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10-30-2004, 03:33 PM
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In Iraq, U.S. Officials Outline Hurdles in Fight
October 31, 2004
By ERIC SCHMITT
WASHINGTON, Oct. 30 - Senior American military commanders
and civilian officials in Iraq are speaking more candidly
about the hurdles that could jeopardize their plans to
defeat an adaptive and tenacious insurgency and hold
elections in January.
Outwardly, they give an upbeat assessment that the
counterinsurgency is winnable. But in interviews with 15 of
the top American generals, admirals and embassy officials
conducted in Iraq in late October, many described risks
that could worsen the security situation and derail the
political process that they are counting on to help quell
the insurgency.
Commanders voiced fears that many of Iraq's expanding
security forces, soon to be led by largely untested
generals, have been penetrated by spies for the insurgents.
Reconstruction aid is finally flowing into formerly
rebel-held cities like Samarra and other areas, but some
officers fear that bureaucratic delays could cripple the
aid's calming effects.
They also spoke of new American intelligence assessments
that show that the insurgents have significantly more
fighters - between 8,000 and 12,000 hard-core militants -
and far greater financial resources than previously
estimated.
Perhaps most disturbing, they said, is the militants'
campaign of intimidation to silence thousands of Iraqis and
undermine the government through assassinations,
kidnappings, beheadings and car bombings. New gangs
specializing in hostage-taking are entering Iraq,
intelligence reports indicate.
"If we can't stop the intimidation factor, we can't win,"
said Lt. Gen. John F. Sattler, the commander of nearly
40,000 marines and soldiers in western and south-central
Iraq, who is drawing up battle plans for a possible
showdown with more than 3,000 guerrillas in Falluja and
Ramadi, with the hope of destroying the leadership of the
national insurgency.
In some cases, senior officers say, their goals could
inadvertently act at cross purposes. For example, Iraq
cannot hold meaningful national elections if militants
still control major Sunni cities like Falluja. Negotiations
there have broken down and many officers predict a military
offensive. But hard-line Sunni clerics say they will call
for an election boycott if American troops use force to put
down the insurrection.
"Getting Sunnis involved in the political process to me is
the biggest thing that has to happen to help the security
situation," said one senior commander. "If a good portion
of Sunnis don't participate, then that may give life to a
larger Sunni insurgency. That's worrisome."
Some pivotal political decisions, including those shaping
the election process and setting a time to attack militants
in Falluja, rest with Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and his
government, leaving American officials in the position, at
best, of just trying to influence their outcome. Despite
these obstacles, these officers and officials still express
optimism that their detailed campaign plan and its
military, political and economic elements have provided the
blueprint for retaking rebel-held cities and navigating a
tumultuous period when violence will undoubtedly intensify
as insurgents seek to delay or scuttle the elections. That
plan, adopted in August, is refined every two weeks by top
American and Iraqi generals.
"I'm guardedly optimistic," said Brig. Gen. John DeFreitas
III, the military's chief intelligence officer in Iraq. "If
you look at Najaf, Tal Afar and Samarra, I think we are
having good effects."
For the first time, military officers also disclosed that
the United States could begin withdrawing its 138,000
troops from Iraq in July, if Iraqi security forces have
established control and the threats plaguing Iraq now have
lessened. "It's a mark on the wall," said one senior
officer.
The Military Answer
But when pressed in interviews and informal conversations -
mostly not for attribution, because of fear that their more
candid remarks could be used as campaign fodder back home -
senior commanders and civilian officials voiced misgivings
about how their plans could go awry, reflecting the
unpredictability of events in Iraq.
"It's a very complex country, and there are many things to
worry about," said one senior officer. "But we're trying to
work through all the unforeseen results of an insurgency
that becomes more robust."
Senior military officers say they are under no illusion
that military might alone will resolve Iraq's problems. At
best, using force to retake rebel-held cities will help
establish an environment secure enough to allow political
and economic programs that will ultimately defeat the
insurgency, they say.
Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the top American commander in
Iraq, compares the priorities in Iraq to two giant
locomotive engines, one generating new Iraqi security
forces, the other producing reconstruction gains, aides
say. The two are intended to generate "irreversible
momentum" that demonstrates to Iraqis and to the American
public that steady progress, even if sometimes halting is
being made.
Each morning General Casey's command briefing includes a
slide called "Drumbeat," a detailed compilation of progress
made in security, governance and the economy. No
accomplishment is too minor for mention, from the opening
of a new hospital to the signing of contracts for water
projects. General Casey presses his commanders to show that
reconstruction projects are under way and "turning dirt,"
and not just on the books. Right now there are about 700
such projects, with 1,800 scheduled to be under way by
year's end, officers said.
Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus, the head of training and
equipping Iraqi security forces, has a more colorful
analogy. Succeeding in Iraq, he says, is like a cattle
drive from Texas to Wyoming in the Old West: the cattle are
the myriad tasks that need to be done in Iraq, and American
and Iraqi trail bosses are battling insurgent rustlers,
treacherous conditions and daunting logistical hurdles to
keep the herd moving.
"I don't think it's too late to succeed, but it's not going
to be easy," General Petraeus said. "The bottom line is,
you just have to keep it going."
The broader context, senior officers and embassy officials
say, is for the United States to stay the course and be
patient, with the aim of restoring local control to Iraqis
and helping to rebuild the security forces and the economy.
"We can't lose this one," said Maj. Gen. Henry W. Stratman,
who as deputy chief of staff for political, military and
economic affairs is the military's main liaison with the
United States Embassy and Iraqi ministries.
Confronting Intimidation
The military is measuring its
progress against a 43-page document, prosaically titled
"Multinational Force Iraq Campaign Plan: Operation Iraqi
Freedom." Under this plan, the military uses 215
measurements to gauge progress in 15 pivotal cities and 7
smaller towns that must be brought under control before
nationwide elections can be held.
The measurements are reviewed weekly by senior officials,
including 25 military planners nicknamed the Brainiacs, who
are responsible for anticipating worst-case scenarios and
proposing possible solutions. Every other week, General
Casey and his top aides adjust the measurements to reflect
changing dynamics on the ground.
"I see indications to believe the security environment will
be sufficient for Iraq to have legitimate elections in
January," said Maj. Gen. Stephen T. Sargeant, the principal
architect of the plan.
Officials say General Casey and John D. Negroponte, the
United States ambassador in Baghdad, have a close and
cordial working relationship, unlike that of their
predecessors, Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez and L. Paul
Bremer III. "It's like night and day,'' said one senior
officer.
But senior officers also say there are formidable hurdles
ahead.
The recent massacre of 49 newly trained Iraqi soldiers in
remote eastern Iraq illustrates the lengths that the
insurgents, including former Baathist security forces and
followers of the Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,
will go to terrorize Iraqis who cooperate with the
Americans or take part in the new government.
Military intelligence in recent weeks has reported the
discovery of numerous suicide-bomber vests bound for
Baghdad and new kidnapping gangs crossing the border into
Iraq. Since the start of the holy month of Ramadan two
weeks ago, there has been a 30 percent increase in daily
attacks.
A job-training program conducted by Navy Seabees near
Falluja to teach construction skills to young Iraqis shut
down earlier this month when the 30 students stopped coming
to work, fearing retaliation.
Another casualty of the intimidation campaign is the flow
of information from ordinary Iraqis to the military about
the location of militants and their arms, including
roadside bombs. As rebel-held cities are retaken,
commanders say, tips from residents have picked up, but
more information is needed. "Intelligence is still a
weakness," a senior embassy official said.
The Economic Issues
Despite the bombings aimed at Iraqi
security forces, American commanders say, there is no
shortage of fresh recruits, a reflection of the desperate
economic straits most Iraqis face. There are now about
100,000 Iraqi security forces trained and equipped, with
45,000 more scheduled to report by the end of the year.
Some Iraqi units have performed well in recent fighting,
especially some elite Iraqi commando units. Earlier this
month, 2,000 Iraqi troops helped American forces retake
Samarra. But one Iraqi battalion reported that 300 of its
750 soldiers abandoned the unit before the offensive began
Oct. 1.
American commanders fear that many Iraqi units are
penetrated by informants. They are also grappling with
cultural differences. With no formal national banking
system in place, recruits and other troops need to bring
their paychecks home to their families. "If you have four
infantry companies, one is always on leave," said a senior
American officer.
The Americans have ambitious goals. "By next July, I hope
enough of the Iraqi security forces will be trained and
equipped that they'll be able to conduct independent
counterinsurgency operations, with some support," said one
senior commander. "There will still be an insurgency; it's
not going to go away. But we're trying to get it down to a
lower level, where the Iraqi security forces can deal with
it."
Once militants are driven out of their enclaves, the aim is
to rush in economic aid, in large part to win over the
civilian population. "We need to take Iraqis off the
streets and give them meaningful jobs so they're holding
shovels and hammers, not AK-47's," said Charles Hess,
director of the Army's Iraq Project and Contracting Office,
which oversees $12.6 billion in reconstruction programs.
In Samarra, Maj. Gen. John R. Batiste, commander of the
Army's First Infantry Division, had a blunt warning to his
superiors recently: "We've got to get these unemployed
folks back to work. We have a very small window of
opportunity to make this work."
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/31/international/middleeast/31command.html?ex=1100158025&ei=1&en=37b1d90c08fbe8ab
Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company
http://images.ucomics.com/comics/ta/2004/ta041029.gif
In Iraq, U.S. Officials Outline Hurdles in Fight
October 31, 2004
By ERIC SCHMITT
WASHINGTON, Oct. 30 - Senior American military commanders
and civilian officials in Iraq are speaking more candidly
about the hurdles that could jeopardize their plans to
defeat an adaptive and tenacious insurgency and hold
elections in January.
Outwardly, they give an upbeat assessment that the
counterinsurgency is winnable. But in interviews with 15 of
the top American generals, admirals and embassy officials
conducted in Iraq in late October, many described risks
that could worsen the security situation and derail the
political process that they are counting on to help quell
the insurgency.
Commanders voiced fears that many of Iraq's expanding
security forces, soon to be led by largely untested
generals, have been penetrated by spies for the insurgents.
Reconstruction aid is finally flowing into formerly
rebel-held cities like Samarra and other areas, but some
officers fear that bureaucratic delays could cripple the
aid's calming effects.
They also spoke of new American intelligence assessments
that show that the insurgents have significantly more
fighters - between 8,000 and 12,000 hard-core militants -
and far greater financial resources than previously
estimated.
Perhaps most disturbing, they said, is the militants'
campaign of intimidation to silence thousands of Iraqis and
undermine the government through assassinations,
kidnappings, beheadings and car bombings. New gangs
specializing in hostage-taking are entering Iraq,
intelligence reports indicate.
"If we can't stop the intimidation factor, we can't win,"
said Lt. Gen. John F. Sattler, the commander of nearly
40,000 marines and soldiers in western and south-central
Iraq, who is drawing up battle plans for a possible
showdown with more than 3,000 guerrillas in Falluja and
Ramadi, with the hope of destroying the leadership of the
national insurgency.
In some cases, senior officers say, their goals could
inadvertently act at cross purposes. For example, Iraq
cannot hold meaningful national elections if militants
still control major Sunni cities like Falluja. Negotiations
there have broken down and many officers predict a military
offensive. But hard-line Sunni clerics say they will call
for an election boycott if American troops use force to put
down the insurrection.
"Getting Sunnis involved in the political process to me is
the biggest thing that has to happen to help the security
situation," said one senior commander. "If a good portion
of Sunnis don't participate, then that may give life to a
larger Sunni insurgency. That's worrisome."
Some pivotal political decisions, including those shaping
the election process and setting a time to attack militants
in Falluja, rest with Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and his
government, leaving American officials in the position, at
best, of just trying to influence their outcome. Despite
these obstacles, these officers and officials still express
optimism that their detailed campaign plan and its
military, political and economic elements have provided the
blueprint for retaking rebel-held cities and navigating a
tumultuous period when violence will undoubtedly intensify
as insurgents seek to delay or scuttle the elections. That
plan, adopted in August, is refined every two weeks by top
American and Iraqi generals.
"I'm guardedly optimistic," said Brig. Gen. John DeFreitas
III, the military's chief intelligence officer in Iraq. "If
you look at Najaf, Tal Afar and Samarra, I think we are
having good effects."
For the first time, military officers also disclosed that
the United States could begin withdrawing its 138,000
troops from Iraq in July, if Iraqi security forces have
established control and the threats plaguing Iraq now have
lessened. "It's a mark on the wall," said one senior
officer.
The Military Answer
But when pressed in interviews and informal conversations -
mostly not for attribution, because of fear that their more
candid remarks could be used as campaign fodder back home -
senior commanders and civilian officials voiced misgivings
about how their plans could go awry, reflecting the
unpredictability of events in Iraq.
"It's a very complex country, and there are many things to
worry about," said one senior officer. "But we're trying to
work through all the unforeseen results of an insurgency
that becomes more robust."
Senior military officers say they are under no illusion
that military might alone will resolve Iraq's problems. At
best, using force to retake rebel-held cities will help
establish an environment secure enough to allow political
and economic programs that will ultimately defeat the
insurgency, they say.
Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the top American commander in
Iraq, compares the priorities in Iraq to two giant
locomotive engines, one generating new Iraqi security
forces, the other producing reconstruction gains, aides
say. The two are intended to generate "irreversible
momentum" that demonstrates to Iraqis and to the American
public that steady progress, even if sometimes halting is
being made.
Each morning General Casey's command briefing includes a
slide called "Drumbeat," a detailed compilation of progress
made in security, governance and the economy. No
accomplishment is too minor for mention, from the opening
of a new hospital to the signing of contracts for water
projects. General Casey presses his commanders to show that
reconstruction projects are under way and "turning dirt,"
and not just on the books. Right now there are about 700
such projects, with 1,800 scheduled to be under way by
year's end, officers said.
Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus, the head of training and
equipping Iraqi security forces, has a more colorful
analogy. Succeeding in Iraq, he says, is like a cattle
drive from Texas to Wyoming in the Old West: the cattle are
the myriad tasks that need to be done in Iraq, and American
and Iraqi trail bosses are battling insurgent rustlers,
treacherous conditions and daunting logistical hurdles to
keep the herd moving.
"I don't think it's too late to succeed, but it's not going
to be easy," General Petraeus said. "The bottom line is,
you just have to keep it going."
The broader context, senior officers and embassy officials
say, is for the United States to stay the course and be
patient, with the aim of restoring local control to Iraqis
and helping to rebuild the security forces and the economy.
"We can't lose this one," said Maj. Gen. Henry W. Stratman,
who as deputy chief of staff for political, military and
economic affairs is the military's main liaison with the
United States Embassy and Iraqi ministries.
Confronting Intimidation
The military is measuring its
progress against a 43-page document, prosaically titled
"Multinational Force Iraq Campaign Plan: Operation Iraqi
Freedom." Under this plan, the military uses 215
measurements to gauge progress in 15 pivotal cities and 7
smaller towns that must be brought under control before
nationwide elections can be held.
The measurements are reviewed weekly by senior officials,
including 25 military planners nicknamed the Brainiacs, who
are responsible for anticipating worst-case scenarios and
proposing possible solutions. Every other week, General
Casey and his top aides adjust the measurements to reflect
changing dynamics on the ground.
"I see indications to believe the security environment will
be sufficient for Iraq to have legitimate elections in
January," said Maj. Gen. Stephen T. Sargeant, the principal
architect of the plan.
Officials say General Casey and John D. Negroponte, the
United States ambassador in Baghdad, have a close and
cordial working relationship, unlike that of their
predecessors, Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez and L. Paul
Bremer III. "It's like night and day,'' said one senior
officer.
But senior officers also say there are formidable hurdles
ahead.
The recent massacre of 49 newly trained Iraqi soldiers in
remote eastern Iraq illustrates the lengths that the
insurgents, including former Baathist security forces and
followers of the Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,
will go to terrorize Iraqis who cooperate with the
Americans or take part in the new government.
Military intelligence in recent weeks has reported the
discovery of numerous suicide-bomber vests bound for
Baghdad and new kidnapping gangs crossing the border into
Iraq. Since the start of the holy month of Ramadan two
weeks ago, there has been a 30 percent increase in daily
attacks.
A job-training program conducted by Navy Seabees near
Falluja to teach construction skills to young Iraqis shut
down earlier this month when the 30 students stopped coming
to work, fearing retaliation.
Another casualty of the intimidation campaign is the flow
of information from ordinary Iraqis to the military about
the location of militants and their arms, including
roadside bombs. As rebel-held cities are retaken,
commanders say, tips from residents have picked up, but
more information is needed. "Intelligence is still a
weakness," a senior embassy official said.
The Economic Issues
Despite the bombings aimed at Iraqi
security forces, American commanders say, there is no
shortage of fresh recruits, a reflection of the desperate
economic straits most Iraqis face. There are now about
100,000 Iraqi security forces trained and equipped, with
45,000 more scheduled to report by the end of the year.
Some Iraqi units have performed well in recent fighting,
especially some elite Iraqi commando units. Earlier this
month, 2,000 Iraqi troops helped American forces retake
Samarra. But one Iraqi battalion reported that 300 of its
750 soldiers abandoned the unit before the offensive began
Oct. 1.
American commanders fear that many Iraqi units are
penetrated by informants. They are also grappling with
cultural differences. With no formal national banking
system in place, recruits and other troops need to bring
their paychecks home to their families. "If you have four
infantry companies, one is always on leave," said a senior
American officer.
The Americans have ambitious goals. "By next July, I hope
enough of the Iraqi security forces will be trained and
equipped that they'll be able to conduct independent
counterinsurgency operations, with some support," said one
senior commander. "There will still be an insurgency; it's
not going to go away. But we're trying to get it down to a
lower level, where the Iraqi security forces can deal with
it."
Once militants are driven out of their enclaves, the aim is
to rush in economic aid, in large part to win over the
civilian population. "We need to take Iraqis off the
streets and give them meaningful jobs so they're holding
shovels and hammers, not AK-47's," said Charles Hess,
director of the Army's Iraq Project and Contracting Office,
which oversees $12.6 billion in reconstruction programs.
In Samarra, Maj. Gen. John R. Batiste, commander of the
Army's First Infantry Division, had a blunt warning to his
superiors recently: "We've got to get these unemployed
folks back to work. We have a very small window of
opportunity to make this work."
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/31/international/middleeast/31command.html?ex=1100158025&ei=1&en=37b1d90c08fbe8ab
Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company