Actually, if Biden wins, the Mueller show is only getting started in January, provided do ents are not incinerated.
Barr, especially, show probably hire an attorney, despite him being one.
If POTUS is re-elected, then we might get an extended version of this show.
There's little political value once the election is over with.
tbh... this talking point has always been the funniest
of course of Flynn's writ pe ion is granted, this amicus brief will be moot, though i think that's pretty unlikely
oh oh, i know how to address this
In other words....
exactly everything we have all seen with our own eyes.
Barr is corrupt and the DOJ corrupted this case because- trump said to do it and Barr obeyed.
Did Gleeson deal with the separation of powers issue?
yes
https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/...92.223.2_3.pdf
there's a section literally led "The Role of Cons utional Separation of Powers Principles" beginning on page 29. see footnotes on page 32 and 38 as well
he just doesnt reach the same conclusions your twitter lawyer de jure wanted. which is fine, this is an argumentative brief. sullivan hasn't made any ruling on the motion to dismiss yet, and he might be reach the same conclusions lawyer de jure did too, and elect to grant the motion to dismiss.
with that said, oral arguments for the writ are going to be heard in 2 days, and if we get a same-day ruling, then maybe by some (imo improbable) chance, the writ is granted and the dismissal is entered on the spot, rendering this brief moot
Last edited by spurraider21; 06-10-2020 at 04:55 PM.
She’s not my twitter lawyer de jure, this guy is.
The Historical Basis of Rule 48(a)
DOJ has moved to dismiss the Flynn prosecution under Fed. Rule of Crim. Proc. 48(a), which provides for such motions by the government “with leave of court” — meaning with the court’s permission. The crux of the dispute concerns the extent of the court’s discretion to say “No” to such motions.
Judge Gleeson stakes a great deal of his reliance on the “historical context” for the creation of Rule 48(a)’s “leave of court” language on a law review article written by Thomas Frampton, which is scheduled to be published in the Stanford Law Review in the Fall of 2020. This article has been bouncing around the anti-Flynn advocates on the internet since DOJ made its motion. And the current “Draft” of the article, which is what Judge Gleeson cites to in his brief, says right at the top that Government’s motion in the Flynn case is a central aspect for why the article exists. I’m not saying Frampton wrote the article because of the Flynn case — I think its clear that it was a work in progress for a much longer period — but it is clear that the current version of the article is written with the intention to bolster the idea that Judge Sullivan has the authority to deny the motion based on the history of the language of Rule 48(a). Gleeson cites the Frampton article 7 different times, but his citations are to Frampton’s words, not the words of a Court or Judge. Examples of Frampton’s statements which Gleeson cites/quotes include the following:
Rule 48(a) was designed to “guard against dubious dismissals of criminal cases that would benefit powerful and well-connected defendants.”
This text [“leave of court”] reflects a considered judicial effort to “guard against dubious dismissals of criminal cases that would benefit powerful and well-connected defendants.”
The Court . . . armed the district judge with a powerful tool to halt corrupt or politically motivated dismissals of cases.
In contrast, separation of powers concerns have significantly less force in the post-plea setting, where “all that is left for the trial court to do is sentence the defendant, a task that is firmly in the district judge’s wheelhouse.”
Those are all the words of a Harvard Law School “Fellow” and “Lecturer” who is the author of the article — not a court or a judge. While law review articles are sometimes “enlightening”, they do not carry any significant weight as legal authority. The fact that Gleeson makes repeated use of the Frampton article is an indicator as to the weakness of his argument on this point.
Finally — for this article — I want to call attention to Gleenson’s citation to a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal Decision which Gleeson describes as “influential” — US v. Hamm.
Hamm was an en banc decision, which means that all active judges in the Fifth Circuit participated in the case, and the outcome reflected the consensus of all those Appeals Court Judges. This is also noteworthy because Hamm comes AFTER the case of US v. Cowan, another Fifth Circuit case one that figures very prominently in anti-Flynn argument that Judge Sullivan should deny the motion. More on Cowan in another article.
As for Hamm, here is what Judge Gleeson has to say regarding its significance:
As the Fifth Circuit framed the issue in an influential opinion, “we must balance the cons utional duty of government prosecutors, as members of the
Executive Branch, to ‘take care that the laws (are) faithfully executed’ with the cons utional powers of the federal courts.”
Judge Gleeson never addresses WHAT ELSE the Fifth Circuit had to say in Hamm.
Just to set things up — Hamm involved several defendants who cooperated in the investigation and prosecution of a large drug smuggling conspiracy after they were arrested and charged. Their cooperation was highly productive, and came at great risk to their own well-being. The defendants had pleaded guilty, and their sentencing was postponed pending completion of their cooperation. While the cooperation was underway, taking in to consideration all they had done and risked, the prosecutor made deals with each of the defendants about the length of sentences they would receive. The prosecutor represented to the defendants that the judge had been informed and agreed to the sentences — but that was not the case. The judge was unaware of the agreements.
When the defendants appeared for sentencing the judge announced that he was unaware of the agreements and did not consider himself to be bound by them. He then proceeded to sentence the defendants to much longer terms that were expected. In response the government moved to dismiss the cases — AFTER SENTENCING — based on the fact that the cooperation had been so productive, so longstanding, and at great personal risk to the defendants well being. The trial judge denied the motion, and set forth the reasons for his disagreement with the justification made by the prosecutor in moving to dismiss.
The en banc Fifth Circuit Court reversed the convictions and ordered the trial court to dismiss the charges — granting the Rule 48(a) motion. Among the comments made by the Fifth Circuit were the following:
The [Supreme] Court [in Rinaldi] noted that the principal object of the leave of court requirement was apparently to protect a defendant from prosecutorial harassment. The Court did not decide whether a trial court has discretion to deny a prosecutor’s motion to dismiss which has the consent of the defendant… The Court did not reach that question in Rinaldi, however, since even if it assumed that the trial court could deny the prosecutor’s motion when it disserved the public interest, the prosecutor’s actions in the case could not be fairly characterized as such a disservice.”
“ … the trial court, in extremely limited cir stances in extraordinary cases, may deny the motion when the prosecutor’s actions clearly indicate a “betrayal of the public interest.”
[T]his [Hamm] is a case in which the Government … decided that it would best serve the public interest to dismiss the indictments against the appellants. Neither this court on appeal nor the trial court may properly reassess the prosecutor’s evaluation of the public interest. As long as it is not apparent that the prosecutor was motivated by considerations clearly contrary to the public interest, his motion must be granted.
Judge Gleeson never addresses this language from the “influential” Hamm decision because this language says Judge Sullivan cannot do what Judge Gleeson is urging him to do — “reassess” the DOJ evaluation of the “public interest” in moving to dismiss the Flynn case.
More to follow.
https://www.redstate.com/shipwrecked...mpression=true
So did Gleeson deal with the separation of powers issue?
Not concerning “ Heckler, Wayte, or ICC all Supreme Court cases”
buys time to repeat Flynn's defacto council
she seems impartial
As impartial as Gleeson. Swing and a miss Splits
Nice to see Ratcliffe pick up right where Grenell left off.
So when are you going to take on my twitter lawyer de jure? You’ve yet to even step to the plate.
Just pardon the traitor already
trump knew flynn was only doing what he was ordered to do
all traitors
all trump team knew exactly what russia was doing and they helped russia attack the US.
Did they include Flynn's lies? You know, the ones he pleaded guilty to twice under oath?
i have a day job
the amount of free time it takes to post and comment here is minimal, the times its going to take to read through a legal analysis and give a point by point response like i did last time is going to be quite different, and i dont always have that kind of free time. sometimes tho... especially with most CA courts being closed
I'm patient.i have a day job
the amount of free time it takes to post and comment here is minimal, the times its going to take to read through a legal analysis and give a point by point response like i did last time is going to be quite different, and i dont always have that kind of free time. sometimes tho... especially with most CA courts being closed
then wait until tomorrow's argument on the writ.
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