Reply With QuoteGEORGE TENET, CIA DIRECTOR: I think the declassified answer is yes, they can do that.
If ol' George says this, I have to doubt that they even HAVE missiles. What an incompetant tool.
Taep'o-dong-2 / Shahab-5
Range-Payload to Throwweight Trade-offs Stages Payload Range kg Pounds km Miles Two or Three Stage variant
1,000 2,205 3,500 2,175
750 1,654 3,750 2,330
570 1,257 4,000 2,486
500 1,103 4,100 2,548
420 926 4,248 2,640
403 889 4,264 2,650
390 860 4,300 2,672
According to some media reports, North Korea has conducted three or four static test firings of Taepo-dong missile engines at Musudan Base in North Hamgyong Province between December 1999 and January 2000. Some of these test firings no doubt involved the static test firing development of the Taep'o-dong-2 first stage four thrust chamber engine. The engine alone could be static tested at a vertical position or horizontally or at 45 degrees from the vertical all of which are quite normal testing procedures used in the liquid propellant rocket engine industry through out the world.
This in turn lead to the more recent late June or early July 2001 North Korea use of its new Taep'o-dong-2 launch pad to static test fire its integrated first stage with its four thrust chambered engine or engines as reported in The Washington Times. On July 3, 2001.(Gertz, Bill, "N. Korea tests its missile engine", The Washington Times, 3, July 2001, pp. 1 and 7.) The burn mark from that firing was very prominent according to the imagery news reports.
That report on the static test firing of what had to be the Taep'o-dong-2 first stage on the launch pad failed to note that the static test firings could only have been conducted in a vertical position not horizontally as suggested. Such stage firings are never done in the horizontal for liquid propellant systems. It was sitting up vertically on the pad firing its flame jet downward into the pad flame bucket, which ducts under the gantry umbilical tower and out the concrete trench into the local foliage. It was placed on the new Taep'o-dong-2 launch pad beside its new gantry umbilical tower. The first stage was tested to check out the stage readiness for flight. That places the Taep'o-dong-2/Shahab-5 class space booster one step from being flight tested of the once they tear-down the first stage engine cluster clean it up, reassemble and install it back in the first stage.
Iran may have tested the IRIS booster last year that failed at 105 seconds in flight. Regardless that could have been a flight test of the second and third stages of the Taep'o-dong-2/Shahab-5 space booster/ballistic missile. This certainly explains the appearance of 3 mobile propellant tanks and 3 additional tank trucks along with a series of 9-10 support trucks/vehicles on the Taep'o-dong-2 launch pad infrastructure recently observed in new imagery taken by Space Imaging of North Korea Taep'o-dong launch site. What will follow both in Iran and North Korea's remains to be seen.
If, in fact North Korea has abandoned its Taep'o-dong-1 booster in favor of its Taep'o-dong-2 booster program as it does appear then that certainly has possible immediate implication in spite of being down played by U. S. officials. They certainly scrapped the launch site pad and gantry umbilical tower and built an entirely new launch pad and much taller gantry umbilical tower to handle the Taep'o-dong-2 and follow on booster systems. The North Korean launch site and its combined gantry umbilical tower and flame bucket use the same plan form as that used by China in its Long March launch vehicle program.
The question that emerges from all of this is whether Iran will in fact flight test the Taep'o-dong-2/Shahab-5, 6 class booster for North Korea and Iran in place of North Korea. This is because North Korea can not afford to do so due to its international agreements not to flight test its ballistic missiles. Equally this would imply that Iran did not want to waste its time and money repeating the Taep'o-dong-1 pathfinder program and instead chose to go for the real systems engineering goal instead nearly two years ago.
Is it inconceivable for North Korea to ship the jointly developed and tested Taep'o-dong-2 booster first stage to Iran where it would be mated with the Iranian Shahab-3D/IRIS second and third stages of the booster to launch a satellite already announced into Earth orbit? Is that Taep'o-dong-2/Shahab-5 booster about to be shipped to Iran now? Only time will tell.
Technical Details
Payload (kg) 100-500
700-1,000
Range (km) 3,500-4,300 (2-stages)
4,000-4,300 (3-stages)
CEP (m) unknown
Diam. (m) 2.2/1.3
Height (m) 32
L. W. (kg) 80-85,000
Thrust (Kg f) Effective: 30,432 per chamber
Actual: 31,260 per chamber
or
Effective: 104,204
Actual: 170,040
Burn time (sec.) <330?
Launch Acceleration (g's) ~1.4-1.5 or 1.3
Thrust Chambers 4, 1, 1
Stages 2, 3
Type LRICBM
Stage 1
Height (m) ~16
Diameter (m) ~2.2
Launch Weight (kg) ~60,000-61,000
Launch Thrust (kg f) ~102,880-104,000
Burn Time (sec.) ~120-130
Fuel TM-185
(20% Gasoline + 80% Kerosene)
Oxidizer AK-27I
(27% N2O4 + 73% HNO3 +
Iodium Inhibitor)
Stage 2
Height (m) ~14
Diameter (m) ~1.32-1.35
Launch Weight (kg) ~15,200
Thrust (Kg f) Effective: ~13,160
Actual: 13,300-13,380
Burn Time (sec.) 110 max
Isp. (sec.) Effective: 226 - SL
Due to vanes steering drag loss of 4-5 sec.
Actual: 230 - SL
Vac: 264
Thrust Chambers 1
Fuel TM-185
(20% Gasoline + 80% Kerosene)
Oxidizer AK-27I
(27% N2O4 + 73% HNO3 +
Iodium Inhibitor)
Propellant Mass (kg) 12,912
Stage 3
Height (m) ~3-4 total package
Diameter (m) ~1.3-2.0 flared skirt type design
Launch Weight (kg) unknown
Launch Thrust (kg f) unknown
Burn Time (sec.) ~100
Propellant Solid motor*
* May have been derived from existing Chinese designs.
Fas.org
GEORGE TENET, CIA DIRECTOR: I think the declassified answer is yes, they can do that.
If ol' George says this, I have to doubt that they even HAVE missiles. What an incompetant tool.
I can site at least 1000 other articles from news sites, government sites, and just about everything else that says they can reach the West coast.
San Francisco is almost 12,000 kilometers, and N. Korea still has not successful test fired the only ICBM missle in it's inventory. A test of the first stage of three exploded 120 seconds into its firing. The bigger threat is sea-based missile systems which the 1998 Rumsfeld report states Iran tested in 1998.
I guess this is the beginning of their preventive measures ...
New job for 7th Fleet: Missile patrol in Sea of Japan
By Nancy Montgomery, Stars and Stripes
Pacific edition, Sunday, September 12, 2004
www.estripes.com/article....icle=24308
YOKOSUKA NAVAL BASE, Japan — The 7th Fleet begins a significant new mission in the next few weeks: patrolling the Sea of Japan to provide early warning of ballistic missiles fired from North Korea at the United States.
The ships tasked with the initial patrols — the first of their kind ever undertaken by the United States — are the USS Curtis Wilbur, the USS John S. McCain and the USS Fitzgerald, according to a publication of the Missile Defense Agency, part of the Defense Department.
All three are 7th Fleet destroyers equipped with an Aegis weapons system that has been modified to detect and track medium- and long-range missiles. The ships would provide earlier warning of a missile launch and transmit the information to other systems, including land-based systems in Alaska and California designed to intercept the missiles and scheduled to be up and working by year’s end.
Adm. Vern Clark, the Navy’s chief of naval operations, who was at Yokosuka on Thursday as part of a several-day visit to Japan, declined to say which ship would be the first on what he agreed would be a “historic” mission. Clark said the missile-tracking mission would be “providing for the defense of our country and our friends.”
North Korea possesses ballistic missiles capable of reaching the U.S. West Coast, as well as Hawaii and Alaska, former CIA Director George Tenet testified at a Senate committee hearing in February 2003. In 1998 the isolated, Stalinist nation test-fired a medium-range Taepodong 1 ballistic missile that arced over northern Honshu before splashing down in the Pacific Ocean.
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in March told reporters that the deployment would enhance regional security. “I think it will serve as a deterrent,” he said in published reports.
Japan has worked cooperatively with the United States on missile defense for several years and has its own Aegis destroyers.
Seventh Fleet spokesmen declined to comment on the mission, which will add a new responsibility to the already busy fleet, or say which ship might be the first to do the watch.
But Lt. Cmdr. Marc Boyd, a 7th Fleet spokesman, did say, “We remain ready to do any mission as tasked.”
Secretary of the Navy Gordon England announced in a March speech that a destroyer would be deployed to the Sea of Japan in September for missile tracking “and on a virtually continuous basis thereafter.”
The new mission is in keeping with the Bush administration’s plan to begin fielding initial missile defense capabilities by the end of 2004.
“The worldwide proliferation of ballistic missiles, combined with the growing development of deadly nuclear, chemical and biological agents requires the United States to field defensive missiles as soon as possible,” according to the Missile Defense Agency.
Four other destroyers from the Navy’s San Diego-based 3rd Fleet also are being readied for the job: the USS Paul Hamilton, USS Stethem, USS Russell and USS John Paul Jones, according to Navy sources. The 3rd and 7th fleets comprise the Pacific Fleet.
By 2006, according to the Missile Defense Agency, 15 destroyers and three cruisers will be equipped for the long-range surveillance and tracking missions. The Pentagon has not said where they’ll all be deployed.
The sea-based systems initially would be capable only of tracking missiles but because of closer proximity to North Korea or other so-designated “rogue states” would provide earlier tracking and a clearer picture for land-based interceptors, according to a Bloomberg News story in July that quoted Chris Myers, Lockheed Martin Corps’ vice president of sea-based missile defense programs. Lockheed Martin was given an $812 million contract to modify the Aegis ships, according to Bloomberg News.
By next year, the Missile Defense Agency says, Aegis cruisers will be able to shoot down short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Last December, the cruiser USS Lake Erie successfully fired a Standard Missile-3 at a test target warhead and scored a direct hit, according to the agency.
The Lake Erie will be joining the 7th Fleet this fall, according to a ship press release.
The 7th Fleet’s new mission likely will mean longer at-sea periods for sailors on those ships, which will rotate in and out of the Sea of Japan to perform the watch. It also would mean that 7th Fleet would have to adjust its busy schedule, which includes more than 100 joint exercises with the navies of numerous nations in its area of operation.
Three years ago, North Korean officials said they would “extinguish the [U.S.] aggressors” if the United States deploys Aegis destroyers to the Sea of Japan. And on Tuesday, Pyongyang issued a press release claiming that the U.S. plan to deploy warships and patrol craft in the area was “a plot to blockade the coast of the DPRK, put the territorial waters of the DPRK under its control and go unchallenged in naval warfare.”
The 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treat between the U.S. and Russia had prohibited sea-based missile defense systems. But in 2002, the U.S. withdrew from the treaty.
Maybe George Tenet was exagerating the claim, maybe he knows something we don't. If North Korea successfully tested a completed ICBM that would be big news.North Korea possesses ballistic missiles capable of reaching the U.S. West Coast, as well as Hawaii and Alaska, former CIA Director George Tenet testified at a Senate committee hearing in February 2003.
You know, I don't understand some of the logic in this thread. There are many of you who feel that Kim has the ability and will to attack the United States first with a nuclear weapon.
And yet, what you want to do is put even more pressure on him, even use the military to threaten him.
Why?
Does anyone here actually believe that he doesn't understand that an attack of any sorts against the US is suicide? How could we possibly threaten him any more?
Does no one else think that the possiblity of us turning him into a cornered animal and making him lash out is very real if we continue to aggressivly position ourselves?
South Korea doesn't want a gung ho at ude by this, and it would stand to figure that they are the ones at the end of the gun barrell, not the US. I say we let them dictate Korean policy and leave well enough alone.
Why woudl it be such big news? It's really not that complicated Dan. Especially if you put a good sized nuke at the end of the missle because then you don't need any accuracy.
I personally don't care to find out how far they go.
Okay, I'll make a prediction.
Kim Jong Mentally-Ill is about to suc b to a sudden, yet deadly, case of something and, the Chinese will have a fairly frank and stern discussion with his successor about ing around in geo-politics without a license (which we'll never hear about).
The effect being that North Korea will revert back to the status quo we had 10-15 years ago of posturing along the DMZ, the occassional intrusion and firefight, etc...
That's my guess.
Again, when NK acted up last year, China told him to knock it off, and he did. I'm sorry this is lost on you pie in the sky types, but we don't have to invade NK - the Chinese would slap Kim the moment he did anything, and NK knows it.
There is a geoeconomic and geopolitical interest in NK not screwing around, and the people in that part of the world (most notably Russia and China) have made it clear through appropriate channels to Kim that the moment he screws around, he gets screwed.
Further, we've made it known that if he jacks with us, he's history. He knows that.
ChumpDumper, you are fighting an unfightable argument. You are asking us to present both sides of the issue to counter your point, which is unrealistic.
Why don't you TELL US what we should be doing, instead of claiming victory because we've said that what we're doing right now is working and there's no need to change.
Every fight is different, we're fighting this one without bullets (which is a good thing, if you like Japan, Hawaii, SK, Alaska, and the West Coast to continue to exist).
Dan, they can reach the west coast, whether your conspiracy flakes agree with that assessment or not.
The softball approach to preventing NKorea from pursuing the development of nukes has failed. All I've seen offered as a counter to pressuring the NKoreans and Iranians is counting on the goodwill of a couple of dictatorships.
OK, we get the idea you people don't like an aggressive diplomatic and military posture. We also get the idea that you have no alternatives to offer besides your ing.
Absolutely not. I'm asking you to consider both side to start a real discussion -- which is possible because the administration has no discernable policy toward NK.ChumpDumper, you are fighting an unfightable argument. You are asking us to present both sides of the issue to counter your point, which is unrealistic.WE ARE DOING NOTHING RIGHT NOW!Why don't you TELL US what we should be doing, instead of claiming victory because we've said that what we're doing right now is working and there's no need to change.
There is no victory to be won here. None of you know what our policy is because we haven't had one for three years. I'm bringing up all alternatives simply because they are NOT nothing.Actually, it could be said abandoning the bribe/ransom approach is the failure. If you can google me any actual policy from this administration beyond their inclusion in the axis of evil, I'd like to see it.The softball approach to preventing NKorea from pursuing the development of nukes has failed.
I agree that direct diplomacy with Kim isn't going to work since he has no confidence in the US actually following through. The US made an agreement and when back on it, so why bother?
An "aggressive diplomatic posture" might be better than no posture at all, which is what we're doing now, but where are you going to draw the line if Kim doesn't blink? NK is THE pariah state and has been since the fall of the USSR, and Kim still doesn't give a . What if the "aggressive military posture" is all it takes to get Kim to push the button? As he gets older and even less stable, Kim could care less about the consequences or his people. He certainly doesn't care that they are eating dirt and tree bark now.
We have a policy, it's called diplomatic backchannels.
You just can't go mass 100K troops at the border of every threat.
Tell us what you would do Chump. Come on. You're not arguinig, you're asking us to do both sides on this.
If you don't feel we are "doing anything", what do you feel we should be doing?
Speak up, or shut up.
Already told you.
RIF
NKorea was the one who didn't live up to their end of the bargain.
Obviously they resumed work on high yield uranium, but the US is far from blameless. The US repeatedly was late with it's heavy oil shipments and the light water reactor construction was pushed back 5 years. You can argue the chicken or the egg or which is worse, but neither side is blameless. The Bush administration effectively isolated NK even before the high-yield program was disclosed in 2002, but strangely enough sent a final shipment of heavy oil to NK even after NK declared the Agreed Framework null and void. Talk about mixed signals.
Currently, the only way we'll deal with with NK is through six party talks that Kim has shown no interest in. Should that continue to be the prerequisite?
You just answered your question. It's much like what the UK/French/Germans are finding out in their dealings with the Iranians.
Treating the uncivilized as civilized hasn't worked.
So you don't want any multilateral talks with NK. Just threats? What is the threat? What are the consequences for NK?
Not just threats. You want to cut off his arms deals and apply pressure through other means. The bas uses the aid his country receives to feed his army.
How? You'd have to stop Pakistan then too, since they are a customer.You want to cut off his arms dealsWhat other means?and apply pressure through other means.
Ultimately, how does that make anything much worse for NK than it already is?
Would it really be a disincentive to continue an enrichment program?
chump is right on the above. north korea is not soley to blame for the deal failing. not constructing the reactors, late oil shipments, and basic political slapping by the united states can be blamed just as much.
the united states has a policy of actively putting pressure on north korea in order to topple the government. it's a flat out open policy. if any country had that kind of policy torwards the united states, most of you would claim it an act of war.
communism is not the threat it was 50 years ago, and this kind of treatment of another country does nothing to make us safer. rather, it creates a divide with a country that we want to do things for us.
actually, i agree a good bit with this article///
www.mercurynews.com/mld/m...539.htm?1cInternal rift stifling U.S. policy on N. Korea
CONSTRAINT MAY FORCE WINNER IN NOVEMBER TO WAGE WAR, OR ACCEPT NUCLEAR PROGRAM
By Robert Madsen
Neither the Bush nor the Kerry campaign has chosen to make U.S. policy toward North Korea a central part of its election platform -- and for good reason. Both sides recognize that it may no longer be possible to peacefully resolve the dispute over that country's nuclear-weapons development, and a debate over whether to wage another controversial war would hardly appeal to the electorate.
The fundamental problem is that North Korea believes it needs a sizable nuclear arsenal. Politically, such an asset would transform the country into a regional power whose views on international issues must always be taken seriously. Militarily, the possession of a large number of atomic weapons would bolster North Korea's security by discouraging intimidation of the sort Washington employed in 1994, when it forced President Kim Jong Il to shut down his plutonium-based arms program.
Most compelling, however, is Pyongyang's financial situation. The North Korean economy is so dysfunctional that it cannot reliably generate enough wealth to sustain the state. Kim and his colleagues have dabbled in reform, but they apparently realize that the degree of liberalization necessary to produce strong GDP growth would coincidentally release a wave of popular animosity sufficient to wash the government away. Thus, the safest course of action is to leave the economy unreconstructed while securing a constant stream of foreign aid.
Since Pyongyang needs leverage to obtain this support, it is determined to amass a big nuclear force. The international community would then have no means of persuading North Korea to abandon its weaponry short of risking catastrophic war and would consequently be reduced to bribing the Kim government not to use its new capabilities.
Moreover, if the flow of aid were interrupted, Pyongyang could garner the foreign exchange it requires by selling its new technology, fissile materials or even a few of its bombs.
What this implies is that despite its rhetoric to the contrary, North Korea does not really want to trade its nuclear program for economic assistance and a security guarantee. Pyongyang would plainly prefer to embark on diplomatic talks with nuclear weapons in hand. This is why it cheated on the 1994 agreement by enriching uranium and why it resumed reprocessing plutonium in early 2003. But to realize his strategic aspirations, Kim must still prevent the United States, China, Japan and South Korea from forming a coalition that imposes crippling sanctions before his armament effort has reached fruition.
Driving wedges between the other regional powers is not as difficult as it might seem. Paradoxically, perhaps, the United States is the only relevant country that views the achievement by North Korea of significant nuclear status as absolutely unacceptable.
Tokyo and Seoul are worried about that eventuality but conversely fear the geopolitical instability and refugee crisis that would ensue if economic or military pressure caused the Kim regime to collapse. Beijing shares these immediate concerns and additionally worries about the longer-term possibility that a united Korean Peninsula might incline toward the United States.
Only by alleviating these anxieties can the U.S. government unite East Asia against North Korea.
Washington, however, is constrained by its own internal rift. On the one hand are those doves who want to exchange aid and a security arrangement for the termination of North Korea's nuclear projects, on the other are the hawks who oppose all diplomatic contact with the Kim government. The conflict between these two camps has paralyzed Bush administration policy, leaving Pyongyang more or less free to proceed with its nuclear gambit.
If the doves err in overestimating Pyongyang's flexibility, the hawks are guilty of the more serious mistake of thinking that a refusal to negotiate with mendacious states is an actual diplomatic strategy.
In fact, the talks advocated by the doves are an essential step toward the application of coercive force. It is only by offering reasonable deals, and having the Kim government reject them, that Washington can demonstrate to Beijing, Tokyo and Seoul that Pyongyang cannot be bought off with money and a verbal guarantee of its security. This recognition, in turn, is critical both to building a coalition against North Korea and, alternatively, to reducing the political costs of unilateral U.S. military action.
The better course has therefore always been to negotiate earnestly with Pyongyang in the hope that it would accede to a peace agreement while knowing that its failure to do so would facilitate the adoption of more assertive measures, if necessary, at a later date.
Yet rather than taking every opportunity to interact with Kim's representatives, the Bush administration has limited its diplomacy to desultory exchanges at multilateral conferences and only put forward a detailed settlement proposal in June. Pyongyang has exploited the opening created by this stubbornness fairly effectively. It has capitalized on anti-American sentiment in South Korea by persuading Seoul to cooperate economically and militarily while also prevailing upon Tokyo to resume large-scale food aid and seek an early exchange of ambassadors.
In the occasional six-party talks with delegations from China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the United States, Pyongyang's objective has been to stall for time. Its diplomats have postponed specific meetings many times; then behaved so egregiously that the other participants were relieved when the North Koreans consented merely to engage in future negotiations. Those too, however, would soon be rescheduled.
Washington has inadvertently abetted these tactics through thoughtless insults -- canceling, for instance, informal exchanges between U.S. and North Korean officials at the last minute -- which Pyongyang could then cite as proof that the United States was not acting in good faith.
North Korea has also benefited from the awkward developments that inevitably arise when sensitive dialogues are delayed. Seoul's recent declaration that it had reprocessed a small volume of nuclear material is one such event; Pyongyang may use that admission to complicate the next round of six-party discussions. Thus the Kim government buys more time for its nuclear technicians to continue their work.
It is true that North Korea has committed some blunders over the past two years, but it has played its cards more adroitly than the United States. The members of a potential coalition are largely going their own way now, and the odds that those countries will unite behind any U.S. strategy, peaceful or otherwise, have diminished considerably.
So, unless the winner of the November election acts quickly and with better judgment than Washington has so far, the United States may soon be forced to choose between launching military strikes without foreign support and letting Kim attain the nuclear status he desires.
ROBERT MADSEN is a fellow at the Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford Ins ute for International Studies. He wrote this article for Perspective.
Playing nice hasn't worked. North Korea is a rogue and repressive state. They are not worthy of being treated as anything but. And certainly not worthy of being treated in a gentlemanly fashion.
lets take a really simple look at the situation.
kim is doing this because he fears that the us has guns pointed in his direction. the us invasino of iraq hasn't lessend those fears, and has probably increased them.
he sees nuclear weapons as the only way he can gain some bargaining room.
so instead, of giving him some breathing room, and backing off, we want to keep putting pressure on him.
ok. i can't buy into this logic, but whatever.
Ok, you prefer stick to carrot. But what pressure is going to work considering the past and the fact that the Bush administration already believes NK has a couple of nukes?
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