If the writer doesn't clearly explain his reasoning for not liking the tactic, that's his own fault.
Rereading his article now, he is all over the map. Let's see...
So he assumes that asking the generals to give up is the 'last plan' we have for the rebels to win. It's right there.If so, that’s a big reversal, right as NATO assumes command of both the no-fly zone and the airstrikes. Whereas once the loyalists did the besieging, now they might be preparing for a siege of Gadhafi’s capitol. No wonder the call for defections is ringing out.
But that’s the only endgame that Clinton and Gates articulated. And NATO’s announcement that it’ll take over the war stopped short of measures to directly tip the military balance on the ground.
Then, further in the article:
I don't think he realizes exactly what air power can do. His assumption that there is a "stalemate" is incorrect. Along with the no-fly zone is the "plus"... the US is also hitting communication towers, which severely hurts any modern military. Communications is a force multiplier; it allows rapid decision making in the face of crises. Without that comm, groups are isolated and may not work in a coordinated fashion, severely limiting their effectiveness.But it’s an open question whether the poorly trained and outgunned rebels can defeat Gadhafi’s mechanized forces, even if they march all the way to Tripoli. For what it’s worth, the top U.S. intelligence official assessed that Gadhafi’s military was simply too strong, although that was before the U.S. and its allies launched the war. That sets up a stalemate on the ground, with NATO planes flying over the protracted war.
Finally, if Gadhafi's forces ARE being sieged, the author doesn't mention anything about "starving out" Gadhafi's forces, cutting the supply lines to the military, or any number of tried-and-true methods that could also be considered part of the "end-game".

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