The Senator misunderstands statistics and the purpose of inspections: he says that the 10 inspections a year will only check on 2 percent of the Russian forces, the implication being that 98% will be a complete mystery to us so we really don’t have any idea what is going on. This is not true: with just a sampling provided by inspections, we can have extremely high confidence in compliance.
As he says, “…these inspections cannot provide conclusive evidence of whether the Russians are complying with the warhead limit.” True, checking on 10 weapons sites is not enough to develop a statistical picture of Russian forces. But the treaty requires data exchanges to declare how many warheads are on which missiles. The data exchanges include the entire arsenal on both sides. The inspections are not really to inspect the weapons themselves so much as to confirm the data exchanges. Say the Russians wanted to cheat by putting more warheads than allowed on, say, 10% of their missiles. (I pick 10% because I don’t think anyone is arguing that 10% more or fewer weapons will make any discernable military difference. The number of warheads we have ready to launch changes by about 10% every time a ballistic missile submarine goes on or off patrol.) They would have to put the warheads on missiles and then lie on the data exchange and hope they don’t get caught. So, if we pick our inspection sites randomly, then there is a 10% chance they will get caught in one inspection and a 90% chance they will get away without detection on that one inspection. But there is only an 81% chance of getting past two inspections, 73% chance away with three, and so on. If we do 10 inspections, there is a 2/3 chance we will catch a violation of only a 10% cheat, hardly odds that would appeal to a prospective cheater. There is a 90% chance we would catch a 20% cheat. Just in the first 10 inspections. Remember that inspections continue over the years and our confidence will increase over time, approaching near certain that even small violations will be detected by the time the warhead limits are reached. Compare this to our complete
lack of knowledge of warhead numbers without inspections.
Note that the important number is the number of inspections, not the fraction of sites inspected. The statistics are essentially the same whether we inspect ten out of a hundred sites or ten out of ten thousand. Therefore, the Senator’s point that the inspections look at only 2-3% of the sites is wholly irrelevant from a mathematical perspective.
It is also important to understand that, contrary to Senator Bond’s implication, our National Technical Means, that is, overhead satellites, do not suddenly disappear. If the Russians tried to quickly load more warheads on missiles, we would see it.
Senator Bond’s objections are not simply politically motivated hysteria but his objections have been addressed and met. The treaty will reduce the nuclear threat and the verification is carefully tailored to meet the provisions of the treaty. Ratify.