Courts employ a two-step analysis to determine whether a jurisdiction-stripping statute violates the Suspension Clause. First, the Court must determine whether the pe ioner is prohibited from invoking the Suspension Clause due to some attribute of the pe ioner or to the cir stances surrounding his arrest or detention. Id. at 739. “[A]t least” three factors are relevant to this first inquiry: “(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where . . the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available” to him (emphasis added))apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the [detainee's] en lement to the writ.” Id. at 766; see also Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, (2020). Second, the Court asks whether there is an “adequate and effective” subs ute for habeas to “test the legality of the [Pe ioner]’s detention (or removal).” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766.
Here, the Suspension Clause applies. To start, all three factors weigh in Pe ioner’s favor. First, it is undisputed that Pe ioner is not a United States citizen, but the Government claims that Pe ioner is “seeking admission” into the United States. However, the “process” through which that status was determined was far from adequate. ICE’s determination that Pe ioner is in the country illegally and “seeking admission,” which was made on the side of the highway before Pe ioner was indefinitely detained without a hearing, provided Pe ioner no due process, discussed more fully below. Cf. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 767 (concluding that the process in which the Combatant Status Review Tribunal’s determination that pe ioners were enemy combatants, which did not permit the pe ioners to retain counsel, introduce evidence on their own behalf, or cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses “f[e]ll well short of the procedures and adversarial mechanisms that would eliminate the need for habeas corpus review”).
Further, despite the fact that Pe ioner is not an American citizen, he was legally paroled into the Country. Once here, he has worked and paid taxes in the United States for years. He has also established a family and significant ties to the community. These contacts indicate that Pe ioner is “part of a national community or [has] otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community.’” See Joshua M. v. Barr, 439 F. Supp. 3d 632, 672 (E.D. Va. 2020) (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990)).
As to the second factor, Pe ioner was re-detained within a sovereign territory of the United States, which weighs in favor of finding that the Suspension Clause applies. Cf. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768 (apprehension and detention occurred outside the sovereign territory of the United States). As to the third factor, there are no practical obstacles in permitting this proceeding, other than the kind of “incremental expenditure of resources” that the Supreme Court deemed an insufficient barrier to granting a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 769 (comparing “[c]ompliance with any judicial process” which always “requires some incremental expenditure of resources” with judicial concerns in a post-war occupation like “enemy elements, guerilla fighters, and ‘werewolves’”) Finally, turning to the second Boumediene inquiry, adequate alternatives to a habeas pe ion do not exist because it is the government’s position that Pe ioner is not en led to any hearing before a neutral decisionmaker on the matter, as discussed more fully below. Thus, the Court still has jurisdiction pursuant to the Suspension Clause. See, e.g., Y-Z-LH v. Bostock, 792 F.Supp.3d 1123, 1142–43 (D. Or. 2025); Munoz Materano v. Arteta, No. 25 CIV. 6137, 2025 WL 2630826, at *10, n. 17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2025); Boutta v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-CV-1559, 2025 WL 3628232, at *8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 15, 2025); see also Kong v. United States, 62 F.4th 608, 616 (1st Cir. 2023) (explaining that the Government’s suggested interpretation could bar the courts from hearing all detention-related claims, which “would raise serious cons utional concerns under the Suspension Clause.
Absent the right to judicial review through a habeas pe ion, the government could detain noncitizens indefinitely without needing to provide a justification to anyone”).
Reply With Quote
