"Curveball" lied, people died.

[Yonivore]

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4066462/

TB: The president described Iraq as a gathering threat — a gathering danger. Was that an accurate description?

DK: I think that’s a very accurate description.

TB: But an imminent threat to the United States?

DK: Tom, an imminent threat is a political judgment. It’s not a technical judgment. I think Baghdad was actually becoming more dangerous in the last two years than even we realized. Saddam was not controlling the society any longer. In the marketplace of terrorism and of WMD, Iraq well could have been that supplier if the war had not intervened.

The Duelfer and Kay reports have been grossly mischaracterized. Did we find stockpiles of weapons? No. Were there signs of an active weapons program? All over the ing place.

It was in one of the reports, Kay's or Duelfer's, where a captured Iraqi official (Not "Curveball") claimed Iraq could have fielded chemical weapons in a matter of days or weeks.

[ChumpDumper]

We were told there were stockpiles of WMDs.

Why are you trying to deny these things?

If you actually read this, I'm sure you'll go off on some tangent about Democrats saying it too. Tough . They were wrong too. Your best defense is that you were thinking like a Democrat and taking them at their word?

[clambake]

in a matter of days or weeks? , i got enough it my garage to fashion a chemical weapon. days or weeks is just a matter of motivation.

[Yonivore]

From Charles Duelfer's March 30, 2004 testimony to Congress:

Let me begin by discussing procurement and financing, two critical areas that cut across all potential WMD efforts. The ISG has been investigating Iraq’s procurement process, sources of finance, the involvement of foreign firms, and the specific types of goods that were sought. Iraq utilized a complex and well developed procurement system hidden by an effective denial and deception strategy. By the late 1990s, Iraq, in contravention of UN sanctions, pursued the procurement of military goods and technical expertise for military capabilities.

The primary source of illicit financing for this system was oil smuggling conducted through government-to-government protocols negotiated by Iraq with neighboring countries. Money also was obtained from kickback payments made on contracts set up through the UN’s Oil for Food program.

Iraq derived several billion dollars between 1999 and 2003 from oil smuggling and kickbacks. One senior regime official estimated Iraq earned $4 billion from illicit oil sales from 1999 to March 2003. By levying a surcharge on Oil for Food contracts, Iraq earned billions more during the same period.

This was revenue outside UN control and provided resources the regime could spend without restriction. It channeled much of the illicitly gathered funds to rebuild Iraq’s military capabilities through the Military Industrialization Commission, the MIC. MIC worked with the Iraqi Intelligence Service to establish front companies in Iraq and other countries to facilitate procurement.

The budget of MIC increased nearly 100 fold from 1996 to 2003, with the budget totaling $500 million in 2003. Most of this money came from illicit oil contracts. Iraq imported banned military weapons and technology and dual-use goods through Oil for Food contracts. Companies in several countries were involved in these efforts. Direct roles by government officials are also clearly established.

Even as procurement and finance cut across all of Iraq’s technical development efforts, denial and deception were infused in these efforts as well.

Much is known about Iraq’s various efforts to conceal WMD from UNSCOM after the Gulf War in 1991. The ISG, however, has uncovered more details about the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq against UNSCOM and later UNMOVIC. Moreover, these efforts at deception did not end with the departure of inspectors in 1998, and indeed deception continued right up until war in 2003.

The Iraqi Intelligence Service was tasked with monitoring and infiltrating UNSCOM and UNMOVIC. Iraqi officials tell us hundreds of officers from multiple directorates were tasked to monitor the UN officials, employing a spectrum of capabilities from human to electronic surveillance. Elaborate plans were developed and rehearsed to enable sensitive sites to be able to hide sensitive do ents and equipment on as little as 15 minutes notice. Iraqi intelligence engaged in a worldwide effort to collect intelligence on the UN, including efforts to recruit sources inside the UN, UNSCOM and UNMOVIC.

The ISG has developed new information regarding Iraq’s dual-use facilities and ongoing research suitable for a capability to produce biological or chemical agents on short notice. Iraq did have facilities suitable for the production of biological and chemical agents needed for weapons. It had plans to improve and expand and even build new facilities.

For example, the Tuwaitha Agricultural and Biological Research Center has equipment suitable for the production of biological agents. While it conducts civilian research, ISG has also determined that it was conducting research that would be important for a biological weapons program. For example, we are continuing to examine research on Bacillus thuringiensis that was conducted until March 2003. This material is a commercial biopesticide, but it also can be used as a surrogate for the anthrax bacterium for production and weapons development purposes. Work continued on single cell proteins at Tuwaitha as well. Single cell protein research previously had been used as the cover activity for BW production at al-Hakam. We are now focusing on what such activities meant.

With respect to chemical production, Iraq was working up to March 2003 to construct new facilities for the production of chemicals. There were plans under the direction of a leading nuclear scientist/WMD program manager to construct plants capable of making a variety of chemicals and producing a year’s supply of any chemical in a month. This was a crash program. Most of the chemicals specified in this program were conventional commercial chemicals, but a few are considered “dual use.” One we are examining, commonly called DCC (N,N-Dicyclohexyl carbodiimide), was used by Iraq before 1991 as a stabilizing agent for the nerve agent VX. Iraq had plans before OIF for large-scale production of this chemical. Again, what do these activities mean?

Likewise, in the nuclear arena, the ISG has developed information that suggests Iraqi interest in preserving and expanding the knowledge needed to design and develop nuclear weapons.

One significant effort illustrating this was a high-speed rail gun program under the direction of two senior scientists associated with Iraq’s pre-1991 nuclear weapons program. Do ents from this project show that the scientists were developing a rail gun designed to achieve speeds of 2-10 kilometers per second. The ostensible purpose for this research was development of an air defense gun, but these speeds are what are necessary to conduct experiments of metals compressing together at high speed as they do in a nuclear detonation. Scientists refer to these experiments as “equation of state” measurements.

Not only were these scientists developing a rail gun, but their laboratory also contained do ents describing diagnostic techniques that are important for nuclear weapons experiments, such as flash x-ray radiography, laser velocimetry, and high-speed photography. Other do ents found outside the laboratory described a high-voltage switch that can be used to detonate a nuclear weapon, laser detonation, nuclear fusion, radiation measurement, and radiation safety. These fields are certainly not related to air defense.

It is this combination of topics that makes us suspect this lab was intentionally focused on research applicable for nuclear weapons development.

We continued our efforts to determine if Iraq was seeking to develop technologies for a uranium enrichment capability. Iraq’s efforts to procure high tolerance aluminum tubes were examined. Ostensibly these tubes were for small rockets, but the manufacturing tolerances specified were much higher than would normally be required for this purpose. Technical reasons for the high tolerances were explained by a number of Iraqis associated with their acquisition, but there are still a number of discrepancies to examine with regard to these tubes. Again, we need to determine what these activities mean.

In addition to WMD technologies, the ISG has continued to uncover a very robust program for delivery systems that were not reported to the UN. New information has been discovered relating to long-range ballistic missile development and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Missiles and UAVs were flight tested that easily exceeded the UN limit of 150 kilometers. More than that, the Iraqi regime was developing technology to extend one of their ballistic missile’s range beyond 150 kilometers with changes to airframes and fuels. Discussions were underway with North Korea regarding technology associated with a 1,300 km system—presumably the No Dong. Other foreign support was being used or solicited.

Iraq was developing a variety of UAVs using inertial navigation systems and navigation using GPS. New information on the L-29 based UAV has also been developed.

Foreign technology and technical assistance were critical to the progress made by Iraqi engineers and designers. Foreign missile experts worked in Iraq in violation of UN sanctions from 1998 until just before the start of OIF. They undertook a complete review of the al-Samoud surface-to-surface missile system, which exceeded UN range limits. Based on this technical assistance, Iraq determined the original al-Samoud concept was not optimal and changed the production process to incorporate the new design information. Contracts were concluded calling for foreign firms to produce several major al-Samoud subsystems.

A variety of foreign companies with high-level political connections acted as middlemen to import technology into Iraq for missile and UAV development. These actions clearly violated UN sanctions.

[clambake]

"I have all these WMDs and I'm not going to use them against a country that everybody knows is about to invade and try to kill me."

Saddam

[Nbadan]

The primary source of illicit financing for this system was oil smuggling conducted through government-to-government protocols negotiated by Iraq with neighboring countries. Money also was obtained from kickback payments made on contracts set up through the UN’s Oil for Food program.

Iraq derived several billion dollars between 1999 and 2003 from oil smuggling and kickbacks. One senior regime official estimated Iraq earned $4 billion from illicit oil sales from 1999 to March 2003. By levying a surcharge on Oil for Food contracts, Iraq earned billions more during the same period.

Oh, damn...not this again....we've already proven that one of the biggest beneficiaries of Saddam's 'illicit' food-for-oil program was a rich Texas Oil Tycoon....How do we know? He confessed in court....

[Nbadan]

most of this money came from illicit oil contracts. Iraq imported banned military weapons and technology and dual-use goods through Oil for Food contracts

Yeah, like the banned uranium enrichment centrifuges that turned out to be unbanned scud missile rockets....what a farce.....

[Nbadan]

So, so much "he has em', we know where they are at....their in the area of Tikrit...."

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Saddam Hussein did not possess stockpiles of illicit weapons at the time of the U.S. invasion in March 2003 and had not begun any program to produce them, a CIA report concludes.

In fact, the long-awaited report, authored by Charles Duelfer, who advises the director of central intelligence on Iraqi weapons, says Iraq's WMD program was essentially destroyed in 1991 and Saddam ended Iraq's nuclear program after the 1991 Gulf War.

CNN

[boutons_]

Poor Yoni, daily slapping

Iraq was not about anything but oil

[Yonivore]

So, so much "he has em', we know where they are at....their in the area of Tikrit...."



CNN

Stuff from the report that CNN didn't report:

The way Iraq organized its chemical industry after the mid-1990s allowed it to conserve the knowledge-base needed to restart a CW program, conduct a modest amount of dual-use research, and partially recover from the decline of its production capability caused by the effects of the Gulf war and UN-sponsored destruction and sanctions. Iraq implemented a rigorous and formalized system of nationwide research and production of chemicals, but ISG will not be able to resolve whether Iraq intended the system to underpin any CWrelated efforts.

• The Regime employed a cadre of trained and experienced researchers, production managers, and weaponization experts from the former CW program.

• Iraq began implementing a range of indigenous chemical production projects in 1995 and 1996. Many of these projects, while not weapons-related, were designed to improve Iraq’s infrastructure, which would have
  enhanced Iraq’s ability to produce CW agents if the scaled-up production processes were implemented.

• Iraq had an effective system for the procurement of items that Iraq was not allowed to acquire due to sanctions. ISG found no evidence that this system was used to acquire precursor chemicals in bulk; however do ents indicate that dual-use laboratory equipment and chemicals were acquired through this system.

Iraq constructed a number of new plants starting in the mid-1990s that enhanced its chemical infrastructure, although its overall industry had not fully recovered from the effects of sanctions, and had not regained pre-1991 technical sophistication or production capabilities prior to Operation Iraqi freedom (OIF).

• ISG did not discover chemical process or production units confi gured to produce key precursors or CW agents. However, site visits and debriefs revealed that Iraq maintained its ability for reconfi guring and ‘making-do’ with available equipment as subs utes for sanctioned items.

• ISG judges, based on available chemicals, infrastructure, and scientist debriefi ngs, that Iraq at OIF probably had a capability to produce large quan ies of sulfur mus within three to six months.

• A former nerve agent expert indicated that Iraq retained the capability to produce nerve agent in signifi cant quan ies within two years, given the import of required phosphorous precursors. However, we have no credible indications that Iraq acquired or attempted to acquire large quan ies of these chemicals through its existing procurement networks for sanctioned items.

ISG uncovered information that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained throughout 1991 to 2003 a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for intelligence operations.

Also, most of the ISG's conclusion on the disposition of the WMD's is couched with the phrase "no evidence was found," which doesn't preclude that it still existed but that they were unable to find it.

Duelfer's report also said Hussein was pursuing an aggressive effort to subvert the international sanctions through illegal financing and procurement efforts, officials said. The official said the report states that Hussein had the intent to resume full-scale weapons of mass destruction efforts after the sanctions were eliminated, and details Hussein's efforts to hinder international inspectors and preserve his weapons of mass destruction capabilities.

Sanctions were crumbling under the stress of France and Russia and the U.N.'s corruption.

[PixelPusher]

Also, most of the ISG's conclusion on the disposition of the WMD's is couched with the phrase "no evidence was found," which doesn't preclude that it still existed but that they were unable to find it.

The Loch Ness monster is real. The fact that no evidence of the creature has been found doesn't preclude that Nessie still exists, just that the research teams with their sonar equipment were unable to find it.

[Nbadan]

Sanctions were crumbling under the stress of France and Russia and the U.N.'s corruption.

Actually, once the US went in, we found that sanctions seemed to be working better than planned...Iraq had not recons uted much of it's conventional weapons programs, much less it's biological or chemical capabilities...besides, Iraq was hardly the 'imminent threat' that the Bush Administration portrayed it to be....fact is, the Average American has a better chance of cons uting WMD with chemicals they have in their garage than Saddam had when the U.S. attacked under the as-pieces of finding huge stockpiles of weapons, not a ability to someday recons ute a dormant WMD program.....

[Yonivore]

Actually, once the US went in, we found that sanctions seemed to be working better than planned...Iraq had not recons uted much of it's conventional weapons programs, much less it's biological or chemical capabilities...besides, Iraq was hardly the 'imminent threat' that the Bush Administration portrayed it to be....fact is, the Average American has a better chance of cons uting WMD with chemicals they have in their garage than Saddam had when the U.S. attacked under the as-pieces of finding huge stockpiles of weapons, not a ability to someday recons ute a dormant WMD program.....

Actually, we found he had increased his budget for weapons programs from approximately 5 to 500 million dollars a year due to OFF kickbacks not being tracked by the UN.

[clambake]

Actually, we found he had increased his budget for weapons programs from approximately 5 to 500 million dollars a year due to OFF kickbacks not being tracked by the UN.

we increased our budget to make up stories. look up and you can see the results.

[ChumpDumper]

Actually, we found he had increased his budget for weapons programs from approximately 5 to 500 million dollars a year due to OFF kickbacks not being tracked by the UN.

So where are the WMDs?

Did we not ask Saddam anything about this main reason for the war?

[clambake]

why bother. we don't look for bin ladin anymore. we know where the crude is.