There is a major problem with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) that has little to do with IP or the internet: how does international law get made—by the President alone, or with Congress's involvement? ACTA's key problem in the United States is a Cons utional question that turns on the separation of powers. The President, or an office of the executive branch like USTR, can negotiate treaties that fall within presidential powers. But for topics that fall within Congressional powers, like IP law, the Cons ution
requires that Congress be involved in the process.
The most obvious and difficult way to involve Congress is through Article II of the Cons ution. Under Article II, a treaty negotiated by the executive branch is presented to the Senate for ratification. The process is notoriously difficult, because it requires two-thirds of the Senate to approve. So USTR, almost understandably, wants to avoid the Article II process if at all possible.
A number of years ago, this wouldn't have been a problem, or at least not a Cons utional one. Congress gave USTR "fast track" authority to negotiate trade agreements, subject to an up-or-down vote at the end of the negotiating process. This authority, however, expired in July 2007. ACTA wasn't announced until October of that same year. Fast track wasn't great, because it didn't allow for amendments, but at least it allowed final oversight over the executive branch by Congress. It also allowed international law to be made, because the hurdle of Senate ratification for Article II treaties can make that process come to a standstill.
USTR knew, then, when it began negotiating ACTA, that it
no longer had Congress's authorization to negotiate these kinds of trade agreements. This doesn't mean that USTR had to drop its activities, but at the end of the negotiating process, it would have to seek Congress's approval anew. If Congress decided not to do an up-or-down vote or amend the agreement, the agreement would need to go to the Senate for ratification, or it would fail.
So USTR tried to avoid the process, and Congress, entirely. USTR initially explained that it planned to negotiate ACTA under the President's powers, alone. This made no sense, as
prominent legal scholars noted. The President's inherent powers do not involve IP. That’s Congress's purview.
In March 2012, USTR switched gears. After Senator Ron Wyden publicly questioned the way in which ACTA had been negotiated, the Legal Advisor to the Department of State, Harold Hongju Koh (disclosure: also formerly the dean of my law school and my professor of transnational law),
explained that ACTA wasn't being negotiated just by the President. Koh explained that--surprise!--Congress actually had been involved in ACTA, authorizing the negotiation of ACTA beforehand in the
2008 PRO-IP Act.
There's a major problem with this argument. First, the part of the PRO-IP Act Koh cited describes the creation of a
plan for US agencies to generally coordinate on IP enforcement, under the IP Czarina Espinel.
It isn't addressed to USTR, and it doesn't authorize USTR to negotiate an agreement.