in that series, but all told he shot 37.1 percent, and had 17 turnovers in six games. More importantly, it happened three years earlier -- eons in the scope of a basketball player's career -- and the 34-year-old Van Exel had diminished a good deal since as a result of his aching knees.
In fact, on any rational basis this decision was completely indefensible. Van Exel had little defensive value, shot erratically, and based on his numbers a year earlier in Portland he was barely marginal as an NBA player. Udrih, meanwhile, had played fairly well in 2004-05 and figured to do better with a year under his belt. Predictably, Udrih did exactly that in the minutes he played, posting a solid 15.21 player efficiency rating, while Van Exel limped to 39.7 percent shooting mark and a miserable 10.96 PER.
Van Exel played poorly enough during the season that it was a bit shocking to see San Antonio keep him in the rotation during the playoffs. Predictably, he was just as bad. Not only were the stats hideous (21.9 percent, 2.2 ppg), but he was even worse on defense than offense. The lowlight came in the fourth quarter of Game 4 against Dallas. On consecutive plays, Van Exel went under a pick against the screen-and-roll, but was still so slow getting to the other side that his man beat him to the basket for a layup and got a foul from Van Exel as the bonus.
I'm not sure there's any way else to put this -- in opting for a faded Van Exel instead of the younger, more talented Udrih, the Spurs essentially sacrificed a championship at the altar of veteran leadership.
OFFSEASON MOVES
With a rare summer in which no foreign players figured in their offseason haul, the Spurs were left to the traditional route of trades and free agency, and they were fairly busy:
• Traded Nesterovic and cash to Toronto for Matt Bonner, Eric Williams and a 2009 second-round pick. Mostly a salary dump by San Antonio, the cash was sent along to ease the Raptors' pain in absorbing Rasho's deal. Bonner's skills overlap a bit with Horry's, but he makes a good hedge against age and is an even better 3-point shooter. Don't be shocked if he's effective as the backup center, playing alongside Duncan for 10 minutes a night off the bench. The challenge will be figuring out how to hide him on defense. As for Williams, he won't play much but his expiring contract might be a factor at the trade deadline.
• Signed Jackie Butler, lost Mohammed. The Spurs might love Isiah Thomas even more than the Bulls do. First he took on Malik Rose's contract and gave them Mohammed -- they don't win the title in 2005 without that deal. Now they lose Mohammed as a free agent, but swipe Butler from New York for peanuts. This was hands down the best free-agent signing of 2006 -- Butler is a potential stud and yet the free-spending Knicks let him walk rather than match a three-year, $7 million offer sheet. Look at the deals mediocre centers are getting around the league and then check that price tag again. The dude is 21 and really can score -- he'll be better than either Mohammed or Rasho and cost about a quarter as much.
• Signed Francisco Elson, lost Sean Marks. Marks had no value other than as a clubhouse guy, but Elson was another cheap free-agent center who can play a little. I emphasize "a little" -- he's a third center type who helps defensively as long as he doesn't have to put a body on anyone. But you have to be impressed with a team that replaced two centers making a combined $12 million a year with two that make half as much, and not appear any worse for it.
• Signed Jacque Vaughn, lost Van Exel. They only had the veteran's minimum left after they got the two centers, so this was the best they could do in the backcourt. It was a direct reaction to the Dallas series, as a defensive guard like Vaughn would have been mighty helpful against Jason Terry and Devin Harris. Vaughn is completely worthless offensively, though, so he's a No. 3 point guard.
BIGGEST STRENGTH
The organization. Welcome to Mayberry. San Antonio is a fairy-tale place where everybody in the locker room gets along, the players are genuinely likable, and nobody feels the slightest sense of entitlement because he's in the NBA. That might be a bit of an exaggeration, but not by much. There's no question this club has the best chemistry in the league.
That chemistry didn't happen by accident -- it's the result of a methodical, yet at times brilliant, approach to building a roster. The Spurs remain the gold standard for a professional basketball organization, not only winning with class but managing the cap with clinical precision. As a result they routinely beat the snot out of their rivals without spending a penny of luxury tax. (That might change this season, but of course, the Spurs have logic on their side -- tax payments are likely to be unusually low this year.)
What's particularly impressive is San Antonio's focus on finding and developing young players, giving the team a long-term competitive advantage by continually replenishing the roster. The Butler heist is one example, but an even better one is San Antonio's trend of drafting European players in the second round of the draft and letting them develop overseas on somebody else's dime.
Ginobili was the first example of this, but the Spurs still have a veritable AAA team playing in Europe right now -- Argentine forward Luis Scola and Lithuanian center Robertas Javtokas are NBA-quality players, while French center Ian Mahinmi and Georgian forward Viktor Sanikidze aren't there yet but are young enough to improve significantly from here forward.
BIGGEST WEAKNESS
Free throws. OK, this one isn't exactly a state secret. Everyone knows that Duncan struggles from the line (68.5 percent career), and Bowen is even worse (56.8 percent). Overall, San Antonio's 70.2 percent mark from the line ranked 28th among the league's 30 teams, and one of the clubs that was worse (Miami) ranked so low almost entirely due to one player. On the Spurs it was a real team effort -- Finley was the only Spur to clear 80 percent, and you have to think there's something in the water down there when even Brent Barry is shooting 66.1 percent.
But San Antonio's problem isn't just making shots from the line, it's getting there in the first place. The Spurs ranked second in field-goal percentage and third in 3-point percentage a year ago, but only seventh in True Shooting Percentage. That's because their ratio of free-throw attempts to field-goal attempts was .298, which ranked 27th in the NBA. Even shooting as badly as San Antonio did, foul shots are a far better proposition than shooting from the field, so not getting to the line more is a major failing. Parker is a major culprit here, earning shockingly few free-throw attempts for a guard who drives to the basket so often.
2006-07 OUTLOOK
San Antonio set a franchise record for wins a year ago, but the amazing part is that there are several reasons to think the Spurs will be even better this year. Their two best players, Duncan and Ginobili, weren't close to being at full strength last year, so one would think San Antonio would be much better if those two return to their normal output. And as harsh as this might sound, Van Exel's retirement alone should make them better, because whoever replaces him virtually is guaranteed to be better.
San Antonio should also be better at center, where Butler and Bonner can replace the indifferent production Mohammed and Nesterovic gave a year ago -- though replacing Nesterovic's defense is a tougher assignment. Age on the wings is a concern -- Finley and Barry have seen better days; Bowen is 35, and Ginobili is only 29 but has taken a beating the past two years -- but that's about the best I can do in making a case for why San Antonio might be worse. The Spurs again should be among the top two or three teams defensively, while they have three stud offensive players and several shooters around them to keep defenses honest. Throw in a great coach and the league's best organization, and all told they're a good bet to win their fourth championship in nine years.
John Hollinger writes for ESPN Insider. To e-mail him, click here.