"People say, 'Well, they bought a sports team; they should expect to lose money,'" he said. "No, they shouldn't. Because when you spend the amounts of money that these teams now cost, and the losses pile up because the players' salaries have gone up from a billion that we were arguing about in 1999 to $2 billion plus, I'm not going to say. 'Oh, we shouldn't make a profit; the goal here is to break even.' Wrong."
No one disagrees with that. Even Hunter doesn't disagree with that. His argument is that the players alone shouldn't provide the margin by which teams can be profitable.
There is another leg to the league argument, of course, and that is that it must alter the CBA to ensure that more teams can have a chance to win les. Some folks agree with that contention, saying the league has become a collection of haves in Miami and L.A. and Chicago whose advantages will only grow with time because of their ability to go into the luxury tax year after year to acquire and to keep players.
This argument, though, ignores six decades of history.
The Lakers and Knicks and Celtics have always had a leg up on their compe ors. The NBA has always been a league of dynasties, with few teams able to break through and challenge the hegemony of the dominant franchises.
A recap:
1950-1960: Minneapolis Lakers, four of 10 les
1960-1970: Boston Celtics, nine of 10 les
1980-1990: L.A. Lakers, five of 10 les; Celtics three les; Detroit Pistons, two les
1990-2000: Chicago Bulls, six of 10 les; Houston Rockets, two les
2000-2010: Lakers, five of 10 les; San Antonio Spurs, three les
You'll notice the 1970-1980 decade is missing. That was the only period in league history that can truly be considered democratic. Eight different teams won championships: the Celtics, Knicks, Bucks, Lakers, Warriors, Blazers, Bullets and Sonics. That would seem to be the kind of parity the league is now seeking. And the league was so popular that its Finals games had to be shown on tape delay. To be fair, there were other factors at play then -- the league was overwhelmed by the perception of white fans that its black players were all on drugs, for one. But the bottom line is the bottom line -- in the most egalitarian 10-year stretch in league history, no one watched on television, and people hated the on-court product.
In the NBA's 60-plus years of existence, seven franchises: Boston, the Lakers, the Bulls, the Spurs, the Philadelphia/Golden State Warriors, the Syracuse/76ers franchise and the Pistons -- have won a combined 53 les. Read that again: seven of the league's franchises have won more than 80 percent of the league's championships. If you're judging compe iveness by championships won, the NBA has never been compe ive.
Personally, I'm fine with that. The NBA is no different from baseball (the Yankees have almost one-fifth of all of baseball's world championships in their storied history), or hockey (the Canadiens have one-fourth of the National Hockey League's les in the Stanley Cup era) or the NFL, where the Steelers, Cowboys, 49ers and Packers have almost half of the league's Super Bowl les since 1966.
But maybe the league doesn't literally mean compete for championships. Maybe it is referring to having the opportunity to make the playoffs on a regular basis.
Since the last lockout (1998), though:
• The lower-budget Spurs have made more postseasons (13) than the Lakers (12);
• The Jazz have been in more playoffs (9) than the Knicks (5);
• The Pacers have been in more playoffs (9) than the Bulls (6);
• The Hornets have been in just as many playoffs (8) as the Celtics.
But that's not the point, the league argues. The point is that smaller-revenue teams can't spend the kind of money necessary to build
championship-caliber teams. They have two choices, each bad: go more and more into hock to keep the players they have, or give those players away for pennies on the dollar to the big boys, like Memphis had to do with Pau Gasol, and fall further behind.
Of course, it was the Gasol trade that allowed the Grizzlies to rebuild in three short seasons, to the point where they made the playoffs this season, beat San Antonio in the first round and almost beat Oklahoma City in the second. And OKC has managed to put a pretty good team around Kevin Durant without breaking any banks; to the contrary, the Thunder have structured contracts with Nick Collison and Kendrick Perkins that go down in the years to come, not up, freeing up funds that can be used to extend Durant and Russell Westbrook and Serge Ibaka.
How did Sam Presti do this? Ouija board? Short-selling on the stock market?
He did it the same way R.C. Buford did it in San Antonio, and the way Joe Dumars did it in Detroit when he built a champion in 2004 out of parts other teams didn't care for, and the way Donnie Walsh did it in Indiana for, oh, 20 years, and the way Kevin O'Connor does it in Utah this morning. Draft the right guys. Sign the right guys. Trade for the right guys. And pay the right guys the right amount of money.
"Dance with me here," the commissioner said Thursday. "You're smarter than I am, as a general manager, and you have $45 million of salary. And I'm not so smart, I have $110 (million), but I hire a decent general manager. Over time, do you think you could compete with me?"
Do the big market teams have a financial advantage? Yes. They always have. But states with no income tax have an advantage over states that do. And states near water have an advantage over states that are landlocked. And states with mountains have an advantage over states that are flat, not that there's anything wrong with flat.
It is not easy to build a contending team in a small market. But it is not unknowable. It does not require magic or spending seven years in medical school.