Massacre or Victory in Najaf?

[Nbadan]

31 January 2007 01:45
US 'victory' against cult leader was 'massacre'
By Patrick burn in Baghdad
Published: 31 January 2007

There are growing su ions in Iraq that the official story of the battle outside Najaf between a messianic Iraqi cult and the Iraqi security forces supported by the US, in which 263 people were killed and 210 wounded, is a fabrication. The heavy casualties may be evidence of an unpremeditated massacre.

A picture is beginning to emerge of a clash between an Iraqi Shia tribe on a pilgrimage to Najaf and an Iraqi army checkpoint that led the US to intervene with devastating effect. The involvement of Ahmed al-Hassani (also known as Abu Kamar), who believed himself to be the coming Mahdi, or Messiah, appears to have been accidental.

The story emerging on independent Iraqi websites and in Arabic newspapers is entirely different from the government's account of the battle with the so-called "Soldiers of Heaven", planning a raid on Najaf to kill Shia religious leaders.

The cult denied it was involved in the fighting, saying it was a peaceful movement. The incident reportedly began when a procession of 200 pilgrims was on its way, on foot, to celebrate Ashura in Najaf. They came from the Hawatim tribe, which lives between Najaf and Diwaniyah to the south, and arrived in the Zarga area, one mile from Najaf at about 6am on Sunday. Heading the procession was the chief of the tribe, Hajj Sa'ad Sa'ad Nayif al-Hatemi, and his wife driving in their 1982 Super Toyota sedan because they could not walk. When they reached an Iraqi army checkpoint it opened fire, killing Mr Hatemi, his wife and his driver, Jabar Ridha al-Hatemi. The tribe, fully armed because they were travelling at night, then assaulted the checkpoint to avenge their fallen chief.

Members of another tribe called Khaza'il living in Zarga tried to stop the fighting but they themselves came under fire. Meanwhile, the soldiers and police at the checkpoint called up their commanders saying they were under attack from al-Qai'da with advanced weapons. Reinforcements poured into the area and surrounded the Hawatim tribe in the nearby orchards. The tribesmen tried - in vain - to get their attackers to cease fire.

Independent

Statfor calls the official story BS too. They provide another scenario:

Not only is this perhaps the most bizarre incident in almost four years of incessant violence that has ravaged the country, the government's version of what allegedly transpired raises more questions than provides answers.

* How could a cult evolve into such a major threat without getting noticed?

* If this was an obscure cult, why were government forces unable to deal with it on their own?

* From where did the group acquire such a large cache of weaponry?

* Given the deep sectarian differences, how can extremist Shia and jihadists both be part of the group?

* Why would a Shiite religious group risk alienation by engaging in the murder of the clerical hierarchy, especially during the holy month of Muharram?


These and other such questions indicate the government is withholding a lot of information. However, Stratfor has received some information that provides insight into the cir stances leading up to the battle.

We are told the al-Hawatim tribe wanted to organize its own Karbala procession during Ashurah but that a rival group with considerable influence prevented it from doing so. A number of tribesmen were killed at a checkpoint operated by this influential group, including a senior tribal sheikh. The tribe then launched a retaliatory attack that led to the battle. The fact that a large number of those arrested are women and children lends some credence to the report that the fighting was related to Ashurah ceremonies.

Stratfor

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Another view:

The motivation and prime actors behind the fighting in Najaf remains uncertain one day after the battle ended. As U.S. and Iraq intelligence attempts to sort out the details, media reports indicate a mix of Shi'ite and Sunni fighters were involved in the battle against Iraqi forces, which resulted in upwards of 300 enemy killed in 24 hours of combat.

As we noted earlier this morning, it appears both a Shi'ite 'end-times cult' and al_Qaeda in Iraq's Omar Brigade are likely the prime actors battling against the Iraqi Army and police. An anonymous U.S. intelligence source informs us that the preliminary information indicates this does appear to be the case. He warns this is based on the best available information at this time, however this is still speculative as the situation remains fluid and U.S. and Iraqi intelligence services are still working to piece together the puzzle of the bizarre engagement in Najaf.

According to the intelligence source, the history of the organization behind the fighting in Najaf is sketchy, however what is clear is this was "an anti-Shi'ite establishment cult," which opposed both the Qom and Najaf schools of Shi'ite Islam as both schools did not recognize Ahmed Hassani al-Yemeni (or Diyah Abdul Zahraa Khadom), the cult's leader, as the Mahdi. Hassani's group received Saddam Hussein's support as it opposed both the leaders of the Iraqi Najaf school, as well as the Iranian Qom school. The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) infiltrated the group during Saddam's rule to maintain tabs on the organization's activities.


Tahir Jalil Habbush al-Tikriti.

After the fall of Saddam's regime, the remnants of the IIS maintained its connections with the organization. Tahir Jalil Habbush al-Tikriti, the chief of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, two of the few Baathists leaders on the original 'Deck of Cards' remained free, and exercised control of the intelligence network.

As al-Qaeda in Iraq began to absorb the Baathist elements of the Sunni insurgency, it inherited the Baathist intelligence network. Al-Douri swore bayat (an oath of unconditional allegiance) to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2004, placing a large segment of the Baathist insurgency under the command of al-Qaeda in Iraq.


Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri.

Zarqawi let the network lie fallow, as his hatred of the Shia prevented him from utilizing the Shia group. While Zarqawi did utilize individual Shi'ite mercenaries to conduct operations, his contempt prevented him from activating entire Shi'ite groups.

With the rise of Abu Ayyub al-Masri, the operational possibilities were expanded. Al-Masri is by far a more shrewed operational and political leader. The intelligence network picked up on the cult's desire to initiate its "end-times" beliefs by rising up and assassinating the Shia clerics during the festival of Ashura. Seeing an opening to foment chaos, al-Masri moved in elements of the Omar Brigade, the al-Qaeda unit tasked with attacking Shi'ites. The Omar Brigade was to take advantage of the Shia-on-Shia fighting in the Najaf region. "Officials in Najaf said Saddam loyalists bought the groves six months ago," FOX News reported earlier today.

The Shia cult formed the previously unheard of Jaish al-Janna, or the Army of Heaven (also described as Jund al-Samaa, or Soldiers of Heaven in news reports), armed its followers, and prepared fighting positions northeast of Najaf. Women and children were put on the battle lines.

News reports indicate a significant involvement of foreign fighters, as "30 of the dead were Afghans and Saudis and that of the 13 arrested, one was from Sudan." Our intelligence source warns us that the Shia cult did have an international following, however the belief is some of the foreign fighters were indeed members of al-Qaeda's Omar Brigade.

Iraqi officials in Najaf are convinced al-Qaeda had a hand in the fighting. "I have come to the total conviction from what I have seen with my own eyes on the ground that Al Qaeda is behind this group," said Abdel Hussein Attan, the Deputy Governor of Najaf. "Based on the confessions of interrogated militants and other information, this well-structured group intended to attack Shia clerics and take control of Najaf and its holy sites."

The fog of war is still thick in Najaf, and time will tell if this narrative proves accurate.

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