God did not create the universe, says Hawking

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dent and his party; paying particular attention to the crowd for any unusual activity. I stressed the fact that this was our President and he should be shown every respect due his position and that it was our duty to see that this was done.176
Captain Lawrence was not instructed to have his men watch buildings along the motorcade route and did not mention the observation of buildings to them.177 The three officers confirm that their primary concern was crowd and traffic control, and that they had no opportunity to scan the windows of the Depository or any other building in the vicinity of Elm and Houston when the motorcade was passing. They had, however, occasionally observed the windows of buildings in the area before the motorcade arrived, in accordance with their own understanding of their function.178

As the motorcade approached Elm Street there were several Secret Service agents in it who shared the responsibility of scanning the windows of nearby buildings. Agent Sorrels, riding in the lead car, did observe the Texas School Book Depository Building as he passed by, at least for a sufficient number of seconds to gain a "general impression" of the lack of any unusual activity.179 He was handicapped, however, by the fact. that he was riding in a closed car whose roof at times obscured his view.180 Lawson, also in the lead car, did not scan any buildings since an important part of his job was to look backward at the President's car.181 Lawson stated that he "was looking back a good deal of the time, watching his car, watching the sides, watching the crowds, giving advice or asking advice from the Chief and also looking ahead to the known hazards like overpasses, under-passes, railroads, et cetera." 182 Agent Roy H. Kellerman, riding in the front seat of the Presidential car, stated that he scanned the Depository Building, but not sufficiently to be alerted by anything in the windows or on the roof.183 The agents in the follow-up car also were expected to scan adjacent buildings. However, the Commission does not believe that agents stationed in a car behind the Presidential car, who must concentrate primarily on the possibility of threats from crowds along the route, provide a significant safeguard against dangers in nearby buildings.

Conduct of Secret Service agents in Fort Worth on November 22.--In the early morning hours on November 22, 1963, in Fort Worth, there occurred a breach of discipline by some members of the Secret Service who were officially traveling with the President. After the President had retired at his hotel, nine agents who were off duty went to the nearby Fort Worth Press Club at midnight or slightly thereafter, expecting to obtain food; they had little opportunity to eat during the day.184 No food was available at the Press Club. All of the agents stayed for a drink of beer, or in several cases, a mixed drink. According to their affidavits, the drinking in no case amounted to more than three glasses of beer or 1 1/2 mixed drinks, and others who were present say that no agent was inebriated or acted improperly. The statements of the agents involved are supported by

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statements of members of the Fort Worth press who accompanied or observed them and by a Secret Service investigation.185

According to their statements, the agents remained at the Press Club for periods varying from 30 minutes to an hour and a half, and the last agent left the Press Club by 2 a.m.186 Two of the nine agents returned to their rooms. The seven others proceeded to an establishment called the Cellar Coffee House, described by some as a beatnik place arid by its manager as "a unique show place with continuous light entertainment all night [serving] only coffee, fruit juices and no hard liquors or beer." 187 There is no indication that any of the agents who visited the Cellar Coffee House had any intoxicating drink at that establishment.188 Most of the agents were there from about 1:30 or 1:45 a.m. to about 2:45 or 3 a.m.; one agent was there from 2 until 5 a.m.189

The lobby of the hotel and the areas adjacent to the quarters of the President were guarded during the night by members of the midnight to 8 a.m. shift of the White House detail. These agents were each relieved for a half hour break during the night.190 Three members of this shift separately took this opportunity to visit the Cellar Coffee House.191 Only one stayed as long as a half hour, and none had any beverage there.191 Chief Rowley testified that agents on duty in such a situation usually stay within the building during their relief, but that their visits to the Cellar were "neither consistent nor inconsistent" with their duty.193

Each of the agents who visited the Press Club or the Cellar Coffee House (apart from the three members of the midnight shift) had duty assignments beginning no later than 8 a.m. that morning. President Kennedy was scheduled to speak across the street from his hotel in Fort Worth at 8:30 a.m.,194 and then at a breakfast, after which the entourage would proceed to Dallas. In Dallas, one of the nine agents was assigned to assist in security measures at Love Field, and four had protective assignments at the Trade Mart. The remaining four had key responsibilities as members of the complement of the follow-up car in the motorcade. Three of these agents occupied positions on the running boards of the car, and the fourth was seated in the car.195

The supervisor of each of the off-duty agents who visited the Press Club or the Cellar Coffee House advised, in the course of the Secret Service investigation of these events, that each agent reported for duty on time, with full possession of his mental and physical capabilities and entirely ready for the performance of his assigned duties.196 Chief Rowley testified that, as a result of the investigation he ordered, he was satisfied that each of the agents performed his duties in an entirely satisfactory manner and that their conduct the night before did not impede their actions on duty or in the slightest way prevent them from taking any action that might have averted the tragedy.197 However, Chief Rowley did not condone the action of the off-duty agents, particularly since it violated a regulation of the Secret Service, which provides:

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Liquor, use of.--a. Employees are strictly enjoined to refrain from the use of intoxicating liquor during the hours they are officially employed at their post of duty, or when they may reasonably expect that they may be called upon to perform an official duty. During entire periods of travel status, the special agent is officially employed and should not use liquor, until the completion of all of his official duties for the day, after which time a very moderate use of liquor will not be considered a violation. However, all members of the White House Detail and special agents cooperating with them on Presidential and similar protective assignments are considered to be subject to call for official duty at any time while in travel status. Therefore, the use of intoxicating liquor of any kind, including beer and wine, by members of the White House Detail and special agents cooperating with them, or by special agents on similar assignments, while they are in a travel status, is prohibited. 198
The regulations provide further that "violation or slight disregard" of these provisions "will be cause for removal from the Service." 199

Chief Rowley testified that under ordinary cir stances he would have taken disciplinary action against those agents who had been drinking in clear violation of the regulation. However, he felt that any disciplinary action might have given rise to an inference that the violation of the regulation had contributed to the tragic events of November 22. Since he was convinced that this was not the case, he believed that it would be unfair to the agents and their families to take explicit disciplinary measures. He felt that each agent recognized the seriousness of the infraction and that there was no danger of a repe ion. 200

The Commission recognizes that the responsibilities of members of the White House detail of the Secret Service are arduous. They work long, hard hours, under very great strain, and must travel frequently. It might seem harsh to cir scribe their opportunities for relaxation. Yet their role of protecting the President is so important to the well-being of the country that it is reasonable to expect them to meet very high standards of personal conduct, so that nothing can interfere with their bringing to their task the finest qualities and maximum resources of mind and body. This is the salutary goal to which the Secret Service regulation is directed, when it absolutely forbids drinking by any agent accompanying the President on a trip. Nor is this goal served when agents remain out until early morning hours, and lose the opportunity to get a reasonable amount of sleep. It is conceivable that those men who had little sleep, and who had consumed alcoholic beverages, even in limited quan ies, might have been more alert in the Dallas motorcade if they had retired promptly in Fort Worth. However, there is no evidence that these men failed to take any action in Dallas within their power that would have averted the tragedy. As will be seen, the instantaneous and heroic

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response to the assassination of some of the agents concerned was in the finest tradition of Government service.

The motorcade in Dallas.--Rigorous security precautions had been arranged at Love Field with the local law enforcement authorities by Agents Sorrels and Lawson. These precautions included reserving a ceremonial area for the Presidential party, stationing police on the rooftops of all buildings overlooking the reception area, and detailing police in civilian clothes to be scattered throughout the sizable crowd.201 When President and Mrs. Kennedy shook hands with members of the public along the fences surrounding the reception area, they were closely guarded by Secret Service agents who responded to the unplanned event with dispatch.202

As described in chapter II, the President directed that his car stop on two occasions during the motorcade so that he could greet members of the public.203 At these stops, agents from the Presidential follow-up car stood between the President and the public, and on one occasion Agent Kellerman left the front seat of the President's car to take a similar position. The Commission regards such impromptu stops as presenting an unnecessary danger, but finds that the Secret Service agents did all that could have been done to take protective measures.

The Presidential limousine.--The limousine used by President Kennedy in Dallas was a convertible with a detachable, rigid plastic "bubble" top which was neither bulletproof nor bullet resistant.204 The last Presidential vehicle with any protection against small-arms fire left the White House in 1953. It was not then replaced because the state of the art did not permit the development of a bulletproof top of sufficiently light weight to permit its removal on those occasions when the President wished to ride in an open car. The Secret Service believed that it was very doubtful that any President would ride regularly in a vehicle with a fixed top, even though transparent.205 Since the assassination, the Secret Service, with the assistance of other Federal agencies and of private industry, has developed a vehicle for the better protection of the President.206

Access to passenger compartment of Presidential car.--On occasion the Secret Service has been permitted to have an agent riding in the passenger compartment with the President. Presidents have made it clear, however, that they did not favor this or any other arrangement which interferes with the privacy of the President and his guests. The Secret Service has therefore suggested this practice only on extraordinary occasions.207 Without attempting to prescribe or recommend specific measures which should be employed for the future protection of Presidents, the Commission does believe that there are aspects of the protective measures employed in the motorcade at Dallas which deserve special comment.

The Presidential vehicle in use in Dallas, described in chapter II, had no special design or equipment which would have permitted the Secret Service agent riding in the driver's compartment to move into the passenger section without hindrance or delay. Had the vehicle been so designed it is possible that an agent riding in the front seat

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could have reached the President in time to protect him from the second and fatal shot to hit the President. However, such access to the President was interfered with both by the metal bar some 15 inches above the back of the front seat and by the passengers in the jump seats. In contrast, the Vice Presidential vehicle, although not specially designed for that purpose, had no passenger in a jump seat between Agent Youngblood and Vice President Johnson to interfere with Agent Youngblood's ability to take a protective position in the passenger compartment before the third shot was fired. 208

The assassination suggests that it would have been of prime importance in the protection of the President if the Presidential car permitted immediate access to the President by a Secret Service agent at the first sign of danger. At that time the agents on the framing boards of the follow-up car were expected to perform such a function. However, these agents could not reach the President's car when it was traveling at an appreciable rate of speed. Even if the car is traveling more slowly, the delay involved in reaching the President may be crucial. It is clear that at the time of the shots in Dallas, Agent Clinton J. Hill leaped to the President's rescue as quickly as humanly possible. Even so, analysis of the motion picture films taken by amateur photographer Zapruder reveals that Hill first placed his hand on the Presidential car at frame 343, 30 frames and therefore approximately 1.6 seconds after the President was shot in the head. 209 About 3.7 seconds after the President received this wound, Hill had both feet on the car and was climbing aboard to assist President and Mrs. Kennedy.210

Planning for motorcade contingencies.--In response to inquiry by the Commission regarding the instructions to agents in a motorcade of emergency procedures to be taken in a contingency such as that which actually occurred, the Secret Service responded:
The Secret Service has consistently followed two general principles in emergencies involving the President. All agents are so instructed. The first duty of the agents in the motorcade is to attempt to cover the President as closely as possible and practicable and to shield him by attempting to place themselves between the President and any source of danger. Secondly, agents are instructed to remove the President as quickly as possible from known or impending danger. Agents are instructed that it is not their responsibility to investigate or evaluate a present danger, but to consider any untoward cir stances as serious and to afford the President maximum protection at all times. No responsibility rests upon those agents near the President for the identification or arrest of any assassin or an attacker. Their primary responsibility is to stay with and protect the President.

Beyond these two principles the Secret Service believes a detailed contingency or emergency plan is not feasible because the variations possible preclude effective planning. A number of steps are taken, however, to permit appropriate steps to be taken
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in an emergency. For instance, the lead car always is manned by Secret Service agents familiar with the area and with local law enforcement officials; the radio net in use in motorcades is elaborate and permits a number of different means of communication with various local points. A doctor is in the motorcade.211
This basic approach to the problem of planning for emergencies is sound. Any effort to prepare detailed contingency plans might well have the undesirable effect of inhibiting quick and imaginative responses. If the advance preparation is thorough, and the protective devices and techniques employed are sound, those in command should be able to direct the response appropriate to the emergency.

The Commission finds that the Secret Service agents in the motorcade who were immediately responsible for the President's safety reacted promptly at the time the shots were fired. Their actions demonstrate that the President and the Nation can expect courage and devotion to duty from the agents of the Secret Service.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission's review of the provisions for Presidential protection at the time of President Kennedy's trip to Dallas demonstrates the need for substantial improvements. Since the assassination, the Secret Service and the Department of the Treasury have properly taken the initiative in reexamining major aspects of Presidential protection. Many changes have already been made and others are contemplated, some of them in response to the Commission's questions and informal suggestions.

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Assassination a Federal Crime

There was no Federal criminal jurisdiction over the assassination of President Kennedy. Had there been reason to believe that the assassination was the result of a conspiracy, Federal jurisdiction could have been asserted; it has long been a Federal crime to conspire to injure any Federal officer, on account of, or while he is engaged in, the lawful discharge of the duties of his office.212 Murder of the President has never been covered by Federal law, however, so that once it became reasonably clear that the killing was the act of a single person, the State of Texas had exclusive jurisdiction.

It is anomalous that Congress has legislated in other ways touching upon the safety of the Chief Executive or other Federal officers, without making an attack on the President a crime. Threatening harm to the President is a Federal offense, 213 as is advocacy of the overthrow of the Government by the assassination of any of its officers.214 The murder of Federal judges, U.S. attorneys and marshals, and a number of other specifically designated Federal law enforcement officers is a Federal crime.215 Equally anomalous are statutory provisions which

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specifically authorize the Secret Service to protect the President, without authorizing it to arrest anyone who harms him. The same provisions authorize the Service to arrest without warrant persons committing certain offenses, including counterfeiting and certain frauds involving Federal checks or securities.216 The Commission agrees with the Secret Service 217 that it should be authorized to make arrests without warrant for all offenses within its jurisdiction, as are FBI agents and Federal marshals.218

There have been a number of efforts to make assassination a Federal crime, particularly after the assassination of President McKinley and the attempt on the life of President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt.219 In 1902 bills passed both Houses of Congress but failed of enactment when the Senate refused to accept the conference report.220 A number of bills were introduced immediately following the assassination of President Kennedy.221

The Commission recommends to the Congress that it adopt legislation which would:
Punish the murder or manslaughter of, attempt or conspiracy to murder, kidnaping of and assault upon
the President, Vice President, or other officer next in the order of succession to the Office of President, the President- elect and the Vice-President-elect,
whether or not the act is committed while the victim is in the performance of his official duties or on account of such performance.
Such a statute would cover the President and Vice President or, in the absence of a Vice President, the person next in order of succession. During the period between election and inauguration, the President-elect and Vice-President-elect would also be covered. Restricting the coverage in this way would avoid unnecessary controversy over the inclusion or exclusion of other officials who are in the order of succession or who hold important governmental posts. In addition, the restriction would probably eliminate a need for the requirement which has been urged as necessary for the exercise of Federal power, that the hostile act occur while the victim is engaged in or because of the performance of official duties.222 The governmental consequences of assassination of one of the specified officials give the United States ample power to act for its own protection.223 The activities of the victim at the time an assassination occurs and the motive for the assassination bear no relationship to the injury to the United States which follows from the act. This point was ably made in the 1902 debate by Senator George F. Hoar, the sponsor of the Senate bill:
... what this bill means to punish is the crime of interruption of the Government of the United States and the destruction of its security by striking down the life of the person who is actually in the exercise of the executive power, or of such persons as have been
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cons utionally and lawfully provided to succeed thereto in case of a vacancy. It is important to this country that the interruption shall not take place for an hour ... 224
Enactment of this statute would mean that the investigation of any of the acts covered and of the possibility of a further attempt would be conducted by Federal law enforcement officials, in particular, the FBI with the assistance of the Secret Service.225 At present, Federal agencies participate only upon the sufferance of the local authorities. While the police work of the Dallas authorities in the early identification and apprehension of Oswald was both efficient and prompt, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, who strongly supports such legislation, testified that the absence of clear Federal jurisdiction over the assassination of President Kennedy led to embarrassment and confusion in the subsequent investigation by Federal and local authorities.226 In addition, the proposed legislation will insure that any suspects who are arrested will be Federal prisoners, subject to Federal protection from vigilante justice and other threats. 227

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Committee of Cabinet Officers

As our Government has become more complex, agencies other than the Secret Service have become involved in phases of the overall problem of protecting our national leaders. The FBI is the major domestic investigating agency of the United States, while the CIA has the primary responsibility for collecting intelligence overseas to supplement information acquired by the Department of State. The Secret Service must rely in large part upon the investigating capacity and experience of these and other agencies for much of its information regarding possible dangers to the President. The Commission believes that it is necessary to improve the cooperation among these agencies and to emphasize that the task of Presidential protection is one of broad national concern.

The Commission suggests that consideration might be given to assigning to a Cabinet-level committee or the National Security Council (which is responsible for advising the President respecting the coordination of departmental policies relating to the national security) 228 the responsibility to review and oversee the protective activities of the Secret Service and the other Federal agencies that assist in safeguarding the President. The Committee should include the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, and, if the Council is used, arrangements should be made for the attendance of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General at any meetings which are concerned with Presidential protection.229 The Council already includes, in addition to the President and Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense and has a competent staff.

The foremost assignment of the Committee would be to insure that the maximum resources of the Federal Government are fully engaged

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in the job of protecting the President, by defining responsibilities clearly and overseeing their execution. Major needs of personnel or other resources might be met more easily on its recommendation than they have been in the past.

The Committee would be able to provide guidance in defining the general nature of domestic and foreign dangers to Presidential security. As improvements are recommended for the advance detection of potential threats to the President, it could act as a final review board. The expert assistance and resources which it could draw upon would be particularly desirable in this complex and sensitive area.

This arrangement would provide a continuing high-level contact for agencies that may wish to consult respecting particular protective measures. For various reasons the Secret Service has functioned largely as an informal part of the White House staff, with the result that it has been unable, as a practical matter, to exercise sufficient influence over the security precautions which surround Presidential activities. A Cabinet-level committee which is actively concerned with these problems would be able to discuss these matters more effectively with the President.

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Responsibilities for Presidential Protection

The assignment of the responsibility of protecting the President to an agency of the Department of the Treasury was largely an historical accident.230 The Secret Service was organized as a division of the Department of the Treasury in 1865, to deal with counterfeiting. In 1894, while investigating a plot to assassinate President Cleveland, the Service assigned a small protective detail of agents to the White House. Secret Service men accompanied the President and his family to their vacation home in Massachusetts and special details protected him in Washington, on trips, and at special functions. These informal and part-time arrangements led to more systematic protection in 1902, after the assassination of President McKinley; the Secret Service, then the only Federal investigative agency, assumed full-time responsibility for the safety of the President. Since that time, the Secret Service has had and exercised responsibility for the physical protection of the President and also for the preventive investigation of potential threats against the President.

Although the Secret Service has had the primary responsibility for the protection of the President, the FBI, which was established within the Department of Justice in 1908, has had in recent years an increasingly important role to play. In the appropriations of the FBI there has recurred annually an item for the "protection of the person of the President of the United States," which first appeared in the appropriation of the Department of Justice in 1910 under the heading "Miscellaneous Objects."231 Although the FBI is not charged with the physical protection of the President, it does have an assignment, as do other Government agencies, in the field of preventive investigation in regard to the President's security. As discussed above, the Bureau has

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attempted to meet its responsibilities in this field by spelling out in its Handbook the procedures which its agents are to follow in connection with information received "indicating the possibility of an attempt against the person or safety of the President" or other protected persons.

With two Federal agencies operating in the same general field of preventive investigation, questions inevitably arise as to the scope of each agency's authority and responsibility. As the testimony of J. Edgar Hoover and other Bureau officials revealed, the FBI did not believe that its directive required the Bureau to notify the Secret Service of the substantial information about Lee Harvey Oswald which the FBI had ac ulated before the President reached Dallas. On the other hand, the Secret Service had no knowledge whatever of Oswald, his background, or his employment at the Book Depository, and Robert I. Bouck, who was in charge of the Protective Research Section of the Secret Service, believed that the ac ulation of the facts known to the FBI should have cons uted a sufficient basis to warn the Secret Service of the Oswald risk.

The Commission believes that both the FBI and the Secret Service have too narrowly construed their respective responsibilities. The Commission has the impression that too much emphasis is placed by both on the investigation of specific threats by individuals and not enough on dangers from other sources. In addition, the Commission has concluded that the Secret Service particularly tends to be the passive recipient of information regarding such threats and that its Protective Research Section is not adequately staffed or equipped to conduct the wider investigative work that is required today for the security of the President.

During the period the Commission was giving thought to this situation, the Commission received a number of proposals designed to improve current arrangements for protecting the President. These proposals included suggestions to locate exclusive responsibility for all phases of the work in one or another Government agency, to clarify the division of authority between the agencies involved, and to retain the existing system but expand both the scope and the operations of the existing agencies, particularly those of the Secret Service and the FBI.

It has been pointed out that the FBI, as our chief investigative agency, is properly manned and equipped to carry on extensive information gathering functions within the United States. It was also suggested that it would take a substantial period of time for the Secret Service to build up the experience and skills necessary to meet the problem. Consequently the suggestion has been made, on the one hand, that all preventive investigative functions relating to the security of the President should be transferred to the FBI, leaving with the Secret Service only the responsibility for the physical protection of the President, that is, the guarding function alone.

On the other hand, it is urged that all features of the protection of the President and his family should be committed to an elite and independent corps. It is also contended that the agents should be intimately

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associated with the life of the Presidential family in all its ramifications and alert to every danger that might befall it, and ready at any instant to hazard great danger to themselves in the performance of their tremendous responsibility. It is suggested that an organization shorn of its power to investigate all the possibilities of danger to the President and becoming merely the recipient of information gathered by others would become limited solely to acts of physical alertness and personal courage incident to its responsibilities. So cir scribed, it could not maintain the esprit de corps or the necessary alertness for this unique and challenging responsibility.

While in accordance with its mandate this Commission has necessarily examined into the functioning of the various Federal agencies concerned with the tragic trip of President Kennedy to Dallas and while it has arrived at certain conclusions in respect thereto, it seems clear that it was not within the Commission's responsibility to make specific recommendations as to the long-range organization of the President's protection, except as conclusions flowing directly from its examination of the President's assassination can be drawn. The Commission was not asked to apply itself as did the Hoover Commission in 1949, for examples to a determination of the optimum organization of the President's protection. It would have been necessary for the Commission to take considerable testimony, much of it extraneous to the facts of the assassination of President Kennedy, to put it in a position to reach final conclusions in this respect. There are always dangers of divided responsibility, duplication, and confusion of authority where more than one agency is operating in the same field; but on the other hand the protection of the President is in a real sense a Government-wide responsibility which must necessarily assumed by the Department of State, the FBI, the CIA, and the military intelligence agencies as well as the Secret Service. Moreover, a number of imponderable questions have to be weighed if any change in the intimate association now established between the Secret Service and the President and his family is contemplated.

These considerations have induced the Commission to believe that the determination of whether or not there should be a relocation of responsibilities and functions should be left to the Executive and the Congress, perhaps upon recommendations based on further studies by the Cabinet-level committee recommended above or the National Security Council.

Pending any such determination, however, this Commission is convinced of the necessity of better coordination and direction of the activities of all existing agencies of Government which are in a position to and do, furnish information and services related to the security of the President. The Commission feels the Secret Service and the FBI, as well as the State Department and the CIA when the President travels abroad, could improve their existing capacities and procedures so as to lessen the chances of assassination. Without, therefore, coming to final conclusions respecting the long-range organization of the President's security, the Commission believes

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that the facts of the assassination of President Kennedy point to certain measures which, while assuming no radical relocation of responsibilities, can and should be recommended by this Commission in the interest of the more efficient protection of the President. These, recommendations are reviewed below.

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General Supervision of the Secret Service

The intimacy of the Secret Service's relationship to the White House and the dissimilarity of its protective functions to most activities of the Department of the Treasury have made it difficult for the Treasury to maintain close and continuing supervision. The Commission believes that the recommended Cabinet-level committee will help to correct many of the major deficiencies of supervision disclosed by the Commission's investigation. Other measures should be taken as well to improve the overall operation of the Secret Service.

Daily supervision of the operations of the Secret Service within the Department of the Treasury should be improved. The Chief of the Service now reports to the Secretary of the Treasury through an Assistant Secretary whose duties also include the direct supervision of the Bureau of the Mint and the Department's Employment Policy Program, and who also represents the Secretary of the Treasury on various committees and groups.232 The in bent has no technical qualifications in the area of Presidential protection.233 The Commission recommends that the Secretary of the Treasury appoint a special assistant with the responsibility of supervising the Service. This special assistant should be required to have sufficient stature and experience in law enforcement, intelligence, or allied fields to be able to provide effective continuing supervision, and to keep the Secretary fully informed regarding all significant developments relating to Presidential protection.

This report has already pointed out several respects in which the Commission believes that the Secret Service has operated with insufficient planning or control. Actions by the Service since the assassination indicate its awareness of the necessity for substantial improvement in its administration. A formal and thorough description of the responsibilities of the advance agent is now in preparation by the Service.234 Work is going forward toward the preparation of formal understandings of the respective roles of the Secret Service and other agencies with which it collaborates or from which it derives assistance and support. The Commission urges that the Service continue this effort to overhaul and define its procedures. While manuals and memoranda are no guarantee of effective operations, no sizable organization can achieve efficiency without the careful analysis and demarcation of responsibility that is reflected in definite and comprehensive operating procedures.

The Commission also recommends that the Secret Service consciously set about the task of inculcating and maintaining the highest standard of excellence and esprit, for all of its personnel. This

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involves tight and unswerving discipline as well as the promotion of an outstanding degree of dedication and loyalty to duty. The Commission emphasizes that it finds no causal connection between the assassination and the breach of regulations which occurred on the night of November 21 at Fort Worth. Nevertheless, such a breach, in which so many agents participated, is not consistent with the standards which the responsibilities of the Secret Service require it to meet.

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Preventive Intelligence

In attempting to identify those individuals who might prove a danger to the President, the Secret Service has largely been the passive recipient of threatening communications to the President and reports from other agencies which independently evaluate their information for potential sources of danger. This was the consequence of the Service's lack of an adequate investigative staff, its inability to process large amounts of data, and its failure to provide specific descriptions of the kind of information it sought.235

The Secret Service has embarked upon a complete overhaul of its research activities.236 The staff of the Protective Research Section (PRS) has been augmented, and a Secret Service inspector has been put in charge of this operation. With the assistance of the President's Office of Science and Technology, and of the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense, it has obtained the services of outside consultants, such as the Rand Corp., International Business Machines Corp., and a panel of psychiatric and psychological experts. It has received assistance also from data processing experts at the CIA and from a specialist in psychiatric prognostication at Walter Reed Hospital.237 As a result of these studies, the planning do ent submitted by the Secretary of the Treasury to the Bureau of the Budget on August 31, 1964, makes several significant recommendations in this field.238 Based on the Commission's investigation, the following minimum goals for improvements are indicated:

Broader and more selective criteria.--Since the assassination, both the Secret Service and the FBI have recognized that the PRS files can no longer be limited largely to persons communicating actual threats to the President. On December 26, 1963, the FBI circulated additional instructions to all its agents, specifying criteria for information to be furnished to the Secret Service in addition to that covered by the former standard, which was the possibility of an attempt against the person or safety of the President. The new instructions require FBI agents to report immediately information concerning:
Subversives, ultrarightists, racists and fascists (a) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior, (b) who have made threats of bodily harm against officials or employees of Federal, state or local government or officials of a foreign government, (c) who express or have expressed strong or violent anti-U.S. sentiments and who have been involved in bombing or bomb-making
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or whose past conduct indicates tendencies toward violence, and (d) whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence and hatred against organized government.239
Alan IH. Belmont, Assistant to the Director of the FBI, testified that this revision was initiated by the FBI itself.240 The volume of references to the Secret Service has increased substantially since the new instructions went into effect; more than 5,000 names were referred to the Secret Service in the first 4 months of 1964.241 According to Chief Rowley, by mid-June 1964, the Secret Service had received from the FBI some 9,000 reports on members of the Communist Party.242 The FBI now transmits information on all defectors, 243 a category which would, of course, have included Oswald.

Both Director Hoover and Belmont expressed to the Commission the great concern of the FBI, which is shared by the Secret Service, that referrals to the Secret Service under the new criteria might, if not properly handled, result in some degree of interference with the personal liberty of those involved.244 They emphasized the necessity that the information now being furnished be handled with judgment and care. The Commission shares this concern. The problem is aggravated by the necessity that the Service obtain the assistance of local law enforcement officials in evaluating the information which it receives and in taking preventive steps.

In June 1964, the Secret Service sent to a number of Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies guidelines for an experimental program to develop more detailed criteria. 245 The suggestions of Federal agencies for revision of these guidelines were solicited. The new tentative criteria are useful in making clear that the interest of the Secret Service goes beyond information on individuals or groups threatening to cause harm or embarrassment to the President.246 Information is requested also concerning individuals or groups who have demonstrated an interest in the President or "other high government officials in the nature of a complaint coupled with an expressed or implied determination to use a means, other than legal or peaceful, to satisfy any grievance, real or imagined. 247 Under these criteria, whether the case should be referred to the Secret Service depends on the existence of a previous history of mental instability, propensity toward violent action, or some similar characteristic, coupled with some evaluation of the capability of the individual or group to further the intention to satisfy a grievance by unlawful means.248

While these tentative criteria are a step in the right direction, they seem unduly restrictive in continuing to require some manifestation of animus against a Government official. It is questionable whether such criteria would have resulted in the referral of Oswald to the Secret Service. Chief Rowley believed that they would, because of Oswald's demonstrated hostility toward the Secretary of the Navy in his letter of January 30, 1962.249

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I shall employ all means to right this gross mistake or injustice to a bonified U.S. citizen and ex-service man. The U.S. government has no charges or complaints against me. I ask you to look into this case and take the necessary steps to repair the damage done to me and my family.250
Even with the advantage of hindsight, this letter does not appear to express or imply Oswald's "determination to use a means, other than legal or peaceful, to satisfy [his] grievance" within the meaning of the new criteria.251

It is apparent that a good deal of further consideration and experimentation will be required before adequate criteria can be framed. The Commission recognizes that no set of meaningful criteria will yield the names of all potential assassins. Charles J. Guiteau, Leon F. Czolgosz, John Schrank, and Guiseppe Zangara--four assassins or would-be assassins--were all men who acted alone in their criminal acts against our leaders.252 None had a serious record of prior violence. Each of them was a failure in his work and in his relations with others, a victim of delusions and fancies which led to the conviction that society and its leaders had combined to thwart him. It will require every available resource of our Government to devise a practical system which has any reasonable possibility of revealing such malcontents.

Liaison with other agencies regarding intelligence.--The Secret Service's liaison with the agencies that supply information to it has been too casual. Since the assassination, the Service has recognized that these relationships must be far more formal and each agency given clear understanding of the assistance which the Secret Service expects.258

Once the Secret Service has formulated its new standards for collection of information, it should enter into written agreements with each Federal agency and the leading State and local agencies that might be a source of such information. Such agreements should describe in detail the information which is sought, the manner in which it will be provided to the Secret Service, and the respective responsibilities for any further investigation that may be required.

This is especially necessary with regard to the FBI and CIA, which carry the major responsibility for supplying information about potential threats, particularly those arising from organized groups, within their special jurisdiction. Since these agencies are already obliged constantly to evaluate the activities of such groups, they should be responsible for advising the Secret Service if information develops indicating the existence of an assassination plot and for reporting such events as a change in leadership or dogma which indicate that the group may present a danger to the President. Detailed formal agreements embodying these arrangements should be worked out between the Secret Service and both of these agencies.

It should be made clear that the Secret Service will in no way seek to duplicate the intelligence and investigative capabilities of the

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agencies now operating in this field but will continue to use the data developed by these agencies to carry out its special duties. Once experience has been gained in implementing such agreements with the Federal and leading State and local agencies, the Secret Service, through its field offices, should negotiate similar arrangements with such other State and local law enforcement agencies as may provide meaningful assistance. Much useful information will come to the attention of local law enforcement agencies in the regular course of their activities, and this source should not be neglected by undue concentration on relationships with other Federal agencies. Finally, these agreements with Federal and local authorities will be of little value unless a system is established for the frequent formal review of activities thereunder.

In this regard the Commission notes with approval several recent measures taken and proposed by the Secret Service to improve its liaison arrangements. In his testimony Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon informed the Commission that an interagency committee has been established to develop more effective criteria. According to Secretary Dillon, the Committee will include representatives of the President's Office of Science and Technology, Department of Defense, CIA, FBI, and the Secret Service.254 In addition, the Department of the Treasury has requested five additional agents for its Protective Research Section to serve as liaison officers with law enforcement and intelligence agencies.255 On the basis of the Department's review during the past several months, Secretary Dillon testified that the use of such liaison officers is the only effective way to insure that adequate liaison is maintained.256 As a beginning step to improve liaison with local law enforcement officials, the Secret Service on August 26, 1964, directed its field representatives to send a form request for intelligence information to all local, county, and State law enforcement agencies in their districts.257 Each of these efforts appears sound, and the Commission recommends that these and the other measures suggested by the Commission be pursued vigorously by Secret Service.

Automatic data processing.--Unless the Secret Service is able to deal rapidly and accurately with a growing body of data, the increased information supplied by other agencies will be wasted. PRS must develop the capacity to classify its subjects on a more sophisticated basis than the present geographic breakdown. Its present manual filing system is obsolete; it makes no use of the recent developments in automatic data processing which are widely used in the business world and in other Government offices.

The Secret Service and the Department of the Treasury now recognize this critical need. In the planning do ent currently under review by the Bureau of the Budget, the Department recommends that it be permitted to hire five qualified persons "to plan and develop a workable and efficient automated file and retrieval system."258 Also the Department requests the sum of $100,000 to conduct a detailed feasibility study; this money would be used to compensate

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consultants, to lease standard equipment or to purchase specially designed pilot equipment.259 On the basis of such a feasibility study, the Department hopes to design a practical system which will fully meet the needs of the Protective Research Section of the Secret Service.

The Commission recommends that prompt and favorable consideration be given to this request. The Commission further recommends that the Secret Service coordinate its planning as closely as possible with all of the Federal agencies from which it receives information. The Secret Service should not and does not plan to develop its own intelligence gathering facilities to duplicate the existing facilities of other Federal agencies. In planning its data processing techniques, the Secret Service should attempt to develop a system compatible with those of the agencies from which most of its data will come.*

Protective Research participation in advance arrangements.--Since the assassination, Secret Service procedures have been changed to require that a member of PRS accompany each advance survey team to establish liaison with local intelligence gathering agencies and to provide for the immediate evaluation of information received from them.260 This PRS agent will also be responsible for establishing an informal local liaison committee to make certain that all protective intelligence activities are coordinated. Based on its experience during this period, the Secret Service now recommends that additional personnel be made available to PRS so that these arrangements can be made permanent without adversely affecting the operations of the Service's field offices.261 The Commission regards this as a most. useful innovation and urges that the practice be continued.
*Note at bottom of page: In evaluating data processing techniques of the Secret Service, the Commission had occasion to become informed, to a limited extent, about the data processing techniques of other Federal intelligence and low enforcement agencies. The Commission was struck by the apparent lack of effort, on an interagency basis, to develop coordinated and mutually compatible systems, even where such coordination would not seem inconsistent with the particular purposes of the agency involved. The Commission recognizes that this is a controversial area and that many strongly held views are advanced in resistance to any suggestion that an effort be made to impose any degree of coordination. This matter is obviously beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission, but it seems to warrant further study before each agency becomes irrevocably committed to separate action. The Commission, therefore, recommends that the President consider ordering an inquiry into the possibility that coordination might be achieved to a greater extent than seems now to be contemplated, without interference with the primary mission of each agency involved.
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Liaison With Local Law Enforcement Agencies

Advice by the Secret Service to local police in metropolitan areas relating to the assistance expected in connection with a Presidential visit has hitherto been handled on an informal basis.262 The Service should consider preparing formal explanations of the cooperation anticipated during a Presidential visit to a city, in formats that can be communicated to each level of local authorities. Thus, the local chief of police could be given a master plan, prepared for the occasion, of all protective measures to be taken during the visit; each patrolman might be given a prepared booklet of instructions explaining what is expected of him.

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The Secret Service has expressed concern that written instructions might come into the hands of local newspapers, to the prejudice of the precautions described.263 However, the instructions must be communicated to the local police in any event and can be leaked to the press whether or not they are in writing. More importantly, the lack of carefully prepared and carefully transmitted instructions for typical visits to cities can lead to lapses in protection, such as the confusion in Dallas about whether members of the public were permitted on overpasses.264 Such instructions will not fit all cir stances, of course, and should not be relied upon to the detriment of the imaginative application of judgment in special cases.

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Inspection of Buildings

Since the assassination of President Kennedy, the Secret Service has been experimenting with new techniques in the inspection of buildings along a motorcade route.265 According to Secretary Dillon, the studies indicate that there is some utility in attempting to designate certain buildings as involving a higher risk than others.266 The Commission strongly encourages these efforts to improve protection along a motorcade route. The Secret Service should utilize the personnel of other Federal law enforcement offices in the locality to assure adequate manpower for this task, as it is now doing. 267 Lack of adequate resources is an unacceptable excuse for failing to improve advance precautions in this crucial area of Presidential protection.

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Secret Service Personnel and Facilities

Testimony and other evidence before the Commission suggest that the Secret Service is trying to accomplish its job with too few people and without adequate modern equipment. Although Chief Rowley does not complain about the pay scale for Secret Service agents, salaries are below those of the FBI and leading municipal police forces.268 The assistant to the Director of the FBI testified that the caseload of each FBI agent averaged 20-25, and he felt that this was high.269 Chief Rowley testified that the present workload of each Secret Service agent averages 110.1 cases.270 While these statistics relate to the activities of Secret Service agents stationed in field offices and not the White House detail, field agents supplement those on the detail, particularly when the President is traveling. Although the Commission does not know whether the cases involved are entirely comparable, these figures suggest that the agents of the Secret Service are substantially overworked.

In its budget request for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1964, the Secret Service sought funds for 25 new positions, primarily in field offices. 271 This increase has been approved by the Congress. 272 Chief Rowley explained that this would not provide enough additional manpower to take all the measures which he considers required. However, the 1964-65 budget request was submitted in November 1963 and

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requests for additional personnel were not made because of the studies then being conducted.273

The Secret Service has now presented its recommendations to the Bureau of the Budget.274 The plan proposed by the Service would take approximately 20 months to implement and require expenditures of approximately $3 million during that period. The plan provides for an additional 205 agents for the Secret Service. Seventeen of this number are proposed for the Protective Research Section; 145 are proposed for the field offices to handle the increased volume of security investigations and be available to protect the President or Vice President when they travel; 18 agents are proposed for a rotating pool which will go through an intensive training cycle and also be available to supplement the White House detail in case of unexpected need; and 25 additional agents are recommended to provide the Vice President full protection.

The Commission urges that the Bureau of the Budget review these recommendations with the Secret Service and authorize a request for the necessary supplemental appropriation, as soon as it can be justified. The Congress has often stressed that it will support any reasonable request for funds for the protection of the President.275

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Manpower and Technical Assistance From Other Agencies

Before the assassination the Secret Service infrequently requested other Federal law enforcement agencies to provide personnel to assist in its protection functions.276 Since the assassination, the Service has experimented with the use of agents borrowed for short periods from such agencies. It has used other Treasury law enforcement agents on special experiments in building and route surveys in places to which the President frequently travels.277 It has also used other Federal law enforcement agents during Presidential visits to cities in which such agents are stationed. Thus, in the 4 months following the assassination, the FBI, on 16 separate occasions, supplied a total of 139 agents to assist in protection work during a Presidential visit,278 which represents a departure from its prior practice.279 From February 11 through June 30, 1964, the Service had the advantage of 9,500 hours of work by other enforcement agencies.280

The FBI has indicated that it is willing to continue to make such assistance available, even though it agrees with the Secret Service that it is preferable for the Service to have enough agents to handle all protective demands.281 The Commission endorses these efforts to supplement the Service's own personnel by obtaining, for short periods of time, the assistance of trained Federal law enforcement officers. In view of the ever-increasing mobility of American Presidents, it seems unlikely that the Service could or should increase its own staff to a size which would permit it to provide adequate protective manpower for all situations. The Commission recommends that the agencies involved determine how much periodic assistance they can provide, and that each such agency and the Secret Service enter into a formal

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agreement defining such arrangements. It may eventually be desirable to codify the practice in an Executive order. The Secret Service will be better able to plan its own long-range personnel requirements if it knows with reasonable certainty the amount of assistance that it can expect from other agencies.

The occasional use of personnel from other Federal agencies to assist in protecting the President has a further advantage. It symbolizes the reality that the job of protecting the President has not been and cannot be exclusively the responsibility of the Secret Service. The Secret Service in the past has sometimes guarded its right to be acknowledged as the sole protector of the Chief Executive. This no longer appears to be the case.282 Protecting the President is a difficult and complex task which requires full us of the best resources of many parts of our Government. Recognition that the responsibility must be shared increases the likelihood that it will be met.

Much of the Secret Service work requires the development and use of highly sophisticated equipment, some of which must be specially designed to fit unique requirements. Even before the assassination, and to a far greater extent thereafter, the Secret Service has been receiving full cooperation in scientific research and technological development from many Government agencies including the Department of Defense and the President's Office of Science and Technology.283

Even if the manpower and technological resources of the Secret Service are adequately augmented, it will continue to rely in many respects upon the greater resources of the Office of Science and Technology and other agencies. The Commission recommends that the present arrangements with the Office of Science and Technology and the other Federal agencies that have been so helpful to the Secret Service be placed on a permanent and formal basis. The exchange of letters dated August 31, 1964, between Secretary Dillon and Donald F. Hornig, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, is a useful effort in the right direction.284 The Service should negotiate a memorandum of understanding with each agency that has been assisting it and from which it can expect to need help in the future. The essential terms of such memoranda might well be embodied in an Executive order.

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CONCLUSION

This Commission can recommend no procedures for the future protection of our Presidents which will guarantee security. The demands on the President in the execution of His responsibilities in today's world are so varied and complex and the traditions of the office in a democracy such as ours are so deepseated as to preclude absolute security.

The Commission has, however, from its examination of the facts of President Kennedy's assassination made certain recommendations

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which it believes would, if adopted, materially improve upon the procedures in effect at the time of President Kennedy's assassination and result in a substantial lessening of the danger.

As has been pointed out, the Commission has not resolved all the proposals which could be made. The Commission nevertheless is confident that, with the active cooperation of the responsible agencies and with the understanding of the people of the United States in their demands upon their President, the recommendations we have here suggested would greatly advance the security of the office without any impairment of our fundamental liberties.

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Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy
Appendix 1
IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NOVEMBER 30, 1963

Office of the White House Press Secretary




THE WHITE HOUSE

EXECUTIVE ORDER
NO. 11130

APPOINTING A COMMISSION TO REPORT UPON THE
ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

Pursuant to the authority vested in me as President of the United States, I hereby appoint a Commission to ascertain, evaluate and report upon the facts relating to the assassination of the late President John Kennedy and the subsequent violent death of the man charged with the assassination. The Commission shall consist of --
The Chief Justice of the United States, Chairman;
Senator Richard B. Russell:
Senator John Sherman Cooper;
Congressman Hale Boggs;
Congressman Gerald R Ford;
The Honorable Allen W. Dulles;
The Honorable John J. McCloy.
The purposes of the Commission are to examine the evidence developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and any additional evidence that may hereafter come to light or be uncovered by federal or state authorities; to make such further investigation as the Commission finds desirable; to evaluate all the facts and cir stances surrounding such assassination, including the subsequent violent death of the man charged with the assassination, and to report to me its findings and conclusions.

The Commission is empowered to prescribe its own procedures and to employ such assistants as it deems necessary.

Necessary expenses of the Commission may he paid from the "Emergency Fund for the President".

All Executive departments and agencies are directed to furnish the Commission with such facilities, services and cooperation as it may request from time to time.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON
THE WHITE HOUSE,
November 29, 1963.

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Appendix 2


IMMEDIATE RELEASE

November 29, 1963

Office of the White House Press Secretary



THE WHITE HOUSE

The President today announced that he is appointing a Special Commission to study and report upon all facts and cir stances relating to the assassination of the late President, John F. Kennedy, and the subsequent violent death of the man charged with the assassination.

The President stated that the Majority and Minority Leadership of the Senate and the House of Representatives have been consulted with respect to the proposed Special Commission.

The members of the Special Commission are:
Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman
Senator Richard Russell (Georgia)
Senator John Sherman Cooper (Kentucky)
Representative Hale Boggs (Louisiana)
Representative Gerald Ford (Michigan)
Hon. Allen W. Dulles of Washington
Hon. John J. McCloy of New York
The President stated that the Special Commission is to be instructed to evaluate all available information concerning the subject of the inquiry. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, pursuant to an earlier directive of the President, is making complete investigation of the facts. An inquiry is also scheduled by a Texas Court of Inquiry convened by the Attorney General of Texas under Texas law.

The Special Commission will have before it all evidence uncovered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and all information available to any agency of the Federal Government. The Attorney General of Texas has also offered his cooperation. All Federal agencies and offices are being directed to furnish services and cooperation to the Special Commission. The Commission will also be empowered to conduct any further investigation that it deems desirable.

The President is instructing the Special Commission to satisfy itself that the truth is known as far as it can be discovered, and to report its findings and conclusions to him, to the American people, and to the world.

# # # # #

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Appendix 3


Public Law 88-202

88th Congress, S. J. Res. 137

December 13, 1963

Joint Resolution

Authorizing the Commission established to report upon the assassination of President John F. Kennedy to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of evidence.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) for the purposes of this joint resolution, the term "Commission" means the Commission appointed by the President by Executive Order 11130, dated November 29, 1963.

(b) The Commission, or any member of the Commission when so authorized by the Commission, shall have power to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any evidence that relates to any matter under investigation by the Commission. The Commission, or any member of the Commission or any agent or agency designated by the Commission for such purpose, may administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and receive evidence. Such attendance of witnesses and the production of such evidence may be required from any place within the United States at any designated place of hearing.

(c) In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person under subsection (b), any court of the United States within the jurisdiction of which the inquiry is carried on or within the jurisdiction of which said person guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides or transacts business, upon application by the Commission shall have jurisdiction to issue to such person an order requiring such person to appear before the Commission, its member, agent, or agency, there to produce evidence if so ordered, or there to give testimony touching the matter under investigation or in question; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by said court as a contempt thereof.

(d) Process and papers of the commission, its members, agent, or agency, may be served either upon the witness in person or by registered mail or by telegraph or by leaving a copy thereof at the residence or principal office or place of business of the person required to be served. The verified return by the individual so serving the same, setting forth the manner of such service, shall be proof of the same, and the return post office receipt or telegraph receipt therefore when registered and mailed or telegraphed as aforesaid shall be proof of service of the same. Witnesses summoned before the commission, its members, agent, or agency, shall be paid the same fees and mileage that are paid witnesses in the courts of the United States, and witnesses whose depositions are taken and the persons taking the same shall severally be en led to the same fees ar are paid for like services in the courts of the United States.

(e) No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records, correspondence, do ents, or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena, on the ground that the testimony or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture; but no individual shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture (except demotion or removal from office) for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege

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Pub. Law 88-202

December 13, 1963

against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying.

(f) All process of any court to which application may be make under this Act may be served in the judicial district therein the person required to be served resides or may be found.

Approved December 13, 1963.



LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 109 (1963):

Dec. 9: Passed Senate.

Dec. 10: Considered and passed House.

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Appendix 4: Biographical Information and Acknowledgments
Members of Commission
General Counsel
Assistant Counsel
Staff Members
Acknowledgments
MEMBERS OF COMMISSION

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The Honorable Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the United States, was born in Los Angeles, Calif., on March 19, 1891. He graduated from the University of California with B.L. and J.D. degrees, and was admitted to the California bar in 1914. Chief Justice Warren was attorney general of California from 1939 to 1943. From 1943 to 1953 he was Governor of California and in September 1953 was appointed by President Eisenhower to be the Chief Justice of the United States.

The Honorable Richard B. Russell was born in Winder, Ga., on November 2, 1897. He received his B.L. degree from the University of Georgia in 1918 and his LL.B. from Mercer University in 1957. Senator Russell commenced the practice of law in Winder, Ga., in 1918, became county attorney for Barrow County, Ga., and was a member of the Georgia House of Representatives from 1921 to 1931. He was Governor of Georgia from 1931 to 1933, was elected to the U.S. Senate in January 1933 to fill a vacancy, and has been Senator from Georgia continuously since that date.

The Honorable John Sherman Cooper was born in Somerset, Ky., on August 23, 1901. He attended Centre College, Kentucky, received his A.B. degree from Yale College in 1923, and attended Harvard Law School from 1923 to 1925. Senator Cooper has been a member of the House of Representatives of the Kentucky General Assembly, a county judge and circuit judge in Kentucky, and is now a member of the U.S. Senate, where he has served, though not continuously, for 12 years. He was a delegate to the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, an advisor to the Secretary of State in 1950 at meetings of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and Ambassador to India and Nepal in 1955-56. He served in the 3d U.S. Army in World War II in Europe, and after the war headed the reorganization of the German judicial system in Bavaria.

The Honorable Hale Boggs was born in Long Beach, Miss., on February 15, 1914. He graduated from Tulane University with a B.A. degree in 1935 and received his LL.B. in 1937. He was admitted to the Louisiana bar in 1937 and practiced law in New Orleans. Representative Boggs was elected to the 77th Congress of the United States and in World War II was an officer of the U.S. Naval Reserve and of the Maritime Service. He has been a Member of Congress since 1946 when he was elected to represent the Second District, State of Louisiana, in the 80th Congress, and he is currently the majority whip for the Democratic Party in the House of Representatives.

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The Honorable Gerald R. Ford was born in Omaha, Nebr., on July 14, 1913. He graduated from the University of Michigan with a B.A. degree in 1935 and from Yale University Law School with an LL.B. degree in 1941. Representative Ford was admitted to the Michigan bar in 1941. He was first elected to Congress in 1948 and has been reelected to each succeeding Congress. He served 47 months in the U.S. Navy during World War II. Representative Ford was elected in January 1963 the chairman of the House Republican Conference.

The Honorable Allen W. Dulles was born in Watertown, N.Y., on April 7, 1893. He received his B.A. degree from Princeton in 1914, his M.A. in 1916, his LL.B. from George Washington University in 1926, and LL.D. degrees. Mr. Dulles entered the diplomatic service of the United States in 1916 and resigned in 1926 to take up law practice in New York City. In 1953 Mr. Dulles was appointed Director of Central Intelligence and served in that capacity until 1961.

The Honorable John J. McCloy was born in Philadelphia, Pa., on March 31, 1895. He received an A.B. degree, laude, from Amherst College in 1916; LL.B. from Harvard, and LL.D. from Amherst College. He was admitted to the New York bar in 1921 and is now a member of the firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy. He was Assistant Secretary of War from April 1941 to November 1945. Mr. McCloy was President of the World Bank from 1947 to 1949 and U.S. Military Governor and High Commissioner for Germany from 1949 to 1952. He has been coordinator of U.S. disarmament activities since 1961.

GENERAL COUNSEL

J. Lee Rankin was born in Hartington, Nebr., on July 8, 1907. He received his A.B. degree from the University of Nebraska in 1928 and his LL.B. in 1930 from the University of Nebraska Law School. He was admitted to the Nebraska bar in 1930 and practiced law in Lincoln, Nebr., until January 1953 when he was appointed by President Eisenhower to be the assistant attorney general in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice. In August 1956 President Eisenhower appointed Mr. Rankin to be the Solicitor General of the United States. Since January 1961 Mr. Rankin has been in private practice in New York City. He accepted the appointment as General Counsel for the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy on December 8, 1963.

ASSISTANT COUNSEL

Francis W. H. Adams was born in Mount Vernon, N.Y., on June 26, 1904. He graduated from Williams College with an A.B. degree, and received his LL.B. degree from Fordham Law School in 1928. Mr. Adams has acted as chief assistant U.S. attorney in New York, special

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assistant to the U.S. Attorney General, and as an arbitrator for the War Labor Board. In 1954 and 1955 he served as police commissioner of New York City. Mr. Adams is a member of the New York and Washington law firm of Satterlee, Warfield & Stephens.

Joseph A. Ball was born in Stuart, Iowa, on December 16, 1902. He received his B.A. degree from Creighton University in Omaha, Nebr., and his LL.B. degree from the University of Southern California in 1927. Mr. Ball teaches criminal law and procedure at the University of Southern California. He is a member of the U.S. Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Mr. Ball is a member of the firm of Ball, Hunt & Hart, Long Beach and Santa Ana, Calif.

David W. Belin was born in Washington, D.C., on June 20, 1928. He is a graduate of the University of Michigan, where he earned three degrees with high distinction: A.B. (1951), M. Bus. Adm. (1953), and J.D. (1954). At the University of Michigan he was associate editor of the Michigan Law Review. He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and the Order of the Coif. He is a member of the law firm of Herrick, Langdon, Sandblom & Belin, Des Moines, Iowa.

William T. Coleman, Jr., was born in Germantown, Philadelphia, Pa., on July 7, 1920. He graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1941 with an A.B. degree, summa laude, received his LL.B. in 1946, magna laude, from Harvard Law School and served as an editor of the Harvard Law Review. From 1947 to 1948 he served as law clerk to Judge Herbert F. Goodrich, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and during the 1948-49 term of the U.S. Supreme Court, as law clerk to Justice Felix Frankfurter. Mr. Coleman has served as a special counsel for the city of Philadelphia and has been a consultant with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency since January 1963. He is a member of the law firm of Dilworth, Paxson, Kalish, Kohn & Dilks, Philadelphia, Pa.

Melvin A. Eisenberg was born in New York City on December 3, 1934. He was graduated from Columbia College, A.B., summa laude, in 1956, and from Harvard Law School, LL.B., summa laude, in 1959. Mr. Eisenberg is a member of Phi Beta Kappa, and served as an editor of the Harvard Law Review. He is associated with the law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler in New York City.

Burt W. Griffin was born in Cleveland, Ohio, on August 19, 1932. He received his B.A. degree, cure laude, from Amherst College in 1954, and LL.B. from Yale University Law School in 1959. He was note and comment editor of the Yale Law Journal. During 1959-60 Mr. Griffin served as law clerk to Judge George T. Washington of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. From 1960 to 1962 Mr. Griffin was an assistant U.S. attorney for the northern district of Ohio, and since 1962 he has been associated with the firm of MacDonald, Hopkins & Hardy, Cleveland, Ohio.

Leon D. Hubert, Jr., was born in New Orleans, La., July 1, 1911. He received his A.B. degree from Tulane University in 1932, and

Page 478

LL.B. from Tulane in 1934. He was associate editor of the Tulane Law Review, and a member of Phi Beta Kappa and the Order of the Coif. Mr. Hubert was assistant U.S. attorney for the eastern district of Louisiana, 1934-46, and a professor of law at Tulane University, 1942-60. He has worked with the Louisiana State Law Ins ute on the revision of statutes and on the codes of civil and criminal procedure. Mr. Hubert is a member of the law firm of Hubert, Baldwin & Zibilich, New Orleans, La.

Albert E. Jenner, Jr., was born in Chicago, Ill., on, June 20, 1907. He received his law degree from the University of Illinois in 1930. He is a member of the Order of the Coif. In 1956 and 1957 Mr. Jenner served as a special assistant attorney general of Illinois in the investigation of fraud in the office of the auditor of public accounts of the State of Illinois. Mr. Jenner is a Commissioner on Uniform State Laws, a member of the U.S. Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and vice chairman of the Joint Committee for the Effective Administration of Justice. He is a former professor of law at the Northwestern University School of Law. Mr. Jenner is a member of the law firm of Raymond, Mayer, Jenner & Block, Chicago, Ill.

Wesley J. Liebeler was born in Langdon, N. Dak., on May 9, 1931. He received his B.A. degree from Macalester College, St. Paul, Minn., in 1953 and graduated, laude, from the University of Chicago Law School in 1957. He was a managing editor of the University of Chicago Law Review and is a member of the Order of the Coif. Mr. Liebeler is associated with the law firm of Carter, Ledyard & Milburn, New York City.

Norman Redlich was born in New York City on November 12, 1925. He received his B.A. degree, magna laude, from Williams College in 1947, his LL.B., cure laude, from Yale Law School in 1950, and LL.M. (Taxation) in 1955 from the New York University School of Law. He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and the Order of the Coif, and was executive editor of the Yale Law Journal. Mr. Redlich is Professor of Law at the New York University School of Law, and is editor in chief of the Tax Law Review, New York University.

W. David Slawson was born in. Grand Rapids, Mich., on June 2, 1931. He received his A.B. degree, summa cure laude, from Amherst College in 1953, and M.A. from Princeton University in 1954. Mr. Slawson received his LL.B., magna laude, from Harvard University in 1959. He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and was a note editor of the Harvard Law Review. Mr. Slawson is a member of the law firm of Davis, Graham & Stubbs, Denver, Colo.

Arlen Specter was born in Wichita, Kans., on February 12, 1930. He received his B.A. degree from the University of Pennsylvania in 1951, where he was a member of Phi Beta Kappa, and received his LL.B.. from Yale Law School in 1956. He was an editor of the Yale Law Journal. Mr. Specter was an associate of the law firm of Dechert, Price & Rhoads in Philadelphia from 1956 to 1959, and from 1959 to 1964 he was an assistant in the Philadelphia district attorney's

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office. Mr. Specter is a member of the firm of Specter & Katz, Philadelphia, Pa.

Samuel A. Stern was born in Philadelphia, Pa., on January 21, 1929. He graduated with honors from the University of Pennsylvania with an A.B. in 1949. In 1952 he received his LL.B., magna laude, from Harvard Law School, and was developments editor of the Harvard Law Review. Mr. Stern served as law clerk to Chief Judge Calvert Magruder, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, during 1954-55 and was law clerk to Chief Justice Earl Warren during 1955-56. He is a member of the law firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Picketing, Washington, D.C.

Howard P. Willens was born in Oak Park, Ill., on May 27, 1931. He received his B.A. degree, with high distinction, from the University of Michigan in 1953 and his LL.B. from Yale Law School in 1956. Mr. Willens is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and was an editor of the Yale Law Journal. He was associated with the law firm of Kirkland, Ellis, Hodson, Chaffetz & Masters, Washington, D.C., until 1961, when he was appointed Second Assistant in the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.

STAFF MEMBERS

Philip Barson was born in Philadelphia, Pa, on May 2, 1912. He received his Bachelor of Science of Commerce, from Temple University, Philadelphia, in 1934. Mr. Barson has been employed by the Internal Revenue Service, Intelligence Division, Philadelphia, since September 1948, first as a special agent and since 1961 has been group supervisor. Mr. Barson is a certified public accountant from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Edward A. Conroy was born in Albany, N.Y., on March 20, 1920. He attended Brooklyn Polytechnical Ins ute and Benjamin Franklin University, Washington, D.C. Mr. Conroy joined the Internal Revenue Service as a revenue officer in 1946. After acting as executive assistant to the assistant regional inspector, Boston, Mass., Mr. Conroy became senior inspector in the Planning and Programing Branch of the Internal Security Division, Inspection, of the Internal Revenue Service. He currently occupies that position.

John Hart Ely was born in New York City on December 3, 1938. He graduated, summa laude, from Princeton University in 1960, and from Yale Law School, magna laude, in 1963. He was note and comment editor of the Yale Law Journal. He is a member of the Phi Beta Kappa and the Order of the Coif. During the 1964-65 term Mr. Ely will serve as law clerk to Chief Justice Warren.

Alfred Goldberg was born in Baltimore, Md., on December 23, 1918. He received his A.B. degree from Western Maryland College in 1938, and his Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins University in 1950. After 4 years' service with the U.S. Army, Dr. Goldberg became historian with the U.S. Air Force Historical Division and later Chief

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of the Current History Branch. In 1962-63 he was a visiting American fellow, King's College, University of London, and since his return has been senior historian, U.S. Air Force Historical Division. Dr. Goldberg is the author or editor of several publications on historical subjects and is a contributor to Encyclopedia Britannica and the World Book.

Murray J. Laulicht was born in Brooklyn, N.Y., on May 12, 1940. He received his B.A. in 1961 from Yeshiva College, and received his LL.B. degree, summa laude, from Columbia University School of Law in 1964. He was notes and comments editor of the Columbia Law Review. During 1964-65 Mr. Laulicht will clerk for Senior Judge Harold R. Medina of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Arthur K. Marmor was born in New York City on December 5, 1915. He received a B.S.S. degree from the College of the City of New York in 1937 and an A.M. degree from Columbia University in 1940. He served in the U.S. Army in World War II. Mr. Marmor has been historian for the Departments of Interior, Army, and Air Force, and Chief, Editorial Services Branch, Department of State. He has also taught for the American University and the University of Maryland. Mr. Marmor has contributed to numerous Government publications and has been in charge of the editing of historical and legal volumes. At present he is a historian for the Department of the Air Force.

Richard M. Mosk was born in Los Angeles, Calif., on May 18, 1939. He graduated from Stanford University, with great distinction, in 1960 and from Harvard Law School, laude, in 1963. Mr. Mosk is a member of Phi Beta Kappa. During the 1964-65 term of the California Supreme Court Mr. Mosk will clerk for Justice Mathew Tobriner.

John J. O'Brien was born in Somerville, Mass., on September 11, 1919. Mr. O'Brien received his B.B.A. degree in law and business, laude, from Northeastern University, Boston, Mass. He re-received his M.A. degree in the field of governmental administration from George Washington University, Washington, D.C., and in 1941 joined the Bureau of Internal Revenue. After service in the U.S. Coast Guard, Mr. O'Brien resumed his work as an Internal Revenue Service investigator, and is currently the Assistant Chief of the Inspection Services Investigations Branch, in the National Office of Internal Revenue.

Stuart R. Pollak was born in San Pedro, Calif., on August 24, 1937. He received his B.A. degree from Stanford University, with great distinction, in 1959, and was a member of Phi Beta Kappa. Mr. Pollak obtained his LL.B., magna laude, from Harvard Law School in 1962, where he was book review and legislation editor of the Harvard Law Review. During the 1963-64 term Mr. Pollak was law clerk to Justices Stanley Reed and Harold Burton. Mr. Pollak is a staff assistant in the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.

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Alfredda Scobey was born in Kankakee, III. She received her A.B. degree from American University, Washington, D.C., in 1933, studied law at John Marshall Law School, Atlanta, Ga., and was admitted to the Georgia bar in 1945. Miss Scobey did graduate study at the National University of Mexico, at Duke University, and at Emory University, Atlanta. She practiced law from 1945 to 1949 in Atlanta and since 1949 has been a law assistant in the Court of Appeals, Georgia.

Charles N. Shaffer, Jr., was born in New York City on June 8, 1932. He attended Fordham College in 1951 and received his LL.B. from the Fordham University School of Law in 1957. From 1958 to 1959 Mr. Shaffer was associated with the law firm of Chadburn, Parke, Whiteside & Wolff, New York City. He was assistant U.S. attorney in the southern district of New York from 1959 to 1961 when he was appointed Special Trial Attorney in the Criminal and Tax Divisions of the U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Lloyd L. Weinreb was born in New York City on October 9, 1936. He received B.A. degrees from Dartmouth College, summa laude, in 1957, and from the University of Oxford in 1959. He received his LL.B., magna laude, from Harvard Law School in 1962. He was case editor of the Harvard Law Review. During the 1963-64 term Mr. Weinreb was law clerk to Justice John M. Harlan. Mr. Weinreb is a staff assistant in the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Acknowledgments
During the taking of testimony in various parts of the United States, the Commission was greatly assisted by the offices of numerous U.S. attorneys of the Department of Justice. The Commission would like to acknowledge its gra ude for this assistance and thank in particular Harold Barefoot Sanders, Jr., U.S. attorney for the northern district of Texas, and his conscientious assistant, Martha Joe Stroud.

In addition the Commission wishes to thank the following lawyers, secretaries, and clerks for their unstinting efforts on behalf of the Commission:

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Sheila Adams

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Stephen R. Barnett

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Thomas D. Barr

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Miriam A. Bottum

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Stephen G. Breyer

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Patrick O. Burns

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Charlene Chardwell

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Anne M. Clark

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Jonathan M. Clark

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George C. Cochran

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Betty Jean Compton

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Francine Davis

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Viola C. Davis

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Paul Dodyk

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Charlee Dianne Duke

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Julia T. Eide