Spurs' D, Suns' shortcomings key to Game 1
Charley Rosen / Special to FOXSports.com


There are the four significant reasons why the Spurs had such a relatively easy time downing the Suns in Game 1:

1. Tim Duncan's irresistible offense
All game long, Tim Duncan had little difficulty maneuvering himself into easy shots. It made no difference whether he was guarded by Shawn Marion, Steven Hunter, or Amare Stoudemire. And because of his lame ankles, TD even missed at least six very makeable layups.


Early on, the Suns let Duncan operate one-on-one, whatever meager success they achieved was only because TD missed so many gimmes. Midway through the third quarter, Phoenix began sloughing defenders into the middle. Duncan's counter was to drive baseline or to kick the ball back outside. And here's where Phoenix really got burned.

Their defense was a half-step slow into the paint, but even slower in recovering to tag the Spurs' 3-point shooters. One reversal pass on the perimeter and Tony Parker, Robert Horry, and especially Brent Barry could fire away in total freedom. Indeed, it was the Suns' y rotations that made a hero out of Barry.

In the end-game, Phoenix began double-teaming Duncan on the catch, but they came at him with Steve Nash. Duncan just took his time, sized up the spacing, and made pinpoint passes to open shooters. Phoenix made two mistakes here: They have to double-team the 7-foot Duncan with another big man to hinder his vision and put pressure on his passes. And, if they're intent on doubling Duncan, they should do so on the move, not on the catch.


2. The Spurs' superb transition defense
This happens to be one of the specialties. Tearing back on defense, running the ball down from behind, and/or running into the anticipated passing lanes. The Spurs' hustle here forced the usually sure-handed Suns fastbreak into a half-dozen turnovers.

The Suns can only play at top speed, so under this relentless onslaught, they rarely pulled the ball back out to initiate a half-court set. Besides the turnovers, we saw young Leandro Barbosa force and miss a complicated layup in a 2-on-4 situation. The Suns likewise came up empty on several 2-on-3, as well as 3-on-4 breaks. The Suns must see the floor better and not just motor headlong into the paint.

Phoenix only managed six fastbreak points — all of them coming when their quick hands disrupted San Antonio's interior passing and created turnovers.


3. The Suns' game plan was myopic
Whenever Phoenix was forced to play half-court offense, the Suns focused too much on high screen-and-rolls that featured Nash working with Stoudemire (and sometimes with Hunter). In so doing, the Suns allowed the Spurs to anticipate the offensive positioning and movements of one and all. As a result, San Antonio was able to settle into a comfortable defensive rhythm. Also, the Suns' stubbornness in trying to make hay with their screen/rolls allowed the savvy Spurs to take Marion, Quentin Richardson, and (in the second half) Jim Jackson out of the game.

In Barry's first rotation, the Suns cleared out a side for Jackson and let him go one-on-one to great effect. But with the increasing overemphasis on screen/rolls as the game progressed, Barry had a free pass on defense since whomever he was guarding wasn't involved in the offense anyway. This turn of events is what enabled Gregg Popovich to keep Barry on the court.


4. Defense against the Suns' screen-and-rolls
For starters, San Antonio played soft defense on any screen/roll involving Nash. That meant going under the screen and letting Nash shoot long-range jumpers, and also allowing him to turn the corner and penetrate into the paint. As Nash dribbled hoopward, he was met (in a rather passive stance) by whichever big man had been guarding Stoudemire (or Hunter). From there, two possibilities ensued: Either Tony Parker caught up with Nash, or Nash was given the chance to pull up and shoot. (Nash shot 6-for-9 in these situations.) Stoudemire's quickness and sheer athleticism did make him available for a few assisted layups, but the Spurs also managed to deflect several of these passes (most of which Phoenix recovered).





The Spurs had another anti-screen/roll strategy: Nash's defender (usually Parker, and occasionally Beno Udrih) would simply overplay Nash and beat him to the offered pick, thereby forcing the Suns' MVP toward the sideline or baseline where Duncan, Horry or Nazr Mohammed would be waiting for him. (This defense dates back to the Russellian Celtics.) Once again, Nash was thusly kept away from the hoop and either had to pass back outside or take a short jumper. Either way, the screen/roll didn't pan out the way Mike D'Antoni had planned.

Midway through the fourth quarter, the Spurs unveiled another way to discombobulate the Suns' notorious screen/rolls. They started doubling Nash and rotating weakside help to cut off the passing lane to the rolling Stoudemire. This sudden shift of tactics was the main reason why the Suns' offense disintegrated in clutch time.

Here's a rundown on the last 10 screen/rolls run by Phoenix:


San Antonio double-teamed Nash, but the ball was delivered to a cutting Stoudemire who was fouled by Duncan. Result: 2-of-2 free throws.

Nash was double-teamed and tossed a pass to Richardson who missed a 3-ball.

Nash was double-teamed, but passed to Stoudemire, whose subsequent pass was intercepted and turned into a fastbreak bucket by the Spurs.

Nash was double-teamed, the play broke down completely, but Stoudemire bagged a mid-range jumper.

The Spurs reverted to playing soft and Nash missed a lefty layup.

Horry switched on to Nash, who hit a jumper.

The Spurs played soft and Nash missed a jumper.

Nash was double-teamed and missed a jumper.

Nash was double-teamed and passed to Marion, who missed a jumper.

Nash was double-teamed, had the ball stripped, and the Spurs ran themselves into a layup.

Nash was double-teamed, passed to Stoudemire who missed a layup but snatched the rebound and scored.
OK, that's 10 possessions, which according to the NBA norm of a team's scoring 1.1 points per possession should have gained the Suns 11 points. Instead, the Suns scored a total of eight points and the Spurs scored four (on steals and breakaways), for a net of plus-4 for Phoenix. This was where the game was irretrievably lost.

Now let's see what adjustments the coach of the year will make for Game 2. And let's see what new tricks Popovich will make that will render D'Antoni's adjustments useless.

This is the heart of playoff basketball. And it'll only get better.


Charley Rosen, former CBA coach, author of 12 books about hoops, the current one being A pivotal season — How the 1971-72 L.A. Lakers changed the NBA, is a frequent contributor to FOXSports.com.