In summary, high-speed rail is the costliest of the three modes we examined,
largely because of its high capital costs relative to the number of anticipated
riders. It has the highest costs to the service provider, presumably the
state of California, because other modes spread their costs among private sector
owners and operators of vehicles and parts of the infrastructure system.
Conclusion
It is doubtful that without considerable subsidy high-speed rail could be
constructed, much less profitable in California. These subsidies are anticipated
to be higher than those required in other countries. The conditions in
Europe and Japan during the early stages of high-speed rail are significantly
different than most parts of the United States. Land uses are denser
and cities are closer together. Furthermore, constraints on federal spending
in the 1990’s hinder the development of new infrastructure. A last key distinction
is that the regulated transportation sectors in Japan and Europe prevented
compe ion from air travel to the same degree as in the United
States when the HSR lines were planned and deployed. Had air travel been
deregulated and privatized at the time, the decision to proceed with highspeed
rail, particularly in Europe, may have been different. As an illustration
of this, Southwest Airlines is a major opponent of high-speed rail in
Texas (Krumm 1994). As with all rail modes, there is a significant amount
of inflexibility associated with the system design. The high-speed networks
are limited, and the rails require very specific vehicles. Compared with the
greater flexibility afforded the untracked air travel system or the ubiquitous
highway system, high-speed rail faces serious difficulties.
However, should such a system be built, it can be expected to increase
the commuter sheds of both the San Francisco Bay area and Los Angeles
to include Central Valley cities. A one hour commute, while on the long
end of acceptable, would now be much farther away through the use of local
high-speed trains. On the other hand, total travel between the two metropoles
would likely increase very little, since the time and cost savings of
even non-stop high-speed rail against the existing frequent air service from
the three Bay area and five Los Angeles airports are minimal.