There are varying interpretations of the original intent of Congress, based on statements made during the congressional debate over the amendment.[5] During the original debate over the amendment Senator Jacob M. Howard of Michigan—the author of the Citizenship Clause—described the clause as excluding American Indians who maintain their tribal ties, and "persons born in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, who belong to the families of ambassadors or foreign ministers." He was supported by other senators, including Edgar Cowan, Reverdy Johnson, and Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Lyman Trumbull.[6] Howard further stated the term jurisdiction meant "the same jurisdiction in extent and quality as applies to every citizen of the United States now"[6] and that the United States possessed a "full and complete jurisdiction" over the person described in the amendment.[7][8][6] Other senators, including Senator John Conness,[9] supported the amendment, believing citizenship should cover all children born in the United States.
In Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884), the clause's meaning was tested regarding whether birth in the United States automatically extended national citizenship. The Supreme Court held that Native Americans who voluntarily quit their tribes did not automatically gain national citizenship.[10]
The clause's meaning was tested again in the case of United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). The Court ruled that children of non-citizen Chinese immigrants possessed national citizenship by being born in United States.[11]
The difference between "legal" and "illegal" immigrants was not clear at the time of the decision of Wong Kim Ark.[12] Wong Kim Ark and subsequent cases did not explicitly decide whether such children are en led to birthright citizenship via the amendment,[13] but such birthright is generally assumed to be the case.[14] In some cases, the Court has implicitly assumed, or suggested in dicta, that such children are en led to birthright citizenship: these include Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), and INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444 (1985).[15][16][17]
Loss of national citizenship is possible only under the following cir stances:
Fraud in the naturalization process. Technically, this is not loss of citizenship but rather a voiding of the purported naturalization and a declaration that the immigrant never was a United States citizen.
Voluntary relinquishment of citizenship. This may be accomplished either through renunciation procedures specially established by the State Department or through other actions that demonstrate desire to give up national citizenship.[18]
For much of the country's history, voluntary acquisition or exercise of a foreign citizenship was considered sufficient cause for revocation of national citizenship.[19] This concept was enshrined in a series of treaties between the United States and other countries (the Bancroft Treaties). However, the Supreme Court repudiated this concept in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), as well as Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980), holding that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment barred the Congress from revoking citizenship.