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https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena...-arabian-gulf/The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), a public service linked to the Royal Navy which monitors security risks for civilian shipping, said on Tuesday it was aware of a non-piracy "incident" underway in the Arabian Gulf.
The incident occurred near the Straits of Hormuz, one of the world's busiest shipping lanes, UKMTO said. The area has seen a number of incidents since 2018 linked to Iranian attacks on shipping using drones and magnetic mines attached to ship hulls, known as limpet mines.
Iran has also seized a South Korean vessel, the MT Hankuk Chemi, in January, although the ship was released in April, following a deal with the South Korean government over Iranian assets that had been frozen by US sanctions.
UKMTO gave no further information on the nature of the incident saying that investigations were still underway.
The warning notice, based on a third party source, advised vessels in the area to exercise extreme caution.
close in time
who's itching to attack Iran?
https://www.centcom.mil/Portals/6/Pr...G2%20final.pdf2) The investigative team determined that the extensive damage to the Mercer Street, do ented in the attached slides, was the result of a third UAV attack on July 30. This UAV was loaded with a military-grade explosive, and caused the death of two crewmembers; the master of the ship, a Romanian citizen, and a United Kingdom national who was part of the security detail.
3) The explosive detonation following the UAV impact created an approximately 6-foot diameter hole in the topside of the pilot house and badly damaged the interior. Explosive chemical tests were indicative of a Nitrate-based explosive and identified as RDX, indicating the UAV had been rigged to cause injury and destruction.
4) Explosives experts were able to recover several pieces of this third UAV, including a vertical stabilizer (part of the wing) and internal components which were nearly identical to previously-collected examples from Iranian one-way attack UAVs. The distance from the Iranian coast to the locations of the attacks was within the range of do ented Iranian one-way attack UAVs. Following an on-scene analysis, some of the material was transferred to U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters in Manama, Bahrain and subsequently to a U.S. national laboratory for further testing and verification.
5) U.K. explosive experts were provided access to the evidence at the Fifth Fleet headquarters. Evidence was shared virtually with Israeli explosive experts. Both partners concurred with the U.S. findings.
U.S. experts concluded based on the evidence that this UAV was produced in Iran.
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