Senate vote

[clambake]

The Senate voted against the troop surge.

Where's the outrage from the forum republicans? It's been over three hours!

[boutons_]

12 - 9 against. pro forma only, has no power to stop the Exec

the shit is hitting the fan.

Nobody think I'm happy about this.

We are in full-blown geo-political crisis fabricated entirely and gratuitously by dubya/dickhead/rummy/condi/neo-cunts.

[1369]

If the commanders on the ground say they have a plan for winning and need the troops, then by all means send them (And spare me, Boutons, the whole jack-booted, automaton, "dubya" clone rant you're just itching to post).

That's one thing in this whole debate on troop size/tactics I don't understand. Isn't it that the military commanders formulate the plan and send it up the chain of command for approval (and if the operation is big enough, all the way to the CIC)?

Since when does what the Senate (And no, I don't care which side of the aisle they're on), determine tactics based upon polls that they need for reelection?

[Yonivore]

The Senate voted against the troop surge.

Where's the outrage from the forum republicans? It's been over three hours!
Well, the forum Libertarian says there's no outrage because, it's a meaningless vote.

[clambake]

So you think this vote should be meaningless?

[boutons_]

"Isn't it that the military commanders formulate the plan and send it up the chain of command for approva"

They've been saying for years they had enough troops (although they woudn't dare go Shinsheki on Rummy again).

Lots of generals thinks 21K more isn't enough.

21K just more of the same wondrous dubya war management that fucked up Iraq in the first place.

Of course, Petraeus would suck along with dumbfuck-in-chief. Good career move.

300K too little, 4 years too late.

dubya/dickhead/rummy have fucked the military who are now not in any position to un-break Iraq that they broke.

The Iraqi parliament hasn't had quorum show up to do business since November.
There is no Iraq country there to "stand up".

Stick a jackboot up your ass.

I'll post whatever the fuck I want and whenever the fuck I want to. Go fuck yourself.

[Yonivore]

congress did not vote to declare war on iraq...if they didn't nut up then, they have no say now..bush started this war and he's c&c
Semantics. The AUMF accomplishes the same thing and you've yet to hear anyone, on either side of the aisle, say the President started this war without the consent of Congress.

[Yonivore]

So you think this vote should be meaningless?
It doesn't matter what I think, it is meaningless.

If they want to force a change, defund the operation.

[boutons_]

The vote has TREMENDOUS meaning, just no legal weight.

It means that the Congress is voting along with the SOVEREIGN People of the USA who voted in November against Emperor dubya and against his bullshit war.

[boutons_]

no one wants to de-fund the troops, asshole. NO ONE!

They, "the army we have", were alread under-funded and under-equipped in 2003, insufficient body armor, unarmored vehicules.

[01Snake]

Look out 1369 or Croutons is going to beat you with a flurry of cut & paste articles.

Croutons...you are AHF's bitch!

[Yonivore]

The vote has TREMENDOUS meaning, just no legal weight.

It means that the Congress is voting along with the SOVEREIGN People of the USA who voted in November against Emperor dubya and against his bullshit war.
Then they should step up and introduce legislation to defund the operation in Iraq. The President will bring home the troops then.

The vote is political pandering of the worst kind. They should be ashamed.

Hell, forget the Republicans that voted for it, there were more than a few Democrats who, as late as December, proposed just such a surge. In fact, the new Chairman of the Intelligence Committee proposed almost identical numbers.

What changed in the past 30 days?

Well, I'll tell you. Democrats took over Congress and Republicans started running for office in '08.

Additionally, the Democrats started backpedalling because al Qaeda started fleeing Baghdad in anticipation of the surge, and Maliki started cooperating and quit protecting Sadr. Both conditions greatly increased the chance of a surge succeeding and, therefore, was no longer a good idea.

[01Snake]

Then they should step up and introduce legislation to defund the operation in Iraq. The President will bring home the troops then.

The vote is political pandering of the worst kind. They should be ashamed.

Hell, forget the Republicans that voted for it, there were more than a few Democrats who, as late as December, proposed just such a surge. In fact, the new Chairman of the Intelligence Committee proposed almost identical numbers.

What changed in the past 30 days?

Well, I'll tell you. Democrats took over Congress and Republicans started running for office in '08.

Additionally, the Democrats started backpedalling because al Qaeda started fleeing Baghdad in anticipation of the surge, and Maliki started cooperating and quit protecting Sadr. Both conditions greatly increased the chance of a surge succeeding and, therefore, was no longer a good idea.

Bingo

[Yonivore]

no one wants to de-fund the troops, asshole. NO ONE!

They, "the army we have", were alread under-funded and under-equipped in 2003, insufficient body armor, unarmored vehicules.
You're right, but if Congress really wants the President to pull out of Iraq, they need to defund the operation. No bullets, no army...they all come home or go to Afghanistan or elsewhere.

Although, they'd probably only go to Kuwait and wait until the genocide started and demands that we go back and stop the killing started spewing out of the U.N.

[clambake]

Well, we are responsible.

[boutons_]

Whether US military stays or withdraws to wherever, funed or not funded, Iraq is spiralling into a firestorm, probably for years to come.

We can't lose, but we can't win, either.

I'll take Saddam and Feb 03 anyday rather than Iraq in Jan 07 and years after.

A HUGE FUCKING fuckup by the WH/Repugs.

[johnsmith]

Well, we are responsible.


We weren't responsible for the first round of genocide put forth by Saddam though.

[johnsmith]

I'll take Saddam and Feb 03 anyday rather than Iraq in Jan 07 and years after.


Yeah, who cares about all those people he killed anyway?

[Yonivore]

Whether US military stays or withdraws to wherever, funed or not funded, Iraq is spiralling into a firestorm, probably for years to come.

We can't lose, but we can't win, either.
Oh, we'll do one or the other.


I'll take Saddam and Feb 03 anyday rather than Iraq in Jan 07 and years after.
So would al Qaeda and the insurgents. Not so much the Iraqi people and his neighbors.


A HUGE FUCKING fuckup by the WH/Repugs.
Then you have to include everyone who voted for the AUMF as well.

[clambake]

Another bogus attempt to connect Saddam with al-qaeda.

[Yonivore]

Another bogus attempt to connect Saddam with al-qaeda.
Whatever version you want to believe -- al Qaeda was in the Kurdish North or al Qaeda was in Baghdad unbeknownst to Hussein or al Qaeda was living large at the privilege of Saddam Hussein, you can't argue they weren't there and that they'd be much happier if we weren't.

You're pretty knee-jerk sometimes.

[clambake]

Then why would they flee now? (talk about knee jerk)

Logic would suggest that to rid yourself of Al-Sadr you would need to get Al-Sadr. What's the holdup? Better do something quick before our troops star taking orders from him again.

[clambake]

Al-Qaeda is living in the U.S. unbeknowst to us. So I guess we're equally connected.

[boutons_]

The Senate and anybody who's actually following what's going on in Iraq, probably had several stories like this one in mind, as to why they are against dubya wasting more US military lives with more of the same old failed approach:



The New York Times


January 24, 2007

Iraq Parliament Finds a Quorum Hard to Come By

By DAMIEN CAVE

http://graphics10.nytimes.com/images/2007/01/23/world/24noshow.600.jpg

BAGHDAD, Jan. 23 — Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, the speaker of Parliament, read a roll call of the 275 elected members with a goal of shaming the no-shows.

Ayad Allawi, the former prime minister? Absent, living in Amman and London. Adnan Pachachi, the octogenarian statesman? Also gone, in Abu Dhabi.

Others who failed to appear Monday included Saleh Mutlak, a senior Sunni legislator; several Shiites and Kurds; and Ayad al-Samaraei, chairman of the finance committee, whose absence led Mr. Mashhadani to ask: “When will he be back? After we approve the budget?”

It was a joke barbed with outrage. Parliament in recent months has been at a standstill. Nearly every session since November has been adjourned because as few as 65 members made it to work, even as they and the absentees earned salaries and benefits worth about $120,000.

Part of the problem is security, but Iraqi officials also said they feared that members were losing confidence in the institution and in the country’s fragile democracy. As chaos has deepened, Parliament’s relevance has gradually receded.

Deals on important legislation, most recently the oil law, now take place largely out of public view, with Parliament — when it meets — rubber-stamping the final decisions. As a result, officials said, vital legislation involving the budget, provincial elections and amendments to the Constitution remain trapped in a legislative process that processes nearly nothing. American officials long hoped that Parliament could help foster dialogue between Iraq’s increasingly fractured ethnic and religious groups, but that has not happened, either.

Goaded by American leaders, frustrated and desperate to prove that Iraq can govern itself, senior Iraqi officials have clearly had enough. Mr. Mashhadani said Parliament would soon start fining members $400 for every missed session and replace the absentees if they fail to attend a minimum amount of the time.

Some of Iraq’s more seasoned leaders say attendance has been undermined by a widening sense of disillusionment about Parliament’s ability to improve Iraqis’ daily life. The country’s dominant issue, security, is almost exclusively the policy realm of the American military and the office of the prime minister.

Every bombing like the one on Monday, which killed 88 people at a downtown market, suggests to some that Parliament’s laws are irrelevant in the face of sprawling chaos and the government’s inability to stop it.

“People are totally disenchanted,” Mr. Pachachi said in a telephone interview from Abu Dhabi. “There has been no improvement in the security situation. The government seems to be incapable of doing anything despite all the promises.”

Though the Constitution grants Iraq’s only elected body wide powers to pass laws and investigate, sectarian divisions and the need for a twothirds majority in some cases have often led to deadlock. Sunni and Shiite power brokers have blocked efforts to scrutinize violence connected to their own sects.

“Parliament is the heart of the political process,” Mr. Mashhadani said in an interview at his office, offering more hope than reality. “It is the center of everything. If the heart is not working, it all fails.”

Monday’s attendance actually surpassed the 50 percent plus one needed to pass laws. It was the first quorum in months, caused in part by the return of 30 members loyal to the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr, whose end to a two-month boycott created a public relations blitz that helped attract 189 members.

But the scene in the convention center auditorium where Parliament meets only underscored the rarity of the gathering. It seemed at times like a reunion. At one point Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, who is head of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and a Shiite rival of Mr. Sadr, arrived late — after being marked absent. He spent the first five minutes waving and nodding at colleagues, some of whom he apparently had not seen in months.

Parliamentary officials refused to provide attendance lists for every session, fearing retribution. They said all sects and regions had members who often did not come.

Each representative earns about $10,000 a month in salary and benefits, including money for guards. Yet on Monday, members from Baghdad neighborhoods to small towns in the hinterland — Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds, Christians and Turkmen — were all on the list of no-shows that Mr. Mashhadani read aloud.

The largest group of absentees consisted of unknown figures elected as part of the party lists that governed how most people voted in the December 2005 election. Party leaders in Baghdad said they had urged their members to attend but emphasized that for many, Parliament had become a hardship post.

Representatives who travel from afar stay at the Rashid Hotel in the Green Zone, across a road, two checkpoints and several pat-downs from the 1970s-era convention center. It is not luxurious. It is barely safe. The food is mediocre.

In short, many said, the job is not what members thought they had signed up for.

“Most of them were here for the game, for prestige, for the money,” said Muhammad al-Ahmedawi, a Shiite member of the Fadhila Party. “It’s upsetting and disappointing. We want the members to come, to pursue the interests of their constituents, especially in this sensitive time.”

Mr. Ahmedawi said politicians who had larger shares of power before the elections seemed to view Parliament as a demotion best ignored. Mr. Allawi, for example, who did not return calls to his London aides requesting an interview, has been rallying support in Amman and London among exiles who have fled Iraq’s violence.

Of the 25 members of his bloc, only six attended the session on Monday.

Mr. Pachachi, who is in his mid-80s, said he left Iraq a few months ago because his wife needed open-heart surgery and he did not trust that she would be well cared for in one of Baghdad’s decrepit hospitals. He said he hoped to return in a few weeks, admitting that “one has to be there — you can’t be a member of the Parliament and live abroad.”

But he said the dangers involved with being a public figure in Iraq had made it much more difficult to participate in government. He has 40 guards to protect him when he comes to Iraq, he said, and the salary from Parliament pays for only 20.

“I have protection, and unfortunately the protection is not sufficient for anyone anymore,” he said. “The level of violence has become unmanageable.”

Other Iraqi politicians take a harder line. Adnan Dulaimi, a member of the largest Sunni bloc in Parliament, put it simply, “If there are some members who think there is no benefit to attending, then they should resign.”

Mr. Mashhadani seems to be shaping a slightly softer approach that mixes persuasion with punishment. Like Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, he has met repeatedly with party leaders, pushing them to ensure the attendance of their members.

During an interview in his office, lined with baroque cushioned chairs with gold trim, he also acknowledged that more money should be set aside for members’ security, but only if members show up to pass a budget.

He said the shaming of the absentees at the public session, a first, was the first step. He said the fines and threat of replacement would also help.

There is, of course, only one problem. For the proposals to be put in place, a majority of members in Parliament have to be present to pass them.

Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company

=====================

"Iraq" is lost, there is no Iraq there, certainly nothing worth dying for.

The fucked-over US military is completely impotent to stop violence.

you're doing a heckuva job, dubya

[BIG IRISH]

.....Additionally, the Democrats started backpedalling because al Qaeda started fleeing Baghdad in anticipation of the surge, and Maliki started cooperating and quit protecting Sadr. Both conditions greatly increased the chance of a surge succeeding and, therefore, was no longer a good idea.

Yep the SURGE s/b Change in Tactics is working
Three interesting things have happened since President Bush announced plans to "surge" U.S. troops.

First, al Qaida appears to be retreating from Baghdad. A military intelligence officer has confirmed to Richard Miniter, editor of Pajamas Media, a report in the Iraqi newspaper al Sabah that Abu Ayyub al Masri, the head of al Qaida in Iraq, has ordered a withdrawal to Diyala province, north and east of Baghdad.

Mr. al Masri's evacuation order said that remaining in Baghdad is a no-win situation for al Qaida, because the Fallujah campaign demonstrating the Americans have learned how to prevail in house to house fighting, Mr. Miniter said.

"In more than 10 years of reading al Qaida intercepts, I've never seen (pessimistic) language like this," he quoted his intelligence officer source as saying.

Second, the radical cleric Moqtada al Sadr, whose Iranian-subsidized militia, the Mahdi army, is responsible for most of the assaults on Sunni civilians in Iraq, is cooling his rhetoric and lowering his profile.

"Mahdi army militia members have stopped wearing their black uniforms, hidden their weapons and abandoned their checkpoints in an apparent effort to lower their profile in Baghdad in advance of the arrival of U.S. reinforcements," wrote Leila Fadel and Zaineb Obeid of the McClatchy Newspapers Jan. 13.

Third, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki is putting more distance between himself and al Sadr, upon whose bloc of votes in parliament he had relied for political support.

Last Friday al Sadr ordered the 30 lawmakers and six cabinet ministers he controls to end the boycott of the government he ordered two months ago. AP writer Steven Hurst described this Monday as "a desperate bid to fend off an all out American offensive."

Despite this, Mr. Maliki consented to the arrest that same day of Abdul Hadi al Durraji, al Sadr's media director in Baghdad. Mr. Sadr said Saturday some 400 of his supporters have been arrested in recent days.

The first development is more of a problem relocated than a problem solved, because Baghdad's gain from al Qaida's departure will be Diyala's loss.

A strategic withdrawal makes good sense from al Qaida's point of view. It's better to live to fight another day. The intelligence officer who was Mr. Miniter's source thinks Mr. al Masri is a more formidable opponent than was his predecessor, Abu Musab al Zarqawi who (ironically) met his end after an encounter with an F-16 in Diyala province.

But leaving Baghdad gives the government and the Americans the opportunity to assert control in the contested neighborhoods, which will make it difficult for al Qaida to return. And because the media play up events in Baghdad more than events anywhere else in the country, it means al Qaida will be leaving center stage.

The lowered profile of the Mahdi army will only be a problem postponed if decisive action isn't taken against al Sadr and his militia.

"Mookie," as the troops call him, can only be relied upon to behave when he is terrified.

So success hinges on the attitude of the Iraqi government.

Mr. Maliki's turnaround on the Mahdi army "was puzzling because as late as Oct. 31, he had intervened to end a U.S. blockade of Sadr City, the northeast Shiite enclave in Baghdad that is headquarters to the militia," Mr. Hurst wrote.

Two Iraqi government officials told him Mr. Maliki had dropped his protection of the Mahdi army because U.S. intelligence had persuaded him it was infiltrated by death squads, the AP reporter wrote.

"Al Maliki realized he couldn't keep defending the Mahdi army because of the information and evidence that the armed group was taking part in the killings, displacing people and violating the state's sovereignty," Mr. Hurst quoted one of those officials as saying.

But Mr. Maliki would have to be blind, deaf and dumb not to have recognized from the get go that the Mahdi army is one gigantic death squad. I suspect Mr. Maliki is only seeing the light now because President Bush finally is applying some heat.

Mr. Maliki has tried to walk a line between the Scylla of the Americans and the Charybdis of the Iranians, but the steps he's taking now will be difficult to retrace.

"He knows that his personal risk increases with each Shiite militia commander he arrests, and eventually he will pass through a door through which he cannot return," said the Web logger Tigerhawk.

Though they may turn out to be fleeting, the troop surge, though barely begun, already is producing beneficial results. Efforts to write it off in advance as a "failure" are, at best, premature.
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/01/surge_produces_some_early_resu.html

[ChumpDumper]

Well, any article that quotes Tigerhawk....

[BIG IRISH]

Same old BS FROM YOU CHUMP, YOU CANNOT DEBATE THE CONTENT, SO YOU CRITIZE THE SOURCE. Typically weak-ass Democrat
However try the BBChttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6289891.stm

Crackdown 'nets 600 Sadr forces'

Many Mehdi Army fighters have melted out of sight
About 600 fighters and 16 leaders of the radical Shia militia, the Mehdi Army, have been captured by security forces in Iraq, the US military says.
The statement said 52 operations had been conducted in 45 days targeting the militia, which is loyal to Najaf-based cleric Moqtada Sadr.

Sunni extremists were also the focus of the crackdown, the US military said.

US and Iraqi forces are currently preparing for a broad offensive in the strife-torn Iraqi capital Baghdad.

In other developments:


Five Iraqi police were reported to have been killed in a gun battle in Mosul

At least three people died in car bomb attacks in central Baghdad

The deaths of three US soldiers were announced

Thirty Palestinian men were abducted in Baghdad by gunmen wearing police uniforms. They were later released.

A civilian helicopter crashed in a Sunni area of Baghdad, killing five people. Unconfirmed reports said it had been shot down.
A UN envoy in Iraq said the country was sliding "into the abyss of sectarianism" after two car bombs killed 88 people in a Baghdad market on Monday.

"These deplorable outrages again underscore the urgent need for all Iraqis to reject violence and together choose the path of peace and reconciliation," Ashraf Qazi said in a statement.

'Responsible for attacks'

The military said five of the Mehdi Army leaders were detained in the pro-Sadr bastion, Sadr City. One senior figure was killed in a raid.

Criminal activities by these individuals propagated instability within Iraq

US military statement
"The detainees are responsible for attacks against the government of Iraq, Iraqi citizens and coalition forces," the US military said.

"Criminal activities by these individuals propagated instability within Iraq and their removal from the social structure is a critical start to providing the Iraqi populace with a safe and stable environment."

In addition, 33 Sunni extremist cell leaders were detained in Baghdad, the statement said.

The statement said they were "responsible for foreign fighter facilitation, car bomb facilitation, and propaganda operations".

Correspondents say the Mehdi Army has up to 60,000 fighters.

Harder line

The BBC's Andrew North in Baghdad says it is still not clear how significant the senior Mehdi Army figures now in custody are.


Sadr's group has spearheaded anti-US military action in the past
But this appears to be the beginnings of a harder line on this widely feared Shia militia, he says.

In the past, the Iraqi government has been criticised for turning a blind eye to Mehdi Army activities for political reasons.

A spokesman for the movement would not confirm the numbers detained, but he said they were now seeing Iraqi and US raids almost every day.

Police are still finding dozens of bodies across the capital every day, most of them believed to be the victims of sectarian death squads.

Many Iraqis remain deeply sceptical that the Mehdi Army will be broken up, our correspondent says, and those fighters who have gone to ground are believed to have hidden their weapons, ready for future confrontations

oops sorry that is a foreign source how about the AP
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070118/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_070118180930

Mahdi Army expressing siege mentality By STEVEN R. HURST, Associated Press Writer
Thu Jan 18, 4:33 PM ET



BAGHDAD, Iraq - Mahdi Army fighters said Thursday they were under siege in their Sadr City stronghold as U.S. and Iraqi troops killed or seized key commanders in pinpoint nighttime raids. Two commanders of the Shiite militia said Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has stopped protecting the group under pressure from Washington and threats from Sunni Muslim Arab governments.
The two commanders' account of a growing siege mentality inside the organization could represent a tactical and propaganda feint, but there was mounting evidence the militia was increasingly off balance and had ordered its gunmen to melt back into the population. To avoid capture, commanders report no longer using cell phones and fighters are removing their black uniforms and hiding their weapons during the day.

During much of his nearly eight months in office, al-Maliki has blocked or ordered an end to many U.S.-led operations against the Mahdi Army, which is run by radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, the prime minister's key political backer.

As recently as Oct. 31, al-Maliki, trying to capitalize on American voter discontent with the war and White House reluctance to open a public fight with the Iraqi leader just before the election, won U.S. agreement to lift military blockades on Sadr City and another Shiite enclave where an American soldier was abducted.

But al-Maliki reportedly had a change of heart in late November while going into a meeting in Jordan with President Bush. It has since been disclosed that the Iraqi leader's vision for a new security plan for Baghdad, to which Bush has committed 17,500 additional U.S. troops, was outlined in that meeting.

Al-Maliki is said by aides to have told Bush that he wanted the Iraqi army and police to be in the lead, but he would no longer interfere to prevent U.S. attempts to roll up the Mahdi Army.

In a meeting before his session with Bush, Jordan's King Abdullah II was said by al-Maliki confidants to have conveyed the increasing anger of fellow Sunni leaders in the Middle East over the continuing slaughter of Sunni Muslims at the hands of Shiite death squads.

Until February, much of the violence in Iraq was the work of al-Qaida in Iraq and allied Sunni organizations. They had killed thousands of Shiites in random bomb attacks in what was seen as an al-Qaida bid to foment civil war.

When al-Qaida bombers blew up the Golden Dome mosque, an important Shiite shrine in the mainly Sunni city of Samarra on Feb. 22, Shiite militiamen, especially the Mahdi Army fighters based in Sadr City, stormed out of the poor enclave in a drive for revenge that has only grown in ferocity.

The U.N. reported this week that the sectarian fighting killed more than 34,000 Iraqis last year, a figure that was criticized but not disputed Thursday by the Iraqi government.

With the Sunni threat in mind, evidence since the meetings in Jordan indicates that al-Maliki has kept his pledge to Bush that there would be no further interference in favor of Shiite militias.

On Wednesday, the prime minister said 400 Mahdi Army fighters had been detained in recent months, although an exact timeframe was not given.

The midlevel Mahdi Army commanders, who spoke to The Associated Press on condition of anonymity because the group operates in secret, said at least five top commanders of similar standing were captured or killed in recent months, including one snatched in a night raid from his Sadr City hide-out on Tuesday. They refused to name him.

Two other key officials at the top of the organization were killed in raids last month:

• Sahib al-Amiri, a senior al-Sadr military aide, was slain by American forces in the Shiite holy city of Najaf on Dec. 27. The U.S. military reported his death, calling him a criminal involved roadside bombings. Al-Sadr lives in Najaf.

• The other top commander, identified by a third Mahdi Army commander as Abu al-Sudour, was shot to death in a joint U.S.-Iraqi raid last month as well. He was hunted down in Sadr City.

The third commander, who also spoke anonymously to protect his identity, said U.S.-led raiding parties were now also engaged in massive sweeps, having rounded up what he said was every male old enough to carry a gun in south Baghdad's Um al-Maalef neighborhood Tuesday night.

The U.S. military spokesman, Maj. Gen. William Caldwell, alluded to the tactics early this month when he was asked by the AP if the coming security operation would focus on pinpoint raids or broader military engagements.

"It'll be a combination of targeted killings and more traditional large-force operations," Caldwell said.

There has been so much advance publicity about the coming security plan, major speeches by both Bush and al-Maliki, that the militant targets of the operation — both Sunni insurgents and Shiite militiamen — have had ample warning the U.S. and Iraqi militaries are drawing a bead.

One of the Mahdi Army commanders who spoke with the AP said the early warning was not ignored.

"Our top leadership has told us to lay low and not confront the Americans. But if Sadr City is attacked, if civilians are hurt, we will ignore those orders and take matters in our own hands. We won't need orders from Sheik Muqtada (al-Sadr)," the midlevel commander said.

Others in the organization said street fighters have been told not to wear their black uniforms and to hide their weapons, to make their checkpoints less visible. Reports from the growing number of neighborhoods controlled by the militias indicate fighters are obeying.

Gen. George Casey, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, said the security strategy and the additional American forces would allow the crackdown to be sufficiently broad to sweep up those who try to escape Baghdad and operate elsewhere.
"On the militia, the Baghdad plan itself is integrated to a holistic, countrywide plan that the multinational corps is developing. And security for Baghdad won't just come from securing the inside of Baghdad," Casey said at a briefing on Monday.

"It comes from the support zones around the outside as far away, as you suggest, Baqouba and Ramadi and Fallujah. It goes all the way out to the borders to stop the flow of foreign fighters and support coming in there."

The Mahdi Army commanders said they were increasingly concerned about improved U.S. intelligence that has allowed the Americans to successfully target key figures in the militia.

"We're no longer using cell phones except in emergencies. Some of our top commanders have not been home (in Sadr City) for a year because they fear capture," one of the commanders said.

The militiamen said al-Sadr himself had apparently gotten wind of the coming assault and ordered a reshuffling of the Mahdi Army command structure, transferring many leaders to new districts and firing others who were of suspect loyalty.

While Shiite militiamen were less in evidence on Baghdad streets, Sunni insurgents continued their bomb and shooting attacks in Shiite regions and Shiite death squads remained active at night.

Police reported a total of 59 people killed or found dead Thursday, with the single largest toll from a triple car bombing that killed 10 in a wholesale vegetable market in a south Baghdad Shiite neighborhood. Twenty-seven bodies were found dumped in Baghdad, 19 on the largely Sunni west side of the Tigris, eight on the mainly Shiite east bank.

FYFM CHUMP, it's not so much as the additional troops, but the troops and a change of tactics but why bother, and I wish ,Chump, you would stop trying
to stand up stright. You lean so far to the left I don't see how you manage.

Stop it, You don't need the stress.

[ChumpDumper]

Hey, I hope it works. I've said so.

So fuck yourself, Tigerhawk.

[BIG IRISH]

Hey, I hope it works. I've said so.

So fuck yourself, Tigerhawk.

What is you definition of a moderator :lol

[boutons_]

Here's an interesting simulation of what the Shiite insurgent leaders might be thinking.

==============

Looking at the Surge From the Other Side

By Gary Anderson
Friday, January 26, 2007;

Policy Memo From the Planning Directorate, Mahdi Army:

We have completed a review of the new American surge strategy announced by their president. In analyzing possible courses of action, we must make two key assumptions:

First, it represents their administration's last chance to change course given the reported mood of the American public and their legislature. For us, this presents both opportunity and danger. We have to assume that we are the primary Shiite target of this plan. How we respond will largely determine how we position ourselves for operations after the Americans are gone.

Second, our Sunni adversaries will not be able to react in a coordinated manner; they are expected to remain divided in their actions and motivations.

Our first potential course of action would be to openly resist government and American efforts to gain control over Sadr City and other predominately Shiite neighborhoods. Potential advantage: Waging a stand-up battle could create such chaos and so many disturbing images of casualties -- American and Iraqi -- that the American public and Congress will demand an immediate withdrawal.

The disadvantages here are that such a battle would weaken us by causing attrition to our best fighters. We are just now recovering from the casualties that we sustained in the 2004 fighting with the occupiers. We must keep in mind (and be prepared for) the inevitable post-American battles with the Sunnis and the Badr Organization.

A second potential course of action is classic insurgent strategy: going to ground when confronted by enemy strength. The object here would be to lull the enemy into a false sense of security, perhaps enough for him to begin decreasing his strength early. Once the Americans have carried out a significant drawdown, we could openly challenge the government forces and attempt to push them out of our areas of influence. It is very likely this would have the effect of the Vietnamese Tet Offensive in convincing the Americans that nothing they do will work. It is also unlikely that their administration could get support for reinforcing Baghdad once they have begun to reduce troop levels.

Potential drawbacks:

First, there is always the chance that the Americans and the Maliki government will use this period to significantly increase the capability of the security forces and actually gain public support through increasing public service and employment, rendering us far less useful to Maliki. Given their performance to date, this is a remote possibility, but it cannot be totally discounted.

More likely is that some of our more enthusiastic fighters will resist on their own authority. Given the decentralized nature of our command-and-control system, this possibility must be considered. One solution would be to create training camps outside of Baghdad where we could hone their skills for urban combat (necessary if we are to succeed in the future). This would keep them occupied and out of the way.

A third course would be to avoid challenging the Americans and government forces directly but continue to attack them with IEDs and snipers. There will be many more American targets on the street, and a continuing stream of casualties would further undermine American public support. This has the advantage of keeping our fingerprints off such operations because the Sunnis will probably do this regardless of what we do. This also conserves our combat power. It shares the potential disadvantage that the American "hearts and minds" strategy may actually work and that the security forces will increase in capability. Again, we think this is unlikely.

Consequently, this final course seems to be the one most likely to serve our long-term interests by preserving our capabilities and allowing the Sunnis to bear the brunt and take the blame for most anti-government action. Clearly, America's time here is limited. Hurrying its exit at the cost of weakening our position does not make sense. We have been patient for a thousand years; another year or so is nothing.

If God wills it, we will be successful.

The writer, a defense consultant, has been an opposition player in many war games regarding Iraq and Afghanistan.

=================

So, we'll see how the surgee insurgents react to the surging surgers.

The context is that even if the surge works, there is /will be no Iraqi state or govt or non-compromised/infiltrated Iraqi army/police to "stand up".

The insurgents can wait in Iraq much longer than dubya can.
When dubya stands down, the insurgents/Iran will resurge and stand up, not the Iraqi "government".

[Yonivore]

Here's an interesting simulation of what the Shiite insurgent leaders might be thinking.

==============

Looking at the Surge From the Other Side

By Gary Anderson
Friday, January 26, 2007;

Policy Memo From the Planning Directorate, Mahdi Army:

We have completed a review of the new American surge strategy announced by their president. In analyzing possible courses of action, we must make two key assumptions:...
Okay, you can stop right there.

Why the fuck do they even have our surge strategy to review?

Oh yeah, because the defeatists in this country have been wailing, non-stop, for 4 years demanding this President share his war strategy with the world. And, when he won't, they leak it to the New York Times or, they sue their own government on behalf of the terrorists.

But, on a brighter note, I doubt the President revealed enough in his public statements for the Mahdi Army to conclude anything, much less develop a sufficient counter strategy. In other words, yeah, I think he lied to you about the surge strategy. Really, what choice does he have?

The surge is underway. The rules of engagement have changed. They're fucked.

[boutons_]

"demanding this President share his war strategy with the world."

dubya didn't have a strategy to finish Iran, only to start it. There was NO STRATEGY to reveal or leak. Rummy threatened to fire any Generals who talked about the need for post-invasion planning.

If the surge strategy is so fucking brilliant and guaranteed success, why wasn't it tried 3 years ago? Because Rummy was a disaster, and dubya didn't/doesn't have a clue.

The surge only comes as a last resort. Every "strategy" up now, not that they were much to talk about, has failed. But the surge will "win" Iraq? Right, I'm not holding my breath.

Military victory in Iraq, assuming there will be one, will be as empty as the US military victory in the VN Tet offensive, which was a horrible setback for the NVA/VC.

There is no Iraq there. Whatever was there under Saddam, a very effective counter-weight to Iran and NO THREAT TO USA, was destroyed by dubya, and there's nothing there to replace it.

[Pero]

We are just now recovering from the casualties that we sustained in the 2004 fighting with the occupiers.

Hmmm, huh?

Anyway, one thing I don`t get. How can your army be underfunded? You spend billions upon billions for the military and it`s underfunded? WTF? Where does the money go? Is it spent on hookers or what?