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Ingenious! How did that work out?
Revisionist history. Can you describe the meetings, Yoni, or did you just make that up?
Maybe listen to Richard Clarke, who wanted to focus more on Al Qaeda. Missed opportunity there, but hindsight is 20/20.
Again, not the only reason we invaded Iraq. Besides, it made a nice magnet for al Qaeda to pour into.
The Bush administration spent the first months of its administration increasing funding to anti-terrorist activities and crafting a plan that was more aggressive than had been the previous administrations.
I'm not sure what you expected him to do between January 21 and September 11. Do tell.
Ingenious! How did that work out?
Revisionist history. Can you describe the meetings, Yoni, or did you just make that up?
Maybe listen to Richard Clarke, who wanted to focus more on Al Qaeda. Missed opportunity there, but hindsight is 20/20.
Killed a whole of a lot of 'em.
Besides, al Qaeda declared Iraq a central front in their war against us.
Iraq's Centrality To The War Against Al-Qaeda
I'd say it worked out pretty good if Obama doesn't it up.
9-11 Commission detailed the activities of the Bush administration leading up to September 11.
While the Bush administration did not take any military or covert actions against al-Qaeda in its first months, generally because the closest "catalyst event," the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole had been too far in the past with the previous administration having done nothing; but, the Bush administration did take some political actions directed against al-Qaeda.
Bush wrote Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf about pressuring the Taliban about al-Qaeda in February 2001 and again in August 2001.
Secretary of State Rice also discussed al-Qaeda with Pakistan's foreign minister in June 2001.
State Department officials also met with a visiting Taliban official in Washington DC March 2001. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said on March 19, 2001 that State Department officials had stressed that the Taliban must give Bin Laden over for trial and must close terrorist camps.
Administration officials also took precautionary measures in the summer of 2001 in response to threat reports indicating possible attacks against U.S. interests overseas. The government reacted with steps such as closing one embassy and raising the force protection levels for U.S. troops in six countries to the highest level.
More broadly, the Bush administration did propose an increase in the federal government's counterterrorism budget, just as the Clinton administration had done in each of the immediately preceding years. The federal government spent $6.06 billion to combat terrorism in FY1998, $8.32 billion in FY1999, and $8.69 billion in FY2000 and it enacted $9.70 billion for FY2001. Even before the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration requested $10.33 billion to combat terrorism, an increase of 6.5 percent above the prior year's enacted amount and a 70 percent increase from FY1998.
From what I remember, the 9-11 Commission merely said the administration chose not to use Clarke's ideas. That doesn't mean they weren't planning on another track and, indeed, that is what is reported.
According to then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice's testimony before the 9/11 Commission, Bush's position was that he was "tired of swatting at flies" and wanted to take the offense against al-Qaeda. The 9/11 Commission reported that Bush told them that he wanted a long-term policy.
Such a strategy was developed over the months and weeks before September 11. Deputies to Cabinet-level officials met in full committee on April 30, 2001 to discuss al-Qaeda and terrorism, and Cabinet-level officials approved a draft directive in their first Principals Committee meeting on al-Qaeda on September 4. Deputies then met again on September 10 to finalize a three-year plan that would first pressure the Taliban to oust Bin Laden and ultimately use covert action to overthrow the Taliban if necessary.
I'm not sure what else you would have had the administration do...and, I'm sure we're not aware of everything that was being done.
Right, we completely eliminated them and captured Osama!
[quote]The Bush administration spent the first months of its administration increasing funding to anti-terrorist activities and crafting a plan that was more aggressive than had been the previous administrations.[/quotre]
Too bad they went with the plan the CIA already had on the shelf. The Pentagon had no plan regarding Afghanistan. None.
How many cabinet meetings was that again? What was the plan?
Please. Following the Clarke recommendations like they did immediately after 9/11 would have been a good start. Breaking the logjam between the military and CIA regarding maintenance and weaponization of the Predator. Keeping the counterterrorism office at the cabinet level. Actually comprehending the phrase "Bin Laden determined to Strike in US" when it is presented to you in a daily intelligence briefing.I'm not sure what you expected him to do between January 21 and September 11. Do tell.
You know -- the little things.
So, one cabinet meeting?
That's it?
I expected more than that, since you claimed they considered it such a high priority.
Why do you equate cabinet meetings with priority? Oh yeah, you're from the Bill Clinton symbolism over substance school of thought.
How many cabinet meetings has Obama had on the economy? That's right, he can't get a cabinet assembled and is doing this with Czars.
Why do you think it doesn't equate?
[QUOTE=ChumpDumper;3380500]Right, we completely eliminated them and captured Osama!
Hindsight is 20/20. Fact remains Bush made it more of a priority than did Clinton.The Bush administration spent the first months of its administration increasing funding to anti-terrorist activities and crafting a plan that was more aggressive than had been the previous administrations.[/quotre]
Too bad they went with the plan the CIA already had on the shelf. The Pentagon had no plan regarding Afghanistan. None.
How many cabinet meetings was that again? What was the plan?
Please. Following the Clarke recommendations like they did immediately after 9/11 would have been a good start. Breaking the logjam between the military and CIA regarding maintenance and weaponization of the Predator. Keeping the counterterrorism office at the cabinet level. Actually comprehending the phrase "Bin Laden determined to Strike in US" when it is presented to you in a daily intelligence briefing.
You know -- the little things.
And, he admits we were caught flatfooted.
Clarke is a lying asshole. He was quite impressed with the Bush administration until it became politically unpopular and he developed an agenda of his own.
In what way did he make it more of a priority?
Be specific in your comparisons.
What are you saying he lied about?Clarke is a lying asshole. He was quite impressed with the Bush administration until it became politically unpopular and he developed an agenda of his own.
Transcript: Clarke Praises Bush Team in '02
WASHINGTON — The following transcript do ents a background briefing in early August 2002 by President Bush's former counterterrorism coordinator Richard A. Clarke to a handful of reporters, including Fox News' Jim Angle. In the conversation, cleared by the White House on Wednesday for distribution, Clarke describes the handover of intelligence from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration and the latter's decision to revise the U.S. approach to Al Qaeda. Clarke was named special adviser to the president for cyberspace security in October 2001. He resigned from his post in January 2003.
RICHARD CLARKE: Actually, I've got about seven points, let me just go through them quickly. Um, the first point, I think the overall point is, there was no plan on Al Qaeda that was passed from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration.
Second point is that the Clinton administration had a strategy in place, effectively dating from 1998. And there were a number of issues on the table since 1998. And they remained on the table when that administration went out of office — issues like aiding the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, changing our Pakistan policy -- uh, changing our policy toward Uzbekistan. And in January 2001, the incoming Bush administration was briefed on the existing strategy. They were also briefed on these series of issues that had not been decided on in a couple of years.
And the third point is the Bush administration decided then, you know, in late January, to do two things. One, vigorously pursue the existing policy, including all of the lethal covert action findings, which we've now made public to some extent.
And the point is, while this big review was going on, there were still in effect, the lethal findings were still in effect. The second thing the administration decided to do is to initiate a process to look at those issues which had been on the table for a couple of years and get them decided.
So, point five, that process which was initiated in the first week in February, uh, decided in principle, uh in the spring to add to the existing Clinton strategy and to increase CIA resources, for example, for covert action, five-fold, to go after Al Qaeda.
The sixth point, the newly-appointed deputies — and you had to remember, the deputies didn't get into office until late March, early April. The deputies then tasked the development of the implementation details, uh, of these new decisions that they were endorsing, and sending out to the principals.
Over the course of the summer — last point — they developed implementation details, the principals met at the end of the summer, approved them in their first meeting, changed the strategy by authorizing the increase in funding five-fold, changing the policy on Pakistan, changing the policy on Uzbekistan, changing the policy on the Northern Alliance assistance.
And then changed the strategy from one of rollback with Al Qaeda over the course of five years, which it had been, to a new strategy that called for the rapid elimination of Al Qaeda. That is in fact the timeline.
QUESTION: When was that presented to the president?
CLARKE: Well, the president was briefed throughout this process.
QUESTION: But when was the final September 4 do ent? (interrupted) Was that presented to the president?
CLARKE: The do ent went to the president on September 10, I think.
QUESTION: What is your response to the suggestion in the [Aug. 12, 2002] Time [magazine] article that the Bush administration was unwilling to take on board the suggestions made in the Clinton administration because of animus against the — general animus against the foreign policy?
CLARKE: I think if there was a general animus that clouded their vision, they might not have kept the same guy dealing with terrorism issue. This is the one issue where the National Security Council leadership decided continuity was important and kept the same guy around, the same team in place. That doesn't sound like animus against uh the previous team to me.
JIM ANGLE: You're saying that the Bush administration did not stop anything that the Clinton administration was doing while it was making these decisions, and by the end of the summer had increased money for covert action five-fold. Is that correct?
CLARKE: All of that's correct.
ANGLE: OK.
QUESTION: Are you saying now that there was not only a plan per se, presented by the transition team, but that it was nothing proactive that they had suggested?
CLARKE: Well, what I'm saying is, there are two things presented. One, what the existing strategy had been. And two, a series of issues — like aiding the Northern Alliance, changing Pakistan policy, changing Uzbek policy — that they had been unable to come to um, any new conclusions, um, from '98 on.
QUESTION: Was all of that from '98 on or was some of it ...
CLARKE: All of those issues were on the table from '98 on.
ANGLE: When in '98 were those presented?
CLARKE: In October of '98.
QUESTION: In response to the Embassy bombing?
CLARKE: Right, which was in September.
QUESTION: Were all of those issues part of alleged plan that was late December and the Clinton team decided not to pursue because it was too close to ...
CLARKE: There was never a plan, Andrea. What there was was these two things: One, a description of the existing strategy, which included a description of the threat. And two, those things which had been looked at over the course of two years, and which were still on the table.
QUESTION: So there was nothing that developed, no do ents or no new plan of any sort?
CLARKE: There was no new plan.
QUESTION: No new strategy — I mean, I don't want to get into a semantics ...
CLARKE: Plan, strategy — there was no, nothing new.
QUESTION: 'Til late December, developing ...
CLARKE: What happened at the end of December was that the Clinton administration NSC principals committee met and once again looked at the strategy, and once again looked at the issues that they had brought, decided in the past to add to the strategy. But they did not at that point make any recommendations.
QUESTIONS: Had those issues evolved at all from October of '98 'til December of 2000?
CLARKE: Had they evolved? Um, not appreciably.
ANGLE: What was the problem? Why was it so difficult for the Clinton administration to make decisions on those issues?
CLARKE: Because they were tough issues. You know, take, for example, aiding the Northern Alliance. Um, people in the Northern Alliance had a, sort of bad track record. There were questions about the government, there were questions about drug-running, there was questions about whether or not in fact they would use the additional aid to go after Al Qaeda or not. Uh, and how would you stage a major new push in Uzbekistan or somebody else or Pakistan to cooperate?
One of the big problems was that Pakistan at the time was aiding the other side, was aiding the Taliban. And so, this would put, if we started aiding the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, this would have put us directly in opposition to the Pakistani government. These are not easy decisions.
ANGLE: And none of that really changed until we were attacked and then it was ...
CLARKE: No, that's not true. In the spring, the Bush administration changed — began to change Pakistani policy, um, by a dialogue that said we would be willing to lift sanctions. So we began to offer carrots, which made it possible for the Pakistanis, I think, to begin to realize that they could go down another path, which was to join us and to break away from the Taliban. So that's really how it started.
QUESTION: Had the Clinton administration in any of its work on this issue, in any of the findings or anything else, prepared for a call for the use of ground forces, special operations forces in any way? What did the Bush administration do with that if they had?
CLARKE: There was never a plan in the Clinton administration to use ground forces. The military was asked at a couple of points in the Clinton administration to think about it. Um, and they always came back and said it was not a good idea. There was never a plan to do that.
(Break in briefing details as reporters and Clarke go back and forth on how to source quotes from this backgrounder.)
ANGLE: So, just to finish up if we could then, so what you're saying is that there was no — one, there was no plan; two, there was no delay; and that actually the first changes since October of '98 were made in the spring months just after the administration came into office?
CLARKE: You got it. That's right.
QUESTION: It was not put into an action plan until September 4, signed off by the principals?
CLARKE: That's right.
QUESTION: I want to add though, that NSPD — the actual work on it began in early April.
CLARKE: There was a lot of in the first three NSPDs that were being worked in parallel.
ANGLE: Now the five-fold increase for the money in covert operations against Al Qaeda — did that actually go into effect when it was decided or was that a decision that happened in the next budget year or something?
CLARKE: Well, it was gonna go into effect in October, which was the next budget year, so it was a month away.
QUESTION: That actually got into the intelligence budget?
CLARKE: Yes it did.
QUESTION: Just to clarify, did that come up in April or later?
CLARKE: No, it came up in April and it was approved in principle and then went through the summer. And you know, the other thing to bear in mind is the shift from the rollback strategy to the elimination strategy. When President Bush told us in March to stop swatting at flies and just solve this problem, then that was the strategic direction that changed the NSPD from one of rollback to one of elimination.
QUESTION: Well can you clarify something? I've been told that he gave that direction at the end of May. Is that not correct?
CLARKE: No, it was March.
QUESTION: The elimination of Al Qaeda, get back to ground troops — now we haven't completely done that even with a substantial number of ground troops in Afghanistan. Was there, was the Bush administration contemplating without the provocation of September 11th moving troops into Afghanistan prior to that to go after Al Qaeda?
CLARKE: I can not try to speculate on that point. I don't know what we would have done.
QUESTION: In your judgment, is it possible to eliminate Al Qaeda without putting troops on the ground?
CLARKE: Uh, yeah, I think it was. I think it was. If we'd had Pakistani, Uzbek and Northern Alliance assistance.
Because they had already assembled a team to develop the counterterrorism plan. What would more cabinet meetings have done?
More money, more planning, more aggressive.
Read the transcript.
Clarke was still working for Bush back then, so I fully accept your accusation that he lied for them.
Rummy said he knew where the WMDs were too.
I said be specific in your comparison.
That was nothing.
Richard Clarke was fairly specific in that transcript. I'll stand by his words there.
No he was not.
Surely their grand plan must have seen the light of day since then.
What was it?
He was fairly specific about what was done. I'm betting there are records, probably in the 9-11 Commission report, that support this version of events.
But, nice try.
And, if the world hadn't stalled by insisting one ultimatums and warnings and hearings, they might have still been where there were last known to be.
Exactly where did all the WMD's go UNSCOM knew Iraq had before they were evicted in 1998 but are still unaccounted for? There were tons of them.
Saddam Hussein is responsible for whatever the world believed about his WMD capabilities.
It's probably classified. But, do an FOIA request.
Where are the plans?
Rummy and Cheney said they knew where they were.And, if the world hadn't stalled by insisting one ultimatums and warnings and hearings, they might have still been where there were last known to be.
Exactly where did all the WMD's go UNSCOM knew Iraq had before they were evicted in 1998 but are still unaccounted for? There were tons of them.
Saddam Hussein is responsible for whatever the world believed about his WMD capabilities.
They lied.
So you don't know of any plan.
You asked for specifics of what was done during the initial months of the Bush Administration.
The transcript of the Clarke interview was very specific about what what done.
If that doesn't satisfy you -- which, I suspect it was more than adequate since you tried to move the target yet again -- find the plan yourself.
Your first question:
Answered. Not that the number of cabinet meetings has any relation, whatsoever, to what is being done...but, it was answered.
Richard Clarke spelled out the general plan in the transcript.
If you'd read the transcript you'd see they were doing a lot more than holding one cabinet meeting.
Richard Clarke asctually compares the Bush administrations action's to the Clinton administration's actions. And, in doing so, demonstrates how the Bush Administration made it more of a priority.
The Clarke transcript destroys the idea that the Bush administration just sat on its hands and did nothing so, Chump moves the target.
There wasn't one. That's the point.
Not by you directly. You tried to hide it in a quote. , you don't even know if one is the actual number. Nice try though.Your first question:
Answered. Not that the number of cabinet meetings has any relation, whatsoever, to what is being done...but, it was answered.
So what was actually done? Seems like those decisions could have been made the day after the inauguration had there been any sense of urgency.Richard Clarke spelled out the general plan in the transcript.
If you'd read the transcript you'd see they were doing a lot more than holding one cabinet meeting.
Are you saying there was a sense of urgency?
It doesn't do anything, since nothing was actually done.Richard Clarke asctually compares the Bush administrations action's to the Clinton administration's actions. And, in doing so, demonstrates how the Bush Administration made it more of a priority.
The Clarke transcript destroys the idea that the Bush administration just sat on its hands and did nothing so, Chump moves the target.
I asked what they did.
You said they planned to do something at some time.
Wow.
Okay, I'll let the Clarke Transcript stand. You keep pissing into the wind, Dumpster.
What plan could Bush have implemented on inauguration day?
Sounds to me like quite a bit went on during the first months of the administration.
A version of the plan the CIA already had on their books and ready to go on September 11.
Doesn't really sound like any of the statements contradict anything Clarke said in his book. The administration diddled about in deputys' meetings over the summer and nothing really happened on the ground in Afghanistan or elsewhere.Sounds to me like quite a bit went on during the first months of the administration.
What did happen: a do ent went to Bush on September 10.
Thanks for the confirmation.
And, what was that plan?
To invade Afghanistan? Tell me; what, in the "off the shelf" CIA plan would have satisfied you in terms of demonstrating the Bush administration had made terrorism a priority.
How do you know?
According to Clarke, President Bush decided in late January to, "...vigorously pursue the existing policy, including all of the lethal covert action findings, which we've now made public to some extent."
This implies a) that, to some extent, lethal covert action findings were pursued and that, b) if Osama bin Laden had been located (as happened when Clinton was president) he would have been killed or captured (as did not happen during the Clinton administration).
All the while, spending on the covert activities, was increased five-fold; lethal covert activities were vigorously pursued; and, a group of Bush administration officials from cabinet-level down were developing a plan (given to the president on 9/10) to deal with al Qaeda and international terrorism, from that point on.
Where's that plan? I'm betting some of it was implemented but that much of it was made moot by September 11.
Just a guess.
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