Thanks for the link; awesome pics. There's something very "Ramses II" about all of those monuments.
(This might not belong in this forum so move it if necessary.)
Some of you might have seen this already but it provides some nice looks inside of North Korea. In addition to the photos, the guy does a good job narrating as well.
Enjoy.
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums...ad.php?t=82755
Thanks for the link; awesome pics. There's something very "Ramses II" about all of those monuments.
Awesome commentary to go along with the pics which is nice. As you said, the architecture is indeed very odd.
i think we should bomb north korea into cookie crumbs
great pics... real pleasure looking through them... well not really ... but you get what i mean.
we should seriously just preemptively nuke the entire penninsula off the planet. who would care?
Umm, yeah. Aside from the minor matter of killing millions of innocent people, I guess nobody would care.![]()
PS - the "entire peninsula" includes our allies, South Korea, which is where a whole of a lot of technology manufacturing is done these days.
LOLOLOLOLOLOL omg LaMarcus Bryant has been doused in korean bukkake in this thread
what a dork
Dr. Yearn Hong Choi, in the Washington Times, explains why the six-party talks represent the only diplomatic approach to dealing with North Korea that holds any prospect for success. He notes that a U.S. attack on North Korea seems out of the question, leaving us with no real leverage except that which we can obtain by working in tandem with China, South Korea, etc. Bilateral talks can be expected to produce only the kind of "agreed cop-out" deal negotiated by Clinton-Carter, which "helped the North Korean dictator sustain his power" without preventing him from developing nukes.
The author wonders, "how could American liberal intellectuals trust North Korea's Kim Jong-il and distrust Mr. Bush?" Apart from this bit of naivety, the piece is worth reading.
Then, Phillip Klein at the American Spectator blog looks at the question of how to deal with North Korea, and the more general matter of "talking with the enemy." As Klein notes, the latter issue shouldn't turn on simple-minded slogans such as James Baker's "I believe in talking to your enemies."
We should, of course, make an effort to find out the real views of our enemies. And if those views indicate the possibility of negotiations that hold a reasonable promise of a beneficial outcome for us, we ordinarily should hold such negotiations. But it's pointless at best, and dangerous at worst, to hold publicized negotiations when we know that the enemy's bottom line is one that we cannot accept. Indeed, while critics of the Bush administration like to remind us that we talked with the "evil empire" Soviet Union, we actually learned though bitter experience to avoid holding major summit-style talks unless there was reason to believe they would succeed in advancing our interests.
How do the Bush administration's practices hold up under this standard? We certainly have access to the views of North Korea, both through our partners in the six-party talks and through our own bilateral contacts within that framework. In effect, we are talking with our enemy. But the key to successful negotiations (if such are possible) appears to lie in changing the dynamic by bringing new pressure to bear on North Korea through key regional players and especially China. Otherwise, negotiations will likely proceed along the same lines as the failed Clinton-Carter talks -- a prime example of negotiations we would have been better off not undertaking.
With respect to Iran and Syria, I assume (as Secretary Rice assures us) that we have access to the views of these two states through, at a minimum, other states in the region with whom we have relations. I assume further that Iran and Syria have certain non-negotiable goals. Iran's is to become a nuclear power so as to establish itself as the pre-eminent regional force and a world power. Syria's is to regain the Golan Heights and to re-assert itself in Lebanon. If these are not their non-negotiable goals, then they have ways to communicate this to us.
In the absence of such communication, we should not negotiate with Iran or Syria unless we find their above-stated objectives acceptable. Otherwise, the negotiations will end either in unfortunate concessions (as the Clinton-Carter negotiations with North Korea did) or in a highly publicized failure. Those who push the administration for negotiations with Syria and Iran -- whether they be James Baker style Republicans or partisan Democrats -- should be required to move beyond slogans and state what, specifically, they think the negotiations will accomplish, and why.
Some suspect that Baker has in mind a deal with Iran in which they get the green light on developing nukes in exchange for helping us exit Iraq. If that deal -- two defeats for the price of one -- makes sense, then by all means we should negotiate. Maybe Jimmy Carter can help Baker iron out the details.
Last edited by Yonivore; 10-13-2006 at 06:15 PM.
I guess I'll wait to ponder how I feel about Lil kim.
We already know why bush can't be trusted.
We are only allies with the south because of the north. We only give a about the south because of the north. And those manufacturing jobs could be sent anywhere else on this entire planet. Nuke the ing penninsula. It's a 10000x better idea than Whottt's infamous "Nuke Mecca" idea, 1) because these guys really do have WMD's, 2) because theres no oil there so it doesn't matter if we destroy the infrastructure, 3) We stop NK from sellin nukes to more terrorists.
You also spread deadly radiation around the globe, killing hundreds of thousands of Chinese in the process. China retaliates by taking Taiwan and nuking Hawaii, Eh, hardly a part of the US anyway, right?
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