Why did the Kremlin intentionally prompt the recent gas crisis with Ukraine at virtually the same time as it takes leadership of the Group of Eight, and after announcing that its chairmanship of the G-8 would focus on global energy security? The answer is multi-faceted and illustrates the new reality as respects Russia's global position with regard to energy.
First and foremost, Russian self-confidence, self-reliance and assertiveness, especially with regard to foreign policy, have all been steadily growing since before the US invasion of Iraq when Russia and its partners stood up to oppose the US. Russia refuses to be pushed around, preferring to take a course of its own choice regardless of US and Western opposition and lecturing, but at the same time also preferring to avoid a direct conflict or heavy-handedness where possible. It makes alliances with whomever it pleases regardless of US and European complaints. It isn't deterred by threats. Russian assertiveness at home and abroad will continue to increase as it sees its national security at risk as a result of US/European moves within its traditional sphere of influence.
Second, Russia has had enough of the incursion by the US in particular into its sphere of influence. It has to deal with troublesome US-sponsored regimes in Ukraine and Georgia, and it has determined there will be no further incursions. Russia's new domestic law severely limiting the operations of non-governmental organizations is an example of its determination to resist US efforts at instigating "regime change" within its own borders.
The Kremlin's moves on Ukraine in the field of energy cons ute a determined pushback against the US and against the European regimes cooperating with the US in that effort. Energy-dependent Ukraine simply cannot win the strategic rivalry with Russia - it can only hold out for a short time at best. The message from Moscow is clear: the Kremlin will not hesitate to use its profoundly effective energy weapon against anyone threatening Russian interests. In the recent dispute with Ukraine, the Kremlin pressed the issue until it mostly got its way, and in the lead-up to elections in March, Moscow wants a "regime change" in Ukraine, either by means of the upcoming parliamentary elections themselves or by corralling the current Ukraine regime into obedience.
Soon, Europe will begin to realize that as virtual US patsies in a drive against Russia the price is too high, and its wiser members will cease to lend support to short-sighted US policies respecting Russia, thus severely marginalizing Europe's smaller members who seem to enjoy antagonizing Russia against their own vital interests.
Third, the Kremlin is now working to drive the final wedge between the US and Europe as it forces Europe to think about the terribly high price of aligning with the US and cooperating with it against Russian interests. Moscow is sending the signal that it is willing and able to be a reliable energy and political and economic partner, only so long as its own legitimate interests and security are also fully respected in return. It will not stand any longer for European duplicity. Energy security is not free. The price is respect for Russia and a guarantee of its legitimate interests.
Fourth, the Kremlin has correctly determined that it already occupies the key global position as respects energy and that it cannot be shifted out of that position, no matter how vigorously the US and its allies may try. Middle East instability is on the rise with no relief in sight. That solidifies Russia's new position. Oil-rich Central Asia is moving firmly into alignment with both Russia and China. Canada and Latin America are incrementally doing likewise.
Neither Europe nor the US has viable energy alternatives in the foreseeable future, making Russia the key. The West's threats of diversification away from reliance on Russian energy are wishful thinking, empty threats that cannot be fulfilled any time soon. Russia isn't fooled by such threats and rhetoric.
Europe is absolutely obliged to rely on Russia as respects energy. So is Asia. There is no way out in the near term, for at least a decade or two. Anywhere in that space of time Russia easily could, if it were obliged by US unilateralism, apply tremendous economic and political pressure to severely damage, or credibly threaten to do such damage, to the economies of the West.
The US and British economies in particular are artificial bubble disasters just waiting to happen, tremendously burdened with enormous debt loads. The dollar definitely appears to have reversed its temporary 2005 gain, now resuming its strategic decline. China has signaled that it will steadily diversify its huge reserves out of dollars.
Russia and its key strategic allies could fight and win an economic war with the West because the energy-dependent, bubble-ridden US and British economies would be forced to "blink" first, before they were crashed. Deeply energy-dependent Europe would be forced to "blink" long before the US and Britain. Most of Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and Canada already show no fondness for US foreign policy and could be expected, at a minimum, to refrain from allying with the US in any warfare (economic, political or military) against Russia and its allies.
The US isolation over its invasion of Iraq provides a suitable illustration of what it would face on a global scale if it prompts a new global crisis by continuing to seek the demise of Russian power and influence in its own sphere by the spread of more democratic "regime changes", as the US State Department has just recently said it intends to do. The same is true if the US or Israel take the enormously destabilizing step of attacking Iran - the global repercussions of such a course would be enormous, with the US suffering most badly.