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and the jazz?
Can somebody with Insider post the ESPN Forcasts for the Spurs, Celtics, Cavs, Magic? Any or all of those teams please
and the jazz?
I posted the Spurs one in the SA board.
As for the East? Quick recap was Cavs first but not enough to beat the Lakers, Orl 2nd, Boston 3rd because of likelihood of injury.
I'm an insider here is what the breakdown is:
Lakers: Going to the Finals
Cavs: Going to the Finals
Spurs: too old of a roster
Magic: Vince Carter is a lateral move
Celtics: something is wrong with KG, won't be the same
Rockets:
***I expect you to treat me decent henceforth, Carr***
Originally Published: September 28, 2009
2009-10 Forecast: San Antonio Spurs
Do the proud but aging Spurs have one more great le run in them? Yes, but only if ...
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By John Hollinger
ESPN.com
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Ronald Martinez/Getty ImagesDuncan needed help last season, and he's got it now, thanks to a productive offseason for the Spurs.
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2008-09 Recap
When Spurs fans look back on the Duncan-era quasi-dynasty, they may very well see 2008-09 as a major transition season. It marked the first time the Spurs couldn't count on the dominance of Duncan and their two other stars, Tony Parker and Manu Ginobili, to rule the West. They required more help, but none was available.
Duncan struggled with knee problems and wasn't his usual dominating self for the latter half of the season, while Ginobili's troublesome ankles cost him 38 games and the entire playoffs. That left Parker to strain under all the heavy lifting, evidenced by his owning the league's fourth-highest usage rate.
Granted, there are five players on the court, so it wasn't just a three-man team. Unfortunately, San Antonio extracted shockingly little from its role players, as age and injuries sabotaged the production of previously reliable weapons. Bruce Bowen finally suc bed to Father Time at age 37, losing his starting job and retiring after the season, while the likes of Fabricio Oberto and Jacque Vaughn also vanished from the scene. Even the veterans who kept producing found themselves taxed -- 36-year-old Michael Finley, for instance, started 77 games and played 30 minutes a night because of the shortcomings of those around him.
HOLLINGER'S '08-09 STATS
W-L: 54-28 (Pythagorean W-L: 54-28)
Offensive Efficiency: 106.2 (T-12th)
Defensive Efficiency: 102.0 (6th)
Pace Factor: 90.4 (27th)
Highest PER: Tim Duncan (24.51)
As long as Duncan dominated, the Spurs could survive such issues. After lazing out to a 9-8 start, they went 30-9 over the next 39 games, and it appeared they'd finish with a patented San Antonio late-season charge. But then Duncan's knee problems cropped up -- officially "tendinosis," which is a chronic ailment that may not go away. Duncan kept playing but wasn't up to his usual standard, so the result was an erratic 15-11 finish that dropped the Spurs to the third seed in the Western Conference. Were it not for a last-second 3 by Finley in the final regular-season game, they would have finished outside the conference's top four teams for the first time since drafting Duncan in 1997.
As it was, San Antonio won 54 games because its star trio, even diminished, could still carry them through on many nights. But a tired Spurs team suc bed in five easy games to Dallas in the first round of the playoffs. This was San Antonio's earliest playoff exit since the 2000 first round against Phoenix, when Duncan was hurt.
The Spurs' advanced age and conservative playing style did produce one interesting element, however: Statistically they were a basket of anomalies, one of the truly unique teams in NBA history.
Spurs games were notable for the absence of turnovers, free throws and offensive rebounds by either side, which is a big reason their contests seemed so dull much of the time. The Spurs were savvy and sound enough to keep opponents off the offensive glass and prevent the types of mistakes that lead to free throws, but they weren't athletic enough to do those things themselves either. Similarly, they knew how to take care of the ball offensively, but they didn't have the wheels to create steals on defense.
Rebounding: 2008-09's best defensive, worst offensive
Team Off. Reb Percentage Team Def. Reb Percentage San Antonio 22.1 San Antonio 78.0 Toronto 24.0 Orlando 75.9 Orlando 24.0 Boston 75.6 New York 24.4 Houston 75.3 Sacramento 24.5 Minnesota 75.0 NBA average 26.7 League average 73.3
Turnovers: 2008-09's best at avoiding, worst at forcing
Team TO Rate Team Opp. TO Rate San Antonio 12.9 San Antonio 12.8 Detroit 13.2 Detroit 13.1 Miami 13.4 Houston 13.3 Dallas 13.5 Minnesota 13.3 L.A. Lakers 13.8 Dallas 13.7 NBA average 15.3 League average 15.3
Free-throw rate: 2008-09's worst offensive, best defensive
Team FTA/FGA Team Opp. FTA/FGA San Antonio .251 San Antonio .249 Indiana .267 Houston .257 New York .268 Toronto .258 Dallas .274 Atlanta .272 L.A. Clippers .275 Philadelphia .276 NBA average .306 NBA average .306
The result? The Spurs were the least likely team to produce a turnover at either end. San Antonio turned it over on just 12.9 percent of its possessions, the best rate in the league, but forced turnovers on just 12.8 percent of opponent possessions, the worst rate in the league. The average NBA game last season featured 29.3 turnovers; the average Spurs game had 23.4, or about one-fifth fewer.
The Spurs owned the same distinction at the free throw line. San Antonio was the league's worst team at getting to the stripe, earning just .251 free throw attempts per field goal attempt. This was a key reason the Spurs finished only 12th in offensive efficiency, as they were seventh in field goal percentage and shot well on 3s but couldn't generate enough easy points from the stripe.
The primary driver behind that was the inability of the Spurs' secondary players to get to the line. Duncan, Parker and Ginobili accounted for nearly two-thirds of the team's free throw attempts. With the rest of the roster composed almost entirely of standstill shooters, they produced only seven foul shots a game between them; Parker nearly matched that total by himself.
Fortunately for San Antonio, they were as good at preventing free throw attempts as they were bad at creating them. San Antonio permitted only .249 free throw attempts per field goal attempt, a league-leading total that explains why they finished sixth overall in defensive efficiency.
But it's the rebounding numbers that are most phenomenal. San Antonio was the best defensive rebounding team, pulling down 78.1 percent of opponents' missed shots, and yet the worst offensive rebounding team, collecting only 22.1 percent of their own missed shots. It doesn't seem possible that a team could rebound so well defensively and so horribly offensively, but in fact the two are very different skills. Additionally, San Antonio's playing style -- with Duncan having his back to the basket and four shooters spacing the floor -- has never been conducive to high offensive rebound totals.
Nonetheless, the Spurs' statistical anomalies from last season are truly amazing -- they were the league's best team in three different categories, and yet the league's worst team at the other end of the court in those same three facets of the game.
In the big picture, however, those bizarre stats served as a red flag showcasing all the areas where the Spurs changed from an "experienced" team into a just plain old one. The Spurs were too smart to beat themselves, but often they couldn't do much to beat the opponent either -- they just didn't have the athleticism to force turnovers, create second shots and get to the free throw line.
Offseason Moves
With the freshness date on the Duncan era drawing closer, the Spurs ventured into unusual territory by going well over the luxury tax to try to squeeze a fifth ring from his prime. The Spurs will sit roughly $10 million over the tax line and have enough expiring contracts and overseas assets (especially Brazilian center Tiago Splitter) to spend much more if they so choose.
The flip side is that the Spurs could pull back and start dumping assets if this season's team doesn't work out the way they hope. For the moment, however, it's full steam ahead, with the only real dilemma being whether to extend Ginobili's contract beyond this season. He'll be an unrestricted free agent after the season, but extending him now would almost certainly make the Spurs a luxury tax team again next season -- something they may be reluctant to pursue on a repeat basis given their small market.
Traded Bruce Bowen, Fabricio Oberto and Kurt Thomas to Milwaukee for Richard Jefferson. This was a huge decision for the Spurs, as it not only makes them a luxury tax payer this season but also precludes the possibility of diving into the juicy 2010 free-agent market -- that will have to wait until 2011 at the earliest.
That said, the Spurs weren't going to stay in contention without a decisive move such as this one. They badly needed another player who could create his own shot, especially given the injury woes of Duncan and Ginobili last season, and Jefferson upgrades what had been their weakest position.
As an added plus, Jefferson quietly put together a very good season shooting corner 3s in Milwaukee, making 45.9 percent from that area according to NBA.com/hotspots. If he can keep knocking down that shot, it will help tremendously since he's likely to get a ton of attempts from there; from Bowen to Danny Ferry to Jaren Jackson to Sean Elliott, the Spurs have been spotting up their small forwards in the corner since a year or two after Columbus landed.
Let Drew Gooden go, signed Antonio McDyess to a three-year, $18 million deal. This was another major coup for San Antonio. The Spurs addressed the lack of a quality frontcourt player alongside Duncan by using their entire midlevel exception on McDyess. Because McDyess is almost exclusively a mid-range jump shooter, offensively he should collaborate very well with Duncan; additionally, he'll sharply improve that pathetic offensive rebounding rate from last season.
McDyess has said he wants to play only two more seasons, which makes the Spurs' offer essentially a two-year deal with a golden parachute at the end. But if it comes to that, in 2011-12 they can afford to pay him $6.7 million not to play because they should be well under the cap by then.
Drafted DeJuan Blair, Nando De Colo and Jack McClinton. Blair was the steal of the draft as an early second-round choice. He was one of the most dominant players in college basketball last season, but teams fretted over his troublesome knees and his lack of height. In that sense, he's very similar to another recent second-round steal, Leon Powe. Blair's knees may derail his career at some point, but he's likely to be a very productive reserve until that point.
McClinton was a late second-rounder whom the Spurs cut when he didn't want to play overseas, while De Colo, a 6-foot-5 wing from France with a modest game but a spectacular name, will play in Valencia, Spain, this season. (And if someone there doesn't invent a mixed drink called a Nando De Colo by the end of the season, I'll be very disappointed.)
Signed Theo Ratliff to a one-year deal for the minimum. This was strictly an insurance deal to get another true center into camp to join Duncan, as the Spurs found themselves unusually devoid of length in the frontcourt this summer. He'll be most helpful if the Spurs get their wish and meet L.A. in the conference finals, where he could prove useful matching up against the Lakers' Pau Gasol.
Let Ime Udoka go, signed Marcus Haislip to a one-year deal for the minimum. A "reimport" from Europe after failing as a first-round pick with the Bucks several years ago, Haislip's translated stats from Europe weren't very good and I'd be shocked if he can crack San Antonio's rotation.
Signed Keith Bogans to a one-year deal for the minimum. Bogans struggled last season and isn't likely to play a major role. However, because he defends and shoots 3s, he's a good fit in San Antonio's system and provides some insurance if Finley suddenly suc bs to age.
Biggest Strength: Perimeter Scoring
Sure, it's nice having Duncan, but they may not need him much with the weapons they've added on the perimeter. Parker came into his own as the team's go-to star last season, using his devastating quickness to blow apart defensive coverages and, increasingly, creating shots for teammates as well as for himself. Ginobili plays only 30 minutes a night but yields superstar production in that time, with his driving ability, outside shooting and passing talent all far beyond the capacity of the typical wing player.
Jefferson, meanwhile, provides a new element -- a big, strong wing man who can finish on the break and post up smaller opponents. He'll take a lot of the strain off Parker and Ginobili, and as such should be a massive upgrade from the small forward situation a year ago.
Two younger players also figure in the mix: George Hill and Roger Mason. Mason was overmatched as a starter last season, but established himself as one of the best long-range shooters in the league, especially in late-game situations. He'll be more at home coming off the bench this season. Hill, meanwhile, enjoyed an encouraging rookie season and figures to step up into a greater role as a combo guard off the bench.
Biggest Weakness: Health
It's hard to know what exactly the Spurs have this season until we see Ginobili and Duncan compete in a real game. Duncan was able to play through his knee injury last season, but it muted his performance considerably -- especially at the defensive end, where he lacked the explosion and quickness to dominate around the basket. Regardless of the knee, he's 7 feet tall and knows how to play, so he should still produce at a high level. But he's not going to put up superstar numbers if he isn't at full strength, and it appears his injury is a chronic, wear-and-tear malady resulting from the 12 NBA seasons he's played.
Ginobili is another question mark after missing the end of last season because of a stress fracture in his ankle -- on the heels of missing the start of the season with an injury in his other ankle. While he's expected to show up at camp fully recovered from the stress fracture, he's been increasingly injury-prone the past four years. Considering he's 32 and absorbs lots of contact on his forays to the rim, there's a concern he'll miss games more regularly going forward.
Outlook
The Spurs are the best organization in sports, hands down. If you prorate the strike year in 1998-99, last season was their 12th straight with at least 53 wins -- four of which produced championships. It's a ridiculous rate of success that still hasn't received the recognition that it deserves, especially given the modest spending by small-market San Antonio in that time frame.
That said, these next few years should present an even greater challenge to the Spurs' organizational excellence. It's real simple: They're fighting a wickedly strong tide. The Spurs are an old team, and their best players are the ones with the greatest age and injury concerns.
The injury worries with Duncan and Ginobili seriously crimp the hopes of rivaling the Lakers at the top of the West, even with the additions of Jefferson, McDyess and Blair in the offseason. While the newbies should take some of the load off Parker this season, San Antonio's championship hopes have always been predicated on having the league's best big man as a centerpiece and its best Sixth Man as a crutch -- now it's unclear if either of those propositions remain viable.
They'll win lots of games, because that's what they always do, and undoubtedly they'll make a few shrewd in-season moves to boost their chances further. But for all the thrashing in the water the Spurs did this summer, the riptide of age might pull them right back to the same spot it did a year ago.
Prediction: 53-29, 1st in Southwest Division, 3rd in Western Conference
Originally Published: September 28, 2009
2009-10 Forecast: Boston Celtics
The questions for the 2008 champs to answer start with KG's knee but don't end there
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Brian Babineau/NBAE/Getty ImagesThe Boston Celtics will likely go as far as Kevin Garnett can take them on his troublesome knees.
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2008-09 Recap
In some ways, Celtics fans probably have more appreciation for the championship they won in 2008, because 2009 demonstrated just how many things have to go right for a team -- even a very good team -- to win a le in a 30-team league.
The Celtics kicked off the year as if they'd put their 2008 championship squad to shame, blasting out of the gate at 27-2 to post the best record through 29 games in league history. From there, however, a series of small misfortunes eventually drove them to a second-round exit in the postseason.
For starters, the 27-2 start probably overstated Boston's strength somewhat. Even at that time the Cavaliers had a better scoring margin, with the Celtics' 7-0 record in games decided by five points or fewer giving them the momentary advantage in the standings.
But the Celtics also played much worse after that torrid 27-2 start. Boston went just 24-16 in the ensuing 40 games, and though they hung on to the East's second seed by riding Paul Pierce to a strong final month, they were a greatly diminished team from the one that dominated the first third of the season.
While the midyear lull had them concerned, things really started going badly for Boston when Kevin Garnett hurt his knee in a February game in Utah. Garnett hopped off with what was originally thought to be a minor tweak; nobody realized it would become essentially a season-ending injury that would require serious surgery.
HOLLINGER'S '08-09 STATS
W-L: 62-20 (Pythagorean W-L: 64-18)
Offensive Efficiency: 108.1 (T-5th)
Defensive Efficiency: 99.4 (T-2nd)
Pace Factor: 92.7 (T-18th)
Highest PER: Kevin Garnett (21.32)
Boston's dip into the barrel for replacements also had a negative impact. A year earlier, the Celtics received a major boost by plucking veterans P.J. Brown and Sam Cassell at midseason, with Brown in particular contributing heavily in the playoffs.
This time around, the opposite happened. First the Celtics jumped the gun by leaping to grab Mikki Moore instead of waiting to see if Joe Smith would become available. Moore had been awful in Sacramento, so there was little urgency to pick him up. It wasn't a big shock that he also performed horrendously as a Celtic, and by the end of the playoffs, Boston had sidelined him and given his minutes to little-used Brian Scalabrine.
In the backcourt, the Celtics encountered a similar problem. An injury to Tony Allen took him out of the mix, and in his place Boston signed Stephon Marbury. Adding Marbury to the locker room required a tremendous faith in the Celtics' team chemistry, and on that front it worked -- Marbury wasn't a problem or distraction in his time with Boston. The unexpected problem was that he couldn't play, shooting 34.2 percent in his 23 games as a Celtic while routinely declining to take wide-open jumpers.
With the bench help wanting, the strain on the Celtics' starters became obvious in the postseason. Boston struggled to dismiss a 41-win Chicago team and then ran out of gas on its home court in Game 7 against Orlando.
In spite of that, and even without Garnett, Boston's defensive intensity was something to behold. After leading the league in defensive efficiency a year earlier, the Celtics were a close second this time around, with center Kendrick Perkins in particular stepping up his game in Garnett's absence.
Field-goal percentage defense leaders, 2008-09
Team Opp. 2-pt FG% Opp. 3-pt FG% Opp FG% Boston 45.4 34.9 43.1 Cleveland 45.9 33.3 43.1 Orlando 45.4 34.2 43.3 Denver 46.4 36.6 44.0 Houston 46.5 35.7 44.4
The Celtics led the NBA in opponent field goal percentage at 43.1 percent and finished a close second in 2-point field goal defense as well (45.4 percent). Plus, Boston magnified the impact of all those bricks they forced by ranking third in defensive rebounding rate at 75.6 percent. The fact Boston didn't lead the league in overall efficiency owes largely to its propensity for fouling -- Celtics' opponents averaged .329 free throw attempts per field goal attempt, ranking Boston's D 24th among the league's 30 teams.
3-point shooting leaders, 2008-09
Team 3-Point Pct. Boston 39.7 Cleveland 39.3 San Antonio 38.6 Portland 38.3 Phoenix 38.3
Offensively, the combination of Pierce, Ray Allen and Eddie House made Boston the best outside shooting team in the league. Boston led the NBA in 3-point shooting at 39.7 percent, ranked second in 2-point shooting at 51 percent, and landed second in true shooting percentage at 57.1 percent.
So how the heck did they finish only sixth in offensive efficiency? The answer was that Boston shot less often than any other team in the league (see chart). For a jump-shooting team, the Celtics amassed a shockingly high turnover rate, giving the ball away on 16.7 percent of their possessions; only the Bobcats coughed it up more frequently.
Fewest shots per possession, 2008-09
Team Shots/poss. Boston 94.63 Memphis 94.69 Sacramento 94.70 Charlotte 94.80 Phoenix 95.19
As a result, the Celtics took fewer shots per possession than any team in the league, where "shots" are defined to include trips to the free throw line. If you're looking for causes, Boston had a turnover-prone point guard in Rajon Rondo (who had a breakout year otherwise), piled up offensive fouls setting screens off the ball for Ray Allen and House, and didn't ac ulate a particularly high offensive rebound rate.
While the Celtics can lament the late injuries to Garnett, Tony Allen and Leon Powe -- subtractions that all but ended their le defense before the playoffs even began -- they were one of the league's healthiest teams for most of the regular season. Pierce, Ray Allen, Rondo and Perkins missed only two games between them, and reserves Powe, House and Glen Davis stayed healthy the entire regular season, as well.
Offseason Moves
Garnett's knee surgery was complicated and the extent to which he'll recover isn't totally certain, which is why the Celtics doubled down on insurance for his position in the offseason. Otherwise, Boston must still settle whether to grant contract extensions for Rondo and Ray Allen. The Celtics reportedly shopped Rondo early in the summer, creating some tension between the team and its best young player, while an extension for Ray Allen would eliminate the cap flexibility offered by his $17 million expiring contract.
Money issues also could come into play if the team disappoints. With the salaries of just three players (Garnett, Ray Allen and Pierce) taking up nearly the entire cap, the Celtics will likely owe about $15 million in luxury tax this season. That's all well and good as long as they keep winning, but if they don't, it could produce some interesting discussions about their future.
Signed Rasheed Wallace to a three-year, $18 million deal. Boston moved aggressively to import another long, mobile defender it can use interchangeably with Garnett by offering Wallace the team's entire midlevel exception. Wallace brings a few negatives to the table -- he's a notorious hothead and looked out of shape last season, plus he's 35 and has pretty much abandoned the low post as a source of offense.
Nonetheless, he's a selfless player who should mesh well in the Celtics' locker room. Plus, his ability to play both frontcourt positions gives Boston lineup flexibility with or without Garnett. It's possible he'll have greater motivation than he did on a jaded Pistons team a year ago, and if so that might translate into a bounce-back season.
That said, three years at this price is a fairly large risk at Wallace's age, even allowing for the fact players of his size and shooting ability tend to age well. He'll be 38 by the time it's done and make nearly $7 million, making him a potential cap-killer right when Boston likely needs to start rebuilding.
Re-signed Glen Davis to a two-year, $6 million deal. Davis's regular-season numbers from last season are misleading -- he improved dramatically in the second half of the season and came up huge as Garnett's replacement in the playoffs. As such, keeping him as a restricted free agent gives the Celtics a great fallback position in the frontcourt, particularly if he can keep refining his midrange jumper.
Waived Gabe Pruitt, drafted Lester Hudson. Boston took Hudson with the third-to-last pick in the draft and it's not clear if he'll even make the team. If he does, he'll spend most of the year with the Celtics' D-League affiliate in Portland, Maine.
Let Leon Powe leave, signed Shelden Williams to a one-year deal for the minimum. Powe was a major contributor but blew out his knee in the first round of the playoffs, and Boston's frontcourt needs were too acute to wait a year for him to recover. Instead the Celtics nabbed Williams, a limited banger but one who will rebound and defend. For a fifth big man on a minimum salary, you could do quite a bit worse.
Signed Marquis Daniels to a one-year deal for $1.99 million. Signing Daniels with the biannual exception was Boston's only remaining card for improving the backcourt after the Celtics used their entire midlevel exception on Wallace. Daniels is a good fit for this team because he can play point guard offensively but can defend shooting guards, which allows House to play off the ball and search out jump shots when the second unit is on the court. He'll likely take over most of the minutes Tony Allen played a year ago, as the latter had a very disappointing campaign even before his injury.
Biggest Strength: Defense
Even without Garnett, this is what carried the Celtics a year ago, and it will again if they're going to get back into the le hunt. Under Doc Rivers, Boston has shown a unique ability to assimilate players without great defensive reputations and get them to play quality defense -- most notably Ray Allen, but also Davis, House and even Marbury.
This year they shouldn't have to do as much cajoling, as both Wallace and Daniels arrive with solid defensive reputations. Wallace in particular makes for an interesting arrangement in the frontcourt, as he could team with Garnett at times to give the Celtics a pair of mobile, aggressive 7-footers who can switch pick-and-rolls and smother drivers from the weak side.
Perkins and Davis, meanwhile, provide the muscle up front. Perkins showed his elite post defense in the second round against Orlando when he neutralized the Magic's Dwight Howard, while Davis' short stature can prove to his advantage when he gets underneath opposing post players and forklifts them out of prime real estate.
The backcourt should remain a strength on defense, too. Rondo is the league's best defender at his position, Pierce is vastly underrated as a defensive stopper and if Tony Allen can eliminate his offensive mistakes, his quickness and athleticism make him a tremendously disruptive force on D.
Biggest Weakness: Age
News flash: The Celtics are old, and the age problems are most acute with their best players. Garnett is 33 and has 1,055 games of mileage on his odometer, which would be a concern even if he weren't hurt a year ago. Entering training camp, it's not clear how well or how often he'll be able to play this year following a tricky knee operation.
Pierce turns 32 in preseason, and while he played very well at the end of the regular season, his numbers as a whole dipped sharply for the second straight season. Ray Allen is 34, and while he keeps himself in exquisite shape and doesn't expend a lot of energy shooting jump shots, he isn't immune to the ravages of aging, either.
Boston made itself older in the offseason with the addition of 35-year-old Wallace, while in the backcourt Daniels (28) and House (31) aren't spring chickens, either. The Celtics do have some quality young players with Rondo, Perkins and Davis, but they may need to show quite a bit of improvement to offset the age-related decline around them.
Outlook
Plotting expectations for the Celtics this year depends first on what one expects from Garnett. If he's fully healthy and can resume playing with his usual ferocity, then it's pretty easy to project Boston returning to its standing among the East's elite and rivaling Orlando and Cleveland for the conference championship. In that scenario, the addition of Wallace is pure gravy and the age concerns are softened by what appears to be superior depth.
But if Garnett comes back in any way diminished, the whole picture changes. Boston has some insurance in the form of Wallace and Davis, but that's to cover themselves against short-term absences, not to replace the production of one of the all-time great power forwards. Throw in the concerns about the other two primary scorers also getting up in years, and one would expect them to slide in the standings considerably.
Even if Garnett doesn't play a single game, Boston will be a playoff team and likely finish no worse than third given the lack of credible contenders in the East. But the Celtics didn't bring their three stars together and pay luxury tax through the nose so they could lose in the second round of the playoffs. Unfortunately, if Garnett's knee doesn't bounce back at full strength, that appears to be where they're headed.
Prediction: 54-28, 1st in Atlantic Division, 3rd in Eastern Conference
Originally Published: September 28, 2009
2009-10 Forecast: Cleveland Cavaliers
Will the Big Shaquisition put the Cavs over the top or just turn the Q into the big top?
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David Liam Kyle/NBAE/Getty ImagesSixty-six wins and a conference finals exit add up to unfinished business for LeBron and the Cavs.
GO TO: 2008-09 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
2008-09 Recap
Despite the championship banner hanging in Los Angeles, I'll always believe the Cavaliers were the best team in basketball last season. They won 66 games, amassed the best scoring margin in the league and featured the league's best player and MVP in LeBron James. They lost three home games the entire season, including the playoffs, and one of them didn't matter.
Unfortunately, playoff basketball is a game of matchups, and the Eastern Conference finals offered about the worst one available. Cleveland drew the one team it was unequipped to beat, losing to Orlando 4-2. It offered a repeat of the regular season, in which the Magic dominated the three matchups between the teams, as the Cavs were hamstrung by an inability to defend Dwight Howard with one man.
What stings for the Cavs is that they could have resolved that weakness at midseason when they seriously pondered a trade for Phoenix's Shaquille O'Neal. At that time, however, Cleveland was much more focused on beating Boston than on what it took to beat Orlando, and with good reason. The Celtics advanced ahead of the Magic in the standings and had beaten Cleveland in the playoffs the year before, while Orlando had just lost Jameer Nelson for the season and appeared to be falling out of contention.
HOLLINGER'S '08-09 STATS
W-L: 66-16 (Pythagorean W-L: 68-14)
Offensive Efficiency: 109.7 (4th)
Defensive Efficiency: 99.4 (T-2nd)
Pace Factor: 91.2 (25th)
Highest PER: LeBron James (31.76)
Instead Orlando stayed afloat, and the Magic exposed Cleveland's few weaknesses: an inability to guard Howard without double-teaming, a lack of size on the wings to guard the likes of Hedo Turkoglu and Mickael Pietrus, and trouble tracking "stretch 4s" like Rashard Lewis. So flustered were the Cavs defensively that they lost in six games despite James playing out of his mind -- he averaged 38.5 points, 8.3 rebounds and 8.0 assists for the series. All that, however, should not take away from the majestic season that preceded it. Cleveland racked up the scoring margin of a 68-win team and won nine playoff games by double figures. It accomplished this by dominating at both ends: The Cavs ranked fourth in offensive efficiency and third in defensive efficiency.
The centerpiece, obviously, was James, but the story of Cleveland's season was all the new help around him. Starting at the trade deadline in 2008, the Cavs acquired sharpshooting guards Delonte West and Mo Williams, and the result was far more space for James and the others to operate. Throw in a comeback season by Anderson Varejao and outstanding health across the board, and Cleveland improved by 21 games in the standings.
The improvement on offense was most notable, thanks to the shooters. Cleveland ranked second in 3-point shooting at 39.3 percent, with nearly all the baskets coming off the hands of Williams, West, Wally Szczerbiak and holdover shooting ace Daniel Gibson. The team 3-point percentage actually understates how effective the guards were in creating space for James' drives, since James himself tried five 3-pointers a game and made only 34.4 percent. Subtract him from the equation, and the supporting cast nailed a blistering 40.7 percent.
All that shooting set the stage for a Jordan-esque season from James. He didn't put up the per-game averages of his previous season because he didn't have to play as many minutes, but his PER of 31.76 was the third highest in the post-merger era. And he wasn't going it alone, either. The Cavs shared the ball as happily as any team in the league: 60.7 percent of their baskets were assisted, the second-highest rate in the league.
"First shot" defense: 2008-09 leaders
Team "First shot" Def. Eff. Cleveland 85.50 Orlando 85.81 Boston 86.47 L.A. Lakers 87.20 Houston 87.49
The improved offense complemented what had previously been the staple of the Cavs' program: a suffocating defense. Granted, it didn't look like one against Orlando, but in the regular season and the first two rounds of the playoffs, Cleveland routinely blasted opponents out of their game.
The Cavs finished a close second to Boston in opponent field goal percentage at 43.1 percent and were even more menacing once you subtract second shots. Take away opponent offensive rebounds and the roughly 1.2 points teams average after an offensive board, and the Cavs were the best defensive team in the league on "first shot" attempts (see chart). Two other teams rebounded better, however, pushing the Cavs down to third in overall defensive efficiency.
James contributed a big part of the defensive effort too, playing the most focused D of his career and earning All-Defense honors. Varejao wasn't honored but was just as important a cog with his ability to defend a variety of positions and take charges. Meanwhile, the concepts coach Mike Brown imported from San Antonio made for one of the league's most cohesive units and earned him the coach of the year award.
Those accomplishments have been largely forgotten in the wake of the disappointment against Orlando, but they shouldn't be. Cleveland delivered a remarkable season, and ten bad days in late May shouldn't be enough to scrub that from the history books.
Offseason Moves
Disappointed by the playoff loss to Orlando and eminently aware of James' impending free agency next summer, the Cavs again spared no expense in assembling a capable roster around their star. Cleveland executed several moves along that front, with the only other notable event of the offseason being Delonte West's arrest for his Mad Max impersonation on a Maryland highway -- an incident that will likely see him suspended for several games to start the season.
Traded Sasha Pavlovic and Ben Wallace to Phoenix for Shaquille O'Neal. One could argue that the horse has already left the barn since Howard pulverized the Cavs last May, but the Cavs didn't want to see an encore performance this coming spring. Pavlovic and Wallace were disposable commodities who hardly played last postseason, essentially making O'Neal a free acquisition. It will be enormously costly from a luxury tax perspective, as the Cavs will owe the league over $10 million because of this trade, but if O'Neal helps them retain James, it will be money well spent.
Drafted Christian Eyenga and Danny Green. Eyenga was a surprise pick at the end of the first round -- even now he's almost completely unknown -- and will spend at least the next year or two developing overseas. Green, the second-round pick, may be able to contribute right away if he can work through the morass of wings the Cavs acquired. He can defend and shoot and should provide a solid rotation player, if not this year then soon down the road.
Let Wally Szczerbiak go, signed Jamario Moon for three years, $9 million. Cleveland chose to add more size and athleticism to its wing rotation in the offseason, signing Moon to an offer sheet and then benefiting when the Heat wouldn't match it. He's a great value at this price, as his defensive numbers the past two seasons are very solid and he's been adequate offensively. He's not the shooter Cleveland's other wings are, but his size and finishing skills present a different dimension. His addition will also let the Cavs play small more often with James at the 4 and Moon at the 3, a lineup against which most opponents will have tremendous difficulty.
Signed Anthony Parker for two years, $5.5 million. The other half of Cleveland's midlevel exception money went to Parker, who had served as a defensive stopper in Toronto and will split that role with West and Moon in Cleveland. An added plus to this pickup is that Parker provides another strong 3-point shooter for the Cavs' guard rotation, and he should be an upgrade on the ineffective Gibson in the rotation.
Let Joe Smith go, signed Leon Powe to a two-year deal for the minimum. Smith spurned the Cavs to pursue more minutes with Atlanta, but the Cavs were able to sign Powe away from Boston. It's more a play for next season than this one, as Powe is recovering from a torn ACL and won't be available at least until midseason. Given Powe's productivity and the cheap price tag, however, it was a commendable value play from the Cavs.
Biggest Strength: Wing Defense
Already a dominant defensive team, Cleveland seriously upped the ante in this regard in the offseason by upgrading its ability to shut down quality wing players. There was certainly a strategic element in this, as its three biggest rivals for the le -- the Celtics, Magic and Lakers -- all possess high-caliber 6-foot-6 wing players who were tough matchups for the 6-4 West a year ago.
West won't have to deal with the likes of Kobe Bryant or Vince Carter if the Cavs can send Moon and Parker after them. Both players produced very strong defensive plus-minus numbers in their time in Toronto, although critics will point out that they didn't make the Raptors a terribly imposing defensive team overall.
The two additions also give the Cavs the flexibility to line up in different ways. West should see more time as the backup point guard, pushing defensive liability Gibson to the bench, because Moon and Parker are capable of taking over the leftover minutes on the wing. Similarly, the Cavs will find it much easier to line up with James as the power forward and Moon or Parker as the 3.
Finally, it bears mentioning that if all else fails, the Cavs can use James as their shut-down stopper in fourth quarters. Indeed, one problem they faced against Orlando was that he could plug only one hole in the -- he could guard either Hedo Turkoglu or Rashard Lewis, but not both at the same time. That shouldn't be a problem this season.
Biggest Weakness: Free-Throw Shooting
It's tough to find many weaknesses on this team without using a magnifying glass, or perhaps an electron microscope. But one area requires little sleuthing: They'll almost certainly rest near the bottom in free-throw shooting, a weakness which may keep them from the top spot in offensive efficiency.
James took nearly 10 free throws a game last season, and while his 78 percent mark from the stripe represented a career high, it was still a bit underwhelming for a superstar wing player. He may not be able to repeat that performance, as he's only a 73.8 percent career shooter.
James' teammates won't boost that percentage much. While Cleveland's guards shoot very well from the line -- Williams made 91.2 percent -- they're mostly spot-up shooters and rarely get to the stripe. The four main guards averaged only seven free throws a game between them last season.
Instead, the two most frequent free-throw shooters after James will be Anderson Varejao and Shaquille O'Neal. Varejao hit only 61.6 percent from the line a year ago on his 3.1 attempts per game, helping drag the Cavs down to a 75.7 percent mark that ranked 21st in the NBA.
Cleveland will almost certainly shoot worse than 75.7 percent this season because of O'Neal's addition. While the trade for O'Neal also unloaded a horrific foul shooter in Wallace, O'Neal takes about six times as many foul shots per game. Last season he made 59.5 percent from the stripe, and it was one of his best marks in years -- for his career he's a 52.8 percent shooter.
Outlook
The Cavs were incredible a year ago until things crumbled in the conference finals, and they look stronger this time around. Cleveland aggressively addressed the weaknesses exposed in the Orlando series a year ago, most notably by importing one of the few dudes who is more massive than Howard. But that wasn't the only move; Cleveland significantly upgraded its perimeter defense by acquiring Moon and Parker, and didn't lose any players of consequence.
And, of course, it employs the best player in the league. James may not register the superhuman PER he posted a year ago, but he may not need to, either, given all the talent around him. Although the hubbub about his impending free agency is a potential distraction, he's shown the ability to shoo those concerns away once the games start.
The one major question is how O'Neal will adjust. Will he buy into the Cavs' defensive mindset and locker-room camaraderie, or will his attention-seeking ways make him a divisive factor?
In any case, the Cavs are likely to return to the Eastern Conference finals against the same Orlando team they faced a year ago, and this time they have more than enough ammunition to surpass that hurdle. They don't match up quite as well against the Lakers, so I'm not picking Cleveland to win it all, but these Cavs are on the short list of teams that have a realistic shot at the le this year.
Prediction: 63-19, 1st in Central Division, 1st in Eastern Conference
Originally Published: September 28, 2009
2009-10 Forecast: Orlando Magic
Here's why the East champs might be better but still might get bounced in 2009-10
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Ronald Martinez/Getty ImagesSuperman can soar, but he's also a key to Orlando's biggest weakness, as explained below.
GO TO: 2008-09 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
2008-09 Recap
It wasn't the 3-pointers.
The topic of Orlando's dependence on the 3-pointer took over virtually every discussion of the Magic during their surprisingly successful campaign. No mention of them seemed complete without a dire warning that their reliance on the long ball might prove their undoing at some point.
It's true the Magic shot 3-pointers with incredible frequency last season, becoming the first team in league history to take more than a third of their shots beyond the arc and setting a record by hitting 23 in one game against the hapless Clippers. This interesting but not terribly important point became the conventional wisdom -- as the story went, the Magic were a bunch of blind 3-point gunners.
But that was a sideshow. Orlando won because of it had the league's best defense, led by defensive player of the year Dwight Howard. While the Magic received comparatively less attention for it, they rode the D to a 59-win season and an unexpected trip to the Eastern Conference finals -- a feat they managed to pull off despite losing All-Star guard Jameer Nelson halfway through the season.
Orlando topped Boston for the league lead in defensive efficiency, and did it with a low-risk approach. The Magic forced turnovers on only 13.7 percent of opponent possessions, a figure that ranked 25th in the league.
Defensive efficiency leaders, 2008-09
Team Opp. 2-pt FG% Def. Reb Percentage Opp. 3A/FGA Def. Eff. Orlando 45.4 75.9 .191 98.9 Boston 45.4 75.6 .226 99.4 Cleveland 45.9 74.6 .225 99.4 Houston 46.4 75.3 .193 101.4 L.A. Lakers 46.5 73.0 .249 101.9 NBA avg. 48.5 73.3 .224 104.8
But the Magic were so good in the other areas they still finished first overall. With Howard making the basket area a no-fly zone for opponents, Orlando placed first in 2-point field goal defense, permitting only 45.4 percent shooting from inside the arc.
Shooting from distance wasn't a great proposition either. Because Howard and the vastly improved Rashard Lewis defended the post so well, the Magic rarely had to double-team and concede open 3s. Opponents took only 19.1 percent of their attempts from 3, which was the second-lowest figure in the league.
HOLLINGER'S '08-09 STATS
W-L: 59-23 (Pythagorean W-L: 62-20)
Offensive Efficiency: 107.2 (8th)
Defensive Efficiency: 98.9 (1st)
Pace Factor: 94.6 (T-12)
Highest PER: Dwight Howard (25.44)
Thus, the Magic essentially removed the two highest-percentage shots in basketball, layups and 3s, from the equation and forced opponents to make do with the rest. That enabled Orlando to grab first place in opponent True Shooting Percentage at 50.9 percent. And when a shot missed, the Magic nearly always grabbed the carom. With Howard dominating the defensive glass, Orlando's 75.9 percent defensive rebound rate ranked second only to San Antonio's.
Of course, this accomplishment required much more than just Howard. Lewis, as I mentioned earlier, has improved by leaps and bounds since coming from Seattle, where he rarely made a sustained effort. Rookie Courtney Lee turned into a defensive stopper on the wings, while off-the-bench newcomer Mickael Pietrus provided a second ace. Veteran Rafer Alston stepped up to the challenge after Nelson went out, while big men Tony Battie and Marcin Gortat also ably defended the post.
Yet a big chunk of credit also must go to Stan Van Gundy, who inspired his team to overachieve at the defensive end all season and should have won coach of the year honors. Instead, much of the public discussion about him focused on Shaquille O'Neal's "master of panic" wisecracks and Van Gundy's frantic nature on the sidelines -- again, matters that were interesting but not very important.
3-point attempts per FGA, 2008-09 leaders
Team 3A/FGA Orlando .335 New York .322 New Jersey .265 Cleveland .259 Houston .254 NBA avg. .224
Offensively the Magic performed well too, especially before Nelson's injury. And yes, the 3-pointers played a big part in that. Orlando shot .335 3-pointers per field goal attempt, blowing away the league average of .224, and it shot them fairly well, too -- its .381 mark came in at seventh.
Again, Howard's monstrous presence inside was a deciding factor. The Magic spaced the floor with four shooters around him, leaving opponents to choose their poison: double Howard and surrender the 3, or guard the 3 and watch Howard dunk. Additionally, Orlando racked up the league's third-highest free-throw rate because of the league-leading 849 free throws Howard earned, though that was a double-edged sword -- he shot only 59.4 percent from the stripe, dragging Orlando to last place in free-throw percentage.
Oddly enough, the Magic were a terrible offensive rebounding team. With four shooters spacing the perimeter and Howard normally lined up on the strong side, Orlando rarely had players in position to gather second shots. The Magic's 24 percent offensive rebound rate ranked 28th -- only Toronto and San Antonio fared worse.
Looking at their playoff run, it's hard to know whether the Magic had good luck or bad. On one hand, with a healthy Nelson they might very well have won the championship. He befuddled the Lakers in the two regular-season matchups, both of which Orlando won, but unfortunately his early return for the Finals didn't net the same results.
On the other hand, the Magic also benefited from Boston's loss of Kevin Garnett in the second round, and still needed seven games to dispatch the Celtics. The truth was that Orlando didn't play nearly as well in the second half of the season after losing Nelson, with the lone exception being the conference finals series against Cleveland when a perfect matchup landed in their laps. With Cleveland's chronic inability to defend Howard, Nelson's absence became immaterial.
Offseason Moves
The Magic got a taste of the Finals, and it appeared to make their front office quite thirsty. Despite playing in a small market and in one of the league's most dated arenas (the replacement won't be ready for another year), the Magic decided to damn the torpedoes and load up on talent this summer. If you're a Magic fan, you have tip your hat to the DeVos family ownership for their willingness to spend (read: lose) money in the quest for a le. The Magic will pay about $10 million in luxury tax, or potentially more if they use Hedo Turkoglu's trade exception.
Traded Courtney Lee, Tony Battie and Rafer Alston to New Jersey for Vince Carter and Ryan Anderson. New Jersey's pain became Orlando's gain, as the Magic traded three spare parts to the Nets to obtain Carter, an Orlando native. His long-range shooting skill fits with Orlando's general offensive strategy, and he can run pick-and-rolls well enough to take over Turkoglu's spot as an offensive orchestrator. Anderson is no slouch either and could find a role off the bench as a floor-spacing four for the Magic.
Signed and traded Hedo Turkoglu to Toronto for cash and a trade exception. Turkoglu had already agreed to a deal with Toronto, so it was surprising at the time to see the Magic help out the Raptors by making it a sign-and-trade. It was a complicated four-team deal and Orlando received cash from both Toronto and Dallas for taking part, but that seemed unimportant until Orlando's offseason spending strategy came to light. The primary benefit for the Magic is a trade exception worth $9 million that they can use any time until July 2010. It will end up costing them $18 million to exercise once they factor in luxury tax costs, but they very well may use the exception if it can usher in another star.
Signed Brandon Bass to a four-year, $18 million deal. This was a heck of a deal for Orlando, because they now have a high-scoring young frontcourt player to fill Battie's spot in the rotation. Bass will likely play much more than his predecessor did, and his arrival allows Rashard Lewis to shift to the 3 on occasion, which mutes some of the effect of losing Turkoglu.
Matched Dallas' 5-year, $34 million offer sheet for Marcin Gortat. This was a spectacular poker play by Magic GM Otis Smith, who convinced the Mavs to let him sign away Bass under the presumption that the tax-paying Magic couldn't possibly add him and still match the Mavs' offer sheet for Gortat. Instead Smith duped them and snagged both players while preserving the asset for a future trade. Granted, barring an injury to Howard, Gortat is likely to play little for the Magic this year.
The stipulations on matching a restricted free agent's offer sheet are tricky. The Magic can't trade him to Dallas for a full year, can't trade him anywhere until Dec. 15, and can't trade him without his consent. Nonetheless, many suspect a trade will come sooner or later. Gortat would be more than happy to relocate to a situation where he'd start, and the Magic can convert him into more urgently needed assets. In the meantime, they have one of the league's best backup centers locked up for half a decade.
Signed Jason Williams to a one-year deal for the minimum. Alston's departure left veteran retread Anthony Johnson as the only other point guard on the roster, and while the Magic may occasionally line up without a point guard (much as they did in the playoffs a year ago), the Magic still need more insurance. Enter Williams, who sat out last season but was productive, if not very healthy, in his two previous seasons in Miami.
Signed Matt Barnes to a two-year deal for $3.2 million. Orlando used the leftover midlevel exception money from the Bass deal to ink Barnes, who provides yet another floor-spacer who can play both the 3 and the 4. Barnes isn't good enough to start for a playoff team, but he is tough, plays with energy and handles the ball well for his size. As a 10-minute energizer off the bench, he should provide good value at this price.
Signed Adonal Foyle to a one-year deal for the minimum. This was strictly an insurance move for the frontcourt, bringing back a player familiar with the system and well-liked in the locker room. Foyle is unlikely to play, or even dress, unless injuries ravage the frontcourt.
Biggest Strength: Defense
I can't emphasize this enough -- everybody focuses on the 3-pointers, but that's a distraction. Orlando wins because it defends, and this year it should again rank among the league's top defensive units.
However, Orlando may struggle to keep its perch at No. 1 in defensive efficiency. Howard remains the linchpin, but the trade of Lee, Alston and Battie to New Jersey removed three of the team's best defensive players. The replacements at those spots -- Barnes, Bass and Williams -- are much more offensive-minded and will be hard-pressed to match their predecessors' contributions.
The hope is that Orlando can offset the losses in other ways. Carter, though he takes many barbs, is certainly a better defensive player than Turkoglu, while the increased playing time for Pietrus could provide another boost at the defensive end. Additionally, J.J. Re has vastly improved as a defender -- as he showed when shadowing Ray Allen in the second round of the playoffs -- and could prove more useful on that end this year.
That said, the biggest variable may be this one: How will they respond to another year under the hard-charging Van Gundy? He squeezed the maximum out of this unit's potential a year ago, but the unanswered question is how long they'll respond to his prodding before the message grows stale.
Biggest Weakness: One-On-One Scoring
Look, we have to choose something. The Magic start four All-Stars, play airtight defense and go 12 deep, so we're talking about fairly small s in the armor here. But against opponents with the size to play Howard straight up, this weakness becomes more apparent, as it did during last year's Finals.
Orlando didn't have a great one-on-one scorer a year ago, forcing them into pick-and-rolls with Hedo Turkoglu that often didn't yield much in the way of open looks. This year the prospects are better with Nelson back from injury and Carter replacing Turkoglu, but each comes with an asterisk. Nelson is coming off a shoulder injury and had put up numbers that vastly exceeded his career norms. Carter, meanwhile, turns 33 in January, and although he played very well a year ago, he has a history of knee trouble and there's no guarantee how long he can keep playing at this level.
Outlook
Surprisingly, the Magic have managed to stay under the national radar despite making the Finals a year ago and loading up the truck with talent over the summer. It's partly a perception issue -- Turkoglu became a "name" player with the Magic's run to the Finals last year, while Carter has been largely forgotten about in New Jersey and has been criticized much of his career for underachieving.
But there's no comparison between the two players: Carter creates more shots with the same shooting accuracy, defends better, and -- despite the renown for Turkoglu's passing skill -- also achieved a higher Pure Point Rating. He's just a much better player.
The Magic also are much deeper in the frontcourt with Bass, Barnes and Anderson, and should be better in the backcourt with a full year of Nelson and the addition of Williams. Additionally, they have assets left in reserve in the form of a $9 million trade exception and the potentially tradable Gortat contract. Using either of those to bring in a marquee player at the trade deadline could swing the balance toward a championship.
All of the above make the Magic a formidable player in the East. But it doesn't necessarily mean they repeat as conference champions. A lot of things had to happen for them to win a year ago, and it helped that Cleveland was more focused on matching up against Boston than against Howard -- otherwise Shaquille O'Neal probably would have been a Cavalier in last year's conference finals.
Shaq will be in a Cleveland uniform this time around, however, and that could change the dynamic of a Magic-Cavs matchup considerably. All told, the Magic are one of three teams I'd put at the top of the list as far as championship favorites, but it's very possible they end up with a better regular season and a worse playoff outcome than a year ago.
Prediction: 62-20, 1st in Southeast Division, 2nd in Eastern Conference
Originally Published: September 28, 2009
2009-10 Forecast: Dallas Mavericks
The Mavs reloaded, reuniting Shawn Marion with Jason Kidd, but is it too little, too late?
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Glenn James/NBAE via Getty ImagesJason, Josh and Dirk remain a dynamic trio, though they'll be 99 years old, combined, by next June.
GO TO: 2008-09 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
2008-09 Recap
Things didn't exactly go according to plan in Dallas, but the Mavs made the best of it. Clinging to their perch at the back end of the Western Conference's elite, Dallas struggled out of the gate and squeezed little or nothing from most of its role players.
The Mavs rode their star power and some successful tweaks by new coach Rick Carlisle to a 50-win season and a first-round upset of San Antonio, salvaging a rocky campaign that began 2-7 and at several junctures looked like it might end with a trip to the lottery.
The Mavs had a strong five-man nucleus in Jason Kidd, Jason Terry, Josh Howard, Dirk Nowitzki and Brandon Bass, offsetting the limited production from the rest of the troops. The two guards were the most pleasant surprises. Terry won the Sixth Man Award after agreeing to come off the bench, posting arguably the best season of his career at age 31. Kidd was no Devin Harris, but he had a good year by his recent standards and posted one of the league's best adjusted plus-minus marks.
Around this core, Carlisle had to constantly mix and match, particularly on the perimeter. To keep Terry coming off the bench required juggling Devean George and Antoine Wright in the starting lineup; it's not clear that either of them belonged in the NBA, much less starting for a playoff team. Others who auditioned for the spot were no better, including Matt Carroll, Shawne Williams, Gerald Green and an injury-riddled Jerry Stackhouse.
Up front, the Mavs somehow thought that using their entire midlevel exception to bring back DeSagana Diop would be a good idea. Even though they had employed him for three and a half of the previous four seasons, they appeared stunned by his lack of offensive skill. Within half a year, they shipped him to Charlotte for the slightly more useful Ryan Hollins.
HOLLINGER'S '08-09 STATS
W-L: 50-32 (Pythagorean W-L: 48-34)
Offensive Efficiency: 108.1 (T-5th)
Defensive Efficiency: 105.3 (17th)
Pace Factor: 93.9 (16th)
Highest PER: Dirk Nowitzki (23.20)
The situation in the backcourt would have been even more dire were it not for the emergence of pint-sized J.J. Barea at the point. Dallas often used Barea, Kidd and Terry in the same backcourt to avoid having to play the likes of Wright or George longer than they absolutely had to. But thanks to the Mavs' key quintet, Dallas finished fifth in the NBA in offensive efficiency and led the NBA in free-throw shooting. The Mavs would have performed even better had they produced a reliable 3-point threat to complement Nowitzki; instead, the Mavs ranked 25th at 35 percent from downtown. Kidd surprisingly made 40.6 percent of his rare 3-point attempts, but no other Mav -- not even Nowitzki -- was able to match the league average from this distance.
If the Mavs' offense was a pleasant surprise, the defense was a disappointment. Carlisle has a reputation as a defensive coach, but Dallas ranked only 17th in defensive efficiency. The odd part is that the Mavs were very good in the most important category: 2-point field goal defense. They ranked eighth at 45 percent.
Unfortunately, they lacked the ability to force turnovers. Dallas opponents turned the ball over on only 13.7 percent of their possessions, placing the Mavs 26th out of the league's 30 teams. Another thing that hurt them, however, was beyond their control. Dallas opponents shot 79.8 percent from the line, pinning the Mavs 29th in free throw "defense." Clearly this resulted from luck rather than skill, and if its opposition had shot the league average of 77.1 percent, Dallas would have ranked 11th in defensive efficiency rather than 17th.
Of course, luck can swing both ways, and in this case it did. Dallas went 18-5 in games decided by five points or less, enabling the Mavs to win 50 games despite having the scoring margin of a 47.6-win team. The boost from winning so many close games more than offset the bad luck from their opponents' free throw success.
Offseason Moves
Owner Mark Cuban's contrarian instincts were on display for all to see this summer -- while everyone else was selling, he and general manager Donnie Nelson were buying. But before we delve into the nitty-gritty of the Mavs' offseason, one other important asset bears mentioning: the de facto expiring contract of Erick Dampier. He's scheduled to make $13 million next season but none of it is guaranteed, which means a team looking to cut its 2010-11 cap number could trade a player to Dallas, acquire Dampier, and waive him before next season.
That, in turn, gives the Mavs a very powerful trade chip given the precipitous decline in the luxury tax level expected in 2010-11. For teams looking to shave cap money, the Mavs provide an easy out with the Dampier contract, allowing the Mavs to extract a high-quality player for the privilege. It's possible they won't play this card until next summer, when it'll peak in value, but it's certainly on the table.
Finally, if things go horribly wrong this season, don't look for the Mavs to tank the season or start trading contacts, because they have little incentive -- they owe a completely unprotected first-round pick to the Nets in 2010 as a result of the Kidd trade.
Drafted Rodrigue Beaubois, Nick Calathes and Ahmad Nivins. Although it may not pay immediate dividends, I'm a huge fan of the Mavs' draft. Beaubois is one of the most athletic players in Europe, and while he may not be a rotation player right away, he has a very high ceiling for a late-first-round draft pick. I'm even more fond of Calathes, who lasted until the second round because he'd already signed with a team in Greece but graded as one of the top point guards in the draft. Nivins was a solid, late-second-round pick as a power forward who can contribute rebounding and some scoring, but he's headed for Europe this year.
Traded Devean George, Antoine Wright, Jerry Stackhouse and cash for Kris Humphries, Greg Buckner, Nathan Jawai and a signed-and-traded Shawn Marion. This complicated four-way trade netted Marion for Dallas without using the Mavs' midlevel exception, allowing the Mavs to maximize their offseason resources. The enabler was Stackhouse's partially guaranteed deal, which the Mavs sent to Memphis along with enough cash to pay it.
That in turn cleared the way for Toronto to sign-and-trade Marion to Dallas on a five-year, $40 million deal, with a few spare parts thrown in. Buckner came from Memphis and was later waived and Jawai may not make the team, but Humphries is a definite keeper who could provide some much-needed brawn off the bench.
While the acquisition enhances the Mavs' talent base in the short term, Marion's deal is a major risk -- five years is a long time for an athleticism-dependent forward who slipped noticeably over the past two seasons. He'll be 36 by the time it ends and likely will offer only a fragment of his current production at that point. Additionally, he's an odd fit in the Mavs' lineup since Dallas already has two very capable forwards in Howard and Nowitzki. It appears they'll accommodate Marion by having Howard start games at shooting guard and Nowitzki finish them at center, but it's also possible they'll trade Howard.
Let Brandon Bass leave, signed Marcin Gortat to a five-year, $33 million offer sheet. This was the low point of the Mavs' summer, as they thought the luxury-tax-paying Magic were going to back away from matching Gortat's expensive offer sheet and let them have the rebounding, finishing center they coveted. They became even more assured when Orlando hotly pursued Bass -- so sure that the Mavs let Orlando sign Bass because they presumed it meant Gortat was theirs. Oops. Orlando matched Gortat's offer and snagged both players, leaving the Mavs devoid of a major frontcourt asset.
Let Ryan Hollins leave, signed Drew Gooden to a one-year deal for $4.5 million. Dallas extracted excellent value from this deal because of how it's structured. Only $1.9 million is guaranteed, which means the Mavs can trade Gooden to a team looking to shed money and acquire a player making as much as $5.7 million any time between now and July 19. As with the Dampier trade, it gives the Mavs a major leg up in any trade discussions, especially given the team's willingness to take on salary and pay additional luxury tax.
The other part, of course, is that Gooden is a pretty good player. He takes knocks for his flightiness and knack for forgetting play calls, but he's also a very good rebounder who can score and defend. For as long as he's around, he can replace much of what Bass contributed.
Signed Quinton Ross to a one-year deal for the minimum. A wing defensive stopper with little scoring ability, Ross could play a prominent role because of the Mavs' shortage of shut-down stoppers on the wing. There's little upside here, but he could help set a defensive tone for 10 minutes a night before Terry checks in. Put it another way: He's better than Antoine Wright or Devean George.
Signed Tim Thomas to a one-year deal for the minimum. Dallas viewed Thomas as a potential fourth big man in the rotation, but he hurt his knee late in the summer and his status is in some doubt entering training camp.
Signed James Singleton to a one-year deal for $1.03 million. Singleton accepted Dallas' qualifying offer after failing to get a better deal anywhere else as a restricted free agent. He's a tweener, but he played very well last season and probably should have seen more extended playing time. Given the crowd at the forward spots, he may not see much more daylight this season, but if he plays, he'll contribute with his rebounding and finishing skills.
Biggest Strength: Forwards
The Mavs have the best trio of forwards in basketball with Nowitzki, Howard and Marion, and they benefit further from having the likes of Gooden, Humphries, Singleton and Thomas coming off the bench -- all of whom are natural forwards.
Nowitzki is obviously the star and although he's getting up in years at age 31, time should treat him well given his size and shooting ability. Nowitzki's shooting talent should help create openings for Marion to dart to the rim for dunks and second shots, skills he's used his entire career to exhaust opponents from either forward spot. Once again, Marion will likely split his time between the 3 and the 4. Howard made the All-Star team two years ago, and his play hasn't dropped off as much since then as some would have you believe. Even last season he averaged 22.5 points per 40 minutes, and he's still among the best two-way players at his position.
Finding minutes for those three alone would use up most or all of the 96 minutes available at the two forward spots, but Dallas has plenty in reserve. Gooden and Humphries are two of the best rebounding power forwards in the league, and both can score as well. Singleton can make a similar rebounding boast from either forward spot, while Thomas makes for a great floor spacer when Nowitzki is off the court.
This is almost too much of a good thing, requiring the Mavs to farm some of their minutes out to other positions. Humphries, Gooden and Nowitzki will almost certainly play stretches at center, and Howard will see lots of action at shooting guard.
However, Dallas' forward depth also opens up trade possibilities, especially involving Howard (who has a team option for next year that a cost-conscious team could decline) and the aforementioned Gooden contract. At the very least, the Mavs can trade from a position of strength.
Biggest Weakness: Age
The Mavs weren't a good defensive team last season, ranking 17th in defensive efficiency, and with the age of the roster, there's a decent chance they'll be worse this time around. Nowitzki, as noted above, is 31, and he's not the only graybeard on the roster. Marion is also 31 and depends much more on his wheels than does Nowitzki; starting center Dampier is 34, and Tim Thomas is 32.
The age concerns are more prominent in the backcourt. Look back at veteran teams that crashed suddenly, and age in the backcourt was a major factor for nearly all of them. Kidd, obviously, is the major question at 36. The Mavs already have to tweak their backcourt rotation so that he never has to defend a speedy point guard; while he was very good against bigger guards a year ago, another lost step might change that situation.
He's not the only worry, however. Terry is 32, and while he had a career year last season, he's also a small guard who relies heavily on his speed. Even Howard, at 29, is not immune from these worries, especially given the ankle problems that bedeviled him last season.
Outlook
The Mavericks won 50 games last season and made several upgrades to the roster by acquiring Marion, Gooden, Humphries, Thomas, Ross and Beaubois. Those additions should help offset the unfortunate loss of Bass and the age issues that are creeping up nearly everywhere, but I'm not sure it does anything more than that.
They'll win more than they lose because they have Nowitzki and a decent supporting cast, as well as a coach in Carlisle who excels at optimizing his roster. However, it's hard to imagine them playing much better than they did a year ago. Plus, the Mavs are unlikely to be as fortunate in close games as they were last season, which is likely to cost them a couple of games in the standings.
The one wild card is what the Mavs might do with the contracts of Dampier and Gooden, as those may still be converted into another star. Such a move could push Dallas into the West's elite, and the possibility can't be discounted given how many teams are looking to shed salary while the Mavs seek to add it.
Short of such a development, however, the Mavs are neither young enough nor deep enough to hang with the top teams in this conference. Based on the current roster, it looks like another year at the tail end of the West's playoff roster and an early May tee time.
Prediction: 47-35, 3rd in Southwest Division, 7th in Western Conference
Just do the whole league.
Can someone post the Blazers' forecast please? Thanks.
If the Spurs are healthy they can dethrone the Lakers, won't be easy but they have the experience to do it (if anyone can it's them). The Cavs have a solid ballclub but if the Celtics are healthy, or Orlando catches fire with Vince Carter, anything can happen in the East. If Shaq plays well, it will take pressure off of Lebron and that could give teams fits. They have a nice 2 tower combo in Shaq and Z, they got to be healthy. I would lean towards Cleveland perhaps winning the East, but Boston if KG is healthy could do it, they have the experience. Seems to come down to a big 3 in both conferences who could win their respective conferences.
West:
Spurs, Lakers, Mavs (any of them could advance to NBA finals)
darkhorse: Denver, Portland
East:
Cavs, Celtics, Magic (same)
darkhorse: Chicago, Toronto
Last edited by Chillen; 09-28-2009 at 03:05 PM.
The Mavs?! GMAFB!
Originally Published: September 28, 2009
2009-10 Forecast: Portland Trail Blazers
The Blazers are on the right path, but will they prove themselves in the playoffs?
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Sam Forencich/NBAE/Getty ImagesIt's no stretch to say that Brandon Roy could lead Portland deep into the West playoffs this season.
GO TO: 2008-09 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
2008-09 Recap
They've arrived. After years of ac ulating talent, 2008-09 marked the Blazers' arrival into the NBA's elite class. Portland won 54 games before suc bing to Houston in the first round of the playoffs, and that result still understates the quality of the Blazers' season. The Blazers racked up the point differential of a 59-win team and led all NBA teams in point differential after the All-Star break -- which, as longtime readers know, is a better predictor of future success than win-loss record.
Not that the win-loss record was shabby. Portland went 22-8 down the stretch of the season -- a 60-win pace -- and every loss came against a winning team. The Blazers appeared poised to make a deep playoff run but met their foil early in the Rockets -- a team they beat only once in the regular season, on a miracle last-second shot by Brandon Roy.
The Blazers succeeded with the unusual style that Nate McMillan imported from Seattle. His teams have a unique signature -- they regularly rank among the league leaders in offensive efficiency and offensive rebound rate while simultaneously finishing among the league's slowest-paced teams. Most people think of offensive juggernauts as wild run-and-gun outfits, but the Blazers succeeded with half-court execution and second shots much as McMillan's outfits with the Sonics did.
HOLLINGER'S '08-09 STATS
W-L: 54-28 (Pythagorean W-L: 58-24)
Offensive Efficiency: 110.7 (2nd)
Defensive Efficiency: 104.5 (10th)
Pace Factor: 89.2 (29th)
Highest PER: Brandon Roy (24.08)
Portland played the league's second-slowest pace, averaging only 89.3 trips per side, and that both muted the players' averages and obscured how devastating they were offensively. The Blazers were deadly efficient, averaging 110.3 points per 100 possessions -- ranking second only to Phoenix in offensive efficiency. Despite a lack of brand-name players, they placed ahead of both the Lakers and Cleveland.
Believe it or not, they did it while barely shooting better than the league average. The Blazers rated eighth in both field goal percentage and true shooting percentage, which is another reason their offensive power stayed under the radar.
Top offensive rebound rate, 2008-09
Team Off. rebound rate Portland 32.6 Philadelphia 31.3 L.A. Lakers 29.4 Oklahoma City 28.6 Utah 28.2 NBA avg. 26.7
Instead, Portland overwhelmed opponents with sheer volume. The Blazers absolutely dominated on the offensive boards, with Joel Przybilla and Greg Oden doing most of the heavy lifting. Portland pulled down a league-leading 32.6 percent of its missed shots on the season, and all those second shots added up to hundreds more offensive opportunities over the course of the season.
As a result of the offensive rebounding prowess and a fairly low turnover rate, the Blazers were the league's runaway leaders in another category -- shot attempts per possession (where "shot attempts" include trips to the free throw line). The Blazers were the only team in the league to average more than one shot attempt per possession, and over the course of a game they averaged nearly four more than the league average. Those extra shots became the difference between a moderately good offense and a fantastic one.
Most shot attempts* per 100 poss., 2008-09
Team Shots/100 possessions Portland 100.1 Detroit 99.7 L.A. Lakers 98.9 Philadelphia 98.5 Dallas 98.3 NBA avg. 96.2 * Shot attempts = FGA + (FTA * 0.44)
Defensively, the Blazers were a bit more mundane. Rookie Nicolas Batum surprisingly earned a starting job out of training camp and provided a defensive stopper on the wings, while an extra year of experience for the young players and the addition of Oden helped Portland show solid improvement. They landed 10th in defensive efficiency, which is swell by most teams' standards, but the Blazers will need to push higher if they're going to challenge the Lakers.
The key to Portland's defense was, again, the rebounding. Portland yanked down 75 percent of opponent's missed shots, the fifth-best rate in the league, and that helped them overcome average numbers in other areas. The Blazers' opponent true shooting percentage of 54.4 was right at the league average, and they forced fewer turnovers than average.
In one respect, however, they were horribly unlucky. Portland opponents shot 80.3 percent from the line last season, far exceeding the league average of 77.1 percent -- no other team's opponents shot this well. It seems unrealistic to blame this on bad free throw defense. Relative to the league average, Portland lost 58 points because of this, which is worth about two games in the standings.
Combining this result with the Blazers' superior point differential yields a very interesting conclusion -- the Blazers had the offensive and defensive results of a 61-win team and were very unfortunate to win only 54 games. What that means going forward is that the Blazers are in much better shape than most people realize.
Offseason Moves
The Blazers entered the offseason with $7.7 million in cap space, room that could have been expanded to about $9 million by renouncing their rights to previous draft picks Joel Freeland and Petteri Koponen. The Blazers experienced an unusual amount of difficulty getting rid of their money. Hedo Turkoglu ditched them at the altar to sign with Toronto, Paul Millsap signed an offer sheet that the Jazz matched, and (reportedly) a last-minute pursuit of Lamar Odom also failed.
Signed Andre Miller for three years, $21 million. It took the Blazers a while to get there, but they eventually made a strong move with their cap space. Only the first two years are guaranteed, giving Portland an easy out if he's a bust, and his ability to score and push the ball from the point guard spot presents a nice contrast from Steve Blake. It's still unclear if he'll start or come off the bench -- though he's better than Blake in a vacuum, Blake tends to mesh better with the starters and Miller with the more up-tempo bench players. But the backup point guard spot was a disaster for Portland last year, so Miller will provide a major upgrade either way.
Drafted Victor Claver. The Blazers used their first-round pick on overseas talent Claver, a wise move because they can park him overseas and let him develop on somebody else's dime. He'll stay in Spain for at least another year while he develops, but it gives Portland a strong succession plan for Travis Outlaw's impending free agency.
Traded Sergio Rodriguez to Sacramento. Rodriguez had value but he wasn't working out in the Blazers' slow-paced system, so the Blazers sent him to Sacramento (along with enough cash to pay his salary) on draft day to create more cap space. That same deal allowed them to move up from 38th to 31st in the draft, where they selected Jeff Pendergraph.
Let Channing Frye go, drafted Jeff Pendergraph, Dante Cunningham, and Patrick Mills. Frye had to go to create the cap space to sign Miller, and in his place the Blazers inserted two power forwards drafted early in the second round. Pendergraph is more the interior tough guy, which is something the Blazers coveted, while Cunningham is an undersized face-up 4. Neither is likely to play much unless injuries hit the frontcourt and each could spend a big chunk of his rookie season with the Blazers' D-league affiliate in Boise. Mills, a much later second-round pick, is a speedy shoot-first point guard who hurt his foot over the summer and remains unsigned.
Extended Brandon Roy for five years at the maximum contract. We won't know the exact figures on the value of his extension until next year's cap number comes out, but it should be worth $85-$90 million. The final year is only 75 percent guaranteed, but it becomes fully guaranteed if he meets any of several conditions, so it's essentially a deal for the full max. Obviously, it's warranted given Roy's performance in his three seasons as a Blazer.
The more interesting question is that of teammate LaMarcus Aldridge, who is eligible for an extension but had not agreed to one as the team headed toward training camp. They'll have until opening day to cut a deal, and it seems something in the $10-$12 million a year range is fair value for his services.
Signed Juwan Howard for the minimum. Howard solves the Blazers' need for another big body to play the 5 should they suffer some injuries along the front line -- a contingency Portland must address given the injury histories of Przybilla and Oden. He's a replacement-level player who won't screw up, which is about what you get at this price.
Signed Ime Udoka to a one-year deal for the minimum. Udoka was a huge surprise as a training camp addition to the Blazers two years ago and has the inside track on Portland's 15th roster spot. While the Blazers don't necessarily need another small forward, he has enough beef to play as a smallball four and could set them to trade one of their surplus wings later on.
Biggest Strength: Size
The Blazers are an unusual team, because they're a slow-paced offensive juggernaut. The reason that style works for them is because they're huge everywhere. Run through the roster from top to bottom and the Blazers are bigger than the league average at every spot. The two centers, Przybilla and Oden, are 7-foot and 7-1, respectively, while power forward Aldridge isn't much smaller at 6-11. That stresses most opponents' frontcourts to the breaking point, as inevitably at least one of their players will give up multiple inches in the paint.
It's a similar story on the perimeter. Batum is 6-8 with long arms, giving him a reach advantage on virtually every opponent. Outlaw is 6-9 and can shoot over nearly any opposing 3, though he'll often be playing at the 4 this year, while Martell Webster is a chiseled 6-7. At shooting guard, Roy's size and strength at 6-6 give him the edge of most opposing 2s, and while Rudy Fernandez won't win any Mr. Hercules compe ions, he's also a long 6-6.
The Blazers are big at the point as well. Miller is 6-2 and wide, one of the best post-up point guards in basketball, while Blake and Jerryd Bayless both stand 6-3.
The Blazers' size advantage manifests itself in multiple ways. For starters, the Blazers are awesome on the offensive boards, as noted above. But equally important is how much easier it makes things for their jump shooters. Because players like Roy and Outlaw can always get a shot away over their smaller defenders, the Blazers have little fear of letting the shot clock run down in search of a better look -- enabling them to comfortably play such a methodical style.
Defensively, Portland also leans on its length. The Blazers are a low-risk, non-gambling outfit that forces opponents to shoot over the top of its long arms, and they succeeded with that style last season.
Biggest Weakness: Frontcourt Depth
Hey, we have to pick something. The Blazers aren't exactly hurting at any of the five positions, but one thing to keep an eye on during the course of the year is all the bodies in the frontcourt. This may be where the failure to nab Millsap or Odom comes back to bite them, as the Blazers essentially have three big bodies in the frontcourt -- Przybilla, Oden and Aldridge. Beyond that, they're looking at Outlaw as a smallball 4, Howard as a replacement-level Band-Aid, or second-round rookies like Pendergraph and Cunningham.
Thus, if any kind of injury were to hit one of the three main frontcourt performers, it would leave the Blazers exposed against opponents with quality size … like, say, the Lakers, Spurs, Nuggets and Jazz. And that's not a remote possibility considering the histories of the players involved, particularly the two centers. Oden has gained renown for his susceptibility to injuries with a broken wrist his one year in college, knee surgery that knocked out his rookie season and then assorted injuries that cost him 21 games a year ago.
Less widely known is that Przybilla isn't exactly Cal Ripken, either. Though he played all 82 games a year ago, he's cleared 60 games in only four of his nine NBA seasons; in his five years in Portland he's missed 76 contests.
Chances are, one of the two will miss a substantial chunk of time at some point this season, and when that happens, it will test the remainder of the Blazers' frontcourt.
Outlook
It would be hard to come up with a team with more positive indicators than this one. The Blazers won five games fewer than their point differential would project, lost another two games to flukishly good foul shooting from their opponents, and added a top-notch point guard in the offseason without losing anyone of importance. The nucleus is still very young and some players could show rapid improvement this year, plus the Blazers regain the services of Webster after he missed all of last season with a foot injury.
Could they regress? Sure, if Roy can't maintain his superstar play of a year ago, or if Oden and Przybilla suc b to their frailty. By far the most likely scenario is that the Blazers are here to stay. Portland remains under the radar nationally because they don't have a marquee star and lost in the first round of the playoffs, but if somebody besides the Lakers is going to win the West, I'd put my chips on these guys.
Certainly, I'd expect them to get past the first round this year. After that it's a bit more of a crapshoot, but if the Blazers accomplish the same things they did a year ago and aren't beset by bad luck, they're a 60-win team. Chances are they'll experience an injury or two along the way and fall short of that standard, but they'll still rank among the last teams standing out West.
Prediction: 55-27, 1st in Northwest Division, 2nd in Western Conference
Originally Published: September 28, 2009
2009-10 Forecast: Portland Trail Blazers
The Blazers are on the right path, but will they prove themselves in the playoffs?
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GO TO: 2008-09 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
2008-09 Recap
They've arrived. After years of ac ulating talent, 2008-09 marked the Blazers' arrival into the NBA's elite class. Portland won 54 games before suc bing to Houston in the first round of the playoffs, and that result still understates the quality of the Blazers' season. The Blazers racked up the point differential of a 59-win team and led all NBA teams in point differential after the All-Star break -- which, as longtime readers know, is a better predictor of future success than win-loss record.
Not that the win-loss record was shabby. Portland went 22-8 down the stretch of the season -- a 60-win pace -- and every loss came against a winning team. The Blazers appeared poised to make a deep playoff run but met their foil early in the Rockets -- a team they beat only once in the regular season, on a miracle last-second shot by Brandon Roy.
The Blazers succeeded with the unusual style that Nate McMillan imported from Seattle. His teams have a unique signature -- they regularly rank among the league leaders in offensive efficiency and offensive rebound rate while simultaneously finishing among the league's slowest-paced teams. Most people think of offensive juggernauts as wild run-and-gun outfits, but the Blazers succeeded with half-court execution and second shots much as McMillan's outfits with the Sonics did.
HOLLINGER'S '08-09 STATS
W-L: 54-28 (Pythagorean W-L: 58-24)
Offensive Efficiency: 110.7 (2nd)
Defensive Efficiency: 104.5 (10th)
Pace Factor: 89.2 (29th)
Highest PER: Brandon Roy (24.08)
Portland played the league's second-slowest pace, averaging only 89.3 trips per side, and that both muted the players' averages and obscured how devastating they were offensively. The Blazers were deadly efficient, averaging 110.3 points per 100 possessions -- ranking second only to Phoenix in offensive efficiency. Despite a lack of brand-name players, they placed ahead of both the Lakers and Cleveland.
Believe it or not, they did it while barely shooting better than the league average. The Blazers rated eighth in both field goal percentage and true shooting percentage, which is another reason their offensive power stayed under the radar.
Top offensive rebound rate, 2008-09
Team Off. rebound rate Portland 32.6 Philadelphia 31.3 L.A. Lakers 29.4 Oklahoma City 28.6 Utah 28.2 NBA avg. 26.7
Instead, Portland overwhelmed opponents with sheer volume. The Blazers absolutely dominated on the offensive boards, with Joel Przybilla and Greg Oden doing most of the heavy lifting. Portland pulled down a league-leading 32.6 percent of its missed shots on the season, and all those second shots added up to hundreds more offensive opportunities over the course of the season.
As a result of the offensive rebounding prowess and a fairly low turnover rate, the Blazers were the league's runaway leaders in another category -- shot attempts per possession (where "shot attempts" include trips to the free throw line). The Blazers were the only team in the league to average more than one shot attempt per possession, and over the course of a game they averaged nearly four more than the league average. Those extra shots became the difference between a moderately good offense and a fantastic one.
Most shot attempts* per 100 poss., 2008-09
Team Shots/100 possessions Portland 100.1 Detroit 99.7 L.A. Lakers 98.9 Philadelphia 98.5 Dallas 98.3 NBA avg. 96.2 * Shot attempts = FGA + (FTA * 0.44)
Defensively, the Blazers were a bit more mundane. Rookie Nicolas Batum surprisingly earned a starting job out of training camp and provided a defensive stopper on the wings, while an extra year of experience for the young players and the addition of Oden helped Portland show solid improvement. They landed 10th in defensive efficiency, which is swell by most teams' standards, but the Blazers will need to push higher if they're going to challenge the Lakers.
The key to Portland's defense was, again, the rebounding. Portland yanked down 75 percent of opponent's missed shots, the fifth-best rate in the league, and that helped them overcome average numbers in other areas. The Blazers' opponent true shooting percentage of 54.4 was right at the league average, and they forced fewer turnovers than average.
In one respect, however, they were horribly unlucky. Portland opponents shot 80.3 percent from the line last season, far exceeding the league average of 77.1 percent -- no other team's opponents shot this well. It seems unrealistic to blame this on bad free throw defense. Relative to the league average, Portland lost 58 points because of this, which is worth about two games in the standings.
Combining this result with the Blazers' superior point differential yields a very interesting conclusion -- the Blazers had the offensive and defensive results of a 61-win team and were very unfortunate to win only 54 games. What that means going forward is that the Blazers are in much better shape than most people realize.
Offseason Moves
The Blazers entered the offseason with $7.7 million in cap space, room that could have been expanded to about $9 million by renouncing their rights to previous draft picks Joel Freeland and Petteri Koponen. The Blazers experienced an unusual amount of difficulty getting rid of their money. Hedo Turkoglu ditched them at the altar to sign with Toronto, Paul Millsap signed an offer sheet that the Jazz matched, and (reportedly) a last-minute pursuit of Lamar Odom also failed.
Signed Andre Miller for three years, $21 million. It took the Blazers a while to get there, but they eventually made a strong move with their cap space. Only the first two years are guaranteed, giving Portland an easy out if he's a bust, and his ability to score and push the ball from the point guard spot presents a nice contrast from Steve Blake. It's still unclear if he'll start or come off the bench -- though he's better than Blake in a vacuum, Blake tends to mesh better with the starters and Miller with the more up-tempo bench players. But the backup point guard spot was a disaster for Portland last year, so Miller will provide a major upgrade either way.
Drafted Victor Claver. The Blazers used their first-round pick on overseas talent Claver, a wise move because they can park him overseas and let him develop on somebody else's dime. He'll stay in Spain for at least another year while he develops, but it gives Portland a strong succession plan for Travis Outlaw's impending free agency.
Traded Sergio Rodriguez to Sacramento. Rodriguez had value but he wasn't working out in the Blazers' slow-paced system, so the Blazers sent him to Sacramento (along with enough cash to pay his salary) on draft day to create more cap space. That same deal allowed them to move up from 38th to 31st in the draft, where they selected Jeff Pendergraph.
Let Channing Frye go, drafted Jeff Pendergraph, Dante Cunningham, and Patrick Mills. Frye had to go to create the cap space to sign Miller, and in his place the Blazers inserted two power forwards drafted early in the second round. Pendergraph is more the interior tough guy, which is something the Blazers coveted, while Cunningham is an undersized face-up 4. Neither is likely to play much unless injuries hit the frontcourt and each could spend a big chunk of his rookie season with the Blazers' D-league affiliate in Boise. Mills, a much later second-round pick, is a speedy shoot-first point guard who hurt his foot over the summer and remains unsigned.
Extended Brandon Roy for five years at the maximum contract. We won't know the exact figures on the value of his extension until next year's cap number comes out, but it should be worth $85-$90 million. The final year is only 75 percent guaranteed, but it becomes fully guaranteed if he meets any of several conditions, so it's essentially a deal for the full max. Obviously, it's warranted given Roy's performance in his three seasons as a Blazer.
The more interesting question is that of teammate LaMarcus Aldridge, who is eligible for an extension but had not agreed to one as the team headed toward training camp. They'll have until opening day to cut a deal, and it seems something in the $10-$12 million a year range is fair value for his services.
Signed Juwan Howard for the minimum. Howard solves the Blazers' need for another big body to play the 5 should they suffer some injuries along the front line -- a contingency Portland must address given the injury histories of Przybilla and Oden. He's a replacement-level player who won't screw up, which is about what you get at this price.
Signed Ime Udoka to a one-year deal for the minimum. Udoka was a huge surprise as a training camp addition to the Blazers two years ago and has the inside track on Portland's 15th roster spot. While the Blazers don't necessarily need another small forward, he has enough beef to play as a smallball four and could set them to trade one of their surplus wings later on.
Biggest Strength: Size
The Blazers are an unusual team, because they're a slow-paced offensive juggernaut. The reason that style works for them is because they're huge everywhere. Run through the roster from top to bottom and the Blazers are bigger than the league average at every spot. The two centers, Przybilla and Oden, are 7-foot and 7-1, respectively, while power forward Aldridge isn't much smaller at 6-11. That stresses most opponents' frontcourts to the breaking point, as inevitably at least one of their players will give up multiple inches in the paint.
It's a similar story on the perimeter. Batum is 6-8 with long arms, giving him a reach advantage on virtually every opponent. Outlaw is 6-9 and can shoot over nearly any opposing 3, though he'll often be playing at the 4 this year, while Martell Webster is a chiseled 6-7. At shooting guard, Roy's size and strength at 6-6 give him the edge of most opposing 2s, and while Rudy Fernandez won't win any Mr. Hercules compe ions, he's also a long 6-6.
The Blazers are big at the point as well. Miller is 6-2 and wide, one of the best post-up point guards in basketball, while Blake and Jerryd Bayless both stand 6-3.
The Blazers' size advantage manifests itself in multiple ways. For starters, the Blazers are awesome on the offensive boards, as noted above. But equally important is how much easier it makes things for their jump shooters. Because players like Roy and Outlaw can always get a shot away over their smaller defenders, the Blazers have little fear of letting the shot clock run down in search of a better look -- enabling them to comfortably play such a methodical style.
Defensively, Portland also leans on its length. The Blazers are a low-risk, non-gambling outfit that forces opponents to shoot over the top of its long arms, and they succeeded with that style last season.
Biggest Weakness: Frontcourt Depth
Hey, we have to pick something. The Blazers aren't exactly hurting at any of the five positions, but one thing to keep an eye on during the course of the year is all the bodies in the frontcourt. This may be where the failure to nab Millsap or Odom comes back to bite them, as the Blazers essentially have three big bodies in the frontcourt -- Przybilla, Oden and Aldridge. Beyond that, they're looking at Outlaw as a smallball 4, Howard as a replacement-level Band-Aid, or second-round rookies like Pendergraph and Cunningham.
Thus, if any kind of injury were to hit one of the three main frontcourt performers, it would leave the Blazers exposed against opponents with quality size … like, say, the Lakers, Spurs, Nuggets and Jazz. And that's not a remote possibility considering the histories of the players involved, particularly the two centers. Oden has gained renown for his susceptibility to injuries with a broken wrist his one year in college, knee surgery that knocked out his rookie season and then assorted injuries that cost him 21 games a year ago.
Less widely known is that Przybilla isn't exactly Cal Ripken, either. Though he played all 82 games a year ago, he's cleared 60 games in only four of his nine NBA seasons; in his five years in Portland he's missed 76 contests.
Chances are, one of the two will miss a substantial chunk of time at some point this season, and when that happens, it will test the remainder of the Blazers' frontcourt.
Outlook
It would be hard to come up with a team with more positive indicators than this one. The Blazers won five games fewer than their point differential would project, lost another two games to flukishly good foul shooting from their opponents, and added a top-notch point guard in the offseason without losing anyone of importance. The nucleus is still very young and some players could show rapid improvement this year, plus the Blazers regain the services of Webster after he missed all of last season with a foot injury.
Could they regress? Sure, if Roy can't maintain his superstar play of a year ago, or if Oden and Przybilla suc b to their frailty. By far the most likely scenario is that the Blazers are here to stay. Portland remains under the radar nationally because they don't have a marquee star and lost in the first round of the playoffs, but if somebody besides the Lakers is going to win the West, I'd put my chips on these guys.
Certainly, I'd expect them to get past the first round this year. After that it's a bit more of a crapshoot, but if the Blazers accomplish the same things they did a year ago and aren't beset by bad luck, they're a 60-win team. Chances are they'll experience an injury or two along the way and fall short of that standard, but they'll still rank among the last teams standing out West.
Prediction: 55-27, 1st in Northwest Division, 2nd in Western Conference
Originally Published: September 28, 2009
2009-10 Forecast: New Orleans Hornets
Despite a relatively quiet offseason, New Orleans can still think big with CP3 in tow
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Layne Murdoch/NBAE/Getty ImagesAfter a quick exit in the playoffs last season, Chris Paul is ready to lace 'em up for a new season.
GO TO: 2008-09 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
2008-09 Recap
The Hornets made one of the worst mistakes possible prior to the 2008-09 season -- they believed their press clippings. After a seven-game, second-round defeat to San Antonio, much was written about how San Antonio's experience proved the telling difference and how the Hornets needed to add some to get over the hump.
Closer analysis could have offered more tangible reasons -- like the lack of a quality backup center. This forced the Hornets to double-team Tim Duncan every first half since they were terrified of Tyson Chandler picking up fouls, and it directly led to the barrage of 3-pointers that tripped them in Game 7. Unfortunately, the Hornets placed their faith in the intangible rather than the tangible, and it set the stage for a disappointing 2008-09 campaign.
New Orleans invested its money in a full midlevel offer to James Posey, hoping his magic playoff beans would lead them to the promised land. They did this in lieu of moves that would have made them a better basketball team, such as using their cap exceptions to fill the gaping holes at backup center and backup point guard.
It was no fault of Posey's, who put up his usual numbers, but he provided little difference from the legions of other small forwards already on the Hornets' roster. The lack of a backup big man, on the other hand, killed them when Chandler hurt his ankle and missed 37 games. New Orleans' backup fives were Hilton Armstrong (PER 10.49), Sean Marks (8.64) and Melvin Ely (5.67); between them they gave the Hornets 2,303 minutes of sub-replacement-level production and essentially neutralized the team's two All-Stars.
HOLLINGER'S '08-09 STATS
W-L: 49-33 (Pythagorean W-L: 46-36)
Offensive Efficiency: 106.2 (T-18th)
Defensive Efficiency: 104.1 (9th)
Pace Factor: 90.0 (28th)
Highest PER: Chris Paul (30.04)
The backup point guard spot was an even greater calamity until the team engineered a deal for Washington's Antonio Daniels, relieving the wholly incapable Mike James of the gig. Daniels wasn't anything great, either, but he at least patched an open sore for the 10 minutes or so Chris Paul wasn't out there. On the wings, Morris Peterson's play fell off and Peja Stojakovic's back woes returned, leading to the worst season of Stojakovic's pro career. New Orleans also made the puzzling decision to keep second-year wing Julian Wright sequestered at the end of the bench despite his productive play in limited cameos, instead relying on Rasual Butler, Posey and Stojakovic for the bulk of its wing minutes.
The one thing that kept them afloat was Paul. He was even better than his MVP runner-up season from the prior year, joining the tiny fraternity of players to post a 30-plus PER and leading the league in assists and steals. But it was basically a two-man team: Paul and David West were the only Hornets to finish with a PER above the league average, and most of their teammates weren't even close.
Hornets coach Byron Scott rode the starters hard down the stretch in order to get them into the playoffs, but they had nothing left by then. Chandler and Stojakovic played but were clearly hurt, and the others looked out of gas and somewhat dejected by the entire state of affairs. Denver humiliated New Orleans in five games, including an embarrassing 121-63 home defeat in Game 4.
Statistically, the one defining characteristic of the Hornets' season was the snail's pace at which they played. With an all-world point guard, you would think they would be a terrifying transition team, but Paul rarely had anybody in position to run with him. The Hornets finished 28th in pace factor, often requiring the entire shot clock to get a clean look. Despite the excellence of Paul and West, the Hornets finished just 13th in offensive efficiency, as the supporting cast couldn't cut the mus .
New Orleans did excel in one area -- not getting shots blocked. Only 4.5 percent of Hornet attempts were sent back, the lowest percentage in the league. However, a big part of this can be attributed to how often the Hornets settled for jumpers and how rarely they attacked in the post. The Hornets finished 22nd in free throw rate and 25th in offensive rebound rate, an indication of how rarely they had the ball in scoring position in the paint. That, in turn, is yet another reflection of how the 2008 offseason failed to address the roster's shortcomings.
Offseason Moves
A history of previous missteps tied the Hornets' hands as they entered the offseason several million dollars above the 2009-10 luxury-tax level and even farther above the shrunken 2010-11 threshold. As a small-market team with a limited revenue base, New Orleans had little choice but to spend the offseason furiously working its way back under the tax line.
Traded Tyson Chandler to Charlotte for Emeka Okafor. This was a spectacular deal for the Hornets, cutting more than $1 million from their luxury-tax payment while upgrading at the center position with Okafor. Though Okafor isn't the alley-oop finisher that Chandler is, he's a useful post scorer who can hit short bank shots and the occasional jumper -- making him vastly more versatile than Chandler. On a team that had only two primary scoring options a year ago, this is huge. The drawback is the longer obligation to Okafor, who has five years left at an overvalued $12 million a pop, but it makes their short term considerably brighter.
As a side note, Okafor's arrival virtually guarantees that the Hornets will not claim the league's lowest blocked-shot rate this time around. Okafor gets his shot rejected so often -- 12 percent of his shots were sent back last season, according to 82games.com -- that you half expect to see the word "Spalding" imprinted backward on his forehead.
Traded Rasual Butler and cash to the Clippers for a future second-round pick. This was a straight salary dump by New Orleans to lower their luxury-tax assessment, ditching the $3.9 million owed to Butler in return for essentially nothing -- the draft pick is in 2016 and is top 55 protected. The Hornets also get a trade exception worth $3.9 million, but it seems inconceivable that they'd use it. The main benefit was offloading one of their legions of fungible wings to reduce the tax payment, which was so valuable to the Hornets that they threw in cash to pay a big chunk of Butler's salary.
After this move and the Antonio Daniels trade below, the Hornets are $3.2 million over the tax. They can eliminate the remaining amount at the trade deadline by trading Hilton Armstrong (who makes $2.8 million) to a team under the cap, paying them the maximum allowable $3 million for their trouble, and then shuttling a minimum-sized contract (such as the redundant Devin Brown) to another squad in a similar move. The mechanics are less important than the big picture -- it appears they'll be able to dodge the luxury-tax bullet for this year with limited pain thanks to these moves.
Drafted Darren Collison. The Hornets filled a roster hole on draft day by tabbing Collison, and in that sense it was a success -- he should be an adequate backup point guard who hits open shots, and he solved a clear problem. The issue is that the Hornets set such a low ceiling for potential success, given that Collison is going to play 10 minutes a game at the absolute most because he plays the same position as Chris Paul. That will be as true five years from now as it is today, regardless of how well Collison plays. Perhaps they might have been better off targeting a frontcourt player with the draft pick and then using their minimum salary exception on a generic backup point guard.
Traded two future second-rounders to Miami for a second-rounder; drafted Marcus Thornton. I'm sure they liked Thornton, but trading two future picks for one pick of the same ilk makes little sense -- it's the basketball equivalent of a payday loan with 50 percent interest. He'll get some chances to play because of the paucity of true shooting guards on the roster, but he wasn't a highly ranked prospect.
Signed Ike Diogu for the minimum salary. I'm not a big fan of some of the Hornets' other moves, but I loved this one. Diogu can flat-out score, and that's vitally important on a second unit that had massive trouble generating offense. He'll give the bench group a post-up threat and create doubling situations that open up the 3-point line, plus he's a decent rebounder. Diogu has his weaknesses -- he's turnover-prone and he doesn't defend well -- but at this price he was a spectacular bargain.
Traded Antonio Daniels to Minnesota for Darius Songaila and Bobby Brown. This trade essentially made the Hornets' jobs a little easier this year but much harder next year. Songaila is a useful frontcourt reserve who can bang and shoot from outside, and Scott has familiarity with him from his Sacramento days. As such, he's a welcome addition to a frontcourt that was looking paper-thin.
However, Daniels had an expiring contract while Songaila makes $4.8 million in 2010-11, which puts the Hornets about $10 million into the tax a year from now depending on where the new cap number comes in. It will be difficult to shed that much salary next summer and seemingly untenable to pay the tax in this market, so it's not clear how the Hornets plan to wriggle out of it. The we'll-deal-with-it-later mindset toward the cap has been a running theme in New Orleans in the past few years, and they keep digging the hole deeper.
Biggest Strength: Frontcourt Scoring
One huge difference between this year's Hornets and last year's is the mul ude of scoring options New Orleans has in the frontcourt. West was the only reliable frontcourt weapon a year ago, and when he and Paul were out of the game, it produced some rather undesirable play calls -- Posey posting up, for instance, or Armstrong trying to attack from the high post. Now there's legitimate offense waiting in the wings. Okafor might not be the most fluid post scorer in the world, but he's strong, can get free for shots in the paint and earns plenty of putbacks. All told he averages over five points more per 40 minutes than Chandler, which is a huge improvement.
Diogu should also be a major factor. He's averaged about a point every two minutes during his pro career, and despite sporadic playing time, he's performed well everywhere he's landed. As a go-to scorer for the second unit, he should engender a major improvement from last year's toothless bunch.
Additionally, Songaila is another frontcourt player who can put the ball in the hoop, and his ability to space the floor from the perimeter makes him a nice complement to the Hornets' pick-and-roll game with Paul.
Biggest Weakness: Shooting Guard
The Hornets have six wing players on the roster, but out of the group only Thornton, a rookie second-round pick, is naturally a 2. Posey, Wright, Stojakovic, Brown and Peterson are pure 3s, forcing at least one of them to play as a fish out of water at the shooting guard spot. It's less of an issue on this team compared to some others because Paul does nearly all the ballhandling, but it still leaves them a step slow on D and minus some creativity on offense.
The bigger problem is not the lack of a natural 2, however -- it's that none of their wings are good enough to start. Somehow, two of them have to step up. The best bet at small forward is Stojakovic, who was miserable a year ago but should produce if he can shrug off the back problems that limited him so much. Posey is more comfortable coming off the bench but could end up playing the bulk of the minutes at this spot if Stojakovic continues to struggle.
That takes care of one position, but the 2 is an even bigger issue. Wright is the most logical candidate, even though he's 6-foot-8 and can't shoot, because he's the best ball handler of the bunch and has been the most productive. If not, Peterson may retake the starting gig he lost last season after a year-plus of rather unimpressive play.
Big picture, the Hornets need to get more from these players than they did a year ago, or they'll surrender the advantage they have in the frontcourt.
Outlook
The Hornets have nothing but question marks at the wing positions, and despite adding Diogu, Songaila and Collison, the bench isn't exactly rock-solid, either. Additionally, their difficult salary situation makes it unlikely they can make moves to upgrade the roster during the course of the season. If anything, they'll be shedding talent, with Armstrong the most likely player to depart since offloading his contract would help put the Hornets under the luxury-tax line.
Fortunately, the Hornets have two huge positives in their favor. First, the frontcourt will be much more potent than a year ago thanks to the additions of Okafor, Songaila and Diogu. On a per-minute scoring basis, the newcomers should nearly double what the Hornets got from Chandler and the assorted flotsam backing him up a year ago.
But the biggest reason the Hornets will stay afloat is Paul. He's the best point guard in the league, and if anything, he's still underrated because of New Orleans' small market and the team's slow-paced, half-court style. They may step up the pace a bit this year if Wright starts, but this still won't be a track team.
Instead, Paul will carve up opponents on pick-and-rolls enough for the Hornets' defense to do the rest. That D should remain robust, as Okafor is Chandler's equal on that end. As a result, the Hornets will be back in the playoffs and may even win a round once they get there.
Prediction: 51-31, 2nd in Southwest Division, 5th in Western Conference
Originally Published: September 28, 2009
2009-10 Forecast: Houston Rockets
Despite injuries to Yao Ming and Tracy McGrady, some Rockets trademarks remain
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Lisa Blumenfeld/Getty ImagesYao Ming's absence and uncertain future have cast a cloud over the Rockets' 2009-10 season.
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2008-09 Recap
By any objective measure, this was a successful season. The Rockets won 53 games, finally made it to the second round of the playoffs and took the eventual world champion Lakers to seven games despite having a skeleton crew on hand for the final four contests.
Unfortunately, the physical toll on the roster was so great that it's likely to undermine the Rockets' progress well into the future. Tracy McGrady battled an ailing knee, a recuperating shoulder and his own frail psyche for half the year before undergoing microfracture knee surgery at the midway point; Dikembe Mutombo was lost to a career-ending knee injury in the first round of the playoffs; and Yao Ming suffered a broken foot in the Lakers series, leaving his career in peril.
As a result, the Rockets come away from the most successful season of the post-Olajuwon era with a decidedly bitter taste in their mouths. It was a great year, but at a minimum it seems they'll need a step back or two before the next step forward.
That shouldn't take anything away from the campaign, as Houston battled through McGrady's early-season malaise and the loss of defensive ace Shane Battier to hang with the conference's non-Lakers elites. And while Yao gave his usual All-Star performance, the story of Houston's season was the production the Rockets got from secondary players who cost them little or nothing:
HOLLINGER'S '08-09 STATS
W-L: 53-29 (Pythagorean W-L: 55-27)
Offensive Efficiency: 105.4 (T-14th)
Defensive Efficiency: 101.4 (4th)
Pace Factor: 92.7 (T-18th)
Highest PER: Yao Ming (22.74)
• Luis Scola, acquired in what was effectively a salary dump by San Antonio, played all 82 games, averaged 12.3 points and 8.8 boards and dominated the more heralded LaMarcus Aldridge in the first round of the playoffs.
• Ron Artest, acquired for a late first-round draft pick and a couple of deadweight salaries, did exactly what the Rockets hoped (on the court, at least) by providing a shot-creator to help out Yao and playing exquisite defense on the perimeter.
• Aaron Brooks, picked up with a late first-round draft choice, emerged as the starting point guard halfway through the year and tormented both Portland and the Lakers with his quickness in the playoffs.
• Von Wafer, picked up from the scrap heap in the offseason, averaged a point every two minutes in becoming a strikingly effective scorer off the bench.
• Carl Landry, acquired with a second-round draft choice, scored nearly as often as Wafer while shooting 57.4 percent from the floor.
The Rockets added one more name to that list at the trade deadline, sending Rafer Alston to Orlando and somehow landing Kyle Lowry from Memphis out of the deal. Lowry has his warts, but he is 10 years younger than Alston and a great defender, and he draws fouls by the bundle. He became the latest example of Houston's manufacturing a useful player from limited resources.
Unfortunately, the Rockets' big-money guys let them down. Most notably, McGrady soaked up $20 million in salary but played only 35 games, and I'm using the loosest possible definition of the word "play" here -- half the time he seemed disappointed that the game was carving a few hours from his busy schedule.
Battier, who has become something of a "Moneyball" icon due to his extraordinary plus-minus stats the past few seasons, missed 21 games and labored through foot problems in many others, resulting in a much more mortal plus-minus number. Yao, of course, played extremely well until the unfortunate injury in the Lakers series, and one still wonders if Houston might have been able to pull the upset had he stayed upright.
Offensively, the Rockets were a strong 3-point shooting team that ranked fifth in 3-point frequency (.254 3-point attempts per field-goal attempt) and 10th in accuracy. The Rockets can thank all the attention Yao drew for those numbers, but they did little else well. In particular, the perimeter players kept firing up bricks when they weren't hitting 3s. The top four Rockets in shot attempts per game after Yao were Artest, McGrady, Alston and Brooks, who shot 40.1, 38.8, 37.0 and 40.4 percent, respectively.
Defensively, the Rockets were much stronger, playing a conservative style designed to prevent free throw attempts and 3-pointers. Houston rated 28th in forcing turnovers, but finished second only to San Antonio in opponent free throw frequency (.257 free throw attempts per field-goal attempt) and permitted the fourth-fewest 3-point attempts (19.3 percent of opponent field-goal attempts).
In one aspect, the Rockets got just plain lucky. Houston opponents shot only 74.9 percent from the line, the worst mark in the NBA. This wasn't because Houston "defended" free throws better than the opposition; this was just a gift from the basketball gods. Relative to the league average of 77.1 percent, Houston saved 38 points over the course of the season, or nearly half a point a game. As such, the free throw discrepancy was worth about 1.28 wins.
Offseason Moves
It was a busy offseason in Houston, especially after learning that Yao's recovery from the foot injury would not be a speedy one. The Rockets expect him to miss the entire season and the hope is that he can come back to his former level in 2010-11, but it's tricky enough that there are no guarantees. Meanwhile, Mutombo retired from his knee injury. The news on McGrady is better: He's shown enough progress over the summer that it's possible he'll return by opening night. It remains questionable how much zip he'll have left in his step, not to mention how much zest for the game he retains.
As a result, the Rockets spent the summer focused more on the future than on the present, spending nearly $9 million to acquire the rights to four young players while letting a few older ones move on.
Let Von Wafer leave and drafted Chase Budinger, Jermaine Taylor and Sergio Llull. Wafer got a good deal in Greece and decided to make the leap, leaving a scoring hole in the Houston bench. Houston drafted three players at his position, paying $6 million in total to acquire the rights to Budinger, Taylor and Llull as second-round picks on draft day. Llull has the most promise of the three but will stay in Europe for the time being, while Budinger and Taylor will compete for a rotation spot.
Let Ron Artest leave and signed Trevor Ariza for five years, $36 million. One of Houston's biggest decisions was making what effectively was a trade of small forwards with the Lakers, deciding to allow Artest to move on and signing Ariza to a five-year deal for the full midlevel exception. It made all kinds of sense for Houston, as Artest's antics were much easier to deal with on a short-term deal on a club with championship aspirations than on the rebuilding team that Houston carries into the coming season.
Ariza is a much better fit because he's still young (24) and still improving. While it's totally unrealistic to expect him to shoot the way he did in the playoffs -- he's a 29.9 percent career 3-point shooter -- he should provide an effective long-term solution at small forward. Houston also caught a break when the league granted an injury exception for Yao prior to Ariza's signing, enabling the Rockets to slot Ariza into the injury exception and pursue other players with their midlevel.
Traded for rights to David Andersen, signed him for three years, $7.5 million. The Rockets paid Atlanta $3 million and relinquished a second-round draft pick to get their mitts on Andersen, who has been one of Europe's most productive big men for the past half-decade. His translated European stats from the past several seasons show a PER in the 12-14 range. He's a consistent midrange shooter and can hit face up J's with a hand in his face, but he's the archetypal European softie and a subpar rebounder and defender. Only the first two years are guaranteed, so he's a decent gamble to supplement the frontcourt, especially since the team needs more offense.
Signed Pops Mensah-Bonsu to a one-year deal for the minimum. An athletic big man who can really rebound, Mensah-Bonsu adds another undersized big man to the Rockets' growing contingent: He's a 6-foot-9, 235-pound center. Signing Mensah-Bonsu gives the Rockets 17 players under contract, but it's likely that two older veterans with expiring deals -- Brent Barry and Brian Cook -- will either be bought out or traded to bring Houston back to the league roster limit of 15.
Traded James White to Denver for the rights to Axel Hervelle. The Rockets dealt White, a promising prospect who was among the best players in the D-League last season, because they had 17 players and 15 roster spots. Mainly they saved a bit of money, but unlike a lot of Europeans you see thrown into these deals, Hervelle isn't dead weight. He's a Belgian rebounding power forward who could plausibly crack an NBA roster at some point.
Biggest Strength: Wing Defense
The Rockets may not be as imposing as they were a year ago at the defensive end, but they're still going to be vexing for high-scoring wing players. Houston can throw a tag team of defenders at opposing 2s and 3s led by Battier, who should be fully recovered from last year's foot problems. His length at 6-8 makes him a huge obstacle for shooters, but it's his intelligence as a defender that really sets him apart: He's a master of forcing opponents into long 2s and then making a late challenge around their eyes.
Behind him is Ariza, another long 6-8 wing who adds the ability to zip into passing lanes for steals and blaze in from the weak side for blocked shots, and McGrady, who isn't exactly renowned for his intensity but causes problems with his sheer length at 6-8. Another factor here when the Rockets go small is Lowry, who is undersized at 6-0 but tough as nails and eminently capable of guarding 2s when opponents go with small backcourt combos.
Biggest Weakness: Frontcourt Size
Once Yao went out, the obvious difference in the Lakers series was Houston's Lilliputian frontline going up against 7-0 Pau Gasol and 7-1 Andrew Bynum. With Yao gone for the entire year, look for more of the same. Scola and Landry, Houston's likely starting frontcourt, each are listed at 6-9, and I emphasize "listed at" -- Landry in particular is more like 6-7. They're backed up by the even smaller Chuck Hayes, who at 6-6 is unquestionably the league's shortest center.
Andersen, at 7-0, is the only healthy player on the roster taller than 6-9, and he weighs just 235 pounds and abhors contact. Otherwise, it's more of the same in the Houston frontcourt: Deep reserves include 6-9 Cook and Mensah-Bonsu and 6-8 Joey Dorsey.
This is likely going to create problems against big teams like the Lakers, as neither Scola nor Landry has the size to defend top-notch post players without ac ulating fouls. The presence of Yao and Mutombo largely insulated the Rockets from such pairings a year ago, but they won't have that protective cover this time around.
Outlook
Houston will unquestionably slide in the standings from a year ago. While the Artest-Ariza trade is at worst a wash, the same can't be said for the Yao-Andersen swap. Additionally, the Rockets took a step back on the bench by deciding to build for the future with White, Budinger and Taylor rather than re-signing Wafer and targeting another player with the leftover portion of their midlevel exception.
In particular, it's not clear how they're going to score. Scola, Ariza and Brooks will put up decent numbers and the vastly underrated Landry could be poised for a breakout year, but the bench has less fizz than day-old champagne and the lack of a go-to star will strain all the others to force up shots they wouldn't otherwise take. The early return of McGrady won't provide a panacea either, as he had been in a steady descent prior to the injury and will be working his way back into game shape.
Houston will still defend, despite its size disadvantage up front, and it's a given that Rick Adelman will squeeze as much from this roster as it can give. But the Western Conference is a cruel place to compete with an All-Star center sitting behind the bench in civilian clothes, so it's likely to be a difficult year in Houston. A strong return from McGrady could propel the Rockets to a playoff spot and yet another first-round exit, but that's about the ceiling here.
Prediction: 37-45, 4th in Southwest Division, 9th in Western Conference
Originally Published: September 28, 2009
2009-10 Forecast: Utah Jazz
Utah opened its wallet to keep the core intact, but how much return will it see?
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Rocky Widner/NBAE/Getty ImagesDeron Williams and the Jazz are looking to bounce back from an injury-plagued season.
GO TO: 2008-09 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
2008-09 Recap
It wasn't supposed to turn out like this. A Jazz nucleus that made the conference finals in 2007 and took the eventual conference champion Lakers to six tough games in 2008 was poised to take the final step in 2009. With all the key players in their prime and a few younger ones emerging, all eyes were on Utah to push for a spot in the Finals.
Instead, the Jazz struggled with injuries and inconsistency all season and never quite found a rhythm. Star point guard Deron Williams labored through an ankle injury in the first half of the year while All-Star forward Carlos Boozer missed 45 games with knee and hamstring problems. Utah managed to tread water in spite of it all, as reserve forward Paul Millsap replaced Boozer and played so well that he nearly made the All-Star team. A 12-game winning streak in February put them at 41-23 just as Boozer returned and, seemingly, left them poised to claim the division le and make a deep playoff run.
That's when the Jazz unveiled their worst surprise. Utah went 7-11 over its final 18 games -- including embarrassing home losses to injury-riddled Minnesota and Golden State squads -- to fall to the No. 8 seed in the Western Conference. In the postseason, it fell in five easy games to L.A., with all four losses coming by double digits. In short, the Jazz were far less threatening than advertised, going 8-15 in the final 23 contests.
In that stretch, they went 2-12 on the road, and that's part of a larger, troubling trend. Utah was 33-8 at home but 15-26 on the road, the largest home-road split in the league, and it marked the second straight season the Jazz claimed that honor. In the 2007-08 season, the split was actually worse: 37-4 at home, but 17-24 on the road. Over the past two seasons, their 38-game differential is far and away the league's largest. Their 70-12 home record is tied with Boston for the league's best in that span, but their road record is just 13th (see chart).
Biggest home-road differential, 2007-08 and 2008-09
Team Home W-L Road W-L Difference Utah 70-12 32-50 +38 Dallas 66-16 35-47 +31 Portland 62-20 33-49 +29 Atlanta 56-26 28-54 +28 Denver 66-16 38-44 +28
Playing on the road was one thing, but the Jazz also struggled in back-to-backs. Actually "struggled" is putting it mildly; they became an expansion team, going 4-18 on the second night of a back-to-back. It doesn't seem obvious why -- the Jazz were one of the league's deeper teams, so if anything, they should have thrived in that situation.
One key reason the Jazz underperformed was because their offense wasn't nearly as potent as it was the previous season -- Utah finished ninth in offensive efficiency after ranking second in 2007-08. The injuries to Williams and Boozer obviously were factors, but so was the lack of an outside threat. The Jazz ranked 27th in both 3-point attempts per field goal attempt and in 3-point accuracy; combine those two data points, and only Oklahoma City and Philadelphia had a less threatening perimeter game.
Utah still punished opponents inside, of course -- a fixture of the Jazz attack under Jerry Sloan -- and ranked second in the NBA in free throw rate. The Jazz finished fourth in 2-point field goal percentage, too, and had they complemented that inside power with more 3s, they would have been a devastating offensive force. Instead, they ranked seventh in true shooting percentage, not nearly good enough for an offensive team with le aspirations.
HOLLINGER'S '08-09 STATS
W-L: 48-34 (Pythagorean W-L: 50-32)
Offensive Efficiency: 107.1 (9th)
Defensive Efficiency: 104.7 (12th)
Pace Factor: 95.6 (10th)
Highest PER: Deron Williams (21.13)
Defensively, the Jazz were their usual middling selves. As ever, they fouled at an unusually high rate, though they've dialed it back enough in recent years that they no longer annually lead the league. Utah was 26th in opponent free throw rate, and as a result, 19th in opponent TS%. Despite ranking third in forcing turnovers, their opponents' high TS% doomed the Jazz to a 12th-place finish in defensive efficiency -- again, a good showing, but below expectations for a team that hoped to win the West.
To complete the disappointing tone of the season, the Jazz also suffered a huge loss off the court -- the death of beloved owner Larry Miller. The team now is under the aegis of his son, Greg; so far, at least, not much has changed.
Offseason Moves
As with several teams this summer, Utah found its offseason colored heavily by two words that have nothing to do with basketball: luxury tax. With Deron Williams' maximum extension kicking in this season and the luxury tax level taking a slight dip, the Jazz suddenly found themselves well above the threshold. They hoped to move under it because Boozer, Mehmet Okur and Kyle Korver all had the ability to opt out of their contracts; somewhat to the team's surprise, all three opted to stay in Utah and play out the final year.
As a result of those decisions and matching an offer sheet to Millsap, the Jazz enter training camp about $14 million over the luxury tax threshold. They've never paid the tax before, and as a small-market team, aren't terribly well-equipped to take the hit. Fortunately, their financial foundation is otherwise solid, so they may swallow the bitter pill to keep the nucleus together.
On the other hand, if the team struggles, it makes little sense to keep Boozer's $12 million deal on the books -- at a cost of $24 million when the tax is included -- and the Jazz are likely to donate him to a team sitting under the cap if that situation arises.
But one thing they're unlikely to do, regardless of cost, is trade what has become an incredibly valuable asset -- a completely unprotected first-round draft pick from the Knicks in 2010. Utah acquired the pick several years ago, but looking at the Knicks' roster, it could very well end up being the first pick in the draft.
Aside from widespread debate about whether the team could handle the tax and if or when Boozer would be traded, very little happened in Salt Lake City this summer:
Drafted Eric Maynor and Goran Suton. Maynor will take over as the backup point guard after veterans Brevin Knight and Ronnie Price failed in that role last season. He's a savvy four-year player who doesn't have great upside, but as a 10-minute-a-night game manager, he provides decent value for the 20th pick. Plus, he's big enough that he might be able to pair with Williams in small backcourts at times. Second-round pick Suton surprised many by not playing in Europe to develop his skills; instead he will compete for a roster spot in training camp.
Matched Portland's four-year, $32 million offer sheet for Millsap. This was far and away the biggest decision of the summer, as it all but ensured the Jazz would pay a large luxury tax bill. The Blazers front-loaded the offer to maximize their division rival's financial pain, but for the Jazz, preserving the asset was more important than avoiding the tax. Basketball-wise, that perspective makes tons of sense. The Jazz were looking to a post-Boozer future after this season (or perhaps sooner if they trade him), and Millsap is the obvious successor at the position given how well he played a year ago.
Announced Matt Harpring would miss training camp. Harpring is staying home and will reportedly check back in six weeks on the progress of his troublesome knee and ankle injuries. While it seems highly likely he will end up retiring, neither he nor the Jazz has gone there yet.
On the court, it's a blow more stylistically than in terms of quality. Harpring's stats declined last season, but his physicality was one of the defining traits of Jazz basketball. With Kosta Koufos -- who is bigger and more skilled, but far less physical -- replacing him in the rotation, Jazz games will less resemble human pinball this season.
Incidentally, if Harpring can't play, the Jazz won't be eligible for any kind of medical exception to sidestep the luxury tax, except in the unlikely event he agrees to a buyout for less than the $6.5 million he's owed. They could get an injured player exception from the league worth $6.5 million to sign another player, but it would count against their tax assessment.
Biggest Strength: Interior Offense
The Jazz will once again pound the ball down opponents' throats, and few clubs are more qualified to attack this way. Up front, Utah overpowers opponents with the three-pronged attack of Okur, Boozer and Millsap, with each being a potent scorer. Boozer is the best of the bunch when healthy, as he combines tremendous strength and leaping ability with a decent shooting touch and arguably the best weak-hand finishing skills in the game. Okur is no slouch either -- while the 6-11 pivot man tends to hang out on the perimeter, he's one of the best shooting big men in basketball and supplements those points with a steady diet of putbacks.
Behind them is Millsap, who could win the league's Sixth Man award this year. Despite being a bit undersized and lacking a perimeter game, he's so powerful and athletic around the basket that opponents struggle to contain him. He was phenomenal as a replacement starter for Boozer, racking up 19 straight double-doubles at one point, and should see starter-type minutes despite coming off the bench.
Finally, don't forget about Koufos. The 7-footer played very well in his limited minutes a year ago and should see a lot more playing time with Harpring and Jarron Collins no longer on the roster.
That covers the frontcourt, but that's not the whole story. Utah's guards are nearly as good around the basket as the big men. Ronnie Brewer shot 55.8 percent and 50.9 percent the past two seasons largely by feasting on layups; few players are better at cutting off the ball. And at the point, the 6-3 Williams is a strong finisher who relentlessly attacks the paint, either setting up others or getting himself a layup and/or free throws.
Biggest Weakness: Wing Shooting
Utah is loaded at point guard and power forward and pretty well set at center too, leaving the wing positions as the major question marks. Those two spots are also largely responsible for the paucity of 3-point shooting the past few seasons, a major weakness since it's allowed opponents to pack in their defenses to stifle Utah's forays into the paint.
The biggest magnet for criticism is small forward Andrei Kirilenko, who came off the bench for most of last season but may return to a starting role this season. He's making $17 million a year but has played much better as a running power forward his entire career -- probably because he's a 30.8 percent career 3-point shooter and seems like a fish out of water on the perimeter.
It doesn't help that Brewer has the same issues. He's at 22.9 percent on 3s for his career and rarely even attempts them; when he and Kirilenko share the court together, it lets opponents double the paint with impunity.
As a result, the Jazz frequently turn to Korver and C.J. Miles. Korver is the best shooter of the bunch but the least skilled in other phases, and his 39.0 percent mark on 3-pointers last season wasn't strong enough for a one-trick pony. Miles got a promotion to the starting lineup but proved disappointing and may relinquish that job this season -- he struggled on defense and too often settled for contested long jumpers.
The best resolution would be to trade Boozer for a strong marksman on the wings and move Kirilenko to the 4, a move that would put Utah in a much stronger position to succeed offensively. Until such an event happens, however, Utah's wings are unlikely to scare opponents from packing in the defense to stop the power game.
Outlook
Much of Utah's projection depends on how the Boozer situation resolves itself, and that's still the biggest unknown heading into the season. Boozer seemed less than enthusiastic about staying in Utah and the feeling appears to be mutual, but his contract and impending free agency makes him extremely difficult to move -- especially if the Jazz are looking mainly to unload his salary obligation.
In this case, all we can do is evaluate the Jazz based on the current roster. On that basis, it appears they have three-fifths of a championship team. Williams is rock-solid at the point, obviously, and the Boozer-Millsap-Okur-Koufos frontcourt can hang with any in the league offensively. Unfortunately, they didn't get nearly enough from the wing positions last season, and with the same four players returning, it doesn't seem that situation will improve.
If so, the Jazz will have a top-10 offense but not a top-3 one, and they need it to be the latter to challenge the West's elite because the defense is merely average. Roster changes stemming from the Boozer situation could alter this outlook for better or for worse, but at the moment, their prospects look only marginally better than last season's.
Prediction: 50-32, 3rd place in Northwest Division, 6th in Western Conference
Originally Published: September 28, 2009
2009-10 Forecast: Washington Wizards
A healthy Agent Zero has D.C. thinking le, but the Wiz may be in for a reality check
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Randy Belice/NBAE/Getty ImagesNo pain, no gain: Gilbert Arenas has worked his way back with some help from trainer Tim Grover.
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2008-09 Recap
About the worst-case scenario for an NBA team is to commit a boatload of long-term dollars to a nucleus and then have it suddenly become terrible. That became reality for the Wizards last season as they spent $111 million to retain Gilbert Arenas and another $50 million to keep Antawn Jamison only to finish with the worst record in the East at 19-63.
Arenas' health was the main story of the season, as the knee injury that wrecked his 2007-08 campaign didn't heal in time for him to participate much -- he played only two late-season games. That begs the question of why the Wizards would commit such huge dollars to a quickness-dependent player with knee problems, a line of inquiry that may only increase given that five years remain on his deal.
Arenas' problem wasn't the only one. Washington hoped to contend for the playoffs even in his absence, much as the Wizards had done a year earlier. Instead they were horrible right out of the gate and never got better. Coach Eddie Jordan was fired with the team 1-10 and replacement Ed Tapscott did little to inspire the troops. The Wizards, who were never a motivated defensive team even in the best of times, barely showed up on many nights and finished 29th in defensive efficiency.
HOLLINGER'S '08-09 STATS
W-L: 19-63 (Pythagorean W-L: 18-64)
Offensive Efficiency: 102.3 (26th)
Defensive Efficiency: 111.2 (29th)
Pace Factor: 93.4 (17th)
Highest PER: Antawn Jamison (20.63)
Matters worsened with a spate of injuries -- though Jamison played his usual 82 games, Brendan Haywood missed all but six games with a wrist injury, DeShawn Stevenson exited after 32 miserable games due to a back problem, Caron Butler sat out 15 games and, as per usual, Etan Thomas missed nearly the entire season.
Washington made a trade to try to salvage the point guard spot but only made its problems worse. The Wizards sent Antonio Daniels to New Orleans and a conditional first-round pick to Memphis in return for Mike James and Javaris Crittenton. Although Daniels' usefulness had declined, he did offer some value as a combo guard off the bench, and his absence was noticeable. James was just flat out awful, hoisting terrible shots and defending poorly even by this team's standards. Meanwhile, Crittenton showed some promise but his career remains stuck thanks to a dreadful outside shot and iffy instincts at the rim. As bad as he was, he was a far sight better than James, and it remains one of life's great mysteries how the latter was allowed to start 50 games.
Despite the injuries and the unproductive trade, there was no excuse for Washington to be this bad. In addition to Jamison and Butler, the Wizards had a solid stash of young talent. First-round pick JaVale McGee proved a revelation as an athletic, scoring center; second-year pro Dominic McGuire was one of the year's few positive stories in emerging as a defensive stopper; and wingman Nick Young showed progress as a scoring sixth man.
Highest pct. assisted baskets allowed
Team Opp. Assist/FG Washington .637 Lakers .608 New Jersey .607 Clippers .606 Milwaukee .606
Unfortunately, virtually everyone on the roster possessed the same strengths and weaknesses. Offensively, the Wizards hoisted the first jump shot they saw whether it was a good one or not, even though many of their players were below-average shooters. Washington took more shots per possession than the league average, but finished 29th in 3-point shooting and 27th in true shooting percentage.
Defensively, the Wizards were a point guard's dream opponent, and not only because James was guarding them. Washington allowed assists on 63.7 percent of opponent baskets, far and away the highest percentage in the league, and that was a good indicator of how easy it was for opposing penetrators to carve up its defense for an open shot.
Worst opponent TS percentage, 2008-09
Team Opponent TS% Washington .571 Sacramento .571 Milwaukee .562 Minnesota .561 Memphis .560
The Wizards allowed 3-point attempts on 26.5 percent of opponent shots, also the highest figure in the league, as basic drive-and-kick and pick-and-pop plays routinely flummoxed their young frontcourt players.
Opponents nailed 38.7 percent of those tries, placing the Wizards 27th in the league (but an improvement on their 29th-place standing against 2-point shots), and for that reason they were dead last in another metric, as well -- opponent true shooting percentage.
It wasn't just the young bigs, though -- there was plenty of blame to go around. While the young players -- particularly McGee, Young and Andray Blatche -- struggled to learn their assignments, the veterans appeared to pack it in once it became apparent Washington wouldn't contend.
Offseason Moves
One can conjure many potential responses to a 19-win season -- "Let's go all in for the championship!" isn't one of them. Yet that was the Wizards' approach to the struggles of 2008-09, as owner Abe Pollin signed off on going well into the luxury tax and the Wizards sought to supplement their roster with veteran help that could push them deep into the postseason.
Depending on one's point of view, this is either a heartening change from the usual salary-dumping and cost-cutting that most of the league's bottom half underwent this summer, or a delusional, misguided and expensive effort. Washington will pay nearly $10 million in luxury tax for a team that won 19 games a year ago. If the Wizards don't succeed early, it will be interesting to see if they keep the faith or start shedding salaries since they have until the trade deadline to scoot under the tax line.
Hired Flip Saunders. Say what you want about the Wizards' other personnel moves, but there's no arguing with this one. Saunders was the best coach available, with the only critique being that he's never won a championship. Alas, few active coaches have, what with Phil Jackson and Gregg Popovich monopolizing 14 of the past 19 les and retired coaches (Pat Riley, Rudy Tomjanovich) claiming three of the five others.
Saunders boasts a .597 career winning percentage and was fired from his last gig for the sin of losing to a better team in the conference finals. His impact is subtle, but he's one of the league's most skillful users of zone defenses, while offensively his squads have been notable for their low turnover rates.
Traded Darius Songaila, Oleksiy Pecherov, Etan Thomas, and the No. 5 pick for Mike Miller and Randy Foye. This draft-day deal set the stage for everything else that took place this offseason, as the Wizards sent an early signal that they wouldn't be retrenching. The deal was cap-neutral but sent out the fifth overall pick in the draft -- one that would become Spanish phenom Ricky Rubio -- to bring back backcourt help in Miller and Foye.
Certainly Washington needed the assistance. Foye is capable of playing the point should Arenas' knee problems resurface, while Miller's long-range shooting and underrated passing ability should help provide space and shots for everyone else. Washington lost three frontcourt players in the trade, but with youngsters like Blatche and McGee pushing for more minutes and Haywood returning from injury, those three players were unlikely to play much anyway.
Signed Fabricio Oberto to a one-year, $2.1 million deal. Washington needed a veteran big man to supplement the rotation, so it was a justifiable decision. However, they paid a bit much for Oberto's services considering his rapid decline the past two seasons and infrequent availability due to a heart problem (besides, didn't they already go through this with Thomas?). If Oberto can teach McGee and Blatche the dark arts of clutching, grabbing and flopping, he'll justify the expense, but on the court he's just six more fouls.
Biggest Strength: Creating Shots
Washington certainly doesn't lack for players who can create offense, so the Wizards will never have to fret about a declining shot clock. Even though he's a question mark coming back from the knee injury, Arenas has to head the list because of his ability to generate shots with his quickness and long-range shooting ability. He's arguably the best in the league in end-of-quarter situations, where he usually generates a good look at the last possible instant. If his quickness bounces back, he's one of the best one-on-one players in basketball.
Butler also is adept at generating clean looks from a standstill, using a crossover move to free himself for his deadly midrange jumpers. Jamison operates a bit differently, moving without the ball to free himself for quick daggers in the paint, but the result is the same -- he can produce a clean look with little help.
Those three are the core, but several others have proven capable of creating offense, as well. Young had some big scoring games off the bench, and while he needs to get better at noticing the other four guys sharing the court with him, he can rise over just about any defender for midrange jumpers. Blatche is another capable scorer, as he has a high skill level for his size and is comfortable attacking opposing big men from the perimeter. Finally, newcomers Foye and Miller can produce offense, as well.
Biggest Weakness: Defense
No surprise here -- it's only been the team's biggest weakness for half a decade now. The Wizard have lots of capable offensive players, as they did throughout the Michael Jordan area, but that netted them only 45, 42, 41 and 43 wins in the four seasons preceding last year's debacle. Even with the trio of Arenas, Butler and Jamison firing on all cylinders, Washington could outscore its opponent only about half the time because its defense was so soft.
Little has changed on that front. Arenas has the skills to be an outstanding defender but has never shown much interest in becoming one, while Butler's effort slackened noticeably last season after Washington fell out of the race. Jamison is a below-average defender, as well, particularly from the help side, and with those three all providing little effort, the burden falls on the Wizards' secondary players to defend well.
As a result, there's little reason for encouragement. Haywood's return will be important, as he's been one of the league's most underrated defenders the past several seasons, but the other frontcourt players were clueless on D a year ago. McGuire is the only perimeter player who has shown a zest for defense, but he may not play much given the additions of Miller and Foye.
Outlook
The additions of Arenas, Miller and Foye has to hearten Wizards fans -- last year they had the worst backcourt in the league, but the return of Agent Zero and the other new blood should turn this spot from a glaring weakness to a strength. Arenas reportedly looked very good in offseason workouts now that his injury has had enough time to heal, so it's reasonable to think he can score more than 20 points a game and stay on the floor for 70 games or so.
Saunders' arrival is another encouraging sign, as he's likely to spend more effort improving the defense than his predecessors did and may be able to coax better results. Don't expect miracles, but between Saunders' arrival and Haywood's return, the Wizards won't be 29th in defensive efficiency this time around.
That said, it's time to pull back for a reality check. This team won 19 games a year ago, and even with the additions it doesn't appear to be any kind of threat to the conference's elite. Washington won in the low 40s the other four years they had the Arenas-Butler-Jamison nucleus together, and this time around Arenas may not score at such a prolific rate.
Overall, there are reasons for optimism looking forward. The coaching situation appears strong, the Wizards have several promising young players and Arenas finally appears healthy again. That should be enough to get Washington back to the playoffs, but expecting anything beyond that seems unreasonable. Whether a first-round exit is worth a $10 million luxury-tax bill is up to Abe Pollin, but I'm guessing he had higher hopes when he signed off on it.
Prediction: 41-41, 3rd in Southeast Division, 6th in Eastern Conference
Originally Published: September 28, 2009
2009-10 Forecast: Denver Nuggets
Can last year's postseason surprise make it two seasons in a row?
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Noah Graham/NBAE via Getty ImagesChauncey Billups pulled things together for the Nuggets last season. Can Denver make another push?
GO TO: 2008-09 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
2008-09 Recap
We all make preseason predictions based on the most-likely scenarios, but events can veer dramatically toward the unlikely once the games start. Last year's Nuggets were a perfect example. Just when expectations were at a low ebb -- not one of ESPN.com's prognosticators had them making the playoffs -- opportunity and fortune combined to yield their best season in franchise history.
Expected to take a step back after an offseason of shedding salary -- most notably the donation of Marcus Camby to the Clippers -- the Nuggets defied all predictions. They benefited from having Chauncey Billups dropped in their laps in the first week of the season and rode career years from Nene and Chris Andersen to a wholly unexpected trip to the conference finals, where they made the Lakers sweat for the better part of five games before suc bing in six.
HOLLINGER'S '08-09 STATS
W-L: 54-28 (Pythagorean W-L: 52-21)
Offensive Efficiency: 107.5 (7th)
Defensive Efficiency: 103.5 (8th)
Pace Factor: 96.8 (5th)
Highest PER: Carmelo Anthony (19.09)
Unquestionably, the catalyst for the turnaround was the trade of Allen Iverson for Billups and Antonio McDyess in the first week of the season. That trade accomplished three things. First and foremost, it replaced a declining Iverson with a better player in Billups. Second, it made the rest of the roster work because the Nuggets finally had a true point guard -- meaning J.R. Smith and Dahntay Jones could get in the mix at the 2 without compromising the ballhandling, and the team didn't have to lean so heavily on veteran retread Anthony Carter at the point.
Third, and less acknowledged, is that it pushed the Nuggets under the luxury tax. The third player in that trade, McDyess, agreed to a very favorable buyout with the Nuggets that dramatically reduced Denver's cap number. After a couple of moves later in the season (most notably trading Chucky Atkins to Oklahoma City), the Nuggets found themselves just under the tax threshold.
In other words, they cut big chunks of salary and still got better, an unlikely scenario made possible by the Billups trade and two other equally improbable developments -- the big years from Nene and Andersen. Nene had missed most of the previous season undergoing cancer treatment, while Andersen was coming off a two-year suspension for violating the league's drug policy. Neither was a great bet to stay healthy or productive, let alone both. But Nene averaged 14.1 points while finishing second in the league in shooting percentage at 60.4 percent, and Andersen compiled the highest blocked-shot rate in basketball to become a game-changing force off the bench.
All of these developments allowed the Nuggets to thrive despite an off year from Carmelo Anthony, who struggled with elbow problems before exploding during Denver's playoff run. Combined with a down year for several other Western powers, the Nuggets unexpectedly found themselves the second playoff seed in the West.
FTA per FGA: 2008-09 leaders
Team FTA/FGA Denver .382 Utah .355 Orlando .351 Philadelphia .339 Golden State .339
Statistically, Denver defied its long-held reputation for poor shot selection -- in fact, the Nuggets were a high-percentage offensive outfit that won by getting to the line. Denver finished third in the NBA in true shooting percentage, with their knack for drawing fouls doing the bulk of the heavy lifting. The Nuggets averaged .382 free throw attempts per field goal attempt, far and away the best mark in the league (see chart), and they can thank the newcomers for that. Billups, Nene, Andersen and Jones (a preseason pickup off the scrap heap) all ranked among the top dozen players at their position in free throw rate.
While Denver shot efficiently, it didn't shoot particularly often. The Nuggets produced ordinary turnover and rebound numbers, which is why they ranked seventh in offensive efficiency despite the third-best true shooting percentage.
At the defensive end, the Nuggets exhibited similar tendencies. In a big departure from the previous two seasons, they were only average at forcing turnovers -- because Iverson's departure and a few other changes dramatically reduced the gambling in the passing lanes. They were subpar on the defensive glass, too, where Nene, Andersen and Kenyon Martin were a bit undersized up front.
Percent of opp. shots blocked: '08-09 best
Team FTA/FGA Denver 7.30 Orlando 7.25 L.A. Clippers 7.08 Miami 7.03 Cleveland 6.75
Nevertheless, they rated fourth in 2-point field goal defense, primarily because of their shot-blocking. Denver led the NBA by blocking 7.3 percent of opponent shots. It's hard to overstate Andersen's importance here -- take away his whopping 4.79 blocks per 40 minutes and the Nuggets go from first to 29th -- but Nene and Martin contributed an equal number of rejections and everybody on the roster sent back at least a dozen shots.
Unfortunately, two weaknesses came back to bite them in the conference finals -- a lack of a defensive stopper to check Kobe Bryant, and a lack of frontcourt size to deal with Pau Gasol and Andrew Bynum. Jones was great for a minimum-wage pickup but underequipped to stop the West's leading scorer, while Nene (6-foot-11), Martin (6-9) and Andersen (6-10) all gave up both inches and pounds to their L.A. counterparts. Even with those shortcomings, Denver fought L.A. to a draw in the first four games and had a working lead in the second half of the fifth before its dream season finally ran out of steam.
Offseason Moves
Denver's salary situation isn't getting any better, as the ills of the Kenyon Martin contract in particular have left them scrambling to reorganize the balance sheet. The Nuggets will almost certainly pay luxury tax this year but strained desperately to try to minimize the bill, staying out of the free-agent market except to ink their own free agents or sign minimum deals.
This is contrary to the behavior of most of the other contenders, who spent the offseason stocking up their arsenals while the Nuggets stood by idly. Part of the logic is that their situation gets much worse a year from now. Denver's starting five alone could be a luxury-tax team a year from now -- Billups, Smith, Anthony, Nene and Martin will combine to make $64 million, possibly exceeding the projected tax line -- so the Nuggets could be looking at two straight years of writing big checks to the league.
All of this leads one to wonder if management will start shedding salary if the Nuggets get off to a disappointing start. Unlike the L.A.s and Bostons of the world, Denver doesn't have the revenues to compensate for paying the tax -- it's strictly a favor from owner Stan Kroenke. As long as the Nuggets keep winning, however, expect them to stay in the tax the next two seasons.
Traded a future first-round pick to Minnesota for the rights to Ty Lawson. This was an astute move to fill the backup point guard spot with one of the most undervalued commodities in the draft. Lawson's output at North Carolina was phenomenal and I was shocked he fell all the way to 18th. In nabbing Lawson, the Nuggets get a successor to Billups and an immediate replacement for Anthony Carter.
Let Dahntay Jones go, traded a future second-round pick to Detroit for Arron Afflalo, Walter Sharpe and cash. The Afflalo trade was basically a salary dump by the Pistons that allowed the Nuggets to replace Jones (who got a ridiculous contract from Indiana) with a younger defensive stopper who shoots better. Afflalo isn't of Jones' caliber athletically, but he should easily replace his production and space the floor better because of his superior long-range shooting.
Traded Sonny Weems and Walter Sharpe to Milwaukee for Malik Allen. This was a cap-neutral deal that netted the Nuggets another big man, something they'll likely need since neither Nene, Martin nor Andersen has an outstanding track record of health. Allen is a replacement-level talent, but he's also paid like one.
Let Linas Kleiza go. This was a straight money issue for the Nuggets, who didn't have the ducats to fairly compensate Kleiza -- a fairly potent offensive player -- to play only 10 minutes a night behind Anthony. The good news is that he signed in Europe, so the Nuggets retain his rights as a restricted free agent and could very well re-sign him in two years when they don't have tax concerns.
Re-signed Anthony Carter and Johan Petro to one-year deals for the minimum. Denver filled out the roster by bringing back two vets at point guard and center. Carter is a bit of a security blanket for George Karl and tends to be in games when he shouldn't be (most notably, to throw away an inbounds pass at the end of Game 1 of the conference finals against the Lakers), but he's also an inexpensive fifth guard. Petro is a 7-footer who has disappointed with his lack of development but is only 23. His size could come in handy against the big centers who trouble Nene and Andersen.
Traded the rights to Axel Hervelle to Houston for James White. Hervelle is a long-forgotten Belgian forward drafted in 2005, but the Nuggets parlayed him into White when the Rockets found themselves with more players than roster spots. White was arguably the best player in the D-League a year ago and solves the Nuggets' need for another athletic wing player, so this was a solid pickup for Denver's second unit.
Biggest Strength: Starting five
Now that J.R. Smith will be promoted to the starting lineup, Denver's first quintet stacks up with any in basketball. Anthony comes off a poor year by his standards but has the highest ceiling of the bunch, and it's his ability to draw double-teams and find the open man (something he did with increasing enthusiasm as last season wore on) that can make the game easier for the Nuggets' role players.
Billups gets second billing on the marquee because of his ability to direct the game and get to the line while committing remarkably few turnovers, but Smith is nearly as dangerous a threat. A devastating long-range shooter who is still figuring things out at 24, he's shot 40 percent on 3s the past two seasons and will do better if he can overcome a pattern of slow starts to his seasons.
Up front, Nene and Martin complement the starters with finishing ability in the paint and speed in transition. Each can hit a face-up jumper, as well, helping spread the floor and create lanes for the others.
Interestingly, this five-man unit played only 163 minutes together last season, according to 82games.com, but in that time had a plus-63 scoring margin -- an advantage of nearly 19 points per game. While we can expect some regression to the mean in a larger sample of minutes this season, the Nuggets may enjoy some dominating first and third quarters with this group.
Biggest Weakness: Wing depth
Smith and Anthony make up a powerful scoring combo on the wings, but what happens when Denver digs into its bench or wants to go small with Anthony at the 4? Last year they had an answer to both questions in the form of Kleiza, but this year it's unclear where the points will come from.
Afflalo is an underrated defender and can make open shots, but he provides little in the way of creativity or athleticism. White, a D-League veteran who has yet to establish himself in the NBA, showed great promise last season but is at best an unknown quan y. The only other candidate on the roster is Renaldo Balkman, who is more of a 4 than a 3 because he can't shoot to save his life. The Nuggets may sign another player between now and the start of the season, but given that they're dealing with the remnants of the free-agent scrap heap, don't hold your breath waiting for a great solution.
Outlook
A lot of things went right for the Nuggets last year, and we shouldn't necessarily expect that good fortune to repeat itself. To wit, an injury-prone frontcourt was reasonably healthy, their compe ors in the West had setbacks and they were fortunate to finish seeded ahead of the Blazers, Rockets and Spurs despite an inferior scoring margin.
Additionally, the Nuggets' financial limitations prevent them from making some of the over-the-top moves we've seen from other contenders. While Denver still sits on a pair of huge trade exceptions from its cost-cutting moves of a year ago, it seems unlikely to utilize those assets and increase its luxury-tax bill.
That said, Denver has a couple of big items pointing in its favor. First of all, Anthony is likely to put up far better regular-season numbers than he did a year ago, as the elbow that plagued him for much of last season seems healed. Second, they'll have Billups for a full training camp this time around instead of trying to incorporate him during the first week of the season. And third, the addition of Lawson and promotion of Smith means that Denver can replace 3,200 minutes that went to two marginal players, Carter and Jones, a year ago with more productive talents.
Sum up those pros and cons and the Nuggets are right back where they started. Denver had the scoring margin of a 52-win team a year ago and that seems a fair prediction for where they'll end up again this year. Unfortunately, it's highly unlikely such performance will again yield a No. 2 seed in the West.
Prediction: 52-30, 2nd in Northwest Division, 4th in Western Conference
Originally Published: September 28, 2009
2009-10 Forecast: OKC Thunder
The future is certainly bright for KD and crew, but what about 2009-10?
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Layne Murdoch/NBAE/Getty ImagesKevin Durant and the Thunder no longer look like the 98-pound weaklings of the Western Conference.
GO TO: 2008-09 Recap | Offseason Moves | Biggest Strength/Weakness | Outlook
2008-09 Recap
Sometimes you have to look beyond the win-loss record to see where a team stands. The Thunder won only 23 games in their first season on the prairie, yet in many ways it was a hugely successful season, and their future seems as bright as any team in the league's.
It didn't seem this way at first, as the Oklahoma City era could hardly have started worse -- the Thunder were 3-29 after 32 games. But looking closer at this poor start reveals that few of the contributing factors were of long-term concern to the Thunder. Yes, two wings expected to make major contributions -- Damien Wilkins and Desmond Mason -- both played horribly, setting back the Thunder's hopes. At the point, it was a similar story, as Earl Watson labored through a thumb injury that threw off his shooting all season.
But those players weren't in the Thunder's long-term plans anyway. Those who were -- chiefly Kevin Durant, Jeff Green and Russell Westbrook -- were playing fairly well right out of the gate and continued to improve as the season went on, leaving the Thunder in a much more solid position than their early record indicated.
Oklahoma City strengthened its position by firing disciplinarian P.J. Carlesimo and replacing him with well-regarded assistant Scotty Brooks. Brooks made an important and productive decision almost immediately, moving Kevin Durant from shooting guard to small forward and Green from small forward to power forward. This proved to be a much better utilization of the Thunder's talent, and Durant in particular bloomed following the transition.
HOLLINGER'S '08-09 STATS
W-L: 23-59 (Pythagorean W-L: 22-60)
Offensive Efficiency: 99.9 (29th)
Defensive Efficiency: 106.9 (21st)
Pace Factor: 96.1 (8th)
Highest PER: Kevin Durant (20.85)
That helped the Thunder to a respectable 20-30 finish in their final 50 games, helped along by several personnel moves along the way. We normally think of talent acquisition as an offseason activity, but the Thunder were extremely active body-snatchers during the year. Oklahoma City signed Nenad Krstic to a three-year deal when he left his team in Russia, traded a future first-round pick to Chicago for Thabo Sefolosha to supplant the struggling Wilkins-Mason tandem on the wings, and added Shaun Livingston to the roster late in the year as a potential solution in the backcourt. Even in the second half of the year, the Thunder had their problems. Chief among them was a tendency to think the shot clock had 10 seconds instead of 24, with lots of wild shots early in possessions. Durant and Westbrook were the most frequent transgressors, but certainly not the only ones, and the results were disastrous for the offense: Oklahoma City finished eighth in the league in pace factor but last in 2-point shooting percentage.
Worst 2-point shooting pct., 2008-09
Team FG pct. Oklahoma City 46.3 L.A. Clippers 46.7 Milwaukee 46.7 Minnesota 46.7 Sacramento 47.2
A lack of outside shooting was another huge problem. While Durant shot well on 3s (42.2 percent), nobody else could space the floor for him. The Thunder were dead-last in the league in 3-point attempts per field goal attempt, with only 14.1 percent of their shots coming from beyond the arc (see chart). Oklahoma City was one of only two teams not to have a single player make at least 100 3s, and Durant and Green were the only ones to make more than 35.
That led to all sorts of problems in the half-court offense, as defenses felt free to crowd the paint, double Durant and force Oklahoma City to choose between tough, contested looks or jump shots by players who couldn't shoot.
Fewest 3s per field-goal attempt, 2008-09
Team 3s per 100 FGA Okla. City 14.1 Philadelphia 16.4 Detroit 16.5 Utah 16.9 Memphis 17.5
The Thunder played defense better than offense, despite a glaring lack of size in the middle that Krstic, still recovering from knee problems, failed to address in a meaningful way. One interesting aspect of their defensive activity was how good they were at stealing the ball, and how bad they were at any other means of forcing a turnover.
The Thunder stole the ball on 8.8 percent of opponent possessions, the highest rate in the league. But the Thunder created dead-ball turnovers only 5.6 percent of the time, placing them 28th out of the league's 30 teams, and overall they forced fewer turnovers than the league average. Oklahoma City's other defensive numbers weren't far off the league average, especially after Brooks took over and rescued Durant from nightly blow-bys against opposing shooting guards.
Across the board, the numbers screamed out the Thunder's youth and inexperience. They played too fast, shot too quickly and gambled too much on defense. Fortunately, all those youthful transgressions are easily remedied. Unfortunately, the only cure for them is time. They're getting better before our eyes, but experience was a painful teacher last season.
Offseason Moves
It was an eerily quiet summer in Oklahoma City. The Thunder had a raft of cap space, but given a weak free-agent market, they decided to hold their cards for next summer, when they could have as much as $15 million under the cap to pursue a much stronger free-agent crop. At that point, Oklahoma City could be a much more enticing free-agent destination, because the young players will be a year further along in the development process and the team could have two lottery picks (Phoenix's and their own) to supplement the free-agent haul.
The Thunder may also extend Sefolosha before the season starts, which may cut into their cap space but would lock up a quality defender for their nucleus, if the price is right.
Signed Serge Ibaka. A first-round pick in 2008, Ibaka played in a low-level league in Spain last season. It was a bit of a surprise to see the Thunder commit to the raw prospect from Congo this early, if only because it started the clock on his eventual free agency a year earlier and he doesn't seem able to contribute yet. The benefit, however, will be that he can play for the franchise-run D-League team in nearby Tulsa, permitting the Thunder much closer supervision over his development.
Drafted James Harden, B.J. Mullens, and Robert Vaden. Looking at the previous chapter on the Thunder's woes in field goal shooting and 3-point opportunities, Harden could not have been a more obvious selection. The Thunder had a glaring need for a floor spacer who could provide more room for Durant and Westbrook to operate, and Harden fits the bill quite nicely. The hope is that he can be a long-term solution at shooting guard, leaving only the center position as a prominent need going forward.
To answer that latter concern, the Thunder took a late flier on Mullens. He's 7-foot-1 and has some talent, but his freshman year at Ohio State was rather unimpressive. The Thunder can afford to be patient and may send him to become Ibaka's workout partner in Tulsa; as with the former, Mullens' selection was more a long-term play than a quest for immediate dividends.
Vaden, a late second-round pick, will play in Europe.
Traded Damien Wilkins and Chucky Atkins to Minnesota for Kevin Ollie and Etan Thomas. The Thunder took on some salary in this deal but didn't affect their long-term cap space since both Ollie and Thomas have expiring contracts. Additionally, both players could fill important roles. Ollie provides insurance as a third point guard in case Livingston's injury woes return, but as a hardworking and highly respected veteran, Ollie may prove more important for his sage counsel in a locker room filled with kids. Thomas hardly played the past two seasons due to health problems, but if he reverts to his level of 2006-07, he could provide the interior toughness the Thunder have so clearly lacked the past two seasons.
Bought out Earl Watson. This move saved the Thunder nearly $3 million, a windfall given how poorly Watson performed last season.
Biggest Strength: Assets
One can't appreciate what the Thunder are in the process of building just by watching them on the court. Last season, they looked like any other garden-variety bad team. The difference is that they've managed their operation very carefully the past couple of years, and as a result, they're overflowing with juicy assets.
Let's start with the cap space. Oklahoma City stayed well under this year's salary cap, allowing the Thunder to make deals at this year's trade deadline to put other teams under the luxury tax by taking on an expiring contract -- and presumably getting paid for it in the form of future draft picks.
Doing so wouldn't subtract any from the $15 million or so they can expect to have under the cap in 2010, depending on where the cap number comes in, how high their draft picks are, and whether they extend Sefolosha. That won't get them a LeBron James or a Dwyane Wade -- not when the compe ion is the bright lights of New York, Chicago, Miami or the "other" L.A. -- but it will put them in play for any number of other quality players that may be available next summer, and/or put them in position to make a trade that takes on salary.
Then there's the Phoenix pick. As a result of a trade for Kurt Thomas in 2007, the Thunder own a completely unprotected lottery pick from the Suns. Given Phoenix's disarray, it could well be a lottery pick, and if the Thunder miss the playoffs, that would give them two shots at the top pick. Oklahoma City also has a 2010 second-round pick owned by Minnesota, which is almost like a first-rounder as it's likely to come in around No. 35.
Combined with the quality young players they've already assembled (Durant, Green, Westbrook, Harden, Sefolosha) and the prospects they're gained the rights to (Mullens, Ibaka, D.J. White, Kyle Weaver), their talent base is poised to explode over the next 12 months.
Of course, they can use any or all of these assets between now and then in trades if they want to accelerate the process, though so far patience has ruled the day. The upshot, however, is that two years from now, this team will be absolutely stacked.
Biggest Weakness: Interior Play
The Thunder have identified high-quality prospects at all the perimeter positions, but the middle remains a different story. Krstic looked wobbly in his return last season and it's an open question whether he'll regain the low-post game he showed in a breakout year for the Nets before his knee injury. Mullens is an intriguing prospect, but there's a reason 23 teams took a pass on him, and at any rate, he may not be ready for years. Ibaka is in the same boat.
As a result, the Thunder will have a hard time competing against power teams. Green is an undersized 4 and Krstic a contact-loathing 5. Nick Collison can play the middle, but he gives up size against most centers as well.
Offensively, it's a similar problem -- the Thunder don't have any quality post players. Krstic and Green are mostly spot-up shooters, Collison an energy guy who gets second shots, and the others too limited offensively to run plays through. It's a secondary reason the Thunder attempted so few 3s as well -- they don't have anybody who can command a double-team on the block.
Outlook
Could the Thunder make it to the playoffs? Absolutely. I have them finishing out of the money, but they're certainly in a position where if enough things break right, they could make it. Chief among them would be breakout years from the youngsters and a monumental campaign from Durant, and along with that would have to come an outstanding run of health; this team is not laden with quality depth.
The more likely scenario, however, involves another year of growing pains while they find their way to the next level. Oklahoma City still has a lot of weaknesses for a Western playoff hopeful -- its depth and the center situation are less than ideal. Additionally, none of its key players is a good passer, which makes it tough for the Thunder to consistently generate good looks.
As a result, expect a lot of ups and downs, but ultimately a "year away" type of campaign that's reminiscent of the 2007-08 Blazers. Oklahoma City will be one of the league's most improved teams and on certain nights Durant, Westbrook and Green will remind everyone of what an awesome future this team possesses. But on others, the lack of depth, size and consistency will prove telling, which is why its future looks better than its present.
Prediction: 36-46, 4th in Northwest division, 10th in Western Conference
Thanks cubby!
No problem. You guys are the goods, bar none.
culburn, you get a pass on being a for today!
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