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boutons_
11-01-2006, 06:05 AM
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November 1, 2006
U.S. Central Command Charts Sharp Movement of the Civil Conflict in Iraq Toward Chaos

By MICHAEL R. GORDON (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/g/michael_r_gordon/index.html?inline=nyt-per)
WASHINGTON, Oct. 30 — A classified briefing prepared two weeks ago by the United States Central Command portrays Iraq (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iraq/index.html?inline=nyt-geo) as edging toward chaos, in a chart that the military is using as a barometer of civil conflict.

A one-page slide shown at the Oct. 18 briefing provides a rare glimpse into how the military command that oversees the war is trying to track its trajectory, particularly in terms of sectarian fighting.

The slide includes a color-coded bar chart that is used to illustrate an “Index of Civil Conflict.” It shows a sharp escalation in sectarian violence since the bombing of a Shiite shrine in Samarra in February, and tracks a further worsening this month despite a concerted American push to tamp down the violence in Baghdad.

In fashioning the index, the military is weighing factors like the ineffectual Iraqi police and the dwindling influence of moderate religious and political figures, rather than more traditional military measures such as the enemy’s fighting strength and the control of territory.

The conclusions the Central Command has drawn from these trends are not encouraging, according to a copy of the slide that was obtained by The New York Times. The slide shows Iraq as moving sharply away from “peace,” an ideal on the far left side of the chart, to a point much closer to the right side of the spectrum, a red zone marked “chaos.” As depicted in the command’s chart, the needle has been moving steadily toward the far right of the chart.

An intelligence summary at the bottom of the slide reads “urban areas experiencing ‘ethnic cleansing’ campaigns to consolidate control” and “violence at all-time high, spreading geographically.” According to a Central Command official, the index on civil strife has been a staple of internal command briefings for most of this year. The analysis was prepared by the command’s intelligence directorate, which is overseen by Brig. Gen. John M. Custer.

( Custer? no comment! :lol )

Gen. John P. Abizaid (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/a/john_p_abizaid/index.html?inline=nyt-per), who heads the command, warned publicly in August about the risk of civil war in Iraq, but he said then that he thought it could be averted. In evaluating the prospects for all-out civil strife, the command concentrates on “key reads,” or several principal variables.

According to the slide from the Oct. 18 briefing, the variables include “hostile rhetoric” by political and religious leaders, which can be measured by listening to sermons at mosques and to important Shiite and Sunni leaders, and the amount of influence that moderate political and religious figures have over the population. The other main variables are assassinations and other especially provocative sectarian attacks, as well as “spontaneous mass civil conflict.”

A number of secondary indicators are also taken into account, including activity by militias, problems with ineffective police, the ability of Iraqi officials to govern effectively, the number of civilians who have been forced to move by sectarian violence, the willingness of Iraqi security forces to follow orders, and the degree to which the Iraqi Kurds are pressing for independence from the central government.

These factors are evaluated to create the index of civil strife, which has registered a steady worsening for months. “Ever since the February attack on the Shiite mosque in Samarra, it has been closer to the chaos side than the peace side,” said a Central Command official who asked not to be identified because he was talking about classified information.

In the Oct. 18 brief, the index moved still another notch toward “chaos.” That briefing was prepared three days before General Abizaid met in Washington with President Bush, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/r/donald_h_rumsfeld/index.html?inline=nyt-per) and Gen. Peter Pace, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/j/joint_chiefs_of_staff/index.html?inline=nyt-org), to take stock of the situation in Iraq.

A spokesman for the Central Command declined to comment on the index or other information in the slide. “We don’t comment on secret material,” the spokesman said.

One significant factor in the military’s decision to move the scale toward “chaos” was the expanding activity by militias.

Another reason was the limitations of Iraqi government security forces, which despite years of training and equipping by the United States, are either ineffective or, in some cases, infiltrated by the very militias they are supposed to be combating. The slide notes that “ineffectual” Iraqi police forces have been a significant problem, and cites as a concern sectarian conflicts between Iraqi security forces.

Other significant factors are in the political realm. The slide notes that Iraq’s political and religious leaders have lost some of their moderating influence over their constituents or adherents.

Notably, the slide also cites difficulties that the new Iraqi administration has experienced in “governance.” That appears to be shorthand for the frustration felt by American military officers about the Iraqi government’s delays in bringing about a genuine political reconciliation between Shiites and Sunnis. It also appears to apply to the lack of reconstruction programs to restore essential services and the dearth of job creation efforts to give young Iraqis an alternative to joining militias, as well as the absence of firm action against militias.

( The Iraqis are just mimicking the Repugs' own horrible record in "governance" )

The slide lists other factors that are described as important but less significant. They include efforts by Iran and Syria to enable violence by militias and insurgent groups and the interest by many Kurds in achieving independence. The slide describes violence motivated by sectarian differences as having moved into a “critical” phase.

The chart does note some positive developments. Specifically, it notes that “hostile rhetoric” by political and religious leaders has not increased. It also notes that Iraqi security forces are refusing less often than in the past to take orders from the central government and that there has been a drop-off in mass desertions.

Still, for a military culture that thrives on PowerPoint briefings, the shifting index was seen by some officials as a stark warning about the difficult course of events in Iraq, and mirrored growing concern by some military officers.

=====================

The Repugs have lost Iraq and Afghanistan, creating an unbroken "arc of militarnt Islam" from Syria to Pakistan", with Israel on the western edge.

you're doing a heckuva job, dubya

01Snake
11-01-2006, 09:21 AM
Right on cue....


Another article from the resident NewsBot

boutons_
11-01-2006, 10:24 AM
Dubya's "We'll stand down when the Iraqis stand up" is working as well as all his other bullshit moves for Iraq.

============================

U.S. Officers Detail Problems With Iraqi Soldiers

Lack of Discipline Cited in Military Journal

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, November 1, 2006; A12

U.S. military advisers are confronting difficult behavior from Iraqi soldiers, who tend to fire all their ammunition in response to a single sniper shot or go on rampages even against civilians upon witnessing the death of a colleague, according to Lt. Col. Carl D. Grunow, a former adviser to an Iraqi army armored brigade.

"The 'burst reaction' may be attributed to Iraqis experiencing denial, anger and grief all at the same time," Grunow wrote in a recent article published in Military Review, the bimonthly publication of the U.S. Army's Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

(denial, anger and grief Welcome to The New feminized Army adding pscyho-babble to the Army's well-known obsession with gratuitously complicated jargon )

He attributes that reaction to the Iraqi army's experience in the "high-intensity Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, a war with clear battle lines fought with mass military formations." At that time, Grunow writes, "Iranian human-wave assaults presented Iraqi soldiers with a target rich environment" and "battlefields covered with bodies following huge expenditures of ammunition."

His article, based on his year in Iraq, which ended in June, is in the July-August Military Review and is one of several in recent issues that have dealt forthrightly with concerns of military participants with the U.S. effort to rebuild Iraq's army during the ongoing war.

For example, Grunow writes that Iraqi units drop in strength as much as 20 percent after paydays because soldiers take leave and go home. Lt. Gen. John R. Vines, who commanded the Multi-National Corps-Iraq in Baghdad from January 2005 to January 2006, picks up that theme in an article in the most recent Military Review. "The lack of a central banking system detracted from forces available. . . . Soldiers once a month must journey back to their homes to pay debts and pass the money on to their families . . . [and] are normally gone for up to a week, with the resultant loss to the unit of ready combat power," Vines writes.

Grunow also notes that some Iraqi soldiers do not show up for training that is difficult, and he says that up to 40 percent of some Iraqi units run away in the face of dangerous situations -- without punishment.
Their officers, Grunow writes, value relationships rather than results and frequently fail to notice misconduct or failure.

He argues that U.S. advisers must deal honestly with the local culture because Iraqi soldiers "are under no effective contract and they always have the option to leave the service. The only power holding them is the promise of a paycheck (not always delivered) and a sense of duty."

Not all the critiques in recent Military Affairs issues center on lessons learned abroad. Some are aimed at officials in Washington.

"The trust senior officers repose in senior civilian officials has eroded," writes F.J. Bing West, who was an assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration and is a frequent traveler to Iraq and a consultant to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's office. "Inside the senior levels of the military and among those who follow foreign policy, anger is directed at elected and appointed civilian officials seen as too blithe in initiating the war and too obtuse in leading once the going got tough," West writes in his article on the U.S. military performance in Iraq in the new Military Review.

"While there is no unity of military judgment about the civilian management of the war, the Bush administration has been injudicious in its consultations with the military," West writes. Both he and Grunow say a key event was the May 2003 decision to disband the Iraqi army, which was made by former Coalition Provisional Authority chief L. Paul Bremer III at the direction of the Defense Department. Grunow notes that only the Iraqi army can prevent anarchy, and West describes the disbanding as having "changed the mission of the American soldiers from liberators to occupiers."

They agree that the Iraqi army must continue to grow and that the Iraqi police must be reformed. West writes that "training alone was not the answer" for the Iraqi police. "Too many police were corrupt and controlled by Shiite militias, and senior Iraqi leaders were doing little to punish disloyalty." Sectarian issues continue to disrupt police performance, he says: "How Sunni police can be effective and not be assassinated in their own cities has yet to be shown. Conversely, the Shiite police in Baghdad have lost all trust among the Sunnis."

Vines says that even keeping track of friendly forces has been a problem. "Battle-tracking the Iraqi Army, Police, Special Police, Border Enforcement Forces and armed contractors moving around Iraq was difficult, but essential to preventing armed engagements between coalition forces," he writes.

In the Iraq theater of operations, he writes, "we had more than 300 different databases tracking friendly and enemy event data across all the warfighter functions." About 82,000 radio frequencies were used by U.S. military units, government agencies, coalition organizations and Iraqi security forces.

===================

What a fucking mess.

you're doing a heckuva job, dubya

ChumpDumper
11-01-2006, 08:37 PM
Thanks, I didn't see that for all the "impeach Kerry" blather.

Funny thing is, Bush countered Kerry with his own gaffe promising to never remove Rummy. Couldn't that have waited a week?

clambake
11-01-2006, 08:40 PM
All hail President Al-Sadr. He'll take care of rummy.