Reply With Quote
Well....there you go again.
Barcepundit reminds us that the Butler Report, which reviewed issues relating to pre-war intelligence on Iraq, has important information on the subject of Saddam's efforts to purchase uranium in Africa, the subject of the famous "sixteen words" and of Joe Wilson's mendacious campaign against the Bush administration.
You can download the Butler Report here; these are the relevant paragraphs on African uranium:
Until reminded by Barcepundit, I had forgotten that, in addition to trying to buy uranium from Niger, Iraq had also tried to obtain uranium from Congo, and may have succeeded in doing so.492. In the course of the first Gulf war, the facilities involved in this indigenous route were severely damaged. Subsequently, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervised the dismantlement of all the facilities that Iraq had built to process, enrich and fabricate uranium, and removed all potentially fissile material. Some unprocessed uranium ore was left in country, but under IAEA safeguards and subject to regular inspections. Iraq would therefore have had to seek imports of uranium or uranium ore if it wished to restart its nuclear programme covertly.
493. In early 1999, Iraqi officials visited a number of African countries, including Niger. The visit was detected by intelligence, and some details were subsequently confirmed by Iraq. The purpose of the visit was not immediately known. But, uranium ore accounts for almost three-quarters of Niger’s exports. Putting this together with past Iraqi purchases of uranium ore from Niger, the limitations faced by the Iraq regime on access to indigenous uranium ore and other evidence of Iraq seeking to restart its nuclear programme, the JIC judged that Iraqi purchase of uraniumore could have been the subject of discussions and noted in an assessment in December 2000 that: ...unconfirmed intelligence indicates Iraqi interest in acquiring uranium.
494. There was further and separate intelligence that in 1999 the Iraqi regime had also made inquiries about the purchase of uranium ore in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In this case, there was some evidence that by 2002 an agreement for a sale had been reached.
495. During 2002, the UK received further intelligence fromadditional sources which identified the purpose of the visit to Niger as having been to negotiate the purchase of uranium ore, though there was disagreement as to whether a sale had been agreed and uranium shipped.
497. In preparing the dossier, the UK consulted the US. The CIA advised caution about any suggestion that Iraq had succeeded in acquiring uranium from Africa, but agreed that there was evidence that it had been sought.
499. We conclude that, on the basis of the intelligence assessments at the time, covering both Niger and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the statements on Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Africa in the Government’s dossier, and by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, were well-founded. By extension, we conclude also that the statement in President Bush’s State of the Union Address of 28 January 2003 that:
was well-founded.
503. From our examination of the intelligence and other material on Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Africa, we have concluded that:
a. It is accepted by all parties that Iraqi officials visited Niger in 1999.
b. The British Government had intelligence from several different sources indicating that this visit was for the purpose of acquiring uranium. Since uranium cons utes almost three-quarters of Niger’s exports, the intelligence was credible.
c. The evidence was not conclusive that Iraq actually purchased, as opposed to having sought, uranium and the British Government did not claim this.
d. The forged do ents were not available to the British Government at the time its assessment was made, and so the fact of the forgery does not undermine it.
That makes the "sixteen words" were doubly true.
This interview of Tom Joscelyn by FrontPage Magazine provides an excellent summary of what we've learned so far from the Project Harmony do ents. Tom adds some other information, too, some of which was new to me, like this:
Obviously, this paints a very different picture of prewar Iraq than many would like to see.
Well....there you go again.
In the context of "The War on Terr" where al-Quaida (not in Iraq, not being helped by Iraq), is the main target, the above, even if true, still doesn't justify the Repugs' phony, disastrous war on Iraq.
Meanwhile, Quaida is in Pakistan waiting for dubya to cut-and-run in Afghanistan (NATO is already taking over, but they will not have the stomach for it), allowing the Taliban and warlords run the country just like before 2002 invasion, and re-establish Quaida havens and training in Afghanistan.
The Repugs switching of the US military focus and resources from Afghanistan to Iraq will probably result in the US failing to achieve its objectives in both countries, while exposing the limits of US military.
Iraq is an unmitigated disaster that was completely avoidable, and is now seen to be completely unjustified, Yoni's stretching and digging proving nothing.
And that's not all.
A couple of days ago, jveritas at Free Republic, whose translation efforts in the Harmony Project have been instrumental in clarifying some of what was going on in pre-invasion Iraq, has come up with what appears to be a highly significant memorandum. This is how he introduces the translation:
The translation follows:
jveritas concludes:
The apparent significance of this do ent requires no elaboration. Transferring a load of ordinary munitions from Najaf to Baghdad would presumably not require the approval of the Army's Chief of Staff; nor would it be the subject of a top secret memo; nor would arrangements for "special vehicles" be necessary.
This do ent is dated just a few days before the war began, and, based on the prefix assigned to it, I think it came from the Iraq Survey Group. It seems almost inconceivable that the ISG could have overlooked a do ent with such apparent relevance to its mission.
The do ent can be accessed here and I'd like to see confirmation of jveritas's translation, as well as any comments on the significance of other portions of the do ent.
It is, at the very least, an interesting do ent. There is a thesis out there that states, basically, that Saddam Hussein didn't have what we thought he had because he didn't have what HE thought he had. In mid-December 2002, according to the Iraqi Perspectives Project, Saddam Hussein told top regime officials that he doesn't have large quan ies of WMD.
I don't know whether the Army Chief of Staff who authored the memo was among the senior regime officials who were told that the WMD was gone. If he wasn't, it could be that these are genuine orders, contained in an authentic do ent, for materials that simply weren't available to them. The do ent certainly seems to suggest that the author believed that they had them on March 16, 2003.
That said, it's certainly possible that he (or his subordinates) retained some small capability in the chemical area. I think that's the reason that the ISG quite deliberately left open the possibility that some materials could have been transferred to Syria or elsewhere.
Finally, I'm not sure where the recent revelations about Naji Sabri fit into this picture. Sabri, the former Iraqi foreign minister, apparently told the CIA (through the French) in January 2003 that Iraq had retained some chemical capability but that the weapons were no longer under military control.
As is readily agreed, it will take more than a few pieces of paper to resolve the questions surrounding Iraq's WMDs. Let's hope that the Project Harmony do ents, taken in their entirety, provide definitive answers...and fast.
.494. There was further and separate intelligence that in 1999 the Iraqi regime had also made inquiries about the purchase of uranium ore in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In this case, there was some evidence that by 2002 an agreement for a sale had been reached
The British never showed any evidence to substantiate their Congo claims in the Butler Report...
WIKIPEDIAThe Butler Report issued after a review by the British government concluded that the report Saddam's government was seeking uranium in Africa was credible. Nevertheless, the Butler report fails to advance any evidence to substantiate this conclusion. Furthermore, the Butler report concluded that "The forged do ents were not available to the British Government at the time its assessment was made, and so the fact of the forgery does not undermine it,"[3] which again could not be verified.
Show me the evidence.
So it's been proven in two wars that if Saddam had WMDs, he wouldn't use them against the US - even in defense of his own regime.
Now your best argument, your last gasp, is that he had an undetermined amount of undetermined WMDs in undertermined locations in the hands of undetermined parties whose intentions of using the undetermined weapons are -- undertermined.
You're better off saying the occupation wasn't about WMDs. What happened to that talking point?
That's because the Butler Report wasn't about the Congo claims. It was about investigating whether or not the Prime Minister had "sexed" up his claims about Hussein seeking uranium and whether or not the President of the United States had wrongly attributed his SOTUA statement to the Brits..
The British never showed any evidence to substantiate their Congo claims in the Butler Report...
Butler determined the Prime Minister had no embellished his claims and that the President was justified in making the sixteen word statement.
Further, I'm guessing you'd have to be in the "need to know" loop to get a gander at much of the evidence. But, you're not interested...you just like to keep moving the target.
Fact of the matter is, the Butler report suppports the statement made by President Bush in the State of the Union Address; "British Intelligence [not U.S., not the CIA, not Jacques Chirac or Vladmir Putin or Gerhard Schroeder] has learned [supported by intelligence they claim to possess to this day]that Saddam Hussein recently sought[not bought, acquired, or received]significant quan ies of uranium from Africa."[a big continent on which the countries of Niger and the Republic of Congo are situated along with a few others.
Why? Who the are you and what possible value could there be to sharing intelligence information with you?Show me the evidence.
Bush and Cheney lied. Everyone knows it so let's move on.
Sorry, not good enough. If your gonna use it to justify a war, I want to see the evidence.Butler determined the Prime Minister had no embellished his claims and that the President was justified in making the sixteen word statement.
Further, I'm guessing you'd have to be in the "need to know" loop to get a gander at much of the evidence. But, you're not interested...you just like to keep moving the target.
w3rd.
Short and succinct.
Of course, Yonivore MAY just trying to add his own spin after the explosive article that came out on Truthout.org over the weekend
State Department Memo: "16 Words" Were False
By Jason Leopold
t r u t h o u t | Report
Monday 17 April 2006
Sixteen days before President Bush's January 28, 2003, State of the Union address in which he said that the US learned from British intelligence that Iraq had attempted to acquire uranium from Africa - an explosive claim that helped pave the way to war - the State Department told the CIA that the intelligence the uranium claims were based upon were forgeries, according to a newly declassified State Department memo.
The revelation of the warning from the closely guarded State Department memo is the first piece of hard evidence and the strongest to date that the Bush administration manipulated and ignored intelligence information in their zeal to win public support for invading Iraq.
The memo says: "On January 12, 2003," the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) "expressed concerns to the CIA that the do ents pertaining to the Iraq-Niger deal were forgeries."
Moreover, the memo says that the State Department's doubts about the veracity of the uranium claims may have been expressed to the intelligence community even earlier.
Those concerns, according to the memo, are the reason that former Secretary of State Colin Powell refused to cite the uranium claims when he appeared before the United Nations in February 5, 2003 - one week after Bush's State of the Union address - to try to win support for a possible strike against Iraq.
"After considerable back and forth between the CIA, the (State) Department, the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), and the British, Secretary Powell's briefing to the U.N. Security Council did not mention attempted Iraqi procurement of uranium due to CIA concerns raised during the coordination regarding the veracity of the information on the alleged Iraq-Niger agreement," the memo further states.
Iraq's interest in the yellowcake caught the attention of Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Association. ElBaradei read a copy of the National Intelligence Estimate and personally contacted the State Department and the National Security Council in hopes of obtaining evidence so his agency could look into it.
ElBaradei sent a letter to the White House and the National Security Council (NSC) in December 2002, warning senior officials he thought the do ents were forgeries and should not be cited by the administration as evidence that Iraq was actively trying to obtain WMDs.
ElBaradei said he never received a written response to his letter, despite repeated follow-up calls he made to the White House, the NSC and the State Department.
Vice President Cheney, who made the rounds on the cable news shows that month, tried to discredit ElBaradei's conclusion that the do ents were forged.
"I think Mr. ElBaradei frankly is wrong," Cheney said. "[The IAEA] has consistently underestimated or missed what it was Saddam Hussein was doing. I don't have any reason to believe they're any more valid this time than they've been in the past."Rovian Secretions
As it turns out, ElBaradei was correct, the declassified State Department memo now shows.
Monday's declassified State Department memo was obtained over the weekend by the New York Sun under a Freedom of Information Act request the newspaper filed last July. The Sun's story Monday morning, however, did not say anything about the State Department's warnings more than a week before Bush's State of the Union address about the bogus Niger do ents.
The memo, dated June 10, 2003, was drafted by Carl Ford Jr., the former head of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, in response to questions posed in June 2003 by I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Vice President Cheney's former chief of staff, about a February 2002 fact-finding trip to Niger that former ambassador Joseph Wilson undertook to investigate the uranium claims on behalf of the CIA.
The memo had originally been drafted in June in response to Libby's questions about Wilson. But after Wilson wrote an op-ed in the New York Times July 6, 2003, in which he disclosed that he had personally investigated the Niger uranium claims and found that they were false, Powell requested further information from his aides. Ford went back and retrieved the June memo, re-dated it July 7, 2003, and sent it to Powell's deputy,Richard Armitage.
The Sun reported that the memo contained no direct reference to Plame Wilson's CIA status being marked as "secret" despite the fact that the word "secret" is clearly marked on every page of the INR memo.
The memo does not say that the State Department alerted the White House on January 12, 2003, about the bogus uranium claims.
But the memo's author, Carl Ford, said in a previous interview that he has no doubt the State Department's reservations about the Niger intelligence made their way to President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
One high-ranking State Department official said that when the department's analysts briefed Colin Powell about the Niger forgeries, Powell met with former Director of the CIA George Tenet and shared that information with him.
Tenet then told Vice President Cheney and then-National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice and her former deputy, Stephen Hadley, that the uranium claims were "dubious," according to current and former State Department and CIA officials who have direct knowledge of what Tenet discussed with the White House at the time.
The White House has long maintained that they were never briefed about the State Department's or the CIA's concerns related to the Niger uranium claims.
"I refuse to believe that the findings of a four-star general and an envoy the CIA sent to Niger to personally investigate the accuracy of the intelligence, as well as our own research at the State Department, never got into the hands of President Bush or Vice President Cheney. I don't buy it," said a high-ranking State Department official. "Saying that Iraq sought uranium from Niger was all it took, as far as I'm concerned, to convince the House to support the war. The American people too. I believe removing Saddam Hussein was right and just. But the intelligence that was used to state the case wasn't."
A spokeswoman for Tenet said Monday that the former head of the CIA wouldn't comment on the newly declassified do ent but promised that Tenet would tell the "full story" about how the infamous 16 words wound up in Bush's State of the Union address, in Tenet's book, "At the Center of the Storm," expected to be published in late October.
Many career State Department officials interviewed Monday said they were upset that the so-called "16 words" made their way into the State of the Union address and they are pleased that the INR memo has been declassified, thereby proving that their colleagues sounded early warnings about the dubious Niger intelligence.
A State Department official who has direct knowledge of the now declassified INR memo said when the request came from Cheney's office for a report on Wilson's Niger trip it was an opportunity to put in writing a do ent that would remind the White House that it had been warned about the Niger claims early on.
Many other State Department officials believed that the existence of a memo that would, in essence, disagree with the White House's own assessment on Niger would eventually hurt the administration.
"This was the very first time there was written evidence - not notes, but a request for a report - from the State Department that do ented why the Niger intel was bull ," said one retired State Department official.
"It was the only thing in writing, and it had a certain value because it didn't come from the IAEA. It came from State. It scared the heck out of a lot of people because it proved that this guy Wilson's story was credible. I don't think anybody wanted the media to know that the State Department disagreed with the intelligence used by the White House. That's why Wilson had to be shut down."
The 4-17-06 New York Sun article "No Hint Seen in Memo that Plame's Role Was Secret" included a link to a declassified version of a State Department memorandum that has played a significant role in the Plame Scandal. The Sun article suggests the memo "undercuts the idea of a deliberate campaign to expose Plame." That idea was put in check by Jason Leopold's article "State Department Memo: '16 Words' Were False," above.
However, because the Sun article quotes Karl Rove's attorney, Robert Luskin, in its attempt to spin the memo to the White House's advantage, I thought we should take a closer look. The Sun had made a Freedom of Information request for the memo last July, and reportedly had just received it. When we consider that Karl Rove apparently didn't see the memo, and wasn't on Air Force One on the July 2003 trip to Africa when it was reportedly passed around to administration officials who were upset by Joe Wilson's NY Times op-ed, it seems curious that the Sun would seek Luskin's opinion.
Just for fun, let's look back to July of 2005, and see if there is anything that stands out about Rove and Luskin. Perhaps we could start with "Rove At War," the 7-25-05 Newsweek cover story, which concludes, "As for Rove, friends say that he was shaken by the speed with which the Wilson story moved -- and in a direction he didn't expect. He's used to being in control. But now all Rove can do is mark time until someone else -- Patrick Fitzgerald -- says what comes next. After his re-election victory last November, Bush called Rove the 'Architect.' Now the hunter has to wait with everyone else to see if he has become the hunted." (page 34)
In "Think Progress's" research forum on "23 Administration Officials Involved in Plame Leak," we are reminded that on 9-29-03, when asked if he had any knowledge of who leaked a CIA agent's name, Karl answered, "No." (ABC News; 9-29-03) And that very day, White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan said he had spoken with Karl, and it was a "ridiculous suggestion" that he played any role in the scandal. (White House briefing; 9-29-03) And the 7-11-05 Newsweek quoted Karl as saying, "I didn't know her name and didn't leak her name."
Karl had testified three times before the grand jury. He reportedly had admitted that he participated in discussions about Wilson and Plame with some administration officials, apparently those in the WHIG. But he had denied discussing her with Time reporter Matt Cooper. During the period of time Rove denied talking to Cooper, both Time and Cooper were fighting Fitzgerald's efforts to force him to testify to the grand jury. But, as the 7-25-05 Time reports, Cooper had decided to testify.
Matthew Cooper told the grand jury that Rove had told him their conversation was on "deep background," which he understod to mean he "must keep the iden y of my source confidential." Without using Valerie's name, Rove told Cooper that Wilson's wife worked for "the agency," and was responsible for sending him on the trip to Niger. He mentioned that information was going to be declassified in the "coming days that would cast doubt on Wilson's mission and his findings." He ended the conversation by saying, "I've already said too much."
How did Karl Rove and Robert Luskin respond to all of this? The 7-25-05 Newsweek notes, "Last week, Newsweek has learned, after Time's Matthew Cooper provided grand-jury testimony on his July 11, 2003, conversation with Karl Rove, Robert Luskin, Rove's attorney, placed a call to Fitzgerald to make sure he didn't need anything more from Rove in light of Cooper's claims. Fitzgerald didn't bite: 'We'll get back to you,' the prosecutor replied curtly, and quickly got off the line." (page 32)
The 10-15-05 New York Times reported that Rove testified before the grand jury again. He had a cover story, about finding an e-mail to Steve Hadley that he found after his lawyer had "refreshed" his memory. This, we learned, was as a result of Luskin dining with Viveca Novak. However, in two meetings with Fitzgerald -- one under oath -- Ms. Novak's story did not seem to support Luskin's. (See "What Viveca Novak Told Fitzgerald"; Time; 12-11-05)
Ms. Novak would end her career with Time as a result of this incident. Her editors were not the only people unhappy with her behavior. "One Final note," she wrote in her final Time article, "Luskin is unhappy that I decided to write about our conversation, but I feel that he violated any understanding to keep our talk confidential by unilaterally going to Fitzgerald and telling him what was said."
And that brings us to another tactic that Rove and Luskin use frequently: selective secretions to the media. The 10-24-05 New York Times featured an article, "Republicans Testing Ways to Blunt Leak Charges." Among the sad attempts were efforts to say if Fitzgerald indicted Rove, it would amount to "criminalizing politics and that Mr. Fitzgerald did not understand how Washington works."
More, in the 10-19-05 New York Daily News, a presidential counselor was quoted as saying that "an angry President Bush rebuked chief political guru Karl Rove two years ago for his role in the Valerie Plame affair .... 'He made his displeasure known to Karl ... He made his life miserable about this'."
All of this was too much for even Robert Novak, the dehydrated journalist who had first published Plame's iden y in July 2003. On his 12-14-05 MSNBC show, host Tucker Carlson noted that Novak "said yesterday he is confident President Bush knows who leaked Plame's name and should settle the mystery." Guest David Schuster told Carlson that he believed Fitzgerald would eventually indict Rove, based in part upon Ms. Novak's testimony.
Perhaps it was just a coincidence that the New York Sun had an article quoting Luskin, who said, "It's something that people got very excited about," but that the State Department memo "further substantiates that nobody involved in discussions of her or her role in sending Mr. Wilson had the slightest inkling she was in classified status." But the memo never said she sent Wilson. I think this is another selective Rovian secretion, testing ways to blunt upcoming leak charges.
"British Intelligence has learned..."
Well since everyone believes it, lets ignore the evidence and be free thinkers like dark reign who needs no affirmation of his beliefs.
Or we can spend our days and nights dancing around spin and see it for what it is.Well since everyone believes it, lets ignore the evidence and be free thinkers like dark reign who needs no affirmation of his beliefs.
No WMD's followed by new spin that we went to liberate the Iraqis.
I dont need a Butler report to know that the Secretary of Defense resigned because he was made to look like an idiot in front a Senate committee claiming hard evidence of WMD's, which again, where never found.
I dont find my stance confusing, yet following the logic behind this "war" is very much so. If you believe the bull , that is.
WHat are these new reasons for going towards Iraq? WMD's was only amongst other reasons.
Seriously you need to stop spewing what you hear without checking out the facts.
I didn't think Republicans did nuance. Even the W.H. admitted that Dubya's reference in the SOTU address was about Niger, but if you want to believe he was referring to the Congo, you go right ahead.
I believe it was about Niger and the Congo...especially since the President identified the entire continent.
By the Way, the Butler Report stands by the President's statement, the House Select committee found Joseph Wilson to be a liar and, further, stated his report on Niger tended to support -- not dissuade -- intelligence beliefs about Niger Uranium and Iraq.
If the Niger official told Wilson -- which he did -- that he believed the Iraq delegation seeking a business relationship was "code" for wanting to buy uranium, is that the same as saying Iraq sought Uranium in Niger? You will recall that the President's statement merely said that British intelligence had learned that Iraq had SOUGHT uranium in Africa.
Apparently, according to even Joe Wilson's crack investigation, the Iraqis were, indeed SEEKING uranium in Africa.
But, if Wilson did such a bang up job over there, why this:
Clueless Joe Wilson
no matter what the the truth was in Africa, the war was unjustified, launched against the wrong target, and the invasion of IRaq was a Repug POLICY (failure) that dated back before 2000 election.
Hitchens is clueless. This just shows again what Christopher's role is American political life has been reduced to writing articles that can be quoted by the wing-nuts with some varation of; "Even well known Liberal Christopher Hitchens agrees that [insert wing-nut hate-figure of the day here] is a lunatic, lying, extremist who must be disowned by all decent-minded people"
The simple fact is that the US government has had three years and has yet not managed to find any program that could utilize yellowcake even if it fell from the sky as a gift.
In that ever changing sphere that is Christopher's head The do ents used to be true, and then they were "fabricated version of a true bill," and now that they are totally discredited, they become a reverse proof, a "product of disinformation"
Wissam al-Zahawie, the accredited ambassador of Iraq to the Vatican, visited Niger in 1999.
He forgets to mention that there is no way in a million years Iraq could have got yellowcake from Niger as one of the mines was flooded and the other French controlled.
He somehow fails to recall that Iraq was under international embargo at the time so could not have imported yellowcake.
He manages to avoid referring to the fact that three years of postwar searching have shown that Iraq had no equipment and no programme to use the yellowcake for anything at all and that anyway they already had 500 tonnes of the stuff.
What have we left?
Wissam al-Zahawie, the accredited ambassador of Iraq to the Vatican, visited Niger in 1999.
Why embarrass yourself any more Christopher? the war you shilled for has left, at least, tens of thousands of dead and the nation of Iraq virtually destroyed.
There were no nukes, no nerve gas, no unmanned planes, no anthrax, no threat to destroy cities in 15 minutes. It was all a lie.
I know it, you know it, the dogs on the street know it.
Do you really think the world will forgive you because you have found out that Wissam al-Zahawie, the accredited ambassador of Iraq to the Vatican, visited Niger in 1999?
Wissam Al-Zahawie, former Iraqi ambassador to the Vatican
Interview with Al-Zawahie by Tom Hayden of Huffington PostFor American journalists and diplomats, he apparently remains radioactive, however, an off-limits source in the search for the truth. I interviewed al-Zahawi recently in Amman and talked about the infamous July 6, 2000 letter to Niger concerning the alleged uranium deal that bore his name. He had pointed out to UN weapons in 2002 that that the signature on the do ent was forged, a conclusion later upheld by intelligence analysts. The letter in question, al-Zahawi told them, was both signed and sealed, in violation of standard diplomatic procedures. Nevertheless, the Bush Administration used the claims of uranium oxide from Niger as a key basis for going to war; President Bush said "the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quan ies of uranium from Africa." Judith Miller of the New York Times was persuaded to report in September 2002 that Iraq had obtained special aluminum tubes for enriching the Niger yellowcake in centrifuges, a story later repudiated by her own editors.
Al-Zawahie still wants to know who fabricated his signature and the package of do ents. The evidence shows that Italian intelligence operatives provided the forged do ents to their US and UK colleagues, "yet no questions appeared to be asked on where or how the Italian or other intelligence services got the do ents to ascertain their source", al-Zawahie notes. "I did not know that Niger produced uranium", he said.
Even if the President was being intentionally ambiguous, Ari Fleischer later explicitly affirmed that the President was referring to Niger in the SOTU speech.I believe it was about Niger and the Congo...especially since the President identified the entire continent.
White HouseMR. FLEISCHER: When I refer to yellow cake I refer to Niger. The question was on the context of Ambassador Wilson's mission.
Q So are you saying the President's broader reference to Africa, which included other countries that were named in the NIE, were those also incorrect?
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, I think the President's statement in the State of the Union was much broader than the Niger question.
Q Is the President's statement correct?
MR. FLEISCHER: I'm referring specifically to the Niger piece when I say that.
Q Do you hold that the President -- when you look at the totality of the sentence that the President uttered that day on the subject, are you confident that he was correct?
MR. FLEISCHER: Yes, I see nothing that goes broader that would indicate that there was no basis to the President's broader statement. But specifically on the yellow cake, the yellow cake for Niger, we've acknowledged that that information did turn out to be a forgery.
Q The President's statement was accurate?
MR. FLEISCHER: We see nothing that would dissuade us from the President's broader statement.
Q Ari, that means that, indeed, you all believe that Saddam Hussein was trying to obtain uranium from an African nation; is that correct?
MR. FLEISCHER: What the President said in his statement was that according to a British report they were trying to obtain uranium. When I answered the question it was, again, specifically about the Niger piece involving yellow cake.
Q So you believe the British report that he was trying to obtain uranium from an African nation is true?
MR. FLEISCHER: I'm sorry?
Q If you're hanging on the British report, you believe that that British report was true, you have no reason to believe --
MR. FLEISCHER: I'm sorry, I see what David is asking. Let me back up on that and explain the President's statement again, or the answer to it.
The President's statement was based on the predicate of the yellow cake from Niger. The President made a broad statement. So given the fact that the report on the yellow cake did not turn out to be accurate, that is reflective of the President's broader statement, David. So, yes, the President' broader statement was based and predicated on the yellow cake from Niger.
Q So it was wrong?
MR. FLEISCHER: That's what we've acknowledged with the information on --
Q The President's statement at the State of the Union was incorrect?
MR. FLEISCHER: Because it was based on the yellow cake from Niger.
Q Well, wait a minute, but the explanation we've gotten before was it was based on Niger and the other African nations that have been named in the national intelligence --
MR. FLEISCHER: But, again, the information on -- the President did not have that information prior to his giving the State of the Union.
Q Which gets to the crux of what Ambassador Wilson is now alleging -- that he provided this information to the State Department and the CIA 11 months before the State of the Union and he is amazed that it, nonetheless, made it into the State of the Union address. He believes that that information was deliberately ignored by the White House. Your response to that?
MR. FLEISCHER: And that's way, again, he's making the statement that -- he is saying that surely the Vice President must have known, or the White House must have known. And that's not the case, prior to the State of the Union.
Q He's saying that surely people at the decision-making level within the NSC would have known the information which he -- passed on to both the State Department and the CIA.
MR. FLEISCHER: And the information about the yellow cake and Niger was not specifically known prior to the State of the Union by the White House.
Q What does that say about communications?
MR. FLEISCHER: We've acknowledged that the information turned out to be bogus involving the report on the yellow cake. That is not new. You can go back. You can look it up. Dr. Rice has said it repeatedly. I've said it repeatedly. It's been said from this podium on the record, in several instances. It's been said to many of you in this room, specifically.
Q But, Ari, even if you said that the Niger thing was wrong, the next line has usually been that the President's statement was deliberately broader than Niger, it referred to all of Africa. The national intelligence estimate discusses other countries in Africa that there were attempts to purchase yellow cake from, or other sources of uranium --
MR. FLEISCHER: Let me do this, David. On your specific question I'm going to come back and post the specific answer on the broader statement on the speech.
Last one?
All right, no last one. I'll accept that. No briefing today. So we will see you -- I guess we won't see you in Africa.
Q -- will you post something later?
MR. FLEISCHER: I'll just get the word out. If you don't hear from me, just assume that there is nothing new that moves the ball today.
END 9:52 A.M. EDT
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