PJB:How Killing Libyans Became a Moral Imperative

[Winehole23]

Anytime, anywhere there is genocide, we must go?

[vy65]

There's been one going on continuously in the Congo for about 20 years. Millions have already died. Don't we owe them something too?

Yes.

[vy65]

These two quotes - while long - make the argument much better than I could hope to do so

But without necessarily subscribing to the whole Marxist discourse (which moreover, is complex, evolving, heterogeneous) on the State and its appropriation by a dominant class, on the distinction between State power and State apparatus, on the end of the political, on "the end of politics", or on the withering away of the State, and, on the other hand without suspecting the juridical ideas in itself, one may still find inspiration in the Marxist "spirit" to criticise the presumed autonomy of the juridical and to denounce endlessly the de facto take-over of international authorities by powerful National-states, by concentrations of techno-scientific capital, symbolic capital, and financial capital, of State capital and private capital. A "new international" is being sought through these crises of international law; it already denounces the limits of a discourse on human rights that will remain inadequate, sometimes hypocritical, and in any case formalistic and inconsistent with itself as long as the law of the market, the "foreign debt", the inequality of techno-scientific, military, and economic development maintain an effective inequality as monstrous as that which prevails today, to a greater extent than ever in the history of humanity. For it must be cried out, at a time when some have the audacity to neo-evangelise in the name of the ideal of a liberal democracy that has finally realised itself as the ideal of human history: never have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and thus economic oppression affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and of humanity. Instead of singing the advent of the ideal of liberal democracy and of the capitalist market in the euphoria of the end of history, instead of celebrating the "end of ideologies" and the end of the great emancipatory discourses, let us never neglect this obvious macroscopic fact, made up of innumerable singular sites of suffering: no degree of progress allows one to ignore that never before, in absolute figures, never have so many men, women, and children been subjugated, starved, or exterminated on the earth. . . .

The "New International" is not only that which is seeking a new international law through these crimes. It is a link of affinity, suffering, and hope, a still discreet, almost secret link, as it was around 1848, but more and more visible, we have more than one sign of it. It is an untimely link, without status, without le, and without name, barely public even if it is not clandestine, without contract, "out of joint", without coordination, without party, without country, without national community (International before, across, and beyond any national determination), without co-citizenship, without common belonging to a class. The name of the new International is given here to what calls to the friendship of an alliance without ins ution among those who, even if they no longer believe or never believed in the socialist-Marxist International, in the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the messiano-eschatological role of the universal union of the spirits of Marx or Marxism (they now know that there is more than one) and in order to ally themselves, in a new, concrete, and real way, even if this alliance no longer takes the form of a party or a workers' international, but rather of a kind of counter-conjuration, in the (theoretical and practical) critique of the state of international law, the concepts of State and nation, and so forth: in order to renew this critique, and especially to radicalise it

Whenever I speak of the New International in Specters of Marx, emphasising that, in it, solidarity or alliance should not depend, fundamentally and in the final analysis, on class affiliation, this in no wise signifies, for me, the disappearance of "classes" or the attenuation of conflicts connected with "class" differences or oppositions (or, at least, differences or oppositions based on the new configurations of social forces for which I do in fact believe that we need new concepts and therefore, perhaps new names as well) . . . the disappearance of power relations, or relations of social domination . . . . At issue is, simply, another dimension of analysis and political commitment, one that cuts across social differences and oppositions of social forces (what one used to call, simplifying, "classes"). I would not say that such a dimension (for instance, the dimension of social, national, or international classes, or political struggles within nation states, problems of citizenship or nationality, or party strategies, etc.) is superior or inferior, a primary or a secondary concern, fundamental or not. All that depends, at every instant, on new assessments of what is urgent in, first and foremost, singular situations and of their structural implications. For such an assessment, there is, by definition, no pre-existing criterion or absolute calculability; analysis must begin anew every day everywhere, without ever being guaranteed by prior knowledge. It is on this condition, on the condition cons uted by this injunction, that there is, if there is, action, decision and political responsibility -- repoliticization.

[vy65]

Anytime, anywhere there is genocide, we must go?

Begs the question of what "we" means.

[vy65]

I can see that viewpoint. However, when push comes to shove, which side do we go with? Do we go with our ideals and do the "right thing" even without help? Or do we remain pragmatists?

I get your point - and its fair.

But you could have asked an activist in any social struggle (civil rights, women's rights, etc...) in the past 150 years the same question.

[Winehole23]

The USA. We are discussing US foreign policy. Did you forget the frame?

[LnGrrrR]

Begs the question of what "we" means.

That's kinda the point.

While it may be a moral imperative to relieve suffering, that is obviously limited by real world resources.

So, given a finite amount of resources, what is one to do?

Here are some big moral questions that you haven't answered yet:

Does the international community have the resources to combat genocide anywhere and everywhere?

Does America have the resources to combat genocide anywhere and everywhere if the international community won't participate?

Is America obligated to help combat genocide, even if we don't have the resources to effectively fight it?

Is there a possibility that fighting genocide might have unintended negative consequences?

Finally, is it moral to take resources from American people to further aims that may provide little to no benefit to the American people?

[LnGrrrR]

I get your point - and its fair.

But you could have asked an activist in any social struggle (civil rights, women's rights, etc...) in the past 150 years the same question.

So what's the answer?

No one's saying that activists can't do everything within their power to help combat genocide. Many famous people are doing so already (Bono, Clooney, etc etc).

But you're implying the American gov't get involved, which is obviously a different issue.

[Winehole23]

(If you're not from the US, please overlook my loose phrasing -- the intent ought to have pretty clear.)

[LnGrrrR]

Note: We haven't even gotten to other deplorable activities like children soldiers in wartorn areas, human trafficking, etc etc.

I think it smacks of hubris to think we can change all of these things.

[vy65]

That's kinda the point.

While it may be a moral imperative to relieve suffering, that is obviously limited by real world resources.

So, given a finite amount of resources, what is one to do?

Here are some big moral questions that you haven't answered yet:

Does the international community have the resources to combat genocide anywhere and everywhere?

Does America have the resources to combat genocide anywhere and everywhere if the international community won't participate?

Is America obligated to help combat genocide, even if we don't have the resources to effectively fight it?

Is there a possibility that fighting genocide might have unintended negative consequences?

Finally, is it moral to take resources from American people to further aims that may provide little to no benefit to the American people?

You're gonna hate this but:

Derrida’s exploration of Abraham’s strange and paradoxical responsibility before the demands of God, which consists in sacrificing his only son Isaac, but also in betraying the ethical order through his silence about this act (GD 57-60), is designed to problematise this type of ethical concern that exclusively locates responsibility in the realm of generality. In places, Derrida even verges on suggesting that this more common notion of responsibility, which insists that one should behave according to a general principle that is capable of being rationally validated and justified in the public realm (GD 60), should be replaced with something closer to an Abrahamian individuality where the demands of a singular other (eg. God) are importantly distinct from the ethical demands of our society (GD 61, 66). Derrida equivocates regarding just how far he wants to endorse such a conception of responsibility, and also on the entire issue of whether Abraham’s willingness to murder is an act of faith, or simply an unforgivable transgression. As he says, “Abraham is at the same time, the most moral and the most immoral, the most responsible and the most irresponsible” (GD 72). This equivocation is, of course, a defining trait of deconstruction, which has been variously pilloried and praised for this refusal to propound anything that the tradition could deem to be a thesis. Nevertheless, it is relatively clear that in The Gift of Death, Derrida intends to free us from the common assumption that responsibility is to be associated with behaviour that accords with general principles capable of justification in the public realm (ie. liberalism). In opposition to such an account, he emphasises the “radical singularity” of the demands placed upon Abraham by God (GD 60, 68, 79) and those that might be placed on us by our own loved ones. Ethics, with its dependence upon generality, must be continually sacrificed as an inevitable aspect of the human condition and its aporetic demand to decide (GD 70). As Derrida points out, in writing about one particular cause rather than another, in pursuing one profession over another, in spending time with one’s family rather than at work, one inevitably ignores the “other others” (GD 69), and this is a condition of any and every existence. He argues that: “I cannot respond to the call, the request, the obligation, or even the love of another, without sacrificing the other other, the other others” (GD 68). For Derrida, it seems that the Buddhist desire to have attachment to nobody and equal compassion for everybody is an unattainable ideal. He does, in fact, suggest that a universal community that excludes no one is a contradiction in terms. According to him, this is because: “I am responsible to anyone (that is to say, to any other) only by failing in my responsibility to all the others, to the ethical or political generality. And I can never justify this sacrifice; I must always hold my peace about it… What binds me to this one or that one, remains finally unjustifiable” (GD 70). Derrida hence implies that responsibility to any particular individual is only possible by being irresponsible to the “other others”, that is, to the other people and possibilities that haunt any and every existence.

[vy65]

The USA. We are discussing US foreign policy. Did you forget the frame?

The point I'm making would also work to redefine what is meant by that. It would take seriously the position that America is a part of a larger, international network, and to that end, has obligations that stretch beyond its borders. It would mean something like working within international laws and norms to expand our current conceptions of what exactly is within "our community."

[vy65]

Note: We haven't even gotten to other deplorable activities like children soldiers in wartorn areas, human trafficking, etc etc.

I think it smacks of hubris to think we can change all of these things.

You're right - but the point is that we should work towards changing all of these things knowing that it's impossible to actually do so.

[Winehole23]

These two quotes - while long - make the argument much better than I could hope to do so


Originally Posted by Derrida
But without necessarily subscribing to the whole Marxist discourse (which moreover, is complex, evolving, heterogeneous) on the State and its appropriation by a dominant class, on the distinction between State power and State apparatus, on the end of the political, on "the end of politics", or on the withering away of the State, and, on the other hand without suspecting the juridical ideas in itself, one may still find inspiration in the Marxist "spirit" to criticise the presumed autonomy of the juridical and to denounce endlessly the de facto take-over of international authorities by powerful National-states, by concentrations of techno-scientific capital, symbolic capital, and financial capital, of State capital and private capital. A "new international" is being sought through these crises of international law; it already denounces the limits of a discourse on human rights that will remain inadequate, sometimes hypocritical, and in any case formalistic and inconsistent with itself as long as the law of the market, the "foreign debt", the inequality of techno-scientific, military, and economic development maintain an effective inequality as monstrous as that which prevails today, to a greater extent than ever in the history of humanity. For it must be cried out, at a time when some have the audacity to neo-evangelise in the name of the ideal of a liberal democracy that has finally realised itself as the ideal of human history: never have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and thus economic oppression affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and of humanity. Instead of singing the advent of the ideal of liberal democracy and of the capitalist market in the euphoria of the end of history, instead of celebrating the "end of ideologies" and the end of the great emancipatory discourses, let us never neglect this obvious macroscopic fact, made up of innumerable singular sites of suffering: no degree of progress allows one to ignore that never before, in absolute figures, never have so many men, women, and children been subjugated, starved, or exterminated on the earth. . . .

Do you have the audacity to neo-evangelize in the name of liberal democracy, or do you seek a new International inspired by the spirit of Marxism?

Originally Posted by Derrida
The "New International" is not only that which is seeking a new international law through these crimes. It is a link of affinity, suffering, and hope, a still discreet, almost secret link, as it was around 1848, but more and more visible, we have more than one sign of it. It is an untimely link, without status, without le, and without name, barely public even if it is not clandestine, without contract, "out of joint", without coordination, without party, without country, without national community (International before, across, and beyond any national determination), without co-citizenship, without common belonging to a class. The name of the new International is given here to what calls to the friendship of an alliance without ins ution among those who, even if they no longer believe or never believed in the socialist-Marxist International, in the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the messiano-eschatological role of the universal union of the spirits of Marx or Marxism (they now know that there is more than one) and in order to ally themselves, in a new, concrete, and real way, even if this alliance no longer takes the form of a party or a workers' international, but rather of a kind of counter-conjuration, in the (theoretical and practical) critique of the state of international law, the concepts of State and nation, and so forth: in order to renew this critique, and especially to radicalise it

You seek to radicalize the critique, how? By replacing the revolutionary class/cadre with "radicalised" critique from the standpoint of the phenomenological observer?

Originally Posted by Derrida
Whenever I speak of the New International in Specters of Marx, emphasising that, in it, solidarity or alliance should not depend, fundamentally and in the final analysis, on class affiliation, this in no wise signifies, for me, the disappearance of "classes" or the attenuation of conflicts connected with "class" differences or oppositions (or, at least, differences or oppositions based on the new configurations of social forces for which I do in fact believe that we need new concepts and therefore, perhaps new names as well) . . . the disappearance of power relations, or relations of social domination . . . . At issue is, simply, another dimension of analysis and political commitment, one that cuts across social differences and oppositions of social forces (what one used to call, simplifying, "classes"). I would not say that such a dimension (for instance, the dimension of social, national, or international classes, or political struggles within nation states, problems of citizenship or nationality, or party strategies, etc.) is superior or inferior, a primary or a secondary concern, fundamental or not. All that depends, at every instant, on new assessments of what is urgent in, first and foremost, singular situations and of their structural implications. For such an assessment, there is, by definition, no pre-existing criterion or absolute calculability; analysis must begin anew every day everywhere, without ever being guaranteed by prior knowledge. It is on this condition, on the condition cons uted by this injunction, that there is, if there is, action, decision and political responsibility -- repoliticization.

Ghost dance for Marxist Internationalism. Strong.

[Winehole23]

The point I'm making would also work to redefine what is meant by that. It would take seriously the position that America is a part of a larger, international network, and to that end, has obligations that stretch beyond its borders. It would mean something like working within international laws and norms to expand our current conceptions of what exactly is within "our community."

The so-called international authorities to which Mr. Derrida refers upstream. Strikingly akin to off the rack liberal internationalism, don't you think?

[vy65]

Do you have the audacity to neo-evangelize in the name of liberal democracy, or do you seek a new International inspired by the spirit of Marxism?

I think it's the opposite of liberal democracy.

Granted, Derrida does vacilate between the two - but he certainly would concede his conception is animated by Marx.

Instead of singing the advent of the ideal of liberal democracy and of the capitalist market in the euphoria of the end of history, instead of celebrating the "end of ideologies" and the end of the great emancipatory discourses, let us never neglect this obvious macroscopic fact, made up of innumerable singular sites of suffering: no degree of progress allows one to ignore that never before, in absolute figures, never have so many men, women, and children been subjugated, starved, or exterminated on the earth.

No community without exclusion. No liberal democracy without violence. Rather than gloss that over - Derrida's argument is to continually point it out. His is a criticism of liberal democratic ins utions - with the recognition that we have to work within them to move beyond them.

You seek to radicalize the critique, how? By replacing the revolutionary class/cadre with "radicalised" critique from the standpoint of the phenomenological observer?

I'm not sure what you mean by phenomenological observer. The critique is "radicalised" by recognizing that international ins utions bear the promise of something beyond the liberal democratic nation state - that the very systems of oppression and violence bear the kernal of their own undoing.

[vy65]

The so-called international authorities to which Mr. Derrida refers upstream. Strikingly akin to off the rack liberal internationalism, don't you think?

Not at all. While he recognizes that we are constrained by liberal democratic limitations - we have to work within the nation state - international ins utions bear the possibility of something different. Liberal internationalism is a stepping stone for a different kind of internationalism.

[Winehole23]

What international ins utions?

[vy65]

What international ins utions?

The UN, the EU, the ICJ, the ICC, and NATO to name a few.

[Winehole23]

Gotcha.

[MannyIsGod]

Really?

You obviously do not know about french politics. They have a hard on for Libya because a ton of immigration comes from there. Perhaps you have heard about the law about a veil or the muslim neighborhoods during the labor strike last year?

I don't understand how this contradicts what I said? I get the French have a national interest but what does that have to do with the United States military being the main en y in the attacks? NATO is just a way to politically smoke screen that just in the way that the coalition of the willing was a way to smoke screen the US going it alone in Iraq.

[MannyIsGod]

Genocide.

I would love to see a case made for there being genocide in Libya.

[LnGrrrR]

You're gonna hate this but:

Derrida’s exploration of Abraham’s strange and paradoxical responsibility before the demands of God, which consists in sacrificing his only son Isaac, but also in betraying the ethical order through his silence about this act (GD 57-60), is designed to problematise this type of ethical concern that exclusively locates responsibility in the realm of generality. In places, Derrida even verges on suggesting that this more common notion of responsibility, which insists that one should behave according to a general principle that is capable of being rationally validated and justified in the public realm (GD 60), should be replaced with something closer to an Abrahamian individuality where the demands of a singular other (eg. God) are importantly distinct from the ethical demands of our society (GD 61, 66). Derrida equivocates regarding just how far he wants to endorse such a conception of responsibility, and also on the entire issue of whether Abraham’s willingness to murder is an act of faith, or simply an unforgivable transgression. As he says, “Abraham is at the same time, the most moral and the most immoral, the most responsible and the most irresponsible” (GD 72). This equivocation is, of course, a defining trait of deconstruction, which has been variously pilloried and praised for this refusal to propound anything that the tradition could deem to be a thesis. Nevertheless, it is relatively clear that in The Gift of Death, Derrida intends to free us from the common assumption that responsibility is to be associated with behaviour that accords with general principles capable of justification in the public realm (ie. liberalism). In opposition to such an account, he emphasises the “radical singularity” of the demands placed upon Abraham by God (GD 60, 68, 79) and those that might be placed on us by our own loved ones. Ethics, with its dependence upon generality, must be continually sacrificed as an inevitable aspect of the human condition and its aporetic demand to decide (GD 70). As Derrida points out, in writing about one particular cause rather than another, in pursuing one profession over another, in spending time with one’s family rather than at work, one inevitably ignores the “other others” (GD 69), and this is a condition of any and every existence. He argues that: “I cannot respond to the call, the request, the obligation, or even the love of another, without sacrificing the other other, the other others” (GD 68). For Derrida, it seems that the Buddhist desire to have attachment to nobody and equal compassion for everybody is an unattainable ideal. He does, in fact, suggest that a universal community that excludes no one is a contradiction in terms. According to him, this is because: “I am responsible to anyone (that is to say, to any other) only by failing in my responsibility to all the others, to the ethical or political generality. And I can never justify this sacrifice; I must always hold my peace about it… What binds me to this one or that one, remains finally unjustifiable” (GD 70). Derrida hence implies that responsibility to any particular individual is only possible by being irresponsible to the “other others”, that is, to the other people and possibilities that haunt any and every existence.

Or you could have just answered the questions in your own words. That's why I was asking. I'll wait.

And you're right that I hate it; not a huge fan of Derrida. Not a big fan of his take here either, though I am a bit biased, being an atheist. Just because Abraham was being "faithful" doesn't mean he was being "moral. I'm not a big believer in "God = moral".

As well, the idea that one has to make sacrifices doesn't make one "less moral". We all live in a real world, and therefore, one shouldn't be judged on morality based off some sort of fantasy-world version of morality that doesn't exist. It's perfectly justifiable.

This part alone

Derrida hence implies that responsibility to any particular individual is only possible by being irresponsible to the “other others”, that is, to the other people and possibilities that haunt any and every existence

shows how much of a quack Derrida can be. He took a great idea (deconstruction) and then applied it everywhere he could, without limit. His splitting everything into this-or-that dichotomies is farcical.

[Winehole23]

The UN, the EU, the ICJ, the ICC, and NATO to name a few.

All of these plus NGOs and so forth are preferable to putatively outmoded political states, why?

[vy65]

I would love to see a case made for there being genocide in Libya.

Never said that there was one.