Many soldiers say troop surge a bad idea

[PixelPusher]

Apparently, soldiers opinions are more varied than have been represented by Roggio and Hannity.

Many soldiers say troop surge a bad idea

By WILL WEISSERT, Associated Press Writer Thu Dec 28, 12:32 PM ET

BAGHDAD, Iraq - Many of the American soldiers trying to quell sectarian killings in Baghdad don't appear to be looking for reinforcements. They say the temporary surge in troop levels some people are calling for is a bad idea.

President Bush is considering increasing the number of troops in
Iraq and embedding more U.S. advisers in Iraqi units. White House advisers have indicated Bush will announce his new plan for the war before his State of the Union address Jan. 23.

In dozens of interviews with soldiers of the Army's 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment as they patrolled the streets of eastern Baghdad, many said the Iraqi capital is embroiled in civil warfare between majority Shiite Muslims and Sunni Arabs that no number of American troops can stop.

Others insisted current troop levels are sufficient and said any increase in U.S. presence should focus on training Iraqi forces, not combat.

But their more troubling worry was that dispatching a new wave of soldiers would result in more U.S. casualties, and some questioned whether an increasingly muddled American mission in Baghdad is worth putting more lives on the line.

Spc. Don Roberts, who was stationed in Baghdad in 2004, said the situation had gotten worse because of increasing violence between Shiites and Sunnis.

"I don't know what could help at this point," said Roberts, 22, of Paonia, Colo. "What would more guys do? We can't pick sides. It's almost like we have to watch them kill each other, then ask questions."

Based in Fort Lewis, Wash., the battalion is part of the 3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team of the 2nd Infantry Division. Deployed in June, its men were moved to Baghdad from Mosul in late November to relieve another Stryker battalion that had reached the end of its tour.

"Nothing's going to help. It's a religious war, and we're caught in the middle of it," said Sgt. Josh Keim, a native of Canton, Ohio, who is on his second tour in Iraq. "It's hard to be somewhere where there's no mission and we just drive around."

Capt. Matt James, commander of the battalion's Company B, was careful in how he described the unit's impact since arriving in Baghdad.

"The idea in calling us in was to make things better here, but it's very complicated and complex," he said.

But James said more troops in combat would likely not have the desired effect.

"The more guys we have training the Iraqi army the better," he said. "I would like to see a surge there."

During a recent interview, Lt. Gen. Nasier Abadi, deputy chief of staff for the Iraqi army, said that instead of sending more U.S. soldiers, Washington should focus on furnishing his men with better equipment.

"We are hoping 2007 will be the year of supplies," he said.

Some in the 5th Battalion don't think training will ever get the Iraqi forces up to American standards.

"They're never going to be as effective as us," said 1st Lt. Sean McCaffrey, 24, of Shelton, Conn. "They don't have enough training or equipment or expertise."

McCaffrey does support a temporary surge in troop numbers, however, arguing that flooding Baghdad with more soldiers could "crush enemy forces all over the city instead of just pushing them from one area to another."

Pfc. Richard Grieco said it's hard to see how daily missions in Baghdad make a difference.

"If there's a plan to sweep through Baghdad and clear it, (more troops) could make a difference," said the 19-year-old from Slidell, La. "But if we just dump troops in here like we've been doing, it's just going to make for more targets."

Sgt. James Simons, 24, of Tacoma, Wash., said Baghdad is so dangerous that U.S. forces spend much of their time in combat instead of training Iraqis.

"Baghdad is still like it was at the start of the war. We still have to knock out insurgents because things are too dangerous for us to train the Iraqis," he said.

Staff Sgt. Anthony Handly disagreed, saying Baghdad has made improvements many Americans aren't aware of.

"People think everything is so bad and so violent, but it's really not," said Handly, 30, of Bellingham, Wash. "A lot of people are getting jobs they didn't have before and they're doing it on their own. We just provide a stabilizing effect."

Staff Sgt. Lee Knapp, 28, of Mobile, Ala., also supported a temporary troop surge, saying it could keep morale up by reducing the need to extend units past the Army's standard tour of one year in Iraq.

"It could help alleviate some stress on the smaller units," he said. "It could help Baghdad, but things are already getting better."

Sgt. Justin Thompson, a San Antonio native, said he signed up for delayed enlistment before the Sept. 11 terror attacks, then was forced to go to a war he didn't agree with.

A troop surge is "not going to stop the hatred between Shia and Sunni," said Thompson, who is especially bitter because his 4-year contract was involuntarily extended in June. "This is a civil war, and we're just making things worse. We're losing. I'm not afraid to say it."

[boutons_]

The Right Type of 'Surge'

Any Troop Increase Must Be Large and Lasting

By Jack Keane and Frederick W. Kagan
Wednesday, December 27, 2006; A19

Reports on the Bush administration's efforts to craft a new strategy in Iraq often use the term "surge" but rarely define it. Estimates of the number of troops to be added in Baghdad range from fewer than 10,000 to more than 30,000. Some "surges" would last a few months, others a few years.

We need to cut through the confusion. Bringing security to Baghdad -- the essential precondition for political compromise, national reconciliation and economic development -- is possible only with a surge of at least 30,000 combat troops lasting 18 months or so. Any other option is likely to fail.

The key to the success is to change the military mission -- instead of preparing for transition to Iraqi control, that mission should be to bring security to the Iraqi population. Surges aimed at accelerating the training of Iraqi forces will fail, because rising sectarian violence will destroy Iraq before the new forces can bring it under control.

Any military strategy must of course be accompanied by a range of diplomatic, political, economic and reconciliation initiatives, but those alone will not contain the violence either. Success in Iraq today requires a well-thought-out military operation aimed at bringing security to the people of Baghdad as quickly as possible -- a traditional counterinsurgency mission.

Of all the "surge" options out there, short ones are the most dangerous. Increasing troop levels in Baghdad for three or six months would virtually ensure defeat. It takes that long for newly arrived soldiers to begin to understand the areas where they operate. Short surges would redeploy them just as they began to be effective.

In addition, a short surge would play into the enemy's hands. Both Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias expect the U.S. presence to fade away over the course of 2007, and they expect any surge to be brief. They will naturally go to ground in the face of a short surge and wait until we have left. They will then attack the civilian population and whatever Iraqi security forces remain, knowing them to be easier targets than U.S. soldiers and Marines. They will work hard to raise the level of sectarian violence in order to prove that our efforts have failed.

We have seen this pattern so many times before that we can be virtually certain the enemy will follow it in the face of a short surge. The only cure is to maintain our presence long enough either to root out the hiding enemy or to defeat him when he becomes impatient. A surge that lasted at least 18 months would achieve that aim. It would also provide time to bring Iraqi forces up to the level needed to fight whatever enemy remains.

The size of the surge matters as much as the length. Baghdad is a large city. Any sound military plan will break the problem of bringing security to the Iraqi capital into manageable parts. But there remains a minimum level of force necessary to make adequate progress in a reasonable time.

U.S. forces working with Iraqi troops can clear neighborhoods fairly quickly. Unfortunately, past endeavors such as Operation Together Forward relied too much on that ability. We sent forces into the city that were large enough to clear a few neighborhoods at a time but not large enough to maintain the security they had established. Any plan for bringing security to Baghdad must include forces for the "hold" phase as well as the "clear" phase.

Clearing and holding the Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shiite neighborhoods in the center of Baghdad, which are the keys to getting the overall levels of violence down, will require around nine American combat brigades (27 battalions, in partnership with Iraqi forces, divided among some 23 districts). Since there are about five brigades in Baghdad now, achieving this level would require a surge of at least four additional combat brigades -- some 20,000 combat troops. Moreover, it would be foolhardy to send precisely as many troops as we think we need. Sound planning requires a reserve of at least one brigade (5,000 soldiers) to respond to unexpected developments. The insurgents have bases beyond Baghdad, especially in Anbar province. Securing Baghdad requires addressing these bases -- a task that would necessitate at least two more Marine regiments (around 7,000 Marines). It is difficult to imagine a responsible plan for getting the violence in and around Baghdad under control that could succeed with fewer than 30,000 combat troops beyond the forces already in Iraq.

It is tempting to imagine that greater use of Iraqi forces could reduce the number of U.S. troops needed for this operation. The temptation must be resisted. We should of course work with the Iraqi government to get as many trained and reliable Iraqi troops as possible into Baghdad, and we should pair our soldiers and Marines with Iraqis as much as we can. But reducing the violence in the Sunni and mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad is the most critical military task the U.S. armed forces face anywhere in the world. We cannot allow that mission to fail simply because some Iraqi units don't show up, aren't at full strength or are less reliable than we had hoped.

The United States faces a dire situation in Iraq because of a history of half-measures. We have always sent "just enough" force to succeed if everything went according to plan. So far nothing has, and there's no reason to believe that it will. Sound military planning doesn't work this way. The only "surge" option that makes sense is both long and large.

Jack Keane is a retired Army general. Frederick W. Kagan is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Ins ute.

From NYT Op-Ed

[boutons_]

December 28, 2006

Sectarian Ties Weaken Duty’s Call for Iraq Forces

By MARC SANTORA, NYT

BAGHDAD, Dec. 27 — The car parked outside was almost certainly a tool of the Sunni insurgency. It was pocked with bullet holes and bore fake license plates. The trunk had cases of unused sniper bullets and a notice to a Shiite family telling them to abandon their home.

“Otherwise, your rotten heads will be cut off,” the note read.

The soldiers who came upon the car in a Sunni neighborhood in Baghdad were part of a joint American and Iraqi patrol, and the Americans were ready to take action. The Iraqi commander, however, taking orders by cellphone from the office of a top Sunni politician, said to back off: the car’s owner was known and protected at a high level.

For Maj. William Voorhies, the American commander of the military training unit at the scene, the moment encapsulated his increasingly frustrating task — trying to build up Iraqi security forces who themselves are being used as proxies in a spreading sectarian war. This time, it was a Sunni politician — Vice Prime Minister Salam al-Zubaie — but the more powerful Shiites interfered even more often.

“I have come to the conclusion that this is no longer America’s war in Iraq, but the Iraqi civil war where America is fighting,” Major Voorhies said.

A two-day reporting trip accompanying Major Voorhies’s unit and combat troops seemed to back his statement, as did other commanding officers expressing similar frustration.

“I have personally witnessed about a half-dozen of these incidents of what I would call political pressure, where a minister or someone from a minister’s office contacts one of these Iraqi commanders,” said Lt. Col. Steven Miska, the deputy commander for the Dagger Brigade Combat Team, First Infantry Division, who oversees combat operations in a wide swath of western Baghdad.

“These politicians are connected with either the militias or Sunni insurgents.”

Whatever plan the Bush administration unveils — a large force increase, a withdrawal or something in between — this country’s security is going to be left in the hands of Iraqi forces. Those forces, already struggling with corruption and infiltration, have shown little willingness to stand up to political pressure, especially when the Americans are not there to support them. That suggests, the commanders say, that if the Americans leave soon, violence will redouble. And that makes their mission, Major Voorhies and Colonel Miska say, more important than ever.

They added that while political pressure on the Iraqi Army is great, the influence exerted on the police force, which is much more heavily infiltrated by Shiite militia groups, is even greater.

Shiites, led by militia forces and often aided by the local police, are clearly ascendant, Colonel Miska said.

“It seems very controlled and deliberate and concentrated on expanding the area they control,” he said.

The Sunni forces are being bolstered by support from insurgent strongholds in the West. The Shiite militias are using neighborhoods in the north, specifically Shuala and Sadr City, as bases of operation. There is also increasing evidence that militia members from southern cities like Basra are coming to Baghdad to join the fight.

“I believe everyone, to some extent, is influenced by the militias,” Colonel Miska said. “While some Iraqi security forces may be complicit with the militias, others fear for their families when confronting the militia, and that is the more pervasive threat.”

Looking at a map he had his intelligence officers create, which highlights current battle zones and details the changing religious makeup of neighborhoods, Colonel Miska noted just how many different forces, each answering to different bosses, currently occupied the battlefield.

“Who would design this mess?” he said. “It is like an orchestra where everyone is playing a different song.”

His main focus, he said, is trying to establish some kind of unity of command.

As it stands, the police and military answer to different ministries, and within the police force the bureaucracy is divided even further between the regular police and the national police. On top of that are about 145,000 armed men who work as protection detail for the Facilities Protection Services, with minimal oversight, according to United States military officials.

There are also thousands of Shiite militia members and Sunni insurgents posing as security forces.

Colonel Miska tried to define where American forces fit in the tangle of competing interests, which is only further complicated by the complicity and direct participation of top government officials.

“When they are conducting armed aggression against the population, that is where we try and step in and stop it,” he said, adding that when the groups fight one another, “We sit back and watch because that can only benefit us.”

Some days, the line between militia and insurgent clashes and attacks on the population is a blurry one.

Nowhere can the current battle be seen more starkly than on the border between the Shiite district of Shuala and the Sunni controlled Ghazaliya.

Major Voorhies briefed his men before dawn last Thursday morning about the day’s mission, code-named Operation Thunderball. They were to join with Lt. Col. Sabah Kadam Fadily and his command unit and direct a joint search of houses in Ghazaliya. There were 300 American troops and 200 Iraqis involved in the operation.

The sun was just rising as the team set out, and daylight revealed an apocalyptic landscape, trash everywhere, open sewers emitting a revolting smell and scores of buildings damaged in recent clashes. A mosque on the side of the road had a massive hole blown in its once ornate blue dome.

Major Voorhies got a call on his radio. The Iraqi soldiers had spotted a body.

It was a man, dead, tossed on the side of the road, piled with the garbage. His hands were bound behind his back and his shoes were off. His head was turned to the right, revealing a single bullet hole covered in blood that still appeared wet.

As the Iraqi soldiers called the police, who pick up dozens of similarly abused bodies around the city daily, an American soldier spotted a pair of legs. Major Voorhies walked over and, with a stick, flipped a piece of plastic foam off the body.

It was another man, his neck slit, his head almost completely severed. He was lying on his back, eyes open looking vacantly to nowhere, arms bound behind him and torn from their sockets.

Major Voorhies asked Colonel Sabah if he could tell if the man was Shiite or Sunni, but the answer was obvious to the colonel.

“He is Shiite,” Colonel Sabah said absently.

“How do you know?” asked the American major.

“Because this is the Sunni sector,” Colonel Sabah said.

There would be little investigation and no chance that anyone would ever be arrested for the murders, Major Voorhies said. In fact, he said, Colonel Sabah’s assessment might not even be right since the Sunnis and the Mahdi militia, called JAM for Jaish al-Mahdi by American troops, had been fighting for control of this forlorn ground.

“This is either a warning from the Sunni here” to the Shiites to get out, he said. “Or a message sent by JAM that we are winning.”

For the American soldiers, it was just another morning in Baghdad, where Americans are trying to protect people on both sides while being attacked by people on both sides, trying not to take a side themselves.

Major Voorhies thought about what he had just seen and the cycle of killing it would inspire.

“I don’t know what the answer is,” he said, almost to himself.

But he said he would push forward with his mission regardless.

Last week, a search of a house led to the discovery of 23 men being held captive, likely to be killed. He could take pride in helping save their lives, even if some of them might be shooting at him tomorrow.

Colonel Sabah, in glaring contrast to his efficient and focused American partners, did not seem to display a sense of urgency. He paid a visit to a house that belonged to a former Army colleague, a general, who had to flee the area. There he drank tea.

Then he went to see another past colleague, an admiral, and drank more tea. The two discussed what fun they had getting drunk and going to brothels.

Major Voorhies struggled to keep his patience.

“Sometimes I feel like I work for the Iraqi government,” he said.

Outside, neighbors gathered, telling strikingly similar accounts of having their lives threatened by Shiite militiamen, who forced them from their homes. They were angry about the searches.

“Anyone leaving Ghazaliya will get killed because they know you are Sunni,” said Fadhel A. Zaidan, who had lived in nearby Huriya for 50 years. “Now the Americans are taking our weapons, and when they leave, the Mahdi militia will attack.”

American commanders say they are aware of this danger. In part, that is why residents are allowed one AK-47 and two cartridges.

Among Sunnis, there is absolutely no faith in the ability, or desire, of the Iraqi Army or police to provide protection. Colonel Sabah, who is Shiite but who had to leave his own home because of threats by the militia, is viewed as a collaborator.

Major Voorhies acknowledged that it was easier to persuade Colonel Sabah to search Sunni neighborhoods. Still, he said the colonel was one of Iraq’s better army officers.

“When we have his back, he will fight anyone,” said Major Voorhies. “When we don’t, he will cut deals.”

American soldiers seemed to appreciate the difficult position of officers like Colonel Sabah. His brother was murdered on Sept. 12, and just working in the Iraqi Army puts his life in danger.

Facing such stark challenges already, it makes the actions of Iraqi political leaders who try to manipulate the security forces that much more galling, Major Voorhies said.

“Colonel Sabah gets in a very political predicament sometimes,” Major Voorhies said. “He will detain someone and then gets a call and is told not to take them away, so he has no choice.”

===================

The Repugs have lost Iraq. dubya and head fiddle with their surge bull , but it won't make any difference. The Repugs will be tatooed for decades as the Presidency/Pary that lied itself into an unnecessary war and then lost it, and wasted 10s of 1000s of US lives and body parts.

[01Snake]

I thought we were strectched to thin over there? Now "many" say the troop levels are more than sufficient right now?

[AFBlue]

When the article starts out "Many soldiers" it loses all credibility. Obviously the journalists went around to random soldiers and got their opinions. Those opinions represented the few soldiers they interviewed, not the thoughts or opinions of the entire batallion, division, or all ground forces in Iraq.

The personnel interviewed are simply stating and advocating what Combatant Commanders and the Joint Chiefs are saying...if there is to be an increase in troop levels, they want to make sure each of those units has a specific mission.

And to Boutons, it's clear your purpose on this forum is to contradict any and all positions taken by Bush and this administration. What is rediculous is that you're condemning Bush for a decision that he has not made or may NEVER decide is the right course of action. You'd be much more effective if you had your own opinion on the matter, rather than "whatever that Bush guy is for, I'm against".

Bush is evaluating his options and for the first time in a long time, is considering legitimate change in his policy. I consider it a step in the right direction. And my personal view on troop surge. Whether it be 3,000 or 30,000 for 18 months or 18 years, we must not leave Iraq until they have a self-sustaining government with the ability to defend it's borders. If we leave prematurely it could have a calamatous long-term effect.

[01Snake]

When the article starts out "Many soldiers" it loses all credibility. Obviously the journalists went around to random soldiers and got their opinions. Those opinions represented the few soldiers they interviewed, not the thoughts or opinions of the entire batallion, division, or all ground forces in Iraq.

The personnel interviewed are simply stating and advocating what Combatant Commanders and the Joint Chiefs are saying...if there is to be an increase in troop levels, they want to make sure each of those units has a specific mission.

And to Boutons, it's clear your purpose on this forum is to contradict any and all positions taken by Bush and this administration. What is rediculous is that you're condemning Bush for a decision that he has not made or may NEVER decide is the right course of action. You'd be much more effective if you had your own opinion on the matter, rather than "whatever that Bush guy is for, I'm against".

Bush is evaluating his options and for the first time in a long time, is considering legitimate change in his policy. I consider it a step in the right direction. And my personal view on troop surge. Whether it be 3,000 or 30,000 for 18 months or 18 years, we must not leave Iraq until they have a self-sustaining government with the ability to defend it's borders. If we leave prematurely it could have a calamatous long-term effect.

[johnsmith]

When the article starts out "Many soldiers" it loses all credibility. Obviously the journalists went around to random soldiers and got their opinions. Those opinions represented the few soldiers they interviewed, not the thoughts or opinions of the entire batallion, division, or all ground forces in Iraq.

The personnel interviewed are simply stating and advocating what Combatant Commanders and the Joint Chiefs are saying...if there is to be an increase in troop levels, they want to make sure each of those units has a specific mission.

And to Boutons, it's clear your purpose on this forum is to contradict any and all positions taken by Bush and this administration. What is rediculous is that you're condemning Bush for a decision that he has not made or may NEVER decide is the right course of action. You'd be much more effective if you had your own opinion on the matter, rather than "whatever that Bush guy is for, I'm against".

Bush is evaluating his options and for the first time in a long time, is considering legitimate change in his policy. I consider it a step in the right direction. And my personal view on troop surge. Whether it be 3,000 or 30,000 for 18 months or 18 years, we must not leave Iraq until they have a self-sustaining government with the ability to defend it's borders. If we leave prematurely it could have a calamatous long-term effect.

Well, you just went on Boutons ignore list.

[boutons_]

"to contradict any and all positions taken by Bush and this administration."

... because those positions, esp letting himself get hustled/manipulated/string-pulled by puppet-meister head and the neo-cons into lying his way into Iraq, are ALL wrong. The Repugs/neo-cons knew they couldn't get head elected president, so they got a dumb , manipulable "Bush brand" puppet elected.

"decision he has not made"

All the buzz in DC and from WH, including noises from dubya, say that increasing troop levels is what dubya is leaning towards. Anybody can see the PR value. He needs to show something big and obvious to the simplistic rabble and sheeple, like "bigger numbers are always better", rather than something subtle like changing tactics, mission statements, diplomacy, etc, etc. So we're talking about increasing troop levels. what's your problem with that?

"whatever that Bush guy is for, I'm against".

but you give dubya suckers, aka "whatever that Bush guy is for, I'm for", a pass.

Everything that dubya and his Admin has done in office, with tiny exceptions, has been wrong, bad, counter-productive, corrupt, incompetent, destructive. The crowning, defining, overwhelming, dominating ups numbers 1 to 10 are the phony Iraq war.

"until they have a self-sustaining government with the ability to defend it's borders."

The "sectarian ties" article above is one of 100s of aspects over the past 3 years that show that the Iraqi govt is weak, bogus, still-born, corrupt, compromised and will NEVER be anything near the neo-con wet dream wanted it to be. It was never a "state". "There is no there there"

The Iraqi govt, ed as it is, will never stand up so dubya can stand down.

The calamity in Iraq is already in progress, the US military has totally failed to stop it. dubya's new plan admits all he has done for 3+ years in Iraq has failed. 3000+ US military killed, 10s of 1000s of US bodies and minds maimed, and dubya has absolutely NOTHING TO SHOW FOR IT

yes, it will be much worse after the US leaves, sooner or later, and whatever Iraq will be, it will be much worse for Iraqis, Israel, the M/E, the terror war, and the world than the stasis we had with Saddam in power.

dubya's bull war has dumped us from the frying pan into the fire. Better the Saddam devil we knew, and controlled, than the Islamist/terrorist devil we can expect next in that piece of land formerly, artificially known as "Iraq", and won't be able to control.

[judaspriestess]

"to contradict any and all positions taken by Bush and this administration."

... because those positions, esp letting himself get hustled/manipulated/string-pulled by puppet-meister head and the neo-cons into lying his way into Iraq, are ALL wrong. The Repugs/neo-cons knew they couldn't get head elected president, so they got a dumb , manipulable "Bush brand" puppet elected.

"decision he has not made"

All the buzz in DC and from WH, including noises from dubya, say that increasing troop levels is what dubya is leaning towards. Anybody can see the PR value. He needs to show something big and obvious to the simplistic rabble and sheeple, like "bigger numbers are always better", rather than something subtle like changing tactics, mission statements, diplomacy, etc, etc. So we're talking about increasing troop levels. what's your problem with that?

"whatever that Bush guy is for, I'm against".

but you give dubya suckers, aka "whatever that Bush guy is for, I'm for", a pass.

Everything that dubya and his Admin has done in office, with tiny exceptions, has been wrong, bad, counter-productive, corrupt, incompetent, destructive. The crowning, defining, overwhelming, dominating ups numbers 1 to 10 are the phony Iraq war.

"until they have a self-sustaining government with the ability to defend it's borders."

The "sectarian ties" article above is one of 100s of aspects over the past 3 years that show that the Iraqi govt is weak, bogus, still-born, corrupt, compromised and will NEVER be anything near the neo-con wet dream wanted it to be. It was never a "state". "There is no there there"

The Iraqi govt, ed as it is, will never stand up so dubya can stand down.

The calamity in Iraq is already in progress, the US military has totally failed to stop it. dubya's new plan admits all he has done for 3+ years in Iraq has failed. 3000+ US military killed, 10s of 1000s of US bodies and minds maimed, and dubya has absolutely NOTHING TO SHOW FOR IT

yes, it will be much worse after the US leaves, sooner or later, and whatever Iraq will be, it will be much worse for Iraqis, Israel, the M/E, the terror war, and the world than the stasis we had with Saddam in power.

dubya's bull war has dumped us from the frying pan into the fire. Better the Saddam devil we knew, and controlled, than the Islamist/terrorist devil we can expect next in that piece of land formerly, artificially known as "Iraq", and won't be able to control.

[AFBlue]

"whatever that Bush guy is for, I'm against".

but you give dubya suckers, aka "whatever that Bush guy is for, I'm for", a pass.

Though I generally disagree with your point of view, this statement stood out the most...because it's flat-out wrong and falsly assuming.

I don't give anyone a pass because of their affililation with a particular person or party. To me, towing the party line simply because it's the party line is lazy and counterproductive. I am a fan of "thinkers" and "oraters", and you have yet to convince me that you fall into either category.

[johnsmith]

Though I generally disagree with your point of view, this statement stood out the most...because it's flat-out wrong and falsly assuming.

I don't give anyone a pass because of their affililation with a particular person or party. To me, towing the party line simply because it's the party line is lazy and counterproductive. I am a fan of "thinkers" and "oraters", and you have yet to convince me that you fall into either category.