QUESTION: Could you elaborate on the role played by … (inaudible) Kim of Korea University. I want you to elaborate on the roles played by the U.K. in the negotiations between Libya and the U.S. and, particularly, whether you have some kind of relevant application of the role in the case of North Korea, for example, whether Japan can play such a (inaudible)-taking role in the negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: I think the role played by the United Kingdom was critical. In fact, it was the United Kingdom that Libya first approached just a very short time before the onset of military force against Saddam Hussein in Iraq, saying basically that he didn’t want to have happen to him what was about to happen to Saddam Hussein. So, really the role of the British was most important from the outset. Of course, the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom with respect to Libya had a number of elements in common, not the least of which was the fact that the Pan Am 103 was blown up over Lockerbie, Scotland, and that a number of unfortunate civilian victims were killed on the ground as well as U.K. citizens killed in the crash itself. We had worked very closely with the United Kingdom over the years in trying to resolve not just Pan Am 103, but a range of other terrorist actions that the government of Libya had committed.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom was the joint work that our intelligence communities had been doing for several years and following the Khan proliferation network and watching its intimate connection with Libya and other countries and the danger that the continuing activity of Khan’s network posed. So that our action through the Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict the shipment of uranium centrifuge equipment bound for Libya in late October 2003 was a critical element in convincing Qaddafi that we knew what he was doing.
I think the most significant political aspect was that the United States and the United Kingdom came to share the judgment that the Libyan government had made this strategic decision to give up the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. It was that shared assessment that allowed us to stay closely together in the negotiations. I think it’s fair to say that, so far, in the case of Japan and the Republic of Korea in particular, there’s a shared assessment on the position that the North has taken in the negotiations and the position that we have that we want the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of the North’s weapons of mass destruction programs.