http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/10404
This is from last friday, but no one called anyone else a moron, idiot, or retard.
Imagine that.
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http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/10404
This is from last friday, but no one called anyone else a moron, idiot, or retard.
Imagine that.
By the way, I was listening to an Iranian analyst on the radio today and he said the best way for the current regime to fall was to find/create fractures in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.
DarkReign didn't call you any names, but this was your reply.
The timestamp is 10:28.
He did say "blow me", but that was in response to a blatant cheap shot. I just lost a little more respect for you there, D.
There was an unconfirmed rumor out there that the Tehran commander got arrested:
Mohsen Rezai, a 2009 presidential candidate (polled 1.7%) and former IRGC commander, is a man to watch. It's not impossible some IRGC officers are still loyal to him .Quote:
According to unconfirmed reports in Balatarin [Farsi] , Gen. Ali Fazli, the head of revolutionary guards in Tehran, has been arrested after refusing to execute Khamenei’s order of using force against demonstrators in Tehran. He is a war veteran who lost an eye during the Iran-Iraq war.
George Soros' Eurasianet suggests the possibility of a religious coup:
.Quote:
Looking past their fiery rhetoric and apparent determination to cling to power using all available means, Iran’s hardliners are not a confident bunch. While hardliners still believe they possess enough force to stifle popular protests, they are worried that they are losing a behind-the-scenes battle within Iran’s religious establishment.
A source familiar with the thinking of decision-makers in state agencies that have strong ties to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said there is a sense among hardliners that a shoe is about to drop. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani -- Iran’s savviest political operator and an arch-enemy of Ayatollah Khamenei’s -- has kept out of the public spotlight since the rigged June 12 presidential election triggered the political crisis. The widespread belief is that Rafsanjani has been in the holy city of Qom, working to assemble a religious and political coalition to topple the supreme leader and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
"There is great apprehension among people in the supreme leader’s [camp] about what Rafsanjani may pull," said a source in Tehran who is familiar with hardliner thinking. "They [the supreme leader and his supporters] are much more concerned about Rafsanjani than the mass movement on the streets."
Ayatollah Khamenei now has a very big image problem among influential Shi’a clergymen. Over the course of the political crisis, stretching back to the days leading up to the election, Rafsanjani has succeeded in knocking the supreme leader off his pedestal by revealing Ayatollah Khamenei to be a political partisan rather than an above-the-fray spiritual leader. In other words, the supreme leader has become a divider, not a uniter. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Now that Ayatollah Khamenei has become inexorably connected to Ahmadinejad’s power grab, many clerics are coming around to the idea that the current system needs to be changed. Among those who are now believed to be arrayed against Ayatollah Khamenei is Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the top Shi’a cleric in neighboring Iraq. Rafsanjani is known to have met with Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani’s representative in Iran, Javad Shahrestani.
A reformist website, Rooyeh, reported that Rafsanjani already had the support of nearly a majority of the Assembly of Experts, a body that constitutionally has the power to remove Ayatollah Khamenei. The report also indicated that Rafsanjani’s lobbying efforts were continuing to bring more clerics over to his side. Rafsanjani’s aim, the website added, is the establishment of a leadership council, comprising of three or more top religious leaders, to replace the institution of supreme leader. Shortly after it posted the report on Rafsanjani’s efforts to establish a new collective leadership, government officials pulled the plug on Rooyeh.
Meanwhile, the Al-Arabiya satellite television news channel reported that a "high-ranking" source in Qom confirmed that Rafsanjani has garnered enough support to remove Ayatollah Khamenei, but an announcement is being delayed amid differences on what or who should replace the supreme leader. Some top clerics reportedly want to maintain the post of supreme leader, albeit with someone other than Ayatollah Khamenei occupying the post, while others support the collective leadership approach.
To a certain degree, hardliners now find themselves caught in a cycle of doom: they must crack down on protesters if they are to have any chance of retaining power, but doing so only causes more and more clerics to align against them.
Security forces broke up a small street protest on June 22 involving roughly a thousand demonstrators who had gathered to mourn the victims of the government crackdown two days before. Also on June 22, a statement issued in the name of the Revolutionary Guards demanded that protesters immediately stop "sabotage and rioting activities," and threatened to unleash "revolutionary confrontation" against anyone who took to the streets.
Such a showdown could come later this week. One of the country’s highest-ranking clerics, Grand Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri has declared three days of mourning for those who have died in street protests. Grand Ayatollah Montazeri’s declaration could bring thousands of Tehran residents back out into the streets starting on June 24
What?
Darrin issues a call for civility about ten minutes after calling Chumpy a *** dumpster and DR a tranny chaser.
Is the cognitive dissonance somehow lost on you, VLE?
You could have taken the high road and focused on my straight replies to Darrin instead, but no.
Instead you draw even more attention to a reply you supposedly abhor, by reposting it.
National Geographic Channel has had a string of really good mini documentaries about the build up to this. They covered everything from pre WWII all the way up to about 5 days ago.
I had no idea that if it was up to Ahmedinejad back in the 70's the students would have taken the Russian embassy hostage as opposed to the American. He saw Russia as a bigger threat than us. Weird stuff.
The bitterness in this thread is off the charts.
I'm not bitter, just normally observant.
Well, I had a role in increasing it. The whip hand isn't bitter. The target yelps.Quote:
Originally Posted by jman3000
Looks like the Guardian Council declared it isn't going to annul the vote.
Scratch that extremely unlikely scenario from your lists.
http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/20625
Not really a "must see", since it's just two guys talking into webcams, but worth a listen (I subscribe to the podcast) as it's very content rich.
:lmao Everyone knows Viva is bitter - awesome.
Mousavi, the butcher of Beirut?
New Yorker: background on the Mousavi/Khamenei rivalry.
Quote:
Mir-Hossein Moussavi, the Presidential contender whose legions of supporters have taken to the streets of Iranian cities, has a long and complex history with Khamenei. When Moussavi was Prime Minister, in the nineteen-eighties, he belonged to a faction known as the Islamic Left. It shared power with a rival faction, the Islamic Right, led by Khamenei, who was then the President. When Moussavi and Khamenei clashed, as they often did, the charismatic leader of the Islamic Revolution and the supreme leader of the country, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, intervened—most frequently on Moussavi’s side.
So, in 1989, when Khomeini died and Khamenei replaced him as supreme leader, the Islamic Left was exiled to political purgatory. Moussavi did not lift his head in Iranian politics for twenty years. But during those years the rest of his Islamic Left faction, including Saeed Hajjarian, made one of the most dramatic turnabouts in Iran’s political history. It abandoned its hard-line commitments in favor of an agenda of liberalization, freedom of expression, the relaxation of Islamic social codes, and friendlier dealings with the world. On the strength of this platform, in 1997, Khatami, who had been Moussavi’s minister of culture, won the Presidency in a landslide. Parliament soon fell to the reformists, too. Although these elected officials were subordinate to Khamenei, Hajjarian believed that they could extend their reach by triangulating between the mass movement they represented and the autocratic state with which they shared power. He coined the phrase that would define the reformists’ strategy: “Pressure from below, negotiation at the top.”
http://www.cartoonbank.com/assets/1/120048_n.gif
That strategy failed. The pressure from below was for far-reaching democratic reform, which Khatami could not deliver within the confines of the constitution. Moreover, the authorities at the top were not interested in negotiating. A hundred independent newspapers and magazines opened, only to be forced to close; the Guardian Council vetoed much of the legislation passed by the parliament; and Khatami could not keep his inner circle out of prison, let alone the young people whose votes had won him the Presidency. By the time he left office, in 2005, the reformists had neither a credible leader nor a constituency. Activists and public figures called for a boycott of that year’s election. What good was voting if a President with a broad popular mandate could still be controlled and stymied by unelected powers? What difference did it even make who was President?
A major one, as it turned out. Under Ahmadinejad, a crackdown on dissent forced scores of journalists, intellectuals, and activists to flee the country. Ahmadinejad centralized government, empowered the Basij militia and the Revolutionary Guards, flouted expert economic advice, and packed the ministries with ideological cronies. With few reformists permitted to run in the interim elections of 2006 and 2008, liberals and moderates had little recourse inside the political system. Iran seemed headed for a confrontation between irreconcilables:
I wonder how many men in Iran have the name Khomeini or Khamenei and look exactly like them? I'm thinking it's probably pretty damn easy to find a body double.
Off topic, but the whole Khomeini/Khamenei thing and the subtle difference in pronunciation has been getting on my nerves lately.
I'm just bitter.
Don't blame me, I voted for Kodos.
http://www.notjusttoons.com/img_simp...dos%20copy.jpg
Winehole He is probably the most articulate and well read poster on this board.
It wasn't enough to take their daughter, they had to take their right to mourn her as well
Quote:
The relatives and friends piled into minivans for the hourlong trek to Tehran's Behesht Zahra cemetery, where she was buried. Her loved ones were outraged by the authorities' order not to eulogize her, to loudly sing her praises and mourn her loss. But they were too afraid and distraught to speak out, except for Panahi, who said he had nothing more to lose.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationwo...975,full.storyQuote:
Security forces urged her friends and family not to hold memorial services for her at a mosque and asked them not to speak publicly about her, associates of the family said. Authorities even asked the family to take down the black mourning banners in front of their house, aware of the potent symbol she had become.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khalid_El-Masri
Ah well. Stuff happens.
By civil discussion you meant one devoid of substance I see.
But then again, what were you saying about predictable?
The worst possible course of action would be U.S intervention.
What people don't realize is that play's completely into the current regime's hands. They will unify their people against the attacker and restore order amongst their people.
If Darrin doesn't want to be flamed for posting stupid shit, he should make that his thread title.