Source for COVID-19 Information (Johns Hopkins)

[DMC]

Yes, I read it. Nice try.

It is a self-serving apologia that is more than contradicted by other accounts, and Trump himself.



He bragged about the cuts, just last month.

Trump doesn't ing know.

[DMC]

Who cares. That was a respectable move. Why are you piling on like got?

Because Sbm is a got

[SnakeBoy]

Another tracker with timeline slider so you can visualize the world getting infected since this started

http://ncov.bii.virginia.edu/dashboard/

[RandomGuy]

Trump doesn't ing know.

So, you are saying he is not incompetent because he didn't fire the pandemic response team, he is incompetent because he hired someone who is that incompetent and was not competent enough to keep track of what his incompetent hire was doing.

Got it.

...and you are taking a conman who straight up admits he never cops to anything bad at his word.

[TSA]

It’s thus true that the Trump administration axed the executive branch team responsible for coordinating a response to a pandemic and did not replace it, eliminating Ziemer’s position and reassigning others, although Bolton was the executive at the top of the National Security Council chain of command at the time.

snopes

Current and former officials maintain that the structural change has not resulted in a loss of expertise. A spokesman for the NSC said that officials responding to the pandemic within that unit have “extensive experience and expertise in virology, infectious disease epidemiology, global health security, public health, and emergency response,” and a former official said that the WMD directorate, which absorbed the global health security office, “had the same people, the same expertise, with no loss of efficiency as our response to the Ebola virus in Congo showed.”

https://www.politico.com/news/2020/0...-threat-126574




Biodefense is a national effort. Protecting Americans from biological threats requires the involvement of nearly every federal department. Together, we will coordinate federal biodefense efforts and use all appropriate means to assess, understand, prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from biological incidents.

The National Biodefense Strategy and the Presidential Memorandum on the Support for Biodefense outline a structure for interagency cooperation to ensure that biodefense efforts are integrated, comprehensive, efficient, and effective.

Achieving these goals requires participation from federal, state, local, territorial, tribal, and other governments, prac ioners, physicians, scientists, educators, and industry.

The National Security Presidential Memorandum, "Support for National Biodefense" creates a dedicated mechanism, housed within the Department of Health and Human Services, to coordinate federal biodefense activities and assess the effectiveness with which the National Biodefense Strategy goals and objectives are being met.

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA) will serve as lead for policy coordination and review, providing strategic input and policy oversight for federal biodefense efforts.

The Biodefense Steering Committee (BSC), chaired by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, will be responsible for overseeing and coordinating the execution of the strategy and its implementation plan, and ensuring coordination with domestic and international government and nongovernmental partners. As Chair of the Committee, the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall serve as the federal lead for implementation of the Strategy.

The Biodefense Coordination Team (BCT) will assist the Committee in coordinating implementation of the Strategy.

The National Security Presidential Memorandum also describes a process by which the Biodefense Steering Committee and Biodefense Coordination Team will work with federal departments and agencies (D/As), the National Security Council (NSC) staff, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to assess how effectively the goals and objectives of the National Biodefense Strategy are being met. The results of this process will inform the annual budget cycle, ensuring that biodefense resources are managed effectively to assess, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from biological incidents.

https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/bio...ollection.aspx

GOVERNANCE

The NSPM that accompanies the issuance of this National Biodefense Strategycreates a dedicated mechanism, housed within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, to coordinate federal biodefense activities and assess the effectiveness with which the National Biodefense Strategy’sgoals and objectives are being met. Led by the President of the United States and coordinated by the National Security Council staff in the Executive Office of the President, with day-to-day coordination and execution by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, this mechanism will continually assess how effectively the objectives of the National Biodefense Strategy are being met.

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will, in acting through the process described in NSPM-4, Organization of the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and Subcommittees, serve as the lead for policy coordination and review, providing strategic input and policy oversight for federal biodefense efforts.

The Biodefense Steering Committee, chaired by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and comprising the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, will be responsible for overseeing and coordinating the execution of the strategy and its implementation plan, and ensuring federal coordination with domestic and international government and non-governmental partners.

The Chair of the Biodefense Steering Committee, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, will serve as the federal lead for implementation of the strategy. The heads of other agencies with responsibilities or capabilities pertaining to biodefense shall participate in the Biodefense Steering Committee, as appropriate. This coordination and oversight mechanism also has a mandate to reach beyond the Federal Government to engage with SLTT, non-federal, and non-governmental stakeholders. Further, the recommendations and feedback stemming from this governance mechanism will be communicated back to departments and agencies in synchronization with the annual budget cycle. Recognizing that threats, actors, and biodefense-related science and technology are constantly evolving, the governance mechanisms will be adaptive, reviewing and recommending changes, as appropriate, in the National Biodefense Strategyand its implementation plan.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-conten...e-Strategy.pdf

[ChumpDumper]

Well, I for one am glad "Senior Official" is on the case.

[Winehole23]

Classic TSA smokescreen -- the wall of text no one reads and he gives no take on.

[RandomGuy]

snopes

Current and former officials maintain that the structural change has not resulted in a loss of expertise. A spokesman for the NSC said that officials responding to the pandemic within that unit have “extensive experience and expertise in virology, infectious disease epidemiology, global health security, public health, and emergency response,” and a former official said that the WMD directorate, which absorbed the global health security office, “had the same people, the same expertise, with no loss of efficiency as our response to the Ebola virus in Congo showed.”

https://www.politico.com/news/2020/0...-threat-126574

But former officials who worked on the Ebola and H1N1 responses worry that the steady downsizing of the NSC and the elimination of a unit charged with global health and security has further hindered a government response that was bungled early on by confusion and mismanagement.

“I’ve been briefed on every contingency you could possibly imagine,” the president said on Tuesday when asked whether he’d been briefed on the possibility that 100 million Americans could ultimately be exposed to the virus. “Many contingencies. A lot of positive. Different numbers, all different numbers, very large numbers, and some small numbers too.”

snopes = ad hominem

Putting only the quote from the article that supports your position = cherry picking.

As part of my volunteer work, I have studied disaster management.

Responding to crises, you need high level coordination of type that was there before, i.e. a specific team at the white house, as close to the president as possible.

Dissolving that team, and pushing responsibility down to "The Biodefense Steering Committee", and thinking you have the same capabilities or responsiveness, is asinine.

"they didn't fire these experts over here, just the ones at the top"

I guess. Logical fallacies, and a lack of critical thinking.

I would bother asking you a critical thinking question, but know you do not care about honesty, so ... off and go fap to some Qanon tweets or something.

In the end snopes assessment stands, and NOTHING in your article actually contradicts it:

It’s thus true that the Trump administration axed the executive branch team responsible for coordinating a response to a pandemic and did not replace it, eliminating Ziemer’s position and reassigning others, although Bolton was the executive at the top of the National Security Council chain of command at the time.

[RandomGuy]

In January 2019, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence ranked a major disease outbreak among the top global threats to watch, warning: “We assess that the United States and the world will remain vulnerable to the next flu pandemic or large-scale outbreak of a contagious disease that could lead to massive rates of death and disability, severely affect the world economy, strain international resources, and increase calls on the United States for support.” The administration also released a whole 30-page National Biodefense Strategy in 2018.

But the Trump administration never devoted resources commensurate with the perceived danger, critics have charged, and President Trump has acknowledged he was caught off guard. “Who would have thought?” he asked during a visit to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention last week. “Who would have thought we would even be having the subject?”

ing moron. His administration knew. He should have known.

[TSA]

snopes = ad hominem

Putting only the quote from the article that supports your position = cherry picking.

As part of my volunteer work, I have studied disaster management.

Responding to crises, you need high level coordination of type that was there before, i.e. a specific team at the white house, as close to the president as possible.

Dissolving that team, and pushing responsibility down to "The Biodefense Steering Committee", and thinking you have the same capabilities or responsiveness, is asinine.

"they didn't fire these experts over here, just the ones at the top"

I guess. Logical fallacies, and a lack of critical thinking.

I would bother asking you a critical thinking question, but know you do not care about honesty, so ... off and go fap to some Qanon tweets or something.

In the end snopes assessment stands, and NOTHING in your article actually contradicts it:

You seem to have forgotten your position.

They are going to polish this turd hard.

"senior fellow at the Hudson ins ute"

Sure buddy.

i think that is the way you tend to treat info right? ad hominem?

The Trump administration fired the U.S. pandemic response team in 2018 to cut costs.

True
About this rating

https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/tr...pandemic-team/

Legum outlined a series of cost-cutting decisions made by the Trump administration in preceding years that had gutted the nation’s infectious disease defense infrastructure. The “pandemic response team” firing claim referred to news accounts from Spring 2018 reporting that White House officials tasked with directing a national response to a pandemic had been ousted.

Rear Adm. Timothy Ziemer abruptly departed from his post leading the global health security team on the National Security Council in May 2018 amid a reorganization of the council by then-National Security Advisor John Bolton, and Ziemer’s team was disbanded. Tom Bossert, whom the Washington Post reported “had called for a comprehensive biodefense strategy against pandemics and biological attacks,” had been fired one month prior.

It’s thus true that the Trump administration axed the executive branch team responsible for coordinating a response to a pandemic and did not replace it, eliminating Ziemer’s position and reassigning others, although Bolton was the executive at the top of the National Security Council chain of command at the time.

https://www.reddit.com/r/mormonpolit...e_of_pandemic/

https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matte...xits-abruptly/

The top White House official responsible for leading the U.S. response in the event of a deadly pandemic has left the administration, and the global health security team he oversaw has been disbanded under a reorganization by national security adviser John Bolton.

The abrupt departure of Rear Adm. Timothy Ziemer from the National Security Council means no senior administration official is now focused solely on global health security. Ziemer’s departure, along with the breakup of his team, comes at a time when many experts say the country is already underprepared for the increasing risks of a pandemic or bioterrorism attack.

Ziemer’s last day was Tuesday, the same day a new Ebola outbreak was declared in Congo. He is not being replaced.

Pandemic preparedness and global health security are issues that require government-wide responses, experts say, as well as the leadership of a high-ranking official within the White House who is assigned only this role.

It checks out you lying sacks of .

Not really an assumption. It is a verifiable fact that Trump fired the team as a cost cutting measure. It was not replaced.

Neither one of them looked past the headline. It said something that made Trump look less like a ing idiot, so they lapped up the vomitus, without critical thinking.

I remember this news bit very specifically, and thought at the time it was ing dumb.

Provide an org chart of the pandemic response unit. You really believe Trump is competent?

[TSA]

snopes = ad hominem

Putting only the quote from the article that supports your position = cherry picking.

Disproving what you bolded in extra large font is not cherry picking

It’s thus true that the Trump administration axed the executive branch team responsible for coordinating a response to a pandemic and did not replace it, eliminating Ziemer’s position and reassigning others, although Bolton was the executive at the top of the National Security Council chain of command at the time

[RandomGuy]

You seem to have forgotten your position.

Nope. Not sure what you are trying to get at. Once again, you can't be bothered to spell it out, wanting to, instead, vomit out a wall of text.

I'm not the only one to notice the ing self-serving stupidity of the op-ed you linked.

-------------------------------------------------------

Donald Trump Didn’t Disband Pandemic Team, He Did Far Worse
How Ford v. Ferrari can explain Trump's incompetence.

When we started hearing that the Trump administration sowed the seeds for the lackluster response to this outbreak by firing the nation’s whole pandemic preparedness team a few years ago, it was genuinely disturbing how unsurprising it was.

But former administration officials are now pushing back against the report that Trump recklessly fired the response team of experts by claiming… he didn’t dissolve the team at all. An odd flex given that Donald Trump already admitted that he fired everyone in the office, explaining that he didn’t want people on the payroll when there wasn’t an active threat and “when we need them, we can get them back very quickly.”

And while being comically contradicted by Trump himself should end the inquiry, the managerial lackeys who actually staked their careers on this debacle are taking to the press to try and defend their crumbling professional reputations.

Tim Morrison, a former NSC official, wrote to the Washington Post claiming, “No, the White House didn’t ‘dissolve’ its pandemic response office. I was there.” It’s an editorial earning a lot of plaudits from John Bolton, Morrison’s former boss. who is also deeply implicated in this move since he oversaw the decision. Right-wing Twitter is sending it around in… I don’t know… some kind of weird attempt to claim that whatever Trump did with the team isn’t why the response has been so badly botched?

It’s also an editorial that seems to woefully misunderstand both “pandemics” and “preparedness.”

Morrison’s claim is that he ran the successor organization to the pandemic preparedness group, a move that cut most of the minds behind the original, but…

One such move at the NSC was to create the counterproliferation and biodefense directorate, which was the result of consolidating three directorates into one, given the obvious overlap between arms control and nonproliferation, weapons of mass destruction terrorism, and global health and biodefense. It is this reorganization that critics have misconstrued or intentionally misrepresented. If anything, the combined directorate was stronger because related expertise could be commingled.

This is where we can all take a lesson from Ford v. Ferrari.

When you take a highly specialized racing unit and say, “we’re making changes, firing your people, and putting you under the domestic sedan unit,” well, you end up losing Le Mans.

Morrison and Bolton are publicly arguing that they aren’t responsible for dismantling a highly praised pandemic team because they buried its mission under the au es of an arms control and bioterror unit. Except those are security threats predicated upon predicting and remediating human state and non-state actors. Where, exactly, does a group born out of influenza responses fit? Because when your leadership is a bioterrorism hammer, everything becomes a nail. This is how you end up with 800 scenarios for a nerve gas attack on public transit and 0 scenarios for dealing with an asymptomatic pneumoniatic flu.

Like the revolving door corporate hacks that they are, the administration made its cuts about “efficiency” rather than “results” and somehow has the gall to pretend they were right when the whole operation crashes around them. Diseases might come from bioterrorism, but they’re far more likely to come from the serendipity of mutation. If some en y were planning a bioterror attack, it would focus on agents that are highly lethal and, necessarily, not highly contagious — diseases can’t survive when they kill the host. This is precisely why an organization charged with gameplanning terrorist attacks is ill-suited to deal with traditional pandemics. The whole frame of reference is wrong.

Dissolving the team would have been bad, but what the administration actually did was far worse. What they actually did was slit the throat of America’s preparedness for an outbreak like this while convincing themselves they still had a plan. Senior administration officials honestly believed they had this covered by their cut-rate bioterror team. The whole operation revolves around the idea that there’s someone to attack, someone to blame, someone to fire. But there’s no villain here and they can’t seem to grasp what to do about that.

If only they had some sort of “team” charged with “preparing” for something like this…

https://abovethelaw.com/2020/03/dona...did-far-worse/

-------------------------------------------------------------------

In essence, yes, the pandemic response team was axed. Moving the responsibilities into another group that didn't really understand the requirements didn't mean the people who were given those responsibilities understood the parameters of the risks they faced.

[DMC]

So, you are saying he is not incompetent because he didn't fire the pandemic response team, he is incompetent because he hired someone who is that incompetent and was not competent enough to keep track of what his incompetent hire was doing.

Got it.

...and you are taking a conman who straight up admits he never cops to anything bad at his word.

I cannot recall ever having a competent POTUS. They had zero experience at it when hired.

[TheGreatYacht]

The Truth behind 𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐯𝐢𝐫𝐮𝐬!

[DMC]

If you're trying to push misinformation on the virus you should be bannedPERIOD

[Winehole23]

If you're trying to push misinformation on the virus you should be bannedPERIOD

you were saying it was no worse than the flu a week ago.

[TeyshaBlue]

you were saying it was no worse than the flu a week ago.

To be fair, alot of people did until information was presented otherwise. I entertained those thoughts as well, initially. I certainly don't now.

[Winehole23]

To be fair, alot of people did until information was presented otherwise. I entertained those thoughts as well, initially. I certainly don't now.

A year and a half to "wash its way through"

Hopefully we get a good vaccine..

https://www.imperial.ac.uk/mrc-globa...n-coronavirus/

[Winehole23]

Maybe the Army Corps of Engineers could like, build a hospital, or something?

[DMC]

you were saying it was no worse than the flu a week ago.

Opinion isnt information.

Are you really going to equate early opinion with propaganda?

[DMC]

Nope. Not sure what you are trying to get at. Once again, you can't be bothered to spell it out, wanting to, instead, vomit out a wall of text.

I'm not the only one to notice the ing self-serving stupidity of the op-ed you linked.

-------------------------------------------------------

Donald Trump Didn’t Disband Pandemic Team, He Did Far Worse
How Ford v. Ferrari can explain Trump's incompetence.

When we started hearing that the Trump administration sowed the seeds for the lackluster response to this outbreak by firing the nation’s whole pandemic preparedness team a few years ago, it was genuinely disturbing how unsurprising it was.

But former administration officials are now pushing back against the report that Trump recklessly fired the response team of experts by claiming… he didn’t dissolve the team at all. An odd flex given that Donald Trump already admitted that he fired everyone in the office, explaining that he didn’t want people on the payroll when there wasn’t an active threat and “when we need them, we can get them back very quickly.”

And while being comically contradicted by Trump himself should end the inquiry, the managerial lackeys who actually staked their careers on this debacle are taking to the press to try and defend their crumbling professional reputations.

Tim Morrison, a former NSC official, wrote to the Washington Post claiming, “No, the White House didn’t ‘dissolve’ its pandemic response office. I was there.” It’s an editorial earning a lot of plaudits from John Bolton, Morrison’s former boss. who is also deeply implicated in this move since he oversaw the decision. Right-wing Twitter is sending it around in… I don’t know… some kind of weird attempt to claim that whatever Trump did with the team isn’t why the response has been so badly botched?

It’s also an editorial that seems to woefully misunderstand both “pandemics” and “preparedness.”

Morrison’s claim is that he ran the successor organization to the pandemic preparedness group, a move that cut most of the minds behind the original, but…

One such move at the NSC was to create the counterproliferation and biodefense directorate, which was the result of consolidating three directorates into one, given the obvious overlap between arms control and nonproliferation, weapons of mass destruction terrorism, and global health and biodefense. It is this reorganization that critics have misconstrued or intentionally misrepresented. If anything, the combined directorate was stronger because related expertise could be commingled.

This is where we can all take a lesson from Ford v. Ferrari.

When you take a highly specialized racing unit and say, “we’re making changes, firing your people, and putting you under the domestic sedan unit,” well, you end up losing Le Mans.

Morrison and Bolton are publicly arguing that they aren’t responsible for dismantling a highly praised pandemic team because they buried its mission under the au es of an arms control and bioterror unit. Except those are security threats predicated upon predicting and remediating human state and non-state actors. Where, exactly, does a group born out of influenza responses fit? Because when your leadership is a bioterrorism hammer, everything becomes a nail. This is how you end up with 800 scenarios for a nerve gas attack on public transit and 0 scenarios for dealing with an asymptomatic pneumoniatic flu.

Like the revolving door corporate hacks that they are, the administration made its cuts about “efficiency” rather than “results” and somehow has the gall to pretend they were right when the whole operation crashes around them. Diseases might come from bioterrorism, but they’re far more likely to come from the serendipity of mutation. If some en y were planning a bioterror attack, it would focus on agents that are highly lethal and, necessarily, not highly contagious — diseases can’t survive when they kill the host. This is precisely why an organization charged with gameplanning terrorist attacks is ill-suited to deal with traditional pandemics. The whole frame of reference is wrong.

Dissolving the team would have been bad, but what the administration actually did was far worse. What they actually did was slit the throat of America’s preparedness for an outbreak like this while convincing themselves they still had a plan. Senior administration officials honestly believed they had this covered by their cut-rate bioterror team. The whole operation revolves around the idea that there’s someone to attack, someone to blame, someone to fire. But there’s no villain here and they can’t seem to grasp what to do about that.

If only they had some sort of “team” charged with “preparing” for something like this…

https://abovethelaw.com/2020/03/dona...did-far-worse/

-------------------------------------------------------------------

In essence, yes, the pandemic response team was axed. Moving the responsibilities into another group that didn't really understand the requirements didn't mean the people who were given those responsibilities understood the parameters of the risks they faced.

Its hard to take you seriously since your rhetoric is maxed out.

[TheGreatYacht]

THE HIDDEN AGENDA (Coronavirus) FOR THE WORLDWIDE SHUTDOWN-

[RandomGuy]

[vacuous personal attack].

No-take McGurk strikes again.

[RandomGuy]

you were saying it was no worse than the flu a week ago.

Opinion isnt information.

Are you really going to equate early opinion with propaganda?

If that opinion is driven by propaganda, it seems the correct conclusion. If you thought this was no worse than the flu, then you were told what to think, were lazy and didn't bother checking to see if the lie was a lie, and you got suckered.

[RandomGuy]

To be fair, alot of people did until information was presented otherwise. I entertained those thoughts as well, initially. I certainly don't now.

The experts were saying almost from day one that this was worse.

The ONLY people saying it wasn't any worse than the flu was the Trump administration, then when it became canon, Fox propaganda network. "A lot of people" are idiots, who let that channel do their thinking for them.