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Sorry I missed that you posted it.
U.S. official resigns over Afghan war
Foreign Service officer and former Marine captain says he no longer knows why his nation is fighting
By Karen DeYoung
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, October 27, 2009
When Matthew Hoh joined the Foreign Service early this year, he was exactly the kind of smart civil-military hybrid the administration was looking for to help expand its development efforts in Afghanistan.
A former Marine Corps captain with combat experience in Iraq, Hoh had also served in uniform at the Pentagon, and as a civilian in Iraq and at the State Department. By July, he was the senior U.S. civilian in Zabul province, a Taliban hotbed.
But last month, in a move that has sent ripples all the way to the White House, Hoh, 36, became the first U.S. official known to resign in protest over the Afghan war, which he had come to believe simply fueled the insurgency.
"I have lost understanding of and confidence in the strategic purposes of the United States' presence in Afghanistan," he wrote Sept. 10 in a four-page letter to the department's head of personnel. "I have doubts and reservations about our current strategy and planned future strategy, but my resignation is based not upon how we are pursuing this war, but why and to what end."
The reaction to Hoh's letter was immediate. Senior U.S. officials, concerned that they would lose an outstanding officer and perhaps gain a prominent critic, appealed to him to stay.
U.S. Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry brought him to Kabul and offered him a job on his senior embassy staff. Hoh declined. From there, he was flown home for a face-to-face meeting with Richard C. Holbrooke, the administration's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
"We took his letter very seriously, because he was a good officer," Holbrooke said in an interview. "We all thought that given how serious his letter was, how much commitment there was, and his prior track record, we should pay close attention to him."
While he did not share Hoh's view that the war "wasn't worth the fight," Holbrooke said, "I agreed with much of his analysis." He asked Hoh to join his team in Washington, saying that "if he really wanted to affect policy and help reduce the cost of the war on lives and treasure," why not be "inside the building, rather than outside, where you can get a lot of attention but you won't have the same political impact?"
Hoh accepted the argument and the job, but changed his mind a week later. "I recognize the career implications, but it wasn't the right thing to do," he said in an interview Friday, two days after his resignation became final.
"I'm not some peacenik, pot-smoking hippie who wants everyone to be in love," Hoh said. Although he said his time in Zabul was the "second-best job I've ever had," his dominant experience is from the Marines, where many of his closest friends still serve.
"There are plenty of dudes who need to be killed," he said of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. "I was never more happy than when our Iraq team whacked a bunch of guys."
But many Afghans, he wrote in his resignation letter, are fighting the United States largely because its troops are there -- a growing military presence in villages and valleys where outsiders, including other Afghans, are not welcome and where the corrupt, U.S.-backed national government is rejected. While the Taliban is a malign presence, and Pakistan-based al-Qaeda needs to be confronted, he said, the United States is asking its troops to die in Afghanistan for what is essentially a far-off civil war.
As the White House deliberates over whether to deploy more troops, Hoh said he decided to speak out publicly because "I want people in Iowa, people in Arkansas, people in Arizona, to call their congressman and say, 'Listen, I don't think this is right.' "
"I realize what I'm getting into . . . what people are going to say about me," he said. "I never thought I would be doing this."
'Uncommon bravery'
Hoh's journey -- from Marine, reconstruction expert and diplomat to war protester -- was not an easy one. Over the weeks he spent thinking about and drafting his resignation letter, he said, "I felt physically nauseous at times."
His first ambition in life was to become a firefighter, like his father. Instead, after graduation from Tufts University and a desk job at a publishing firm, he joined the Marines in 1998. After five years in Japan and at the Pentagon -- and at a point early in the Iraq war when it appeared to many in the military that the conflict was all but over -- he left the Marines to join the private sector, only to be recruited as a Defense Department civilian in Iraq. A trained combat engineer, he was sent to manage reconstruction efforts in Saddam Hussein's home town of Tikrit.
"At one point," Hoh said, "I employed up to 5,000 Iraqis" handing out tens of millions of dollars in cash to construct roads and mosques. His program was one of the few later praised as a success by the U.S. special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction.
In 2005, Hoh took a job with BearingPoint, a major technology and management contractor at the State Department, and was sent to the Iraq desk in Foggy Bottom. When the U.S. effort in Iraq began to turn south in early 2006, he was recalled to active duty from the reserves. He assumed command of a company in Anbar province, where Marines were dying by the dozens.
Hoh came home in the spring of 2007 with citations for what one Marine evaluator called "uncommon bravery," a recommendation for promotion, and what he later recognized was post-traumatic stress disorder. Of all the deaths he witnessed, the one that weighed most heavily on him happened in a helicopter crash in Anbar in December 2006. He and a friend, Maj. Joseph T. McCloud, were aboard when the aircraft fell into the rushing waters below Haditha dam. Hoh swam to shore, dropped his 90 pounds of gear and dived back in to try to save McCloud and three others he could hear calling for help.
He was a strong swimmer, he said, but by the time he reached them, "they were gone."
'You can't sleep'
It wasn't until his third month home, in an apartment in Arlington, that it hit him like a wave. "All the things you hear about how it comes over you, it really did. . . . You have dreams, you can't sleep. You're just, 'Why did I fail? Why didn't I save that man? Why are his kids growing up without a father?' "
Like many Marines in similar situations, he didn't seek help. "The only thing I did," Hoh said, "was drink myself blind."
What finally began to bring him back, he said, was a television show -- "Rescue Me" on the FX cable network -- about a fictional New York firefighter who descended into "survivor guilt" and alcoholism after losing his best friend in the World Trade Center attacks.
He began talking to friends and researching the subject online. He visited McCloud's family and "apologized to his wife . . . because I didn't do enough to save them," even though his rational side knew he had done everything he could.
Hoh represented the service at the funeral of a Marine from his company who committed suicide after returning from Iraq. "My God, I was so afraid they were going to be angry," he said of the man's family. "But they weren't. All they did was tell me how much he loved the Marine Corps."
"It's something I'll carry for the rest of my life," he said of his Iraq experiences. "But it's something I've settled, I've reconciled with."
Late last year, a friend told Hoh that the State Department was offering year-long renewable hires for Foreign Service officers in Afghanistan. It was a chance, he thought, to use the development skills he had learned in Tikrit under a fresh administration that promised a new strategy.
'Valley-ism'
In photographs he brought home from Afghanistan, Hoh appears as a tall young man in civilian clothes, with a neatly trimmed beard and a pristine flak jacket. He stands with Eikenberry, the ambassador, on visits to northern Kunar province and Zabul, in the south. He walks with Zabul Gov. Mohammed Ashraf Naseri, confers with U.S. military officers and sits at food-laden meeting tables with Afghan tribal leaders. In one picture, taken on a desolate stretch of desert on the Pakistani border, he poses next to a hand-painted sign in Pashto marking the frontier.
The border picture was taken in early summer, after he arrived in Zabul following two months in a civilian staff job at the military brigade headquarters in Jalalabad, in eastern Afghanistan. It was in Jalalabad that his doubts started to form.
Hoh was assigned to research the response to a question asked by Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during an April visit. Mullen wanted to know why the U.S. military had been operating for years in the Korengal Valley, an isolated spot near Afghanistan's eastern border with Pakistan where a number of Americans had been killed. Hoh concluded that there was no good reason. The people of Korengal didn't want them; the insurgency appeared to have arrived in strength only after the Americans did, and the battle between the two forces had achieved only a bloody stalemate.
Korengal and other areas, he said, taught him "how localized the insurgency was. I didn't realize that a group in this valley here has no connection with an insurgent group two kilometers away." Hundreds, maybe thousands, of groups across Afghanistan, he decided, had few ideological ties to the Taliban but took its money to fight the foreign intruders and maintain their own local power bases.
"That's really what kind of shook me," he said. "I thought it was more nationalistic. But it's localism. I would call it valley-ism."
'Continued . . . assault'
Zabul is "one of the five or six provinces always vying for the most difficult and neglected," a State Department official said. Kandahar, the Taliban homeland, is to the southwest and Pakistan to the south. Highway 1, the main link between Kandahar and Kabul and the only paved road in Zabul, bisects the province. Over the past year, the official said, security has become increasingly difficult.
By the time Hoh arrived at the U.S. military-run provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in the Zabul capital of Qalat, he said, "I already had a lot of frustration. But I knew at that point, the new administration was . . . going to do things differently. So I thought I'd give it another chance." He read all the books he could get his hands on, from ancient Afghan history, to the Soviet occupation in the 1980s, through Taliban rule in the 1990s and the eight years of U.S. military involvement.
Frank Ruggiero, the Kandahar-based regional head of the U.S. PRTs in the south, considered Hoh "very capable" and appointed him the senior official among the three U.S. civilians in the province. "I always thought very highly of Matt," he said in a telephone interview.
In accordance with administration policy of decentralizing power in Afghanistan, Hoh worked to increase the political capabilities and clout of Naseri, the provincial governor, and other local officials. "Materially, I don't think we accomplished much," he said in retrospect, but "I think I did represent our government well."
Naseri told him that at least 190 local insurgent groups were fighting in the largely rural province, Hoh said. "It was probably exaggerated," he said, "but the truth is that the majority" are residents with "loyalties to their families, villages, valleys and to their financial supporters."
Hoh's doubts increased with Afghanistan's Aug. 20 presidential election, marked by low turnout and widespread fraud. He concluded, he said in his resignation letter, that the war "has violently and savagely pitted the urban, secular, educated and modern of Afghanistan against the rural, religious, illiterate and traditional. It is this latter group that composes and supports the Pashtun insurgency."
With "multiple, seemingly infinite, local groups," he wrote, the insurgency "is fed by what is perceived by the Pashtun people as a continued and sustained assault, going back centuries, on Pashtun land, culture, traditions and religion by internal and external enemies. The U.S. and Nato presence in Pashtun valleys and villages, as well as Afghan army and police units that are led and composed of non-Pashtun soldiers and police, provide an occupation force against which the insurgency is justified."
American families, he said at the end of the letter, "must be reassured their dead have sacrificed for a purpose worthy of futures lost, love vanished, and promised dreams unkept. I have lost confidence such assurances can be made any more."
'Their problem to solve'
Ruggiero said that he was taken aback by Hoh's resignation but that he made no effort to dissuade him. "It's Matt's decision, and I honored, I respected" it, he said. "I didn't agree with his assessment, but it was his decision."
Eikenberry expressed similar respect, but declined through an aide to discuss "individual personnel matters."
Francis J. Ricciardone Jr., Eikenberry's deputy, said he met with Hoh in Kabul but spoke to him "in confidence. I respect him as a thoughtful man who has rendered selfless service to our country, and I expect most of Matt's colleagues would share this positive estimation of him, whatever may be our differences of policy or program perspectives."
This week, Hoh is scheduled to meet with Vice President Biden's foreign policy adviser, Antony Blinken, at Blinken's invitation.
If the United States is to remain in Afghanistan, Hoh said, he would advise a reduction in combat forces.
He also would suggest providing more support for Pakistan, better U.S. communication and propaganda skills to match those of al-Qaeda, and more pressure on Afghan President Hamid Karzai to clean up government corruption -- all options being discussed in White House deliberations.
"We want to have some kind of governance there, and we have some obligation for it not to be a bloodbath," Hoh said. "But you have to draw the line somewhere, and say this is their problem to solve."
Sorry I missed that you posted it.
No biggie. Thanks for the bump.
when you're already in a hole....stop digging.
this guy will get bashed if it becomes too public.
What does bump mean exactly?No biggie. Thanks for the bump.
When you reply to a thread it gets *bumped* to the top of the page.
So when people just write bump and post it, that's all it is for-get back to the top? TY
i respect his opinion, especially since he served. to be honest though, i think he has it backwards. the bad guys in iraq are insurgents BECAUSE we are there, they weren't going to attack us on US soil, THAT was the war that we should have pulled out of sooner. better yet, never gone. The afgans aren't our enemy, its those that are using their country to hide and plan attacks in India, Pakistan, the US, well basically all over the world. We do need to be there, and in a larger presence. More importantly we need to win over the locals, and thats not going to take guns, its going to take jobs. Until we can give some serious aid and win their minds, its going to seem like a pointless war, and we'll never find Bin Laden. just my opinion though.
Last edited by panic giraffe; 10-27-2009 at 12:35 PM.
There's not the political will to do this inside or outside of government. Nor will there be.
Our mere presence over there stirs the insurgency.
Ergo, we should GTFO.
We weren't in Afghanistan when Al Qada attacked us over and over.
The terrorists are in Iraq because that is where they have been traveling to (with help from Jordan, Syria, and Iran) so to fight infidels.
It is impressive how unapologetic u are about losing a war. Even after we broke apart the Sunni's stronghold's in Iraq and took down huge criminal elements in the JAM mob, you are still saying we should have left the Iraqi's to the wolves. Then even after this country, through the blood and sweat of coalition forces, has gotten Iraqi's the ability to vote you say we should never have fought for them. You are ok with saying that the country of Iraq should still be controlled by Hussein. Thousands a year tortured and murdered for being political prisoners. Iraq still believed to be a nuclear country. A dictator who paid terrorists and families of terrorists.
The Iraqi's aren't our enemies. They are appreciative of Americans freeing them.The afgans aren't our enemy, its those that are using their country to hide and plan attacks in India, Pakistan, the US, well basically all over the world. We do need to be there, and in a larger presence. More importantly we need to win over the locals, and thats not going to take guns, its going to take jobs. Until we can give some serious aid and win their minds, its going to seem like a pointless war, and we'll never find Bin Laden. just my opinion though.
How do we win their minds? It is so easy to say something like that. The Afghan culture is very different from Americans. What the guy in the article says to do is a great idea. I would say to break Afghanistan into states more. Working with tribal leadership better. I love the fight of information(propaganda). We should be giving adults 'free market' classes, since they cannot read in the rural parts. Fighting off the idea that poppy seeds are the best plant to grow. Closing off mountain routes and passes.
Secure from the center and push outward.
Get out and not go back? Should we keep bases there for quick response, or just Get out and leave. Should we have a pre-made notion of when we would come back and why, to give the Afghan govt.
I truly do respect this guy, and I respect his opinion.
I also respect a couple of other guys I know who were involved in the early days of Afghan/Pakistan involvement, even before we went into Iraq. These guys were still trying to find AQ operatives is both countries while all the resources were being sent to Iraq, and the U.S. presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan was being bled white by the committment in Iraq. According to these guys, we might have been able to do some definitve work in those countries had two things happened: 1. the resources to nation-build in Afghanistan were available right after the Taliban collapsed and continued, instead of being siphoned off to Iraq, and 2. The Pakistani's had been forcefully confronted about THEIR unwillingness to go after the Taliban and AQ in the Waziristan area right after the bungled job of getting Bin Laden in the Tora Bora mountains.
The resulting 'nothing' in Pakistan for several years (other than being able to catch some AQ guys who wandered into the cities and were thus able to be found) and 'next-to-nothing' in Afghanistan (not needing to do much fighting but also not taking the improved infrastructure approach that is now being suggested in Afghanistan, resulted in the Taliban regaining a foothold, and us being in the problem we have now.
Does anyone really believe that if we leave Afghanistan now that the taliban will not allow AQ to recons ute itself there again and again wage jihad from there?
I was against the Iraq war. I wish we didn't have to be in Afghanistan. But I honestly think we have to stay there until something good happens, and I don't pretend to know what that is or how long it will take. I fear it will take a very long time.
I hope that the guys in D.C. take as long as they need to figure this out proplerly this time.
Does anyone remember Charlie Wilson's War? Afghanistan wasn't as important as lots of other places after we helped them get rid of the Russians, and into that vacuum went AQ.
I find it amusing people like you truly believe this...
Carry on.
Personally, I don't think we have any business being there anymore. Let them make their own mess.
Afghanistan isn't a very good place for Al Qaeda to attack us from. 9/11 was plotted in Hamburg, Germany, and the pilots were trained in Florida. If UBL wants to hide in Afganistan, let him. He probably isn't as welcome there now, since his very presence there might provoke further US intervention.
I would have to agree with this statement in general.
Who's to say there isn't another "Afghanistan" involvement not going on now in another reluctant, out of the way part of the world?
What has been made obviously clear though is there are people out there who want to attack us for our values, way of life and principles and won't stop attempting to do so.
Where do we draw the line at trying to prevent this from happening?
With this proviso: unless we are already there.Afghanistan isn't a very good place for Al Qaeda to attack us from.
On the contrary: they attacked us here because we were over there.
We do the best we can to prevent it, but in principle, 100% prevention is never possible. The brute force approach, pursued over generations, creates generational enemies.
It's their place. Eventually, we need to GTFO.
Sooner would be advantageous for us, IMO.
Let's be serious, the oil companies aren't just gonna give the pipelines in Afghanistan to the Taliban....remember the wars were not about oil in itself, but oil distribution and control....
Yeah, hand on the tap and all that.
BTW, how's that working out in Iraq?
Are we getting the big oil contracts?
Are you suggesting Afghanistan is a do-over, since war for oil has obviously failed in Iraq?
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