The Agency confuses "the intelligence itself" and "what the intelligence says" with its own conclusions, dismissing any facts that lead to contrary conclusions as "cherry picking," "fragments," or " their own set of facts." The CIA argues strictly by its own authority, and by making up standards to fit its needs in any given cir stance. In 2002, the Agency had concluded that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. Tenet certified this by prominently sitting behind then-Secretary of State Colin Powell as he delivered his February 5, 2002 testimonial to the United Nations. In his book, Tenet explains: "It would have been helpful to have clarified that the use of the words ‘we judge' and ‘we assess' meant we were making analytical judgments, not stating facts." Confusing fact and judgment in one direction was convenient at the time. Distinguishing them became convenient later.
Despite these confusions, he still maintains that "one thing is certain, we consistently told the Congress and the administration that the intelligence did not show any Iraqi authority, direction, or control over any of the many specific terrorist acts carried out by al-Qa'ida." That's weasel-worded longhand for saying Saddam Hussein's Iraq was not responsible for terrorism. But why should we care whether Iraq's government bodies exercised "authority, direction, and control" over specific acts? Isn't it more significant to ask about the many ways in which Saddam's Iraq contributed to terrorism? Tenet had informed the Senate in February 2002 that Iraq "has also had contacts with al-Qa'ida. Their ties may be limited by diverging ideologies, but the two sides' mutual antipathy toward the United States and the Saudi royal family suggests that tactical cooperation between them was possible." He acknowledges that Saddam provided training, safe haven, and contacts to al-Qaeda and lots of other terrorists. He also mentions that the vice president's staff brought "such detailed knowledge on people, sources, and timelines that the senior CIA analytic manager doing the briefing that day simply could not compete." But Tenet tells us that the CIA discounted "reporting that suggested a deeper relationship" between Saddam and al-Qaeda because "[r]egional analysts who focus on geographic areas believed that fundamental distrust stemming from stark ideological differences…significantly limited the cooperation that was suggested by the reporting" (emphasis added). In short, Tenet and the CIA simply dismissed as opinion the facts that displeased them, and called facts their own favorite beliefs.