1). None of the Spurs' role players showed up consistently in that series. In fact, Dennis Rodman, Robinson’s notorious front court mate, went completely crazy [moreso than usual] in the middle of the series. If he had simply imploded and quit on his team, it may have been surmountable. But no, he went bat- crazy and sabotaged the Spurs’ chances for winning the series all-together by being largely responsible for putting them in an 0-2 hole to start the series, AT HOME, no less!! The majority of those that use this series as an argument to knock Robinson’s legacy NEVER mention this fact. Apparently, no one outside of San Antonio even remembers this subterfuge – as if Rodman’s 0 for 5 from downtown in Games 1 and 2 wasn’t sufficient a clue. Upon closer inspection [I’ve watched that series more than I care to admit] Rodman’s sabotage is more cunning. Nonchalantly closing out on three point shooters [which, when motivated, Rodman was one of the best – as was the case against the Lakers’ bombers the series before], doubling the wrong man, fouling at a higher clip than usual, ‘inadvertently’ setting picks against his OWN players, etc… When San Antonio media questioned his antics after Game 1, he cunningly pointed to his free-throw shooting as a counter-argument to the suggestion that he “was playing for the other guys”. In other words, Rodman only cared about his rebounds [as usual, for personal reasons only – not because he cared about winning the actual games], and pretended to care by ensuring his free-throws were ‘well taken’. That is some downright Machiavellian scheming right there – and most would probably never believe that Rodman was capable of such maneuvering. But I saw it, Rudy T. saw it, Bob Hill failed to react to the obvious, and the Rockets took advantage – all at David Robinson’s expense. Lo and behold, ESPN neglected the story.
2). Robinson was constantly double-teamed by Horry and Olajuwon, or by Olajuwon and Charles Jones (whose sole purpose in that series was to hack away at Robinson – in just 88 minutes played over 6 games, Jones averaged a whopping 7.7 fouls per 36 min (for a total of 19 fouls)!!, 84% of which were committed against Robinson]. The Spurs couldn't counter because it left one of Robert Horry, Sam Cassell, Kenny Smith, Clyde Drexler or Mario Elie WIDE OPEN for threes. Game 1, Game 3 and the clincher in Game 6 were decided by critically clutch shots made by these bombers. Most people solely credit Olajuwon for the series victory, due to his other-worldly stats, but utterly fail to mention that 3 games were decided by his shooters!
a). For the series, the Rockets were 44 of 127 from downtown (for a respectable, but not great, 34.6%). Breaking it down further however, they were 13/29 in the 4th quarters (44.8%), and 9/17 in the "clutch" (52.9%) [5 minutes or less in a close game]. For being considered a “weak” team, that type of support will get it done every time. All the Greats have had the benefit of clutch shooting from their respective supporting casts on their way to rings. Robinson’s supporting casts NEVER gave him that sort of help. Olajowon’s did. It’s as simple as that.
b). The Spurs, by contrast were 23 of 72 from downtown for the series (31.9%). 8/27 in 4th quarters (29.6%), and 4/13 in the the "clutch" (30.8%). In other words, the opposite trend.
c). Last year, Amar'e scorched a Duncan-led Spurs team to the tune of 37 ppg (vs. Hakeem's 35.3 ppg in that ill-fated '95 series) [normalized, the difference is more prominent; Amar'e scored 0.89 points per minute vs. Hakeem's 0.81 points per minute]. The Spurs prevailed, largely in part to the Spurs' balanced attack (Spurs' "Big Three" of Duncan, Parker and Ginobili all averaged above 20 ppg for the series) and this squad could actually contribute from beyond 3-point territory (44/107 for 41.1%). Contrary to popular belief, not all of Amar'e's scoring came off of Nash's pick'n'roll sets. He excelled in the open court on transition baskets, 23% of his scoring came by way of the charity stripe, and another 18% of his baskets came off of isolation plays against Duncan or Nazr Mohammed. In other words, he was a prolific, all-around, scoring machine (by Spurs' defensive design, of course). That said, no one in their mind would claim that Amar'e is a better player than Duncan, but had the Suns won the series those stats could certainly be touted against Duncan to make the case. The point being, that CONTEXT is everything. And unfortunately for Robinson, the media and the casual fan have taken a lackadaisical approach by using the ‘95 series, and specifically ONE particular play that is played ad nauseam as the de facto series’ abridged summary [credit to Olajuwon] to tarnish Robinson’s place among the best. It certainly didn’t help that Robinson’s well-deserved MVP award was used as the ‘driver’ to hype up the drama between the two all-star centers, to help build up TV ratings for a series that largely failed to captivate the casual fan once the Spurs ousted the Lakers in the Conference Semifinals. Olajuwon further emphasized said ‘motivation’ only after his ticket to the Finals was secured, an expressed sentiment that unfortunately threw more dirt Robinson’s way. Olajuwon then made sure that the collective memory of that series would degrade Robinson's legacy forever and embellished the series outcome after the summer of 1996, when Robinson outplayed both him and Shaq for the starting gig on the Atlanta 1996 Dream Team II squad. In other words, Olajuwon is a -bag as a compe or. Never once did Robinson speak negatively about his contemporaries (Ewing, Shaq, Olajuwon, Mourning, etc...), never once did he fabricate personal vendettas to hype up their head-to-head match ups [which Robinson holds over every one of those centers]. It's the 'good guy' persona that the media just absolutely hates. The media clamors for upstanding athletes, and role models but only because they make excellent news after they fall from grace or screw-up. David never did, so the only way they can knock him is by undermining his legacy.