How does inequality affect economic efficiency? We care about inequality, or perhaps we care mostly about inequality, because we believe that it affects some important economic phenomena—notably, economic growth: Do more unequal countries grow faster or slower? Historically, the pendulum has swung from a rather unambiguous answer that inequality is good for growth to a much more nuanced view that favors the opposite conclusion.
Why has this been the case? To understand it, look at inequality, as far as economic efficiency is concerned, as cholesterol: There is “good” and “bad” inequality, just as there is good and bad cholesterol. 4 “Good” inequality is needed to create incentives for people to study, work hard, or start risky entrepreneurial projects. None of that can be done without providing some inequality in returns (for the effects of “unreasonable” leveling of incomes, see Vignette 1.5 on inequality under socialism). But “bad” inequality starts at a point—one not easy to define—where, rather than providing the motivation to excel, inequality provides the means to preserve acquired positions. This happens when inequality in wealth or income is used to forestall an economically positive political change for the society (e.g., agrarian reform or abolition of slavery), or to allow only the rich to get education, or to ensure that the rich keep the best jobs. All of this undercuts economic efficiency. If one’s ability to get a good education strongly depends on one’s parents’ wealth, this is equivalent to depriving society of the skills and knowledge of a large segment of its members (the poor). Discrimination according to inherited income is not, in that sense, different from any other discrimination, such as gender or race. In all cases, society decides that the skills of a certain group of people will not be used. Economically, such societies are unlikely to be successful. Depending on which kind of inequality—“positive,” needed for incentives, or “negative,” ensuring monopoly of the rich—is dominant in a given country and time, inequality may be regarded as either beneficial or harmful.
The benevolent view of economic inequality—that it provides incentives for individuals to excel—dominated when economists believed that only the very rich save and that without them, there would be no investments and no wealth creation. Workers (or the poor) were thought apt to spend everything they earned. If everybody then had the same (relatively) low income, there would be no saving, no investment, and no economic growth. The rich per se were not important, but it was important to have them around so that they would save, augment capital, and provide the wherewithal for feeding the engine of economic growth. The rich were supposed to be receptacles for the individualization of savings. They would spend and enjoy themselves no more than the others. All the excess would be simply saved and invested. Asceticism, as Max Weber wrote, was the key ingredient of such a “spirit of capitalism”: “The summum bonum of this ethic, the earning of more and more money, combined with the strict avoidance of all spontaneous enjoyment of life, is above all completely devoid of any ... hedonistic admixture. It is thought of so purely as an end in itself, that from the point of view of happiness of, or utility to, the single individual, it appears entirely ... irrational.”5
It is in the passage written in 1920 by John Maynard Keynes, famous English economist and founder of modern macroeconomics, that this slightly rose-tinted view of the justification of inequality of incomes under the condition that high incomes be used for investment finds perhaps its best expression:
Society [of pre-1914 Europe] was so framed as to throw a great part of the increased income into the control of the class least likely to consume it. The new rich of the nineteenth century were not brought up to large expenditures, and preferred the power which investment gave them to the pleasures of immediate consumption. In fact, it was precisely the inequality of the distribution of wealth which made possible those vast ac ulations of fixed wealth and of capital improvements which distinguished that age from all others. Herein lay, in fact, the main justification of the Capitalist System. If the rich had spent their new wealth on their own enjoyments, the world would long ago have found such a régime intolerable. But like bees they saved and ac ulated, not less to the advantage of the whole community because they themselves held narrower ends in prospect.
This was the view of capitalists as “saving machines” and entrepreneurs.
But the world was also full of another type of capitalist rentiers who would do very little but sit back, relax, and let money “do the work” for them. For a literary description of rentiers we can go to Stefan Zweig’s beautiful book about the “world of yesterday,” pre-World War I Europe, a world where the most cherished compliment (as Zweig writes) was “solid,” the highest value bourgeois respectability, and reasonableness and progress seemed destined to go on forever. For the rich, the living was easy:
Thanks to the constant ac ulation of profits, in an era of increasing prosperity in which the State never thought of nibbling off more than a few percent of income of even the richest, and in which ... State and industrial bonds bore high rates of interest, to grow richer was nothing more than a passive activity for the wealthy.
From this perspective, the rich looked less indispensable as “receptacles” for savings and as possible investors; they appeared much more like parasites living well while clipping coupons and doing little else. Yet the view of inequality as harmful, which began to dominate in the past couple of decades, did not develop from that ethical perspective. Curiously, it shares the same starting point with the view of inequality as a benevolent force—namely, that there should be people who are willing to invest—yet it reaches very different conclusions. Here’s how the argument flows:
People (rich, middle class, and poor) vote for how high they want their taxes to be, taking into account that the advantages from government spending (funded from taxes) accrue mostly to the poor. Very unequal societies will tend to vote for high taxation simply because there are a lot of people who benefit from government transfers, pay nothing or little in taxes, and would always outvote the few rich (see Vignette 1.7). Now, such high taxation reduces the incentives to invest and to work hard, and this lowers the rate of economic growth. The mechanism is similar to the nineteenth-century fear that people without property, if given half a chance to vote,would expropriate the wealthy. Here the same thing happens except that the expropriation is a bit gentler: It operates not through outright nationalization but through taxation.
In both cases—the benign and the malevolent views of economic inequality—the important thing is to have people who are willing to invest. But in the first case, rich investors require high inequality. In the second case, the introduction of political democracy is the monkey wrench that makes high inequality politically unsustainable. Even if the rich could somehow promise the poor that they would not consume but invest surplus income, and that the rich are thus indispensable for economic growth, there is no way that this promise could be enforced. It will not be credible, either. Consequently, the capitalist system must generate on its own a pre-tax income distribution that is sustainable and will not encourage people to choose extortionary tax rates. For this to happen, assets among people need to be distributed relatively evenly. We cannot, over the short or medium term, affect the distribution of financial assets much, but we can affect the distribution of education (what economists call “human capital”)—hence the emphasis on better access to education for everybody. This is not only because education may be thought desirable in itself, not even because higher education may be directly helpful for economic growth, but also because wider distribution of that asset would equalize distribution of pre-tax income and make even those relatively poor think twice before deciding to vote for high taxes.
Does a change in economic development also produce a change in our view of the usefulness of inequality? Quite likely. In the early stages of development, physical capital is scarce. It is then important to have rich people who are ready not to consume their entire income but to invest it so that more machines and roads can be built. As the economy develops, physical capital becomes less scarce, and relative to it, human capital (education) becomes more valuable. It is then crucial to spread education. But if the spread of education is constrained because talented children of the poor cannot pay for education, the growth rate will sputter. Thus, even without the introduction of universal voting rights and democracy, we reach a similar conclusion: For growth to be fast, at higher stages of economic development, education must be widespread, and widespread education is tantamount to less inequality.
The empirical evidence of the effect of inequality on economic growth is mixed. Perhaps this is inevitable because in some places and times, inequality may hamper economic growth (through its monopoly element) and in others help it (through its incentive element). Suffice it to say that our view regarding the positive versus negative effects of inequality on economic efficiency will always depend on how much weight we put on one or the other element in the essential dilemma: social monopoly versus incentives. In those cases where we believe that the monopoly of power and wealth exercised by the rich threatens social stability, and with it economic development and even the viability of a state, we would, as Plato did 2,400 years ago, see income or wealth inequality as a social evil to be combated. Asked whether his laying down of austerity as a desirable feature of his ideal state would not expose it to the danger of conquest from richer neighbors, Socrates (in Plato’s words) replies:
“But what should we call the others [communities that are not an ideal state]?,” he asked.11 “We ought to find a grander name for them,” [Socrates] replied. “Each of them is, as the proverb says, not so much a single state as a collection of states. For it always contains at least two states, the rich and the poor, at enmity with each other.... Treat them as plurality, offer to hand over the property ... of one section [of population] to another, and you will have allies in plenty and very few enemies.”
But in those cases where we think that the leveling of incomes—the absence both of the carrot of success and of the stick of failure—has gone so far that people will not try harder unless allowed to keep the fruits of their labor or investment more fully, we should, as odd as it may seem, opt out and call forth greater inequality.
Milanovic, Branko (2010-12-28). The Haves and the Have-Nots: A Brief and Idiosyncratic History of Global Inequality (pp. 12-18). Basic Books. Kindle Edition.