I don't know how PRISM was justified 
Reply With Quote
read the actual case (i know it's hard). you don't have an expectation of privacy regarding your IP address (since this is shared with a third party, your service provider). that doesn't mean you lose an expectation of privacy just for being on the internet. they had to get a warrant before actually checking the content (the need for a warrant means there is an expectation of privacy)
Here, the NIT was programmed to collect very limited information. Like the pen register in Smith that only captured the numbers dialed, 442 U.S. at 742, 99 S.Ct. 2577, the NIT only obtained identifying information; it did not cross the line between collecting addressing information and gathering the contents of any suspect's computer. Cf. Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510. Indeed, the Government obtained a traditional residential search warrant before searching the computer's contents in this case. Plus, Defendant lacked any expectation of privacy in the main piece of information the NIT allowed the FBI to gather — his IP address. E.g., Michaud, 2016 WL 337263, at *7. Additionally, while the Government could have deployed the NIT as soon as a user logged into Playpen, SA Alfin testified that in this particular case, the FBI took the extra step of not deploying the NIT until after the suspect actually accessed child pornography. These facts support the conclusion that the NIT's deployment does not represent a prohibited search under the Fourth Amendment. Cf. Forrester, 512 F.3d at 511.
Additionally, like the employee in Simons who was put on notice that his computer was not entirely private, 206 F.3d at 398, Defendant here should have been aware that by going on Tor to access Playpen, he diminished his expectation of privacy.
https://www.leagle.com/decision/inadvfdco170425000208
