(a) Reasonable, articulable su ion to conduct the DUI investigation. Before the officer asked Blankenship to exit the vehicle so as to conduct a DUI investigation (including field sobriety tests), the officer had smelled a strong odor of alcohol on Blankenship's breath and had observed Blankenship's watery, bloodshot eyes. "The alcoholic smell provided the officer reasonable grounds to conduct a second-tier investigatory detention." Whitmore v. State.[fn10] See Peterson v. State[fn11] (alcoholic smell alone gave police "sufficiently reasonable and articulable su ion to administer field sobriety . . . tests"); McClain v. State[fn12] (same).
BLANKENSHIP v. STATE, 301 Ga. App. 602 (2009) 688 S.E.2d 395
The fact that Ham smelled strongly of alcohol, standing alone, provided Officer Hatfield with sufficient probable cause to at least offer her a chemical test. See, e.g., Dalton, 773 N.E.2d at 334; see also Jellison v. State, 656 N.E.2d 532, 534 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995)
HAM v. STATE, 810 N.E.2d 1150 (Ind.App. 2004)
The fact that Dalton smelled strongly of alcohol, alone, provided sufficient probable cause to at least offer Dalton a chemical test. See State v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 431, 432 (Ind.Ct.App. 1987), trans. denied. Based on these facts, we find there was sufficient probable cause for Hainje to offer Dalton a test to determine whether he was intoxicated.
DALTON v. STATE, 773 N.E.2d 332 (Ind.App. 2002)
[fn8] The defendant argues that our conclusion that probable cause for arrest existed in Commonwealth v. Blais, 428 Mass. 294, 296 (1998), is inapposite for two reasons: the defendant in Blais was observed driving his vehicle prior to the officer's detection of his intoxicated condition, unlike the defendant here, who was parked; and the officer in Blais detected a "strong" odor of alcohol on the defendant's breath, whereas here the trooper testified to smelling only "an odor" of alcoholic beverage on the defendant's breath. As to the first point, we note, supra, that "operating" in G.L.c. 90, § 24, is not limited to driving. As to the defendant's second point, we do not consider this a meaningful factual distinction.
COMMONWEALTH v. ECKERT, 431 Mass. 591 (2000) [coding error corrected, comment below original--RG]
You'll notice that in each of these cases - the smell of alcohol alone allowed a cop to administer more tests (further investigate) - and the admissibility of the test results is being challenged on fourth amendment grounds.